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SUMMARY
This dissertation is a study of the role in the political and 
social transformation of Cuba of two of the most distinctive 
institutional products of the Castroist regime*s pursuit of mass- 
’’participation’' in the construction of socialism: the Committees for 
the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) and the Popular Courts 
(Tribunales Fopulares). Based upon field-work conducted during the 
author’s fifteen month stay in Cuba in 1968-69, the dissertation 
documents the genesis9 development and day-to-day functioning of 
these formations up to mid-1973, employing for this purpose the 
findings of an intensive investigation of organisational life in a 
selected working class neighbourhood of Havana, as well as printed 
sources. The role of the institutional framework.of the revolutionary 
regime in fostering or inhibiting significant social change is further 
probed in an analysis of the problems of change corresponding to the 
trilogy sex, religion and colour.
Whilst three phases are distinguished in the evolution of the 
CDRs since I960, it is found that this organisation has always 
functioned more effectively as an agency of political ’integration* 
than as a counter-weight to bureaucratic forms of rule. Both positive 
and negative features are ascribed to the Popular Courtrexperiment, 
which is expected to have a permanent influence on the development 
of the judicial system following the letter’s impending “unification". 
Adopting an interpretation of the legacy of the pre-revolutionary 
society which conflicts at certain points with previous treatments, 
the analysis of contemporary social trends concludes that progress in 
this area since 1959 has been uneven. This is attributed to overall 
deficiencies in the institutional framework of the regime, especially 
to the absence of organisations of the soviet type and to the continued 
weakness of the Cuban Communist Party.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
He are not masters of history but the pupils 
of history. We learn from the revolutionary 
process; and the revolutionary process 
itself9 with its infinite variety of new 
experiences, with its infinite number of 
possibilities, must always be the great teacher 
of all people, the great teacher of all 
revolutionaries. The best book, our true text­
book in matters of revolution, will always be 
the revolutionary process itself.
- Fidel Castro, 1967,
The eradication of bureaucratic and authoritarian modes of 
political, economic and social organisation is a task which 
presents itself in today * s socialist world without regard to 
national or doctrinal frontiers. The institutionalisation of a 
system permitting to the mass of the working class a permanent 
and controlling voice in decision-making at all levels of state 
and society remains a precondition of advance towards socialism 
in every one of those countries which have up to the present taken 
their first hesitant steps along this road. This statement is 
intended not merely as a conceptual proposition or as one which 
is true by definition. It is often repeated that the classless 
society is inconceivable without both economic abundance and the 
fullest democracy. Less often is it admitted that the practical 
interconnectedness of the goals which socialism represents may 
well be such that even the short-term aims of today*s Communist 
regimes - the provision of a measure of social justice and the 
attainment of acceptable levels of economic efficiency - are 
unrealisable without a radical reform of their political systems. 
It is the belief that this is generally the case which motivates 
and underpins the present study.
Whilst the task of democratisation is an ubiquitous one, 
however, the form in which it presents itself is obviously subject 
to considerable variation from country to country, depending upon 
a multitude of historical and structural factors. For a combin­
ation of two reasons, the manner in•which, the problem is posed in 
the case of Cuba is peculiar and indeed with few parallels in the 
experience to date of any other post-capitalist state. Firstly, 
the problem of organisation in Cuba cannot be regarded in any 
rigorous sense as the product of the *degeneration1 of a regime 
founded at the outset upon a broadly-based workers1 democracy and 
falling prey little by little to authoritarian or bureaucratic 
practices. On the contrary, the source of the problem is in a 
straightforward and uncomplicated sense the nature of the 
revolution of January 1959 and the character of the political 
process which led to the overthrow of the capitalist order in Cuba 
in years immediately following. Alongside the other great socialist 
revolutions of the twentieth century, the Cuban experience is an 
anomaly not least because it occurred without the creation of 
substantial revolutionary institutions of any type. The Cuban 
revolutionaries had recourse, neither, in 1956-58, nor in 1959-60, 
to mass organs of struggle either in the tradition of the soviets 
of 1917 or in that of the great Asian wars of our time; they 
achieved their ends moreover on the basis of a loosely-constituted 
alliance of exceedingly diverse political forces, beginning the 
job of building a revolutionary party more than two years after 
their seizure of state power. The Rebel Army, with probably fewer 
than 2,000 men under arms at the end of the revolutionary war, was 
not only the principal agency bringing about the collapse of the 
Batista dictatorship, but also the single organised political
formation guaranteeing the continued radicalism of the Revolutionary 
Government during the crucial years 1959-60 and even perhaps for 
some time after that.
The peculiar ease with which Fidel Castro and his comrades 
were able not only to topple Batista but also to lay the foundations 
of a planned economy in the space of a few short years is explicable 
only in the light of the unusual fragility of the political regime 
and underlying social order of pre-revolutionary Cuba, as Robin 
Blackburn first argued in a classic essay. Summarising what are 
today well-known features of the Cuban experience, Blackburn wrote:
The unprecedented hallmarks of the revolution - 
its lack of party or an ideology - were the 
logical product of a pre-revolutionary society 
which itself lacked any decisive institutional 
or ideological structures. There were no 
institutions in Cuba of a kind to force the 
revolution, over decades of testing struggle, 
to create iron counter-institutions of its owp, 
as happened in Russia and China. There was no 
enveloping, pervasive reactionary ideology to 
combat either. The enemy was a starkly corrupt 
and a-social machine. Its character determined 
the condition of its overthrow.1
This observation serves to draw attention to a second distinctive 
property of the problem of organisation as posed in Cuba which, 
in combination with the first, gives it its unique properties. Made 
almost exclusively by non-Communists, the Cuban revolution was led 
through every decisive phase by political forces organisationally 
and ideologically independent of the parties of the Third Inter­
national. A thorough assessment of the implications of this fact 
remains to be made, but one consequence of it is clearly to set 
the Cuban regime apart from all those Communist states established 
in Europe and Asia in the immediate aftermath of the Second World 
War, adding a distinctive dimension to the question of the forms
of post-revolutionary rule. Without wishing to imply thereby 
that the problem of bureaucratic rule is necessarily more easily 
overcome, we may say that the Cuban revolution has not been 
subject to the species of * inherited degeneration* which affected 
all these other regimes in various ways and to a greater or lesser 
extent.
This is not to suggest that orthodox Communists of Stalinist 
or post-Stalinist persuasion have played no role in determining 
the course of the "institutionalisation of the revolution" in Cuba. 
At times the combined forces of the 1old1 Cuban Communists of the 
Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) and their co-thinkers in the CPSU 
have severely constrained the development of Castroist-policies in 
this and other respects, whilst in every period since 1961 at the 
latest the political positions of Moscow-line Communism have 
provided the necessary dramatic counterpoint to the major themes 
of the Cuban symphony. Neither the content nor the style of Fidel 
Castro*s politics can be explained satisfactorily except in the 
context of this fact. A distinctively Fidelista approach to 
questions of political organisation - an ill-defined but nonetheless 
persistent collection of precepts whose affinity with the theory 
and practice of Marxism-Leninism among orthodox Communists is 
slight - is nevertheless clearly identifiable. Two elements run 
like a thread through Fidelista pronouncements on problems of 
organisation in socialist Cuba and are expressed consistently in 
the political practice of Castro and his closest associates. The 
first, the prominence of which has unquestionably increased over 
the years as little by little the Cuban leadership has come to 
recognise the dimensions of the task before it, is a concern to
provide for* the "participation" of the mass of the working class, 
and to a lesser extent of the small peasantry, in the construction
of the new society and of a developed economy. This pre-occupation
has often been expressed in the form of an insistence upon the use 
by revolutionary cadres of "political" styles of leadership, which, 
by definition, help to foster the involvement of the population in 
the central questions of the day, and a corresponding condemnation 
of "administrative" methods which, it is held, promote the passivity
of the masses. The second consistent element in the Fidelista
approach is an extreme and unrepentant pragmatism with regard to 
the means, institutional and otherwise, by which "participation" is to 
be achieved and through which the advance of "administrative" 
procedures is to be prevented. 'Che* Guevara, then a leading 
member of the Fidelista leadership, dwelt upon this latter theme 
in a well-known passage of his "Socialism and Man in Cuba" (1965). 
Observing that the "institutionalisation of the Revolution" had not 
yet been achieved, Guevara went on to explain:
We are seeking something new that will permit 
a perfect identification between the government 
and the community as a whole, adapted to the 
special conditions of the building of socialism 
and avoiding to the utmost the commonplaces of 
bourgeois democracy transplanted to the society 
in formation (such as legislative houses, for 
example). Some experiments have been carried out 
with the aim of gradually creating the institut­
ionalisation of the revolution, but without too 
much hurry. We have been greatly restrained by 
the fear that any formal aspect might make us 
lose sight of the ultimate and most important 
revolutionary aspiration: to see man freed 
from alienation.
The view that Guevara advanced in his essay was not a personal one* 
Speaking a few months after these lines were written, on the 
occasion of the inauguration of the new Communist Party of Cuba
(PCC) in October 1965, Fidel Castro voiced the hope and the 
expectation that through this organisation it would be possible 
to elaborate "a different form of Government”s one which would 
prove "a thousand times more democratic than bourgeois democracy” 
because it would call forth "the constant participation of the 
masses". At the same time he insisted that new political 
institutions would make their appearance through a slow process of 
experimentation and not by the blind imitation of models derived 
from the experience of other countries:
We will develop our own paths, our ideas, 
our methods, our system. We*11 make use 
of all the experience that may be valuable 
to us, and we*11 develop our own experiences.3
Fidel Castro*s elevation of pragmatism to the status of a 
revolutionary virtue - an attitude summed-up in the quotation 
which heads this chapter - is clearly in part a ’cover* which has 
permitted the Fidelistas room to manoeuvre in relation to the 
allegedly more orthodox theory and practice of their critics at home 
and abroad. (Thus it was in the speech of 1965 just cited that 
Castro insisted "it is impossible to conceive of Marxism as 
something like a church, like a religious doctrine, like a Rome
a
with its Pope and Ecumenical Council". ) It would appear, all the 
same, that an empirical approach towards questions of organisation 
recommends itself to the Castroist leaders for reasons which 
transcend the exigencies of factional infighting and inter-party 
diplomacy, rooted rather in the anomalous history of the revolution 
itself. A speech made by Castro in 1967 contains his longest 
public discussion of the question to date and is worth quoting 
liberally in this context. The Cuban revolution, he observed, 
had not begun its history by framing "abstract institutions", and
he added:
The truth is, the few times the Revolution has 
created abstract institutions, it has found in 
. the long-run that this is a mistaken method for
creating social ■‘.institutions. ....  .....
Historically, many social movements have been 
distinguished above air by their creation of a 
Law of Laws, that is a Constitution./ In the long 
term the result has been that this constitution has 
become taboo and inviolable; in the long term it 
has turned into an intellectual creation which is 
ineffective and incapable of responding to 
\ realities*.
It was not the inclination of our Revolution, 
for example, to begin by making one abstract 
creation, in order, starting from that abstract 
creation, to establish a bombastic so-called 
Socialist Constitution. And what a good thing that 
was! What a good thing!
In the light of experience, looking back from the 
here and now into the unfathomable obscurity of our 
past ignorance, we realise very clearly how many 
mistaken notions, how many incomprehensibilities, 
and how many unrealistic and crazy ideas ... such a 
constitution would have implied.5_
Fidelista organisational pragmatism and the faith that "the 
revolutionary process itself” is an adequate guide to the 
construction of a socialist society is not without objective roots 
in the nature of the Cuban revolutionary order. On the other 
hand, to the extent that concealed within it is a refusal to come 
to grips politically with the accumulated theoretical and practical 
heritage of "the revolutionary process" in other lands and other 
epochs, this attitude must be treated as a part of the problem as 
much as a part of the solution to the problem of workers* democracy 
on the island. The concept of "participation" itself contains both
the strengths and the weaknesses inherent in this approach: 
expressing a vague aspiration of a certain type, the ambiguity and 
open-endedness of this concept as employed by the Fidelistas permits 
them considerable creative flexibility in coming to terms with the
peculiar history and problems of the Cuban revolution; at the 
same time the notion has the decisive property of obscuring rather 
than clarifying the analytical distinction between bureaucratic 
and democratic forms of rule and decision-making. By itself 
therefore the Castroist ’theory* of political organisation offers 
little or no.guarantee against the advance, and, more important, 
the consolidation, of "administrative methods". For the 
observer of Cuban affairs, one effect of this consideration is to 
place a premium upon the analysis of the actual practice of organ­
isational innovation and change. There is, in other words, no 
substitute for careful scrutiny and documentation of the practical 
forms through which the aspirations of the Cuban leadership are 
expressed, together with an alertness towards subtle and sometimes 
unheralded developments in the implementation of policy in this 
area.
The aim of this dissertation is to document and analyse two 
of the most important institutional products of the pursuit of 
mass participation In revolutionary Cuba, with particular reference 
to the contribution of these formations to significant political 
and social change. The Committees for the Defence of the 
Revolution - the first object of our enquiry - are a mass political 
organisation. Organised on a residential basis at the level of 
the urban block or street and rural hamlet, the CDRs, as they are 
most often known, possess their own national system of coordination 
and control and comprise by a substantial margin the most inclusive 
of Cuba’s mass organisations. In September 1972, the committees 
had a national membership of over four and a quarter million or 
seventy per cent of the eligible population (men and women aged 
fifteen and above). The trade unions, by comparison, had little
7
.'more"than-.two million members in May 1973 and the Federation of 
Cuban Women (FMC), an organisation dedicated principally to the 
recruitment of women into the labour force, had an enrolment of 
1,600,000 - sixty-three per cent of women aged between fourteen 
and sixty-five - at the end of 1972* The only other mass 
organisation for adults, the National Association of Small Fanners 
(ANAP), reportedly organised 225,000 members from 180,000 small
q ■ . ■
peasant families in 1970. The relative size of the Committees 
for the Defence of the Revolution is not, however, the only factor 
responsible for their considerable importance within the total 
organisational framework of the revolutionary regime. Owing to 
the peculiarities of the process of mass mobilisation in the making 
of the first socialist revolution in the Western Hemisphere - the 
conspicuous passivity of the labour movement before 1959 and the 
urgent priority given to national defence in the years which 
immediately followed - the relative political weight of the committees 
is'greater than that of their structural equivalents in other post- 
capitalist states. For much of the time since their origins in 
September 1960 the CDRs have functioned as the single most effective 
mechanism mediating between the Castroist leadership and its mass 
following, and the organisation has come to occupy a strategic 
place in the thinking of Cuban revolutionaries on questions relating 
to the "institutionalisation of the Revolution1*.
The Popular Courts j^ Tribunales Ponulares j the second focus 
of this study, are the product of Cuban efforts to bring "participation" 
into the judicial sphere. Introduced at the local level throughout 
the country in 1967-68, these new institutions for the administration 
of justice rely entirely upon a non-vocational judiciary elected in
the first instance from among the inhabitants of the localities
in which they have jurisdiction. The aim of the Revolutionary
Government in creating the Popular Courts was both to overcome a
shortage of qualified legal personnel and to draw the moral
weight of the local commun5-ties into the dispensing of petty
justice. Unlike the CDRs, the courts belong to a particular
period in the development of the revolutionary regime and , like
similar experiments in China and the USSR, they appear destined
to disappear in their present form. As of August 1971 plans were
at an advanced stage for a reform of the judicial system designed
to provide it with greater uniformity and whose result is likely
to be that the administration of justice in Cuba will in future
11parallel more closely recent Soviet practice. Nevertheless it 
is to be expected that the influence of the Popular Court experience 
will have some permanence.
The existing secondary literature on the role of the Committees 
for the Defence of the Revolution in Cuban politics scarcely extends 
beyond one title and is therefore best commented upon at an 
appropriate point below. The Popular Courts have been subj ected 
to even greater neglect at the hands both of legal scholars and of 
social scientists, and at the time of writing the student is obliged 
to rely entirely upon primary sources. The general literature on 
Cuban affairs’since 1959, which is of course relatively abundant , 
bears upon the theme of this dissertation in as much as it illuminates 
either the general or the particular features of the problem of 
organisation as it has come to be posed in Cuba. First of all, a
number of economists who made studies, of widely varying quality
and character, on the growing difficulties encountered in the
implementation of Cuba’s development plans in the late ’sixties
have been led to draw conclusions which stress the interdependence
of economic and political problems. Whilst without exception
these authors recommend democratisation, criticising with
greater or lesser acrimony the paternalist attitudes of the Cactroist
leaders, little agreement is to be found among them as to the
precise characteristics of the remedy required. Despite differences
on other aspects of the matter, Roorstein, Huberman and Sweezy,
12Karol, Valier and Maitan appear to favour a devolution of power
within the framework of central planning and a system tending to
■ " 13curtail the effects of market forces. Dumont and Kesa-Lago on 
the other hand emphasise what are alleged to be intrinsic weaknesses 
of the centralisation of economic decision-making, advising the 
adoption by Cuba of features of the ’Yugoslav’ model of democratis- 
ation and decentralisation at plant-level.
As was suggested above, and as we shall see in specific
connections in the pages which follow, the content and timing of
institutional innovations in the context of the Cuban revolution
are not independent of the relation of forces obtaining at a given
moment between the Fidelistas and orthodox Communists at home and
abroad. The literature devoted to advancing one or other of the
several competing explanations of Castro’s initial conversion to
l*fMarxism and Leninism is now substantial. Relating more directly 
to our subject, Suarez provides the most useful study of the 
relations between Castro1sts and Communists from 1959 to 1966,
15
whilst Tutino, Karol, Thomas, and Aguilar illuminate some of 
the relevant historical background. The international aspects of
this relationship in various phases of Cuba’s post-revolutionary 
history are examined in a large literature which continues to grow 
annually.^
Studies Of specific problems in the political institutional­
isation of the Cuban revolution are still scarce. Fidd Castro’s 
role and the fate of successive efforts on the part of the Cuban 
leadership to construct a vanguard party of a recognizably Leninist 
type have been the subject of commentaries by Fagens Angell,
• j i j i
Enzensberger, Suarez and Horowitz. The role of the army and
its relation to the Party leadership remains a topic for speculation,
whilst the development of the trade unions until their reform in
181970 probably merits the neglect which it has suffered. Fagen
has some interesting ideas regarding the general phenomenon of 
mass mobilisation in Cuba.
This study-5.s written In the belief that It is neither possible
nor desirable to discuss forms of political or judicial organisation
in abstraction from the political or social changes which they are
designed to facilitate or bring about. Thorough sociological
studies of particular aspects of Cuba’s changing social patterns
are few indeed, partly because of the obstacles, both external and
internal, to the conduct of research based on other than documentary
sources. Useful surveys have been published by MacGaffey and
20Barnet, Amaro and Mesa-Lago, and Moreno. Studies which, within 
the limitations imposed by the availability of statistical information 
permit a balanced assessment of the changing ’quality of life* in
■ pi -
Cuba have been made by PetrassValdds, Leyva, Paulston and Nelson. ' 
Elizabeth Sutherland’s intelligent reportage on life in Cuba in 1967 
deserves special mention, along with Jose Yglesias* study of a
village in Oriente province, as an outstanding exemplar of the
22strengths of this genre* ’
The research upon which this study is based was conducted 
during a stay in Cuba for fieldwork purposes beginning in August 
1968 and ending in November 1969. The design and orientation 
of the investigation reflects the circumstances of its conception 
as well as the author’s particular predilections and failings.
The study of two organisational forms - the CDRs and the Popular 
Courts - recommended itself not only because of the intrinsic 
interest of these formations and their salience within any global 
discussion of the problem of organisation in Cuba but also because 
of the relative ease with which official sanction could be obtained 
for such a project. The main advantage of proceeding in this way ~ 
with the blessing5 notably, of the National Directorate of the CDRs - 
was that it permitted documentary research to be combined with 
direct observation of a sustained and, by the standards of foreign 
visitors in Cuba, comparatively unobtrusive sort. The degree to 
"which this combination has been successfully achieved here is 
entirely the author’s responsibility.
The drawbacks, on the other hand, of a research project whose 
boundaries are defined as those of a formal institution are several 
and undoubtedly some or all of these manifest themselves from time 
to time in subsequent chapters. Firstly, because the Committees 
for the Defence of the Revolution and the Popular Courts constitute 
mere segments respectively of Cuba’s political and judicial systems, 
the effect of observing and describing their history or functioning
Is often to raise a good many questions of a particular or general, 
order which, within the framework of the research and on; the basis 
of available information, it is quite impossible to answer.
Crucially important issues concerning the interface between 
different organisational spheres - the CDRs and the Party, the 
courts and the police - remain clouded and confused.
The problem of boundaries also arises in a second iray, in 
connection with an assessment of the contribution of specific formal 
organisations within an ongoing process of social and political 
change. In reality there are few aspects of the social trans­
formation of Cuba since 1959 which are not relevant to an under­
standing of the role and significance of the CDRs and Popular 
Courts, and which are not affected in some fashion by the existence 
of these structures. At the same time, to narrow the investigation 
of these processes to the specific issue of their relevance to 
the development of the organisational forms with which we are 
concerned is to run the risk of producing a fatally one-sided 
account of them. To the extent that this difficulty has been 
overcome here, this has been achieved by means of a strict and 
partly arbitrary selection of topics for discussion, together with 
an effort to maintain the integrity of the subject in hand at the 
expense, where necessary, of the major themes of the dissertation. 
These remarks apply specifically to Chapter 3 below, whose purpose 
is to provide some elements of contemporary background as a preface 
to the discussion on the Popular Courts in the following chapter; 
and to Chapter 5, which deals with selected problems of cultural 
change in relation to the theme of "participation”.
A third and final source ofdifficulty for the student of the
CDRs and Popular Courts qua organisations is the fact that those 
institutions had independent origins and have developed in accord 
irith their own particular rhythms. For this reason the chapters \ 
of this dissertation do not observe a historical sequences whereas 
Chapter 2, which deals'with the committees, spans the whole period 
1960-73, Chapters 3 and 4, because they aro concerned with the 
courts, focus more narrowly upon the phase 1966-70, To avoid 
disorientation, the reader is recommended to treat each chapter 
as a relatively self-contained unit.
The parts of the dissertation directly concerned with the 
Committees for the Defence of the Revolution and the Popular Courts 
draw upon notes made by the author on the basis of direct observation 
and informal interviews in Cuba during 1968-69. The contents of 
the files of the Popular Court in one locality of Havana which was 
selected for intensive observation have been made use of in Chapter
4. Elsewhere primary documentary sources have been relied on for 
the most part. In addition to occasional sources including books, 
pamphlets and leaflets, the following regular Cuban publications 
have been consulted: the two remaining daily newspapers, Granma
and Juventud Rebelde, as well as the English language weekly 
summary of the former $ Granma Weekly Review (GNR) 9 whose coverage 
of politically important topics is adequate for general purposes; 
the Party theoretical journal, Cuba Socialists, until its cessation 
of publication in February 1967; a monthly magazine for rank and 
file Party members compiled by the Commission for Revolutionary 
Orientation (COR) of the PCC, El Hllitante Comunista, and the 
monthly journal of the National Directorate of the CDRs Con la 
Guardia en Alto; Bohemia, a fortnightly news magazine aimed at 
the general public; and two publications of ethnographic interest
Actas delFolklore and Etnologia y Folklore. published, respectively 
by the Centre for Folklore studies of the National Theatre of Cuba 
and the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore of the Academy of ■ 
Sciences. Periodic sources cited in the tent but not listed here 
/will be found in the bibliography.
23There is a general lack of reliable statistics in Cuba and 
published information is scarce in many fields particularly since 
the termination of Cuba Socialists. In future the new journal 
Economia y Desarrollo published as a bi-monthly by the Institute 
of Economics at the University of Havana since 1970 may help to 
fill this gap. However for some years now the principal source 
of information regarding government policy and its effects has been 
the speeches of Fidel Castro and, to a lesser degree, other Cuban 
leaders. No apology needs to be made therefore for frequent 
citations of sources of this type in the chapters which follow. 
Quotations accompanied by references in Spanish have been trans­
lated by the author; otherwise, official Cuban government trans­
lations have been used in spite of their occasional lapses in style.
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CHAPTER 2 THE CDRs AND THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION
Whilst most students of contemporary Cuban affairs are
prepared to recognise the importance of the Committees for the
Defence of the Revolution in the organisational framework of the
revolutionary regime, few have devoted more than two or three
lines to specifying their political role*^ Only one study has
attempted to deal with the subject in any detail, arguing that,
along with the literacy campaign of 1961 and the Schools of
Revolutionary Instruction (EIR), the committees may be regarded
from the point of view of their contribution to ”the transformation
2
of political culture” in Cuba. In grappling with the problem of 
the political significance of the CDRs, this chapter traces the 
growth and development of the organisation, paying particular 
attention to discontinuities 5.n its history and to the relationship 
between leadership policy and CDR practice since 1966.
Table 1 below presents statistics indicating the trajectory 
of the total membership of the committees since their beginnings 
in September I960, together with nominal annual growth rates. On 
the view which I shall advance in this chapter, the three phases 
of growth perceptible in the table (if we ignore for the time 
being the significance of the decline in membership registered for 
1967) correspond to, and are the reflection of, the same number 
of relatively distinct periods in leadership policy regarding the 
committees. The major turning points, it will be argued, are 
1966, when increased assertiveness and independence on the part 
of the Fidelista tendency in the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) made 
itself felt in the National Directorate of the CDRs, and 1970,
TABLE 1
CDR MEMBERSHIP 1961-72
3Number of Members Growth over Previous Year
'O
1961 798,703
1962 1,199,835 50
1963 1,656,195 38
1964 1,954,546 18
1965 2,011,276 3
1966 2,237,652 11
1967 1,704,689 -24
1968 2,216,400 30
1969 3,222,147 45
1970 3,222,147 ■ : 0
1971 3,500,125 9
1972 4,236,342 21 ■
Sources: Bohemia, 24 September 1971, pp. 46-53; "Committees
for the Defence of the Revolution: 12 Months, 12 years 
Check-up and Summary”, Granina Weekly Review, 8 October 
1972, p. 10. See also note 3.
when Fidel Castro led the Party into a fundamental reorientation 
of its line on organisational questions generally. To point to 
changes in policy is not to deny the existence of fundamental 
continuities in the structure and style of the organisation from 
its beginnings to the present day. On the contrary it is by 
investigating the twists and turns of its history in the short 
run that I hope best to assess the continuous, long-term contribution 
of the CDRs to the progress of the revolution.
FORMATION OF THE SYSTEM , 1960-66
The CDRs were born and assumed many of their distinctive
features during the critical months between the cuttings of the
Cuban sugar quota by the United States in July 1960 and the defeat
of the counter-revolutionary invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April
1961. The major parameters of mass mobilisation during this
phase need to be borne in mind in what follows. In the first
place, although it was in October 1960 that the process of
expropriation of non-agricultural properties began in earnest,
bringing 85 per cent of industrial production into the state
sector by the following autumn, the revolutionary authorities had
14.
yet to declare themselves Marxist-Leninists, or even socialists.
On the level of political leadership, the need to create a 
revolutionary party, albeit 'after the event', had still not been 
posed by Castro or any of the other leaders of the erstwhile 
26th July Movement. To the extent that organised political 
interventions on the part of the mass of the revolution's supporters 
had already occurred, these had remained both quantitatively and 
qualitatively weak, the de facto destruction of the bases of the
capitalist state having been assured more by the character and 
leadership of the victorious Rebel Army than by the creation of 
organs of independent working class power in the tradition of 
the soviets of 1917. The characteristic forms of mass mobilis­
ation developed to date - notably the militia - had responded to a 
very particular need: that of defending militarily and politically
a series of popular measures, reformist in content if revolutionary 
in form, and the, as yet undefined, future programme of a govern­
ment already firmly established in power* Whilst representing a 
qualitatively new departure for the Castroist masses, thev 
Committees for the Defence of the Revolution sprang from, this same 
■soil. .
In their original form the committees were loosely-constituted 
bodies established at street-, neighbourhood- or village-level, and 
on occasion in workplaces, to combat the campaigns of counter- 
revolutionary sabotage and terror which continued throughout the 
Revolutionary Government1s second year of office. The idea of 
mobilising the government's supporters in the particular fashion 
which led to the creation of Defence Committees is attributable 
to Fidel Castro and his closest associates. Castro launched the 
proposal during a lengthy speech on 28 September 1960 in an atmos­
phere highly charged as a result of bombings in public places and
5rumours of imminent invasion:
..... Let us establish a system of collective 
vigilance; let us establish a system of 
revolutionary collective vigilance. And let's 
see how the lackeys of imperialism manage to 
operate here. Because, when all's said and 
done, we represent the whole city; there is 
not a street, nor a block, nor a neighbourhood 
which is not fully represented here. In the
face of imperialism’s campaigns of aggression,, 
let us set up a system of collective 
revolutionary vigilance - so that everyone may 
know who lives on his-own block, what lie does,
^jhat connections he had with the tyranny, what' 
he does now, with whom he associates, and what 
he gets up to. Because if they think they can 
lock horns with the people they are in for a 
tremendous disappointment! Because we are going 
to organise a Revolutionary Vigilance Committee 
on every block.... They are playing games with 
the people, but they don’t realise what they 
have taken on. They are playing games with the 
people but they don’t realise the tremendous 
revolutionary force which there is in the 
people.6
In the days and weeks which followed, ’Vigilance committees’'
were founded in every neighbourhood of Havana and, in quick
succession, in the towns, villages and hamlets of the interior,
as groups of private citizens set up shop as guardians of the
security of the young regime. By April it was claimed there
were 8 , 0 0 0 of them, with a total membership of about 70,000
7
throughout the country. The energy with which masses of 
Cubans responded to Castro’s call is what partially justifies 
the proposition often voiced in later years that the CDRs 
sprang from a ’’living dialogue between Fidel and the people”.
The purpose of the first CDRs was, as Castro intimated, to
observe and report to the police the activities of known or
9suspected counter-revolutionaries. Hhen the threatened invasion 
materialised on 17 April 1961 in the form of a CIA-organised -// 
landing at Flaya Giron on the south coast of Cuba, they fulfilled 
this purpose to the extent of providing most of the information 
leading to the internment of an estimated 20,000 people in Havana-- - 
and in the region of 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 nationally - for the duration of the 
crisis.1 0 On the view later popularised by Castro himself, CDR
'Vigilance” in this phase was the main cause of the shift in
counter-revolutionary activity away from the cities and towns
of Cuba, into less populous areas of the interior during the
remainder of 1961.*^ But with the new tactics and later
decline of violent internal opposition the development of the
organisation did not come to an end. On the contrar3r, immediately
following the Bay of Pigs the decision was taken to mount a
membership campaign with the target of 500,000 members and 100,000 
12committees. As a result, five months after the invasion a
total of nearly 800,000 cederistas had been recruited and 107,000
CDRs formed in a country whose total population was still under
13the seven million mark. As the tide of sabotage and armed 
opposition subsided from 1962 onwards moreover the expansion of 
the CDR system continued, bringing total membership over one 
million during 1962, over one and a half million in 1963 and close
la.
to two million in 1964.
There is no shortage of plausible explanations of the 
decision to expand the CDRs. Even before April 1961 it is clear 
that the revolutionary leaders saw in the organisation potential­
ities which went well beyond ’Vigilance” proper, and leaflets 
describing their purposes and responsibilities which were in 
circulation early in 1961 included references to the need to aid 
production, the literacy campaign and the holding of public
15
political meetings. To limit ourselves for the time being
to the simplest aspect of the matter, the socialist transformation 
of the Cuban economy, which began to assume a general character 
from October 1960, created for the revolutionary authorities an 
administrative problem of gigantic proportions. In general the
need for some measure of governmental control over newly
nationalised sectors was met by the creation of new ministries
or state agencies endowed with awe-inspiring titles and
impressive, if entirely comprehensible, records of inefficiency*
In the CDRs on the other hand government leaders quickly
recognised a ready-made structure which might be entrusted with,
among other things, the rapid and effective implementation of a
variety of measures in the spheres of adult education, health,
welfare and distribution, on a national scale but at a minimal
cost to the state budget. Thus, starting in 1961, a series of
new demands were made of the committees. In the summer the
Revolutionary Government took a decision of outstanding political
and economic significance: to respond to growing shortages of
essential foodstuffs with plaice-controls and an egalitarian
system of rationing. The CDRs were charged with the necessary
census of consumers and, in 1962 when ration-cards were first
distributed, it was the CDRs that assured their distribution and
exercised ’’vigilance” over the operation of the new system, thus
dealing ”a heavy blow to the speculators, counter-revolutionaries
16'
and class-enemies". During the Missile Crisis of 1962 and
afterwards the committees took responsibility for the mobilisation
of voluntary blood donors, who came forward for the first time in
large numbers in Cuba’s history, and the country’s first national
campaign of polio vaccinations was completed in five days in 1963,
17
thanks to CDR hea3.th posts established for the purpose.
Each year which passed saw the introduction of new duties 
into the ambit of the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution, 
or the elevation of existing activities to the level of a national
campaign. Genei^ally stress was laid on the latest priorities 
set out by Fidel Castro or other revolutionary leaders. Thus 
it was in 1964, the "Year of the Economy", that the organisation 
was asked to add to its tasks responsibility for the mobilisation 
of voluntary weekend labouri to help rescue Cuban agriculture 
from its critical state. Salvage-collections, park-construction „
school-painting ana even street repairs began to be undertaken by 
CDR squads before the middle of the decade and, characteristically, 
since all these activities were seen as part of a war against 
underdevelopment and imperialism, each sphere of work was spoken of 
as a "front". The Education Front of the committees achieved its 
first major "victory" in the "Battle for the Sixth Grade", with 
the enrolment of about 700,000 workers and peasants in free-time 
adult education courses during 1965.
The organisational form of the CDRs however Underwent a 
number of major changes in the course of the period under consider­
ation . The first vigilance committees created late in 1960 or 
early in 1961 enjoyed considerable independence and were permitted, 
if only because there was no way in which this could be effectively 
prevented, a good:deal of leeway to interpret the scope and 
character of their responsibilities according to the inclinations 
of their members. Although from the outset they were formally
required to register with the local government authorities, the
19"ruling was most often honoured in the breach. It was not until
some months after the Bay of Pigs that serious attempts were made 
to organise the street-level CDRs within a national system of co­
ordination and control, and the creation of the type of hierarchy 
of national, provincial and intermediate CDR organs characteristic
of the system in later years took until early in 1962. The 
history of the interim period is littered with evidence of 
excessive, arbitrary and even corrupt actions on the part of 
CDR representatives. Emigrds who left Cuba in the period up 
to October 1962 frequently cited the CDRs in evidence of the 
iniquities of the regime, complaining both of active harassment 
by committee members and of the intolerable psychological burden 
of being "spied upon" by their neighbours and labelled as gusanos 
by longstanding acquaintances.20 But, although it is impossible 
to gauge precisely the incidence of acts in excess of, or in 
contradiction with, the requirements of revolutionary vigilance, 
it is clear that the CDRs earned the animosity not just of anti- 
Communists. On at least two occasions Castro himself was obliged 
to refer in a public speech to the damage done to the revolutionary 
cause by over-zealous or unscrupulous cederistas. The first was
in July 1961, coinciding with the announcement of the new measures 
for food distribution. "It is necessary ....... to discuss
complaints", he urged.
Because we know there are complaints against some 
people in some committees. Vie must discuss 
complaints and criticisms regarding the 
Committees for the Defence of the Revolution, 
irregularities committed by persons who 
infiltrate the Committees for the Defence of 
the Revolution for what they can get out of 
it and, perhaps, to create disorganisation.21
The creation of the higher organs of the Committees for the 
Defence of the Revolution occurred in a phase in which organisational 
questions came to the''fore'bn .every .level of the political life 
of the revolution. Beginning with the decision of the early 
summer of 1961 to commence the construction of a new "integrated"
party (ORI), and ending with Fidel Castro’s denunciation of the
"sectarianism" of the organising secretary of the ORI, Anibal
Escalante, on 26 March 1962, this was also a period in ;:hich the
organisational skills and political dexterity of the leading
Cadres from the "old" Communist Partido Socialista Popular (PSP)
assured them a prominent place and dominant voice in more than
one sphere. The first Rational Coordinator of the CDRs, Josd
Matar Franye, had been close to the PSP and, if he had not been a
member of it, this was probably due to his relatively recent entry 
22into politics. It is probable that other members of the CDR
National Directorate, whichwas formed at some point before March
' 231963., shared this background. In all events during their
reconstruction the CDRs were politically subordinate to the ORI,
as the head of the propaganda commission (COR) of the new party
24made a point of emphasising in its journal in September, and the 
ORI was currently being staffed under the direction of Anibal 
Escalante.
The procedure adopted consisted in the creation, from the top 
down, of a hierarchy of Provincial, District and Sectional offices, 
each headed by a Coordinator and where possible manned by a 
responsable in charge of each of the "fronts" of CDR activity. 
Sectional Coordinators and their aides were elected at mass meetings 
of local cederlstas and worked on a part-time and unpa5.d basis, 
whilst officials at the higher levels were full-time cadres 
appointed from the National Directorate. Finally, at the base of 
the pyramid, each CDR was expected to select from its number an 
activist to be responsible for each front as well as its own 
chairman fpresidents]* The house of the chairman, or as was often
the case in the cities chairwoman, hecame the natural focus of
the life of the committee and bore a plaque inscribed with its
25number and dedication. By September 1S62, six provincial
offices, 150 district offices and some 1,360 coordinaciones 
soccionales had come into existence and were responsible for
26providing directives jorientacionesj to about 100,000 base CDRs.
There are indications that Fidel Castro, for one, was 
unhappy about the manner in which the restructuring of the 
organisation was conducted. The second occasion on which he 
publically criticised the CDRs was ten days before his attack on 
Anibal Escalante, for the latter*s bureaucratic approach to party- 
building, when the process was already at an advanced stage:
Mistakes have to be fought against in every 
field - in every Defence Committee for 
example.. ■ ■
Who denies that the Committees for the 
Defence of the Revolution are necessarj^?
Who denies that they provide a great 
service to the Revolution? V!ho denies that 
there are many good citizens in them? And 
yet, a few days ago we were talking to a group 
of comrades in a day-care centre ..... and many 
of them had complaints about the Committees for 
the Defence of the Revolution .....
And why? Because they make mistakes, because • 
they commit errors, because there is no vigilance, 
because jobs are botched, because sometimes they 
create privileges for themselves and grant .them-, 
selves privileges, having something kept aside 
for someone in the grocery store. And when the 
people see this sort of thing, naturally, they 
are distressed; because our people have a great 
sensitivity to anything which is not done 
properly* And, because a revolution needs the 
whole people to be active, the whole people 
working, the whole people defending it, it is 
pitiful when there are also many who make mistakes; 
because then thousands and thousands of people 
suffer the consequences of the mistakes of 
thousands and thousands of others.
It is for this reason that a revolution has such
a need to struggle against those mistakes, so 
as not to weaken the Revolution, so as not to
do damageb so as not to hurt anyone or offend
anyone without reason and without just5.fication.27
Following this speech and coinciding with the efforts directed 
by Raul Castro and 'Che' Guevara to undo the work of Escalante 
and his associates in the Party, the CDRs held 'assemblies’ up 
and down the country devoted to "criticism and self-criticism".
Both cederistas and non-members were invited and the aim of the
campaign, like that being conducted in the local units of the ORI,
was both to purge opportunists and careerists and to recruit anew 
from the mass of the population. By September 1962, 73,697
committees had held assemblies of this type involving 1,U^,977 
people and serving, in the words of the official journal of the 
CDRs, "to eradicate bad methods of work, to overcome weaknesses
and errors in the work of the organisation, and to strengthen the
. 28 
links, and the bond, between the CDRs and the people". Ho
changes however appear to have taken place in the National
Directorate of the CDRs at this point and otherwise the development
of the organisation proceeded as planned.
One of the prerequisites for the successful operation of the 
system which had been set up^ it m s  argued, was the provision of 
some elementary political education for the cadres of the organis­
ation at all levels. For this purpose, base-CDRs were directed 
in 1962 to organise "Study Circles", which were led by a local 
cederista and met initially about once a week. At Sectional 
level, a more sophisticated type of political education was 
provided in evening classes run by "Circles of Revolutionary 
Instruction". Finally, by October 1962 215 CDR militants from
provincials district and sectional organisations had passed 
through a national CDR cadre school, where intensive three month 
courses on "political economy and philosophy" were combined with 
talks by prominent members of the ORI in a farmhouse twenty miles 
outside Havana. The texts employed at this level, and hence the 
original source of course-materials published for use at the 
lower levels, were the Soviet manuals sponsored by the Schools of 
Revolutionary Instruction (EIR) of the Party until the demise of
29
the latter in February 1968.
Two further organisational innovations were made following 
the second anniversary of the committees in September 1962, both 
of them designed to formalise and increase the effectiveness of 
what was now a national mass organisation not without some super­
ficial similarities to some of the Eastern European "Front"
30organisations. Printed membership cards were first distributed
towards the end of 1962 and thereafter were issued more or less
regularly. In 1963, coinciding with a national campaign to
foster "socialist emulation" in agriculture and industry, the work
of the committees began to be organised as it has been since
around emulation campaigns lasting three to five- months each, in
the course of which base CDRs, sections and districts throughout
the country were invited to distinguish themselves and earn
honorific rewards by fulfilling or over-fulfilling targets on the
31various "fronts" set by national or provincial organs. After 
these developments however, although, as we have seen, the 
practical content of the work of the committees continued to 
extend and diversify itself, the structure and style of the 
organisation was set in a mould which it was to retain until 1966,
and in many respects beyond that.
On the third anniversary of the CDRs, when relatively
detailed statistics were released on the composition and location
of the cederista population, the organisation could claim to have
in its ranks more than a million and a half men and women, or
about one-third of the eligible population (aged 15 and above).
Of the total, it was announced, about one in three was aged
between 15 and 25 years end forty-four per cent of the members
were women, somewhat surprisingly in view of the figure of sixty
per cent given for the previous year. Finally, the CDRs
appeared to have made more progress in urban areas, where thirty-
four per cent were organised, than in rural areas, where only
3?thirty per cent of adults wore members.
THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION» 1966-70
It has been suggested that the transformation of the CDRs 
into a national mass organisation occurred if not under the 
exclusive control of the ’’old” Communists in the Cuban leadership 
at least under the influence of this tendency and in the period 
of its early ascendancy. In and after 1956, events took place 
which can only be interpreted as moves by the Fidelistas to 
rectify this situation. Following the inauguration late in 1965 
of the Central Committee and other leading organs of the Communist 
Party of Cuba (PCC), discussions were initiated between the new 
party’s Secretariat for Organisation, headed by Armando Hart, and 
the National Coordinator of the Committees for the Defence of the 
Revolution, Jose' Matar. These discussions concerned the future 
of the CDRs and specifically, it was later reported, ’’the structure
that: that organisation -..should have. Its functions and other
# •  33 ’organisational questions intended to strengthen 5ts work”.
Differences of opinion on these subjects soon care to light and 
in 1965 Matar was'.dismissed by the Political Bureau of the PCC# 
the most powerful organ of the Party and an exclusively Fidelista 
body# later to be appointed Cuban ambassador in Budapest* His 
replacement was a young and unknown Fidelista■# Luis Gonzalez 
Maturelos.
Conclusions as to the nature of the disagreements which led 
to the removal of Jose Matar from the CDR National Directorate 
have to be arrived at mainly by inference from the subsequent 
development of the organisation. Nevertheless one pointer emerged 
two years later when Matar was implicated in the so-called ’'micro- 
fa ct ion* ■ affair and dishonourably removed from the Party Central 
Committee. According to the testimony of the man at the centre 
of the affair# the tireless Anibal Escalante# the document prepared 
by the CDR National Coordinator for submission to the Party leader­
ship in December 1965 had been drawn up in consultation with him. 
Since Escalante was no longer a member of any of the Party’s
leading bodies# this action allegedly constituted a breach of 
35
.discipline. For our purposes it serves as a reasonably reliable 
indication as to the character of the document.
Changes in the organisation and practice of the Committees 
for the Defence of the Revolution in the years immediately 
following the dismissal of Matar allow us to be more specific on 
this point, as well as to identify some elements of a specifically 
Fidelista approach towards mass organisations. The table
all 5 that between 1963 and 1965 CDR membership prow at a declining
annual rate. If we ignore the figure for 1967, which will be
explained presently, the rate of growth of the organisation would
appear to have been progressively restored between 1966 and 1969,
when it reached almost the level achieved in 1962 when* of course*
the CDRs organised a much smaller proportion of the total
population. From independent sources* we know that recruitment
1 35 ■
was placed on a high priority in 1967. Figures provided to
the author indicate moreover that the membership campaign of
summer 1969* which brought total enrolment to over fifty per cent
of the adult population of Cuba, achieved in the space of only
five months a thirty-six per cent growth in the organisation
■ 37 ■
nationally, and as much as forty per cent in Havana province.
A likely hypothesis, therefore, is that Castro and his comrades 
were becoming dissatisfied with the growth of the organisation 
during the later years of Matar*s incumbency, and possibly suspected 
unduly restrictive recruitment policies. If so, this would not 
be hard to explain in relation to the new tasks entrusted to the 
committees in 1967-69.
He may now turn to the significance of the twenty-four per
cent decline in CDR membership registered in 1967, the year after
the appointment of Gonsalen Maturelos to the National Directorate.
The drop is explained simply as the product of the dissolution
during this year of the workplace Committees for the. Defence of
the Revolution which, it would appear, had not only continued to
exist but had grown on a par with the rest of the organisation 
38
since 1960-61. The officially-stated reasons for this measure
would seem plausible enough: workplace CDRs often duplicated the
membership';of residence-based committees , and they duplicated
39
the functions of the trade union organisations. The evidence
for duplicate membership is in the figures themselves, which show
a marked overall decline in CDR enrolment in spite of the fact
that all workplace cederistas were'- automatically transferred to
the committee at their p3.ace of residence. If this is the case,
however, why were the workplace committees’ retained for so long?
As'-possible,answers to this question, neither sheer inertia -
always a factor in such matters - nor conscious efforts on the
part of the Escalante faction to obtain a "proletarian" base for 
tfO
itself can be absolutely excluded.
The dissolution of the workplace committees also has to be 
seen in the context of other developments under the new dispen­
sation. In 1966 the intermediate-level organs of the CDRs were 
reorganised to bring them into line with the new geographical 
divisions introduced in local government during that year and 
providing for the first tine a uniform division of the. country to
in
be observed by all state agencies and political organisations. 
Although the new pattern of CDR organs is important only in the 
context of the political content which it was to be given, this 
may be the most convenient point at which to describe it. Once 
again the framework of intermediate structures linking the National 
Directorate with "base" CDRs throughout the country consisted of 
a pyramid of geographically-based directorates and committees, but 
new divisions were introduced, referred to respectively as ’’Regions” 
’’Sections" and ’’Zones”. The implications of this change are best 
inferred from Table 2 but it is worth drawing attention to the fact
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that advantage appears to have been taken of the general re-
structuration of the CDR system to consolidate street- or village-
committees into somewhat larger units. Under the new system,
urban "sections” corresponded to "municipalities" in rural areas,
each being responsible for coordinating the work of a number of
constituent "zones”. In 1969 the average urban zone committee
had authority over 16.*4 CDRs, whilst in rural areas zones included
ii2
7.5 CDRs on average. The base CDRs themselves had an average
of thirty-nine members in urban localities and thirty members in 
14.3
rural areas. As before, the higher organs in the system were
staffed mainly or exclusively by full-time cadres whilst the lower 
levels were run entirely by volunteers (now zone-level and below).
The advantage of the new system was that it permitted CDR
organs to establish direct liaison vrith equivalent units of
government ministries, mass organisations and the PCC. Relations
between CDR offices and local Party committees became, as a result,
particularly close during the last years of the ’sixties. In
accordance with the theory that the leading role of the Party
requires it to retain its integrity as an organisation and to
preserve its cadres, it was not usual for members of the PCC to be
appointed to CDR posts (although this theory appears to have been
flouted a good deal in other spheres during the period in question).
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One Section Coordinator in Havana summed up his relations vrith 
the local Party committee thus:
We [i.e. the section of the CDRs] work very 
closely with the Party, though we are 
separate organisations. We always discuss 
important questions with them, and this is 
natural, because we are their fundamental 
base.
The role of these discussions in forming the policy and priorities 
of the CDRs was slight, however. The directives which determined 
targets for the various "fronts" during a given emulation period 
were received through the organisation’s own national hierarchy.
The actual content of local Party ’leadership* is brought out in
Lf.y
the following remarks, evoked by the visit of a PCC delegate to 
one Zone Committee in Havana:
These Party people are very demanding with us.
You see, sometimes it’s difficult to get 
cederistas moving. He Cubans are very alegre; 
we like very much to sit around and keep cool.
But on the other hand Cubans do respect a debt,
and we feel we have a debt to the martyrs of our
national history and of the revolution. That’s 
really what makes us get up off our backsides.
The role of the Party is to constantly remind us 
of our debt, and of our duties.
Uhilst relations between the PCC and the CDRs at the local level 
were close, then, the task assumed by the former was an exhortative 
one, intended to improve the quality of CDR activity rather than
to determine its direction. A more significant consequence of
the restructuring of the national framework of the CDRs was, it 
will be argued presently, the new relationship created thereby 
between the committees and local government.
Not the least of the changes which took place after 1966 was 
the transformation of Fidel Castro’s attitude towards the organis­
ation as displayed in his CDR anniversary speeches. Before this 
date Castro seldom spoke at great length about the role of the 
committees as such. A partial exception was his speech on 
28 September 1961 when he congratulated them on their part in the 
defence effort of the previous April, stressing the decisiveness 
to that effort of "the struggle in the rearguard" and the
immobilisation of the "Fifth Column” within the country during
the invasion. On this occasion Castro went on to spell out his 
view of the value of the CDRs: they were, he said, the organisation
which permitted all those citizens who were unable to participate 
in other organisations to nonetheless make their contribution to
tig
the Revolution. By 1967 his attitude had changed perceptibly:
Few social creations have gone so far, in 
just seven years of life, as this genuine 
mass institution created by our Revolution.
The tasks of the Committees for the Defence 
of the Revolution which came to the fore in 
the most arduous moments of the struggle 
against the counter-revolution have become 
broader and broader, to the point where, today, 
they embrace a great many activities of all 
sorts. Not only do the Defence Committees have 
their specific tasks, but also, whenever it is 
necessary to make some effort in any direction 
and if there is nobody who can take on this job 
immediately, the immediate solution is: call in 
the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution, 
in the certainty that they will do the job.
Our Revolution and our Party have a legitimate 
right to feel satisfied with this institution 
and proud of it. And we know, because the 
experience of these years has taught us this, 
that every day it will go on excelling itself 
further, and every day the revolutionary process 
itself td.ll show us how far it is possible to go 
with this new form of mass organisation.1*9
In the light of the foregoing discussion, this much was to be 
expected, but Castro did not stop here. "In recent days”, he 
went on to observe, the CDRs had been proving that they 
constituted ”a magnificent form of link ^enlaceJ between the 
masses and the institutions of revolutionary power”. Moreover, 
if ever the regime were to order the promulgation of a new 
Constitution for the Republic, it would be impossible to disregard 
the existence of "this reality, this formidable mass institution
which the revolution has created”. The CDRs, Castro concluded:
... march on towards new forms of social 
development, towards new forms of social 
institution, towards new mechanisms for 
linking the masses with the institutions 
of power, towards the development of 
- genuinely new and efficient forms of
democracy.5^
Fidel Castro’s remarks about the CDRs in 1967 were distin­
guished both by their length and by their content. In no previous
speech since September 1961 had he reserved so much eloquence for 
" ■ 51the merits of the organisation, although, as we have seen, he 
had on occasion severely criticised its abuses* Itnow appeared, 
furthermore, that something other than a merely supportive political 
role was being anticipated for the committees. Whilst it was not 
spelt out what was entailed by "genuinely new and efficient forms 
of democracy”, the use of the phrase indicated that a good deal 
more importance was being attached to the CDRs as political 
institutions than had previously been the case. What exactly was 
the new political role of the organisation?
Participation as Localisation
From the beginning, the aims of the Cuban leadership in 
fostering the growth and bringing about the systematisation of 
the Defence Committees were many-stranded and not reducible either 
to the destruction of the counter-revolution or to the creation of 
an effective means of administering new measures of social 
improvement or economic stringency. In a much-quoted passage of 
his speech on the very first anniversary of the CDRs, Fidel Castro 
emphasised that to be a member of a committee entailed having a 
"spirit of sacrifice", since upon the dedication and honesty of
cederistas would depend their ability to ’’integrate into the
revolution” the broad mass of lukewarm revolutionaries and 
waverers.
Because one of the things you must always 
keep in mind is that to be a member of the 
Defence Committee means ....... being an
example for the rest of the citizenry, working, 
observing the counter-revolutionaries; and in
addition working to gain support, proselytising.
Members of the organisation were thus expected to engaged in a 
constant process involving at one and the same time their own 
education and the “education” of the population at large by means 
of example. The committees were open to ”all who are in favour 
of the Revolution and prepared to defend it”, in the words of the 
new membership booklet issued in 1968, but the same publication 
went on to state, under the heading “Duties of a CDR Member”:
- It is the duty of CDR meiribers to work and struggle 
for the unity of the people around their Government, 
their Party and their supreme leader, Major Fidel
. .Castro.
- It is the duty of cederistas to propagate the
; revolutionary ideology, to be firm defenders of 
revolutionary principles and to educate themselves 
in the principles of proletarian internationalism.
- Every cederlsta has the duty of keeping up his 
guard, vigilance being our historic task and one 
of the fundamental tasks, of our organisation.
- Every member of the CDRs is duty-bound to combat 
each and every manifestation of the counter­
revolution. ,
- A duty of every member of the CDRs is to feel 
himself responsible for the advance and strengthening 
of the Revolution, and to be prepared to work for 
this end to the limit of his capabilities.
- A duty of CDR members is to ensure, by means of 
proselytism and hard work, arid by his example, 
that little by little our people comes to discard 
the ideas of the old exploitative society, and 
starts to acquire the awareness that we can only 
enjoy what we are able to produce and create
through our own labour.
- It is the duty of every cederista to combat 
egoism, all manifestations of the ideology.of 
individualism and shallow attitudes, conducting 
a struggle without quarter against parasitism, 
against those who want to live without working.
- The duty of every cederista is to develop that 
spirit which is expressed in the name given to 
the year 1968: ’’Year of the Heroic Guerilla”.53
These injunctions preceded a somewhat longer list of duties 
connected specifically with one or other of the regular ’’fronts” 
of struggle. However, the political role of the committees
was not considered to he in contradiction with the eminently 
practical activities of the fronts. On the contrary it was 
primarily through the latter that the goal of "integrating” the 
masses into the revolution was to be achieved. An editorial of 
1967 in the official monthly magazine of the CDRs contained the 
point:
In addition to their daily tasks, and indeed 
through them5 in the tumult and labour of daily 
struggles the Committees for the Defence of the 
Revolution have played an important political 
and ideological role. They have achieved this 
by creating in the masses a revolutionary aware- ; 
ness of the part that they are playing, by showing 
the masses that they are working for themselves, 
for their own future, and that only in conjunction 
with their Revolutionary Government and their 
Communist Party can they build a socialist society, 
and a communist societ3?v They committees are a 
school of patriots and a forge of revolutionaries.^
Differently.expressed, insofar as the CDRs provided what has been
referred to as "a form of social participation by the masses in
56the solution of their own problems”, and to the extent that the 
measures with whose implementation they were entrusted often brought 
manifest and tangible benefits to the population at large, the 
organisation was equipped with the means to "integrate" and
educate persons who, from a strictly ideological point of view, 
might be indifferent towards tfarxism-LeninisTri .and even anti- 
Communist.
This9 then* was one sense in which the CDRs served to ’’link” 
the masses with the centres of power in Cuba. There was another.
By the end of the 1960s it would not have been inappropriate to 
say that the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution had come 
to function as a kind of central nervous system of the revolutionary 
regime. The same features of the CDR system which led Castro to 
regard it as the most flexible and efficient means for carrying 
out a variety of types of administrative measures, rendered it an 
effective channel for Messages* of a more strictly political sort. 
There were two aspects to this. In the first place, it has to 
be held in mind that in the conditions of the late 1sixties the 
restricted flow of information provided by the national press, and - 
a consideration which must not be neglected - the continued 
prevalence in some layers of the population of beliefs in the
validity of omens, made Cuba fertile ground for rumours of all
types, in a society, moreover, where such an elementary factor 
as labour commitment and discipline depended to a large extent 
upon the morale of the population and its confidence in the future, 
rumours about the government’s intentions or unforeseen catastrophes 
could have disastrous consequences. Fidel Castro frequently 
stressed this point in his speeches. On the eighth anniversary of 
the CDRs he observed;
’’The imperialist enemy, the reactionary enemy, 
the counter-revolutionary enemy, gives battle 
on many fields and uses many weapons, among 
others - and let us never forget it* - on the
field of ideology, by creating illusions, by
creating above all the illusion that you can 
have wealth without work, that a people can 
have something without struggling for it and ;
working hard for it”. ■
Castro went on to condemn malicious rumour-mongers who, he 
alleged, had been spreading stories regarding child-kidnappings 
and ..... vampirism. The previous March-,' however, he had 
made an interesting self-criticism in the same connection:
It is a known fact that, through the Party, 
the Committees for the Defence of the 
Revolution, the Women’s Federation, the.unions 
and the youth organisations, the Revolution 
can, in a matter of hours, rally the whole 
nation, it can mobilise the whole country, it 
can take the starch out of any rumour, it can 
cut the ground out from under all the rumour 
mongers and all the spreaders of pessimism and 
./defeatism.
Let us say that, we are at fault when we don’t 
keep up an adequate flow of information to the 
revolutionary ranks because we don’t make the 
most effective use of the communications media 
and organisation channels at our disposal.58
Whether or not the facility was used as much as it might have been, 
a word in the ear of the National Coordinator of the CDRs could 
be sufficient to quell an ugly rumour of dispel a minor crisis of 
confidence. In fact in 1969 rank and file cederistas received 
on occasion relatively detailed ’’orientations” about the government 
plans through the formal structure of the organisation and as a 
result of visits t6 the local level by full-time cadres.
By this time however the flow of information through the CDR 
system was not by any means unidirectional. Indeed one of the 
most important functions which the committees performed for the 
revolutionary leadership during these years was that they supplied 
it with an invaluable source of "feedback”. In 1969 it was the
custom of the National Directorate to circulate questionnaires
to volunteer workers at Zone level which required respondents to
list “those problems of most urgent concern to the people at the 
59present time”. Less formal soundings of this sort relying 
upon the full-time cadres of the organisation were a more regular 
feature of the system. Although it might be expected that the 
bureaucratic hierarchy standing between the revolutionary leader­
ship and the base of the CDR structure would prove an insuperable 
obstacle to the communication to the former of the genuine 
grievances of "the people"# one important feature of the CDRs 
counteracted this tendency: the heavy reliance of the day-to-day
functioning of the organisation upon voluntary effort. The 
strictly voluntary character of the work of the committees at the 
base placed a ceiling on the manipulability of cederistas. By 
itself# this factor helped to assure the use of what were termed 
"political” rather than purely "administrative” methods of leader­
ship in day-to-day dealings between CDR officials and their base.
In other words# the ability of the lower organs of the CDR 
structure to limit their voluntary work and otherwise *go slow* 
meant that in practice# full-timers had to spend substantial 
proportions of their time speaking to meetings# agitating# arguing 
with their ’subordinates* about the importance of a given project# 
or providing *pep-talks* to activists. The limited character of 
these discussions from a political point of view should not obscure 
the difference between the consequences of "political” leadership 
of this type and those of a purely bureaucratic approach. Unlike 
the latter# the style of leadership developed by force of circum­
stances in the CDRs served to mitigate the generation of apathyi 
by constantly playing upon the political sensibilities of ordinary
workers. It also helped to ensure that problems of burning 
concern to rank-and-file committee members were not neglected 
for long without good reason.
So far I have attempted to specify two senses in which the
CDR system in the period after 1966 provided a means of "linking"
the mass of the Cuban population with its leaders. None of the
mechanisms described# it is clear, amount to what might be called
a system of democracy# nor were they particularly new features of
the organisation. An interesting development occurred in
December 1968 when for the first time the office of the President
of the Republic decided to "consult the people" on a specific
' BO
question# employing for this purpose the CDR system. The issue
a relatively trivial one by most standards but hotly debated by
cederistas at the time# concerned the policy to be adopted in
regard to the bars and nightclubs of Havana, which had been closed
since the official mourning of 1 Che* Guevara the previous year and
brought under state control in the Revolutionary Offensive of the
spring. Should they be re-opened for Christmas or remain closed
for good? Assemblies of CDR chairmen were called at Zone-level
throughout Havana to decide the question. A debate took place
in each locality# votes were recorded and aggregated# and the
61President issued his decree the following week. Although on 
this occasion only the chairmen of CDRs were called upon to give 
their opinion# the case is important as a precedent. Already in 
the spring of 1969 the proposal was being discussed in Party 
circles to submit new legislation (against the practice of 
"loafing") to public debate and amendment by the CDRs. After 
1970 this became a standard practice for certain types of new 
legislation.
The -"genuinely -new and efficient forms of democracy" whose-. • 
germs. Fidel Castro perceived in the practice of the CDRs did not# 
however, hinge upon developments of this.type« As has been 
suggested # the 1educational* impact of the committees upon members 
and non-members alike sprang from the fact that they permitted 
ordinary Cubans to participate directly in the solution of the 
immediate# localised and tangible problems which faced them. 
"Participation" was likewise the cornerstone of the Castroist 
concept ion of proletar ian democracy as formulated after 1966. It 
is therefore to the growth of new forms of participation# and 
specifically the expansion of CDR activity at the local level# 
that we must now give some attention.
In 1969 a total of fourteen regular "fronts" of CDR activity
were recognised and incorporated into the emulation contests of
the organisation at provincial.level. Two - Organisation and
Finance - were concerned with the internal life of the committees#
whilst each of the others - Vigilance# Propaganda, Voluntary
Labour, Education# Public Health# Economy jAhorroj # Civil Defence#
Salvage# Sports# Culture * Services and Local Administration /
£Poder Local ] - represented a sphere of work in which cederistas .
were involved in cooperation with other agencies or in an 
62independent role. ' The last t\*o mentioned were *new* fronts# 
created in the period since 1966. A number of fronts which had 
previously existed were now defunct or of marginal importance# 
enjoying a precarious existence in most street committees and 
CDR Zones in Havana. .Such was the case# for instance, with the 
Front for Peace# established in the CDRs during the brief period 
of Cuban accommodation to the Soviet version of "peaceful .
C »3
coexistence” after the !'issile Crisis of October 19G2. The
place.of this front was taken in 1966 by a Solidarity Front,
■whose task was to publicise the anti-imperialist struggles under 
way in Vietnam and other Third World countries and to hold 
solidarity meetings at the local level. CDP.s held "thousands” of 
such meetings in 1966 following the Tricontinental Conference in
gu
Havana and once again in 1967 at the time of the GLAS conference.
The Solidarity Front was still active in 1969 and held occasional
meetings but it too had ceased to appear in the regular emulatioh-
leaflets*distributed by the organisation* an indication of the
changing priorities of the revolutionary leadership. In a
different field* the 60,000 CDR Study Circles and 2,000 Circles
for Revolutionary Instruction which had existed in 1965 had now
ceased to function. Although most CDRs and Zone Committees still
included a responsable for Political Education* it was now seldom
that formal meetings were held for this.purpose and the study
65materials recommended were of a non-theoretical type. In the 
absence of specific directives to the contrary (and in March 1968, 
Castro had launched a bitter attack upon the abuse of manuals on
" gg'
Marxism-Leninism by the Schools of Revolutionary Instruction) 
cederistas had succumbed to a natural dislike of reading and abstract 
discussion.
In a number of spheres, the work of the CDRs in 1969 assumed 
the character of a community-action project. Members of the 
Education Front of the organisation, for example, were often the 
mainstay of the School Councils - parent-teacher bodies whose 
purpose was to watch over the attendance record of the children of 
the neighbourhood, organise outings and provide other forms of
voluntary .assistance to the institutions to-.which they were 
67 ' .attached. But it was above all with the corning of two new
T!fronts'* after 1966 that comrnunity-action cane to the fore as a 
feature of the activity of the committees. These fronts had 
their origins respectively in the local government reform of 1966 
and the Revolutionary Offensive of 1968.
Before 1966, local government in the sense in which this
phrase is understood in most advanced capitalist countries can
scarcely be said to have existed. In pre-revolutionary Cuba
’’decades of systematic rigging of local elections, of overly
centralised government (the central government took well over
ninety per cent of total tax revenues) and the corresponding
'Havana mentality', and of foreign domination or control of internal
affairs, all reduced local government to the status of a poor 
1 68orphan". Since 1959, the central ministries and agencies of
the Revolutionary Government had created their own local adminis­
trations which often overlapped with regard to both territory and 
function, and the Local Boards of Coordination, Execution and
Inspect ion (JUCEI), which sought to comb ine local government
■ go
functions with a quasi-economic supervisory role,"' served to
increase rather than to reduce the overall centralisation of the
system. In 1965 therefore meetings were held between the chairmen
of the provincial JUCEI and regional Party secretaries with a view
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to a thoroughgoing reform of local government. The result was
Poder Local, a new system of local administrations based at the 
leveb of the urban Section or rural Municipality and directed by 
committees of delegates from local units of government ministries, 
the Party and the CDRs. In 1966 Poder Local was inaugurated and
in 1967 the first CDR delegates , elected on the basis of two
'V.-
delegates per zone , took their seats at Sectional level. One
aim of the reform was to permit the coordination of supplies to
building materials from the central ministries with voluntary:
labour to be mobilised by the CDRs for such purposes as the laying
of drains9 construction of parks and building of recreational
facilities9 and from 1966 most committees became involved in
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projects of this kind.
As was suggested above9 one of the earliest functions adopted 
by the Comma,ttees for the Defence of the Revolution in addition to 
"vigilance” was that of servicing and overseeing the consumer 
; distribution sector. The CDRs retained this function until 1968 
in the imprecise sense that CDR vigilance was expected to be 
universal as well as eternal. As a result of the "Revolutionary 
Offensive” of that year* however, their role as consumer-watchdogs 
was given institutional form. Some 589000 small private 
businesses were brought into the state sector during the Offensive, 
accounting for the bulk of retail food distribution throughout the 
island. Following the expropriation measure, the CDRs were 
directed to hold assemblies at Zone level to select managers for 
the shops now under state control and thereafter to establish 
’Zone Councils* composed of local consumers and interested official 
parties to discuss the merits and shortcomings of the new distribution 
system. Although upon appointment the new managers became formally 
responsible to the Ministry of Internal Commerce (MIHCIN), they were 
briefed to maintain "close contact and consultation" with the CDRs 
in the vicinity, "to avoid the danger of bureaucratisation and to
7 3  - .
assure the best possible service". In one neighbourhood in
Havana the Services Front of the CDRs held Zone Council meetings
as often as once in two or three months and9 although it was
stressed that criticisms of MXNCIH employees should be made "in
a revolutionary manner, and not in the manner of people who create
7t|
disturbances in grocery-shops and in queues", attendance was 
good and the debate lively.
Despite these innovations, most of the CDR members interviewed
by the author in 1969 still regarded Vigilance as the most
important "front" of activity, as did the organisation’s National 
■ 75 ■Directorate. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, 
enemies of the revolution in the strict sense of saboteurs and 
anti-comniuiiistguerrili^-' contingents still made their appearance 
from time to time during the late * sixties, as they have continued
y g
to do since, though nearly always from abroad. Secondly and
more significantly, the focus of CDR "vigilance" proper had broadened
and shifted decisively, being now concerned almost exclusively
■ 77 .
with combatting common crime. The principal forms taken by 
CDR vigilance in 1969 consisted in the posting of watchmen in 
pairs at strategic points - near warehouses and dry-cleaning 
establishments, and on street-corners - and the organisation of 
mobile patrols, sometimes but not always in cooperation with the 
ordinary police (DOE). Its object was the prevention and
detection of burglary. The CDR magazine established the continuity
between this and the earlier activities of the organisation in the 
following terms in an article published in 1968:
When at Giron our armed forces and militia 
were fighting the mercenaries, the forces of 
the people, recently organised in the CDRs, 
gave battle in the rearguard................
Today, we must face a similar encounter. The 
battlefield of today is not at Girdn but in
agriculture. But the activity of the masses 
in the cities and villages must be directed 
once again towards paralysing the activities 
of those who attempt to take advantage of the 
mobilisation to destroy the people's property, 
or to plunder it
The function, too, of Castro1s pointed discussion in his CDR 
anniversary speech in 1968 of a case of vandalism with apparently 
political undertones was to teach cederistas to see crime preven­
tion in political terms.
It is logical that, in keeping with the rate 
at which the revolutionary wave advances, 
the hatred of its enemies should increase ... 
and that they should do everything possible 
to damage the work of the Revolution.
Whatever the future held in store the CDRs would remain ”in the
7 g • - ''' :
front lino ....... permanently vigilant”.
The role of the committees in regard to common crime was not
restricted to its deterrence and detection by means of the patrols.
There was a need, it was argued at the National Forum on Internal
Order held in 1969, to educate cederistas in the causes of various
types of crime since their work "should also involve educational
work, social work and prevention in cases where it is seen that a
young person, or any person, is going wrong”. This concern,
combined with the type of conditions faced by CDR members in some
neighbourhoods in Havana, placed the committees in a situation
where they were forced to operate as informal social-work agencies.
Formal social work in Cuba in 1969 was the responsibility of the
Comisidn Nacional de Prevencion Social, a body composed of all the
interested government ministries, state agencies, and political 
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organisations, and the work of the Commission on the ground was
handled by Provincial, Regional and Municipal or Sectional organs
of the same composition* The bulk of the total staff of the
commission, though not of its central bodies, was composed
however of non-vocational social workers recruited largely from
82the ranks of the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC). Candidate- 
social workers completed a short part-time course of training and 
an aptitude test before taking up their duties, which included 
visiting the homes, schools, and street-CDRs of potential juvenile 
offenders((as identified by previous convictions, or habitual 
absence from school) and of the inmates of reformatories, and
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visiting female offenders. Some social workers selected in
this way argued that non-vocational staff were more effective than 
professionals in the kind of situations they encountered in the 
course of their work. Being themselves of humble origin, they 
argued, the shock-troops of the FMC were able to distinguish real 
social or psychiatric problems from sheer brazenness [descaro], 
and to offer sympathy without gullibility. The official reason 
for relying upon non-vocational staff, however, was the disjunc­
tion existing between the need for professional social workers 
and their availability, and it was this situation which also 
called for the mobilisation of the efforts of ordinary CDR members 
wherever possible. A factor which helped to confirm and extend 
this trend towards an orientation of the CDRs towards ’social work’ 
was, as we shall see, the coming of the Popular Courts during 
1967-68. Not only were cederistas encouraged to attend the 
hearings of the new courts but CDR chairmen were required to submit 
written reports on the situation of accused parties and were often
gty
called upon to testify in open court.
The evolution or the CDR Vigilance front during the second 
half of the ’sixties, taken in conjunction with the reform of 
local government and the creation of neighbourhood consumers’ 
assemblies, completed the conversion of the committees into multi­
functional community organisations whose structure and purposes 
had little in common with those of the ’Vigilance committees” of 
autumn I960. The result was something less than a new and 
effective system of proletarian democracy: whilst certain gains
had been made with respect to the localisation of control over 
questions of exclusively local concern and restricted geographic­
ally in their ramifications, these developments manifestly failed 
to present an alternative to the regulation of society in general 
by means of hierarchically-ordered structures. The CDRs had 
nibbled at bureaucracy around the edges, showing neither the 
inclination nor the possibility of reaching its core. A number 
of the innovations about which cederistas were most proud differed 
little in substance from what became normal practice in many citie 
of the advanced capitalist world during World War II. But pre- 
revolutionary Cuba had not been an advanced capitalist society 
(nor had the country experienced the impact of a modern war). 
Traditionally, secondary institutions operating at the level of 
the urban neighbourhood had been few and weak, and they had been 
fewer still in the hamlets and sugar-centrales of the interior. 
Such voluntary associations and cooperative ventures as had
thrived in the cities had been mainly imitative and exclusively
85restricted to the middle classes, and, where the citizenry at 
large was concerned, the absence of a strong social-democratic 
tradition and the corruption of the trade unions had meant that 
the idea of cooperation itself had made little headway. The
modest achievements of the committees had to be assessed in this 
.light.
The very growth of CDR enrolment during the ’sixties helped 
to assure the transformation of the character of the organisation. 
At the beginning of the decade street-CDRs had been 'committees' 
in a literal sense, even though they were self-appointed and
responsible to no one* By 1969 the size of the typical CDR'was
such that it often consisted of the entire active adult population 
of the street or block. Whilst some of its members might be 
assigned specific responsibilities and duties in connection with 
the various "fronts”, thereby becoming a part of an 'inner circle' 
of cederistas» many others would have no such position, so that
in effect many CDRs came to have the form of residents’ councils
rather than of committees in any meaningful sense. This trans­
formation did not occur without friction or without creating new 
problems alongside new opportunities but discussion along these 
lines is best reserved until I have identified a new phase in the 
development of the organisation, corresponding to its period of 
renewed growth since 1970.
THE CDRs AND THE HEW MASS LINE, 1970-73
As we noticed at the beginning, CDR enrolment has grown 
most rapidly in three periods since 1960. The first influx of 
new members into the organisation was the product of a decision 
on the part of the top leadership of the revolutionary regime in 
the period in which it first came to grapple with the problems 
not merely of consolidating the revolution politically and 
defending it against external and internal attack but of converting
it into a viable social and economic enterprise. The second phase 
of rapid growth, we may conclude from the foregoing, stemmed from 
the renewed self-confidence and energy of those elements in the 
Cuban leadership which identify closely with Fidel Castro and his 
distinctive conception of the nature of revolutionary politics.
It is not possible to specify except in a negative sense what 
strategy for the building of the CDRs might have emerged from the 
continued association of the organisation's National Directorate 
with pro-Soviet tendencies in the PCC. The Fidelista strategy 
however clearly incorporated the following three elements: (a)
an out-going approach towards recruitment, (b) a rationalisation 
of structures and membership designed to permit a close coordination 
between the CDRs and the new Party on the one hand and local 
government on the other, and (c) encouragement of mass "particip­
ation" in every sphere of local neighbourhood life. ,
Since 1970, none of these elements has ceased to play a part 
in the development of the CDRs. During the first part of 1970 
the committees were subject to a neglect - reflected in the zero 
growth of their membership - which affected not only the CDRs, 
and not only political organisations, due to the single-mindedness 
with which Cubans participated in the sugar-harvest "of the Ten 
Million Tons". In 1971 and 1972 however the growth rate of the 
organisation may be judged to have been restored to very respectable 
levels, particularly in view of the fact that by the latter date
about seventy per cent of the adult population of Cuba belonged
■86to it. Two additional points are worth noting about this recent 
expansion. First in 1972 women comprised forty-nine per cent of 
CDR members, as compared with only forty-four per cent in 1963,
thus restoring the sex-balance of the total membership of the 
87 'organisation. Seconds enrolment in rural areas appears to
have been catching up: whereas in 1969 seventy-two per cent of
the members were resident in zones officially classified as urban,
88by 1972 this figure had fallen to sixty-five per cent. The
range of the activities for which the organisation is responsible
has never been greater and its practical accomplishments never on
so great a scale. Fidel Castro talked at length about the
committees and their role in each of his CDR anniversary speeches
between 1970 and 1972. On 28 September 1971 he announced that
in the fields of education* health, salvage and voluntary labour
the pertinent indices of CDR achievement had multiplied several
times since the early /sixties, and even since the latter part of 
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the decade, going on to conclude that ”..... there is no 
problem, no difficulty, no task that cannot be tackled by the 
Committees for the Defence of the Revolution”.
Could it be said that, this mass organisation has 
exhausted all its possibilities? Could it be 
said that the Committees for the Defence of the 
Revolution have done all they could possibly do?
HoJ Life is a teacher. Life reveals new and 
often unsuspected possibilities*^9
A notable development starting in 1971 has been the mobilisation
of voluntary labour brigades on a large scale for work on
construction projects varying in scale from the rebuilding of
the main sports stadium in Havana, through the building of houses
91and schools, to street-repairs. In this connection, Castro
returned to a familiar theme:
The thing we regret is the fact that we hadnVt 
thought about these things beforei that these 
new ways that are coming up now hadnft been 
discovered befox^ e. But also in this case, as
Marx said, no society changes until it realises 
the need to change, and this realisation of the 
need to change does not appear until such time 
as the conditions that make that change possible 
are given* Also, many of the things which have ' 
appeared in the course of the Cuban Revolution 
some of them original - are basically the result 
of the struggle for life, of the struggle to 
overcome obstacles and meet needs. It is 
precisely the struggle that inspires the 
intelligence and engenders the best solutions.
....... Have we by any chance reached the limit
.of. our'possibilities.;;for mobilising the masses ’ 
and finding solutions through the masses? Hot 
at all! Far from it. ....... This is what the
Revolution has taught us. There is no difficulty, 
obstacle or problem that cannot be overcome and 
solved by the tenacity and will of the people: by 
the tenacity, the courage and the will of the 
' masses!®^  : ■
In the context of the Defence Committees, neither the 
elevation of pragmatism to the status of a revolutionary virtue 
nor the importance attributed to “mobilising the masses” was a 
new departure for Fidel Castro. In what sense, then, is it 
correct to say that a new phase in the evolution of the CDR system 
was initiated in 1970? The answer to this question belongs to 
the wider history of the problem of organisation in Cuba since 1970 
and calls for a'- short':digression from' our central theme'.'::
In the late summer and early autumn of 1970, in the aftermath'- 
of the failure to achieve the important and heavily publicised 
target of ten million metric tons of refined sugar in the zafra of 
that year, Castro initiated a new turn in Cuban policy with 
regard to mass organisations in general and the trade unions in 
particular. The major stimulus of the new course, which was 
outlined in a rapid sequence of public speeches by Castro on 23 
August, 3 September and 28 September, was the longstanding problem
of poor labour discipline and managerial inefficiency in state- 
owned agriculture and industry. The critical character of the 
economic situation of summer 1970 as described by Castro in his 
28 July speech served to underline the need for innovations of 
a drastic sort but both the existence of the problem and the 
necessity of finding solutions for it on the level of political 
organisation were clearly recognised in a speech by the then 
Organising Secretary of the PCC, Armando Hart, as early as
03
September 1969." The problem of absenteeism, Hart then argued,
was related to "problems which are basically of a political,
organisational or leadership nature". There was a fundamental
need to "involve the people and the workers even more in the tasks
of the Revolution" because, whilst capitalism could function well
enough without mass support for management, "under socialism, an
administration not based on mass participation and support cannot
function as such and is not efficient as an administration". The
need for worker-participation in management did not arise as a
concession to bourgeois-liberal concepts of democracy; on the
contrary, it was "an objective need for the development of the
Revolution". The Party secretary concluded by sketching a reform
of the trade union movement which, by reconstituting it on an
industry-by-industrybasis, would permit it to play a greater
01|
part than it had done to date in raising productivity."
It was along these lines that Fidel Castro set out, hesitantly 
at first, in July 1970. After absolving the Cuban proletariat 
of responsibility for the failure of the harvest and praising it 
as "the truly revolutionary class, the most potentially revolutionary 
class", he went on to mention the possibility of "introducing a
number of new ideas?*, including the idea that in industry the
* problems of managing a plant should not fall exclusively to the
manager and that the time had come to "begin to establish a
collective body in the management of each plant".~ But by what
means was this to be done? Castro first spelt this out,
deepening at the same time his analysis of the causes of the
economic difficulties of the revolutionary regime, at a rally in
late August celebrating the 10th anniversary of the founding of
96 ■the Federation of Cuban Women. The problem, he argued, was 
that the Cuban revolution had been satisfied for too long with 
purely administrative ways of getting things done, and that as a 
result a certain elitist mentality and even "manifestations of 
privilege" had begun to creep in:
Sometimes we speak of developing the awareness 
of our workers, but the fact is that our 
workers* awareness has developed greatly. And 
often we must ask ourselves if it wouldn’t be 
more correct to say that it is we who must 
drink from that fount, from that revolutionary 
awareness that has developed among our workers.
....... Me no longer have to look at things from
the standpoint that it is a minority that will
do the job of developing awareness. No! We 
must also see it from the standpoint that a 
minority charged with specific tasks and 
functions, must get its awareness from the 
people.
It was necessary both to eliminate privilege and to "give the
people ever greater participation in the solution of their own
97problems", Castro insisted. The main way this would be done
. at first would be through the labour movement, not because the 
other mass organisations - like the Women’s Federation and the
CDRs - were unimportant, but on the contrary because in many
respects these organisations were models of what needed to be
achieved; ■ the. ariinediate task was to "place special emphasis *.♦.. 
on the question of the workers* movement so as to raise it to the 
level of the Federation of Women and the Committees for the 
Defence of the Revolution".~
In his CDR anniversary speech, Castro explained what he 
meant by this:
At this moment we are engaged in a great effort, 
to develop our workers* organisations as much 
as possible. Why? Because, unfortunately, for 
the last two years our workers* organisations 
had taken a back seat - not through the fault 
of either the workers * organisations or the 
workers themselves but through our fault, the 
Party’s fault, the fault of the country*s 
political leadership*
Was this done consciously? Wo! It happened 
somewhat unconsciously, spontaneously; it 
happened as a result of certain idealisms.§9
As Castro indicated, work had already begun in the late summer 
and early autumn or 1970 upon the task of ’raising the trade unions 
to the level ofthe FMCsndCDRs.* On 2-3 September a plenary 
meeting attended by 100 trade union delegates from Havana province 
and the national labour federation (CTC) discussed two new 
proposals affecting the labour sector: firstly, the calling of
public meetings up and down the country to debate the draft of a 
new law making habitual absenteeism, or "loafing"; a punishable 
offence; and, secondly but not less importantly, the holding of 
"absolutely free elections" to select the trade union officials 
of a restructured labour movement.^"*
The proposal to make "loafing" an offence"*^ was already
102under semi-public discussion early in 1969. The attitude of
revolutionaries towards persons who refused to take a job or who
were permanently absent from their place of work was graphically 
expressed by Sergio del Valle, the Interior Minister and a 
member of the Politbureau of the PCC in March of that year: "In
a society such as ours", asserted del Valle, "idleness is a 
shameful crime".
Loafers and parasites carry on a base form 
of exploitation because they try to live3 
like members of the bourgeoisie, off the sweat 
of others....... In a society in which he who
will not work shall not eat8 the idle, the 
vagrants, the thieves and the lumpen - all 
those who refuse to be rehabilitated - attempt 
to live like parasites clinging to a healthy 
tree to live off its sap. The Revolution is 
not going to be overindulgent. This has never 
been its policy.
Measures against non-workers would also have been popular in 1969. 
By this time, cederistas had already modified an anti-American 
slogan of an older vintage for the purpose of demanding action 
against loafers, from the walls of Havana or at mass meetings in 
the Plaza de la Revolucion.^^ It would appear however that 
the government and Party leaders decided against hasty administ­
rative measures, judging them liable to prove ineffective. Instead 
they opted for a carefully-prepared and "political" approach.
As Minister of Labour Jorge Risquet explained at the CTC 
meeting in September 1970, the effectiveness of the new law 
depended upon the prior completion of three measures designed to 
permit the centralisation of information and control over the 
country’s manpower. First was the elimination of the non- 
agricultural private sector as a user of manpower, which had 
occurred during the "revolutionary offensive" of 1968. Second was 
the introduction, announced in August 1969, of "labour merit cards" 
which provided both a personal record of each worker’s past
performance and.a means of-keeping track of labour released from
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any workplace for any reason. Finally* the Census of 1970
xias indispensable, as the only absolutely reliable basis for
estimating the total national labour force and hence the
3*00incidence of ’’loafing”. But political preparation was
important too* Maximum publicity should be given to the workers* 
opinions on the new law* "This way,f 8 Castro explained , "the 
popular* non-administrative nature of the law will be clear to 
all "In large measure* the battle will be won in the
discussion of the law itself. Lax? enforcement will be minimal". , 
In the event* a draft law xras published in January 1971 and in 
March it was announced that over three million workers* students, 
soldiers and peasants.had discussed it, approving or amending it, 
in 115,000 assemblies held by their respective mass political 
organisations.'1'08 The final version of the lax? - three times as 
long as the draft, though similar in substance - went into effect 
on 1 April, but by this time no less than 101,000 men had
10Q
registered for jobs at the offices of the Ministry of Labour.
It was this, as a Granma editorial explained, that made the law a 
success "because the Revolution, seeking to obtain the under­
standing and a change in the conduct of those who maintained a
mistaken position, is glad to have to apply the lax-? to only an
110
insignificant minority of recalcitrant elements On
1 May 1971, Fidel Castro attributed this result to the moral 
authority acquired by the laxf by the mere fact of its public 
discussion and approval, predicting that a similar procedure 
would be pursued in future for "fundamental lax?s".^^
During the nineteen-sixties the Cuban trade unions of the
CTC-R acquired a reputation, which the}/ nav well have deserved,
as the least vital and most noribund of all the revolutionary
mass organisations. As Castro himself has recognised9 this'was
not only not due to any particular failings on the part of their
membership9 but resulted from the accumulated effects of events
in the late *fifties and the policy of the Revolutionary Govern-
112ment since the early *sixties. Under the control of Batistiano 
union officials for most of the pre-revolutionary decade the 
labour movement as such could claim little credit for the revolution 
of January 1959. During the first year of Revolutionary 
Government^ moreover9 the CTC, and the Labour Front of the 26 July 
Movement within it, was split apart by Castrofs policy of co­
operating with the Communists of the PSP. Although at the end of 
the day the CTC was won for the 1revolutionary* position, the
means by which this result was achieved did little to enhance its
n
I 113internal democracy and 5/dependence. Thereafter, the trade
unions were consciously transformed into quasi-administrative or
narrowly exhortative machines without real independence vis-a-vis
government ministries and plant managers in accordance with the
theory - reminiscent of the position defended briefly by Trotsky
in the Soviet debate of 1920 - that the raison d 1etre of union
independence had disappeared with the U.S. monopolies. Ac James
0 fConnor has pointed out, ’’the concept of unions as independent
instruments of the working class and the means of workers* control
■ llhof industry never received serious consideration”. The Twelfth
National Congress of the CTC in 1966 was an event of some importance, 
marking the passage of the ”old” Communist leadership of the 
organisation and the adoption by a new leadership of the then 
Fidelista line on labour incentives, but it is possible that one
effect of thin turn was to reduce r/till further the a.utonomy
115'and internal vigour of the unions.
In no sense did the trade unions reform Of 1970 and after 
reflect a rejection of the view that the primary aim of organs 
of labour representation in a transitional society is to aid 
production and raise productivity. On the contrary, the argument 
ran, the unions needed to be restructured and to have internal 
democracy precisely to permit them to fulfil this role adequately. 
The procedure followed from November 1970, when the National 
Committee of the CTC called the election of Executive Committees 
of new trade union *locals * : j~secciones sindicalesj in work centres
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throughout the country, reflected this pattern of concerns.
Elections at this level, as at higher levels later, were by direct
and secret ballot, a leaflet giving "Instructions for the Electoral
Process in the Trade Union Locals" being distributed beforehand to
■ ■ 118every worker m  the country. The attitude of the Party
leadership towards the possibility that the workers might choose 
as their leaders "absentees,.liars, hacks or corrupt leaders from 
the past" or people who would "take advantage" of their "real 
grievances" was that this was unlikely but also that "if the 
leader is not true to the spirit of the Revolution, the masses 
can remove him at any t i m e " . T h e  meaning to be attached to 
this was clarified by Jorge Risquet a year later. By this time 
35,000 locals had been established and nearly 163,000 local 
executive members elected to lead the workers "into the fulfilment 
of their revolutionary duties and in the defence of their 
revolutionary rights" for a period of one year* According to 
Risquet, "the broadly based nature of the elections necessarily
produced a certain quality of leader in keeping with;the 
characteristics , level of political -awareness and average ideol­
ogical development of the workers in the place whore he was
120 ■ ' elected". The "great majori ty" had proved to be of a high
quality, but where this was not the case the revolutionary
leadership had treated it as a valuable indication as to where
further political work was required:
Each of these "warning lights" constitutes 
a challenge to our political strength; to 
the power of the ideas of the Revolution; 
to our duty to make these ideas take root 
and consolidate them everywhere , man by man 
and place by place. This is why we should 
never turn off any of these ^warning lights”, 
x?hich serve to keep us on our toes, unless we 
do so by taking action against whatever it is 
that turned the so "lights" on.*^l
Local union elections were followed in late autumn 1970, 
during 1971 and in the early part of 1972 by a series of national 
production plenaries, each attended by workers1 delegates from a 
major sector of industry. After every meeting a new national 
trade union was established for the sector in question, with its 
own executive body elected by the delegates present. By 26 July 
1971, nine national unions had been established in this way, and 
a full Workers* Congress was promised for the second naif of 
1 8 7 2 . By 1 May 1972, following new local union elections, 
a total of eighteen national organisations had been created, 
completing the formation of what Fidel Castro called "a powerful 
trade union movement with an absolutely democratic foundation". 
Intermediate bodies had been established within each union, 
totalling 116 provincial councils, 561 regional committees and 
1,319 municipal or sectional committees, and again it was stated
that the 13th Congress of the CTC, the first to be held under
12*4 -the new system, was scheduled for the end of 1972.
On May Day 1973 Castro indicated that the Congress, which
had failed to take place in 1972, was now due to be held the
125following November. Whatever the nature of the difficulties
which necessitated the postponement of this crowning event of the 
post-1970 trade union reform, however, it is clear that important 
progress has been made within the new framework in the decisive 
area of labour discipline and productivity. A notable feature 
of the fturnf of 1970 was the re-adoption:*; by the Cuban leaders, 
following their period of extreme heterodoxy on such matters during 
1966-69, or widely-accepted views on the importance of the estab­
lishment of output standards, the organisation of emulation 
campaigns and the controlled deployment of ’material incentives1.
In explicit recognition of the one-sidedness of the policy pursued 
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after 1966, Fidel Castro explained in May 1971:
We must never do anything that may go against 
the development of ....... collectivist
consciousness, communist consciousness. On 
the contrary we must continue to develop this 
consciousness more and even more. ..........
However the way to communism is not a question 
of consciousness alone. It also has to do 
with the development of both the forces of 
production and the material base.
We cannot fall into the idealism of thinking 
that because we want communism and struggle to 
obtain it and because consciousness is the 
most important factor that must be developed, 
that consciousness has been developed and that 
we already have the necessary material foundation 
and the communist society where all men act 
exactly the same as a result of the dictates of 
their consciousness. This really is not the 
case. It is a process; an ever-upward process.
.......
If in the pursuit of communism we idealistically 
go farther ahead than is possible - and we should
always try to move ahead as fast as is 
possible - if we go farther ahead than 
is possible, we will have to retreat sooner
or later.127
The "retreat11 had been begun on several fronts. Ey May 1971, 
output standards [normas de trabajo j had been established or re- 
established in 58H work centres throughout Cuba. The signific­
ance of this modest step may be judged from Castro1s own admission 
that the true labour requirements of these plants were revealed in 
the process of normaci6n to be a mere sixteen per cent of manage­
ment estimates. A target was therefore set to complete the 
setting of output standards in 1,500 work centres by the end of
1971, and a national meeting on work norms and organisation fixed 
128 'for January 1972. By May of the latter year, over 3,000 work
centres, accounting for approximately one-third of the country*s
129trade union membership, had been included in the programme.
1972 was declared the "Year of Socialist Emulation”, in recognition
130of the "basic” character of this method of improving productivity.
Although the use of patriotic and other ’moral* themes in emulation
programmes was still recommended and the superiority of collective
work-incentives still stressed, material incentives were reintroduced
in this context, together with the selection of individual "Heroes 
131of Labour". By May 1973, two million electrical appliances -
the type of goods chosen as most suitable for the purpose - had
been sold to workers selected on the basis of labour merit by
■ 132their trade union locals. Efforts were made to reduce the
quantity of money in circulation in the economy, with a view to
mitigating some of the effects of the atrophy of regular economic
incentives during the ’sixties, by increasing the price of ’non-
133
essential* goods such as cigarettes and plastic sandals.
Finally but not least importantly, a general campaign was mounted
to increase the sensitivity of managers and workers with respect
134to production costs as well as to output targets.
135The above sketch of the new "mass policy" as applied to
the trade unions will serve to place in the correct perspective
our discussion, to which I now wish to return, of the evolution
since 1970 of the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution.
Regarded as a set of general organisational principles, the Cuban
version of the mass line consists of two major elements which
have their origin in classical Leninist theory. The first is a
rule to the effect that an "organic separation" is to be maintained
between ’vanguard* organisations (including most importantly the
Party) on the one hand and both state agencies and mass organisations
on the other. Non-observance of this rule in the case of the
trade unions, Cuban officials began to argue in 1970, was a major
factor contributing to their poor performance in the second half
of the previous decade. The Advance Workers’ Movement, a
selective organisation of aspirants to Party membership created in
1966 with the aim of assuring the PCC a tried and trusted
proletarian cadre, had tended to supplant the regular trade union
organisations at workplace level, with deleterious consequences
for the overall consciousness of the working class. At the same
time "a certain identification” had sometimes occurred between the
managements of economic enterprise and the local Party,
exacerbating the problem of the unions and also preventing party
cadres from performing their role as the political vanguard of the 
136working class. But this tendency had not been restricted to
the economy. In July 1971, Fidel Castro announced the impending
"organic separation" of the Young Communist League (UJC) - the
Party’s youth section and a ’vanguard’ formation - from the
137Federation of University Students (FEU), During the period
leading up to the Second Congress of the UJC in March/April 1972,
base units of the organisation carried out an evaluation of each
of their members in a spirit of "thoughtful and far-reaching
analysis, real criticism and self-criticism, and internal
democracy". As a result, its National Committee reported, "the
prestige and leading role of the UJC in relation to the mass
of young people was boosted, and the exercise of Leninist organ-
138isational norms was revitalised". Among the criticisms made
of the work of the UJC in the recent past, particular emphasis
was placed upon its members* lack of good study habits and an
acceptable level of political education, a failure to reach the
mass of young people with its influence, and "the application of
139mechanical and extremist concepts in conferring militancy".
In relation to the CDRs, as we noticed earlier, the role of
the Party in the late ’sixties was typified by interventions of
a purely exhortative type,but nevertheless the general tendency
towards a blurring of organisational boundaries was not observable.
More important in this context therefore is the second major
component of the mass policy of 1970, best described as a
concession to the principle set out classically in Lenin's The
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State and Revolution that state functions are the province of 
democratic organs of the mass of the working class. Fidel Castro 
explicitly located himself within this tradition of Leninist 
theory in his words to the FMC in August 1970:
... we have scores of problems at every 
level, in the neighbourhoods, in the cities 
and in the countryside. We must create the 
institutions which give the masses decision-
making power on many of these problems ....
so that it will not be simply a matter of 
the people having confidence in their 
political organisations and leaders and 
their willingness to carry out tasks, but 
that the revolutionary process be at the 
same time -as Lenin wished - a great school 
of Government in which millions of people 
learn to solve problems and carry out the 
responsibilities of government. ....... We
have been able to unleash the energy, interest 
and will to move ahead of millions* .......
Now we must know how to channel that energy ...
toward the possibility of ever greater , 
participation in the decisions that affect 
their lives.
This implies the development of a new society ■ 
and of genuinely democratic principles - really 
democratic - replacing the administrative work 
habits of the first years of the Revolution.
We must begin to substitute democratic methods 
for the administrative methods that run the 
risk of becoming bureaucratic methods.1 ^1
Castro spoke in a similar vein, but more concretely, in his first 
CDR anniversary speech after the ’turn *. "The revolutionary 
•processitself", he explained, "has gradually revealed the incon­
venience of bureaucratic and administrative methods". After the 
reform of the trade unions, the next steps to be taken would 
involve "a more direct participation by the masses in decision 
making and in the solution of problems and a many-sided particip­
ation everywhere, territory-wise, in those problems directly 
under their jurisdiction", and he added:
We are trying to find a way how, starting with 
our mass organisations, to create other 
organisations in which the workers, as workers; 
the Committees for the Defence of the 
Revolution; the women; the young people - in 
fact, everybody - will be represented, so that 
they can carry out close supervision of all 
•[neighbourhood service and retail]] activities 
on a territorial level. This, in addition to
supervision, control and participation in 
those production centres that already have 
some development, that have a workers’ 
nucleus. Therefore, nothing will escape
supervision and control by the masses.J-42
The CDRs, Castro argued in the same speech, were basic to any
developments of the sort mentioned. Firstly the accumulated
"weight and strength" of the organisation had to be considered.
Secondly, its territorial character meant that it could perform
functions which "could never be discharged by other organisations".
And thirdly "the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution
bring together the revolutionaries of all our people, be they
143young or old, adults, men or women". The idea was not, as
Castro stressed some months later, to turn the CDRs, as such, 
into organs of state. Rather, he said, "in contrast to the 
classical bourgeois liberal forms of representation, we are headed 
toward multiple forms of representation, so that our citizens will 
be represented in many ways". Nevertheless "the state, the 
concept of the state, must be established more precisely - and 
this is especially so of the functions of the state". The 
revolutionary leadership had asked themselves
why, in a district or city ....... everything
has to be administered directly by the state.
....... In some cities we are working on the
principle of district organisation with the 
representation of the mass organisations: the 
workers’ organisations, the Committees for the 
Defence of the Revolution, the women's 
organisation or the students* organisations, 
as the case may be, so as to be able to 
organise the districts and begin to turn over 
to them a number of functions that do not 
have to be handled by the state.i44
Castro cited by way of example the possibility that neighbourhood 
organs constituted in this way might be given control over small
hotels, grocery stores and perhaps even supermarkets. The leader­
ship of the CDRs was already holding discussions with the Party 
with a view to reforming the government of the city of Havana, 
but account had to be taken of practical priorities and the 
availability of economic resources. These considerations led to 
the conclusion that, for the time being, the bulk of the organis­
ational efforts made in the cities of Cuba in the coming period 
should be directed towards finding a solution to "the terrible 
problem of housing"
I indicated above that since 1970 the activities in which 
eederistas are involved appear to have undergone no qualitative 
change, even though the scale on which they are undertaken - 
notably in the sphere of voluntary labour in construction - has 
unquestionably increased. It is now possible to add some 
important qualifications to this statement. Firstly, although 
in practice developments in the CDRs to date have remained 
broadly within the framework established in the late ’sixties, 
the revolutionary leadership has gone on record as proposing 
changes which, as we have seen, entail a partial revision of 
Cuban attitudes towards organisation in the light of the Leninist 
theory of the post-capitalist state. Secondly, although for 
the reasons explained above a certain time elapsed before 
attention was given to the organisation of the committees, an 
effort has been made to "strengthen" their internal functioning 
under the direct supervision of the PCC’s Secretariat for 
Organisation. New elections were held between September 1971 
and September 1972 to select responsables to lead Zone and Base 
Committees, and, whilst it appears to have been judged inapprop­
riate to reconstitute higher organs on an elective basis,
municipal, regional and provincial appointments were "submitted
147to the masses for their approval".
The new practice has been introduced of holding annual 
"check-up assemblies" at the national level. The second such 
conference attended by up to 900 delegates and lasting for six 
days in November 1972 may have marked the inauguration of a new 
policy for the selection of the national leadership of the organ­
isation. Proposals for the election of a new Bureau, Secretariat, 
National Directorate and Work Commissions of the CDRs were outlined 
to the delegates by Jesus Montane, Organising Secretary of the PCC 
since 1970, and unanimously approved. The meeting was also
attended by Fidel Castro himself, an indication that unusual
148importance was attributed to it by the Party leadership.
Communists without Cards? - The CDRs and the Future
To conclude this chapter on the evolution of the CDR system 
it will be most appropriate to take up an issue which arises less 
from any particular phase of its development than from the process 
which began in September 1960 considered as a whole. Throughout 
the preceding pages we have been concerned with the ways in which 
the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution have participated 
with greater or lesser intensity and success in various programmes 
and institutional innovations initiated by the Cuban leadership 
since the early ’sixties. One of the most controversial questions 
bearing upon CDR "participation", however, has so far been 
neglected: precisely how significant is CDR membership itself in
the eyes of the ordinary Cubans who belong to the organisation, 
and how seriously do they view this commitment? The problem
arises concretely from any attempt to interpret the committees1 
soaring membership statistics. One view of the matter is well 
expressed in a recent CDR anniversary speech by Fidel Castro. 
Announcing the expansion of the organisation's enrolment to the 
level of seventy per cent of the eligible population, Castro 
asserted:/
This growth, these results, are no accident.
They are the result of twelve years of 
enthusiastic struggle: twelve years of 
experience, twelve years of the development 
of revolutionary spirit among our people.
This mass of millions, this militancy, 
this firmness, this strength, reflects the 
fact that revolutionary ideas have taken root
in the heart of the people.... ....... ......
At first - and even now, to some degree - the 
enemies of the Revolution abroad, the hacks, 
described the CDRs as an espionage organisation.
They imagined a small group of fanatics devoted 
to the defence of the Revolution. They can't 
get it into their heads - because this is too 
big for them - that it is the entire organised 
people on guard.
It is the counter-revolutionaries, not the 
revolutionaries, who represent a tiny m i n o r i t y . i49
Typifying the contrary and opposite view commonly advanced by 
foreign observers of Cuban affairs, the French agronomist Rene 
Dumont has implied that the growth of the CDRs is due preponder­
antly to the spread of merely instrumental conformism on the part
of the mass of the population, owing little or nothing to the
150 -advance of "consciousness".
It is perhaps in the nature of such questions to elicit a 
variety of extreme propositions none of which is amenable to proof 
or refutation in practice beyond narrowly drawn limits. Neverthe' 
less, I wish to suggest, even a tentative effort to probe these 
limits is worth undertaking, if only in order to shift the
argument on to other, more promising terrain. Of the two
positions just outlined, neither may be sustained easily as it
stands. CDR enrolment unquestionably does confer upon the
Cuban worker, housewife or student definite benefits, mostly of
an intangible nature but no less real for being that. Without
pretending to be exhaustive, we may confidently state that to be
"integrated into the Revolution" is to gain an advantage over
other members of society in obtaining various types of employment
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and promotion, on being sentenced by courts of lav?, and in the 
treatment accorded by state agencies and official bodies of all 
sorts. The same may be said, though with more qualification, 
of active participation in the work of the CDRs or the possession 
of a recognised part-time post in the organisation. Tt would 
therefore be illegitimate to conclude on the basis of CDR member­
ship statistics alone that the Cuban masses have been conquered 
by "revolutionary ideas". The existence of conditions which 
permit a plausible account of the expansion of the committees in 
terms of instrumental conformity does not # on the other hand, 
exclude on logical grounds the possibility that its major cause 
may in reality be a long-run change in the political attitudes 
of ordinary Cubans. Casual empirical evidence can of course be 
discovered which appears to support either viev? of CDR participation 
but even the most experienced Cuban observers would hesitate 
before attributing specific weights to the two simple types of 
motive mentioned here, less still to their complex combinations.
There is however an additional obstacle to the satisfactory 
conclusion of a discussion along these lines, which is asfollows. 
The assumption is commonly made from the outset that the criteria
applied by the committees in conferring- membership-- and hence 
the 'objective* status of enrolment - are invariable factors# 
permitting the debate to centre upon the changing motives and 
values of individuals who join the organisation. Is this 
assumption realistic? In order to answer this question we need 
once again to make reference to the orthodox Marxist-Leninist 
distinction as between mass organisations and vanguard organisations.
From their earliest days, the "vigilance committees" were 
regarded by the revolutionary leadership as organisations of the 
masses, being open, as we have seen, to all adults "in agreement 
with the Revolution and prepared to defend it". Neither active 
involvement in the work of the CDRs nor more than a verbal 
commitment to their aims was a prerequisite for membership, and 
this was intentional. In 1969, the present author's observations 
suggested that the expulsion of a member could be produced in 
practice only by either repeated public denunciations by the 
person in question of the policies or leadership of the revolutionary 
regime, or his or her conviction by a court in a relatively serious 
criminal case. On the other hand it is clear that, although 
minimal, the criteria applied in deciding questions of membership 
were of a political or ideological rather than sociological or 
demographic character, in contrast to the policy of other 'mass' 
organisations such as the trade unions, the ANAP or the FEU. It 
is for this reason that the growth statistics of the CDRs, but 
not those of the unions or the student federation, may plausibly 
be cited as evidence of the progress of the revolution and the 
decline of the counter-revolution. Moreover, as will be apparent 
from the foregoing account of the political role of the committees,
cederistas arc regarded by the Part3r leaders as a political - van-. ' 
guard of a certain sort and so regard themselves. The members1 
carnet issued in 1968 stated unequivocally that the CDRs were “a 
vanguard organisation in comparison with the rest of the 
population”, going on to urge its bearer to adopt an exemplary
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attitude in every sphere of social and political life. As
the matter was commonly explained in 1969, cederistas might lack 
Party cards but they were ’’real Communists” all the came; as 
someone had said, they were the ”CommunistS;Without cards”.
The Committees for the Defence of the Revolution thus contain 
and express two contrary principles of organisation: the ideally
inclusive norms of a mass organisation and the necessarily 
exclusive ones pertaining to organisations of the vanguard. An 
underlying tension between these two principles explains a good 
deal about the vicissitudes of CDR recruitment policy over the 
years. R.R. Fagen has suggested how such a contradiction 
typically manifested itself during the early, hectic years of the 
CDRs, the openness of the organisation militating against the 
achievement of its goals as a shop-window of revolutionary 
attitudes and behaviour:
The concept of a mass organisation rapidly 
incorporating into its ranks as many citizens 
as possible clearly conflicts with the concept 
of an exemplary organisation, one in which 
every member behaves with devotion, restraint, 
self-sacrifice, and creativity. In their drive 
for mass participation, and the necessary but 
rapid elevation of persons of little skill and 
experience to positions of organisational ,
importance, the committees have sacrificed a 
great deal of popular support.153
As we saw earlier, it was partly in response to cases of opportunistic 
or misguided behaviour among the first cederistas that a more
systematic j though in .reality not more exclusive, approach .was 
adopted towards recruitment. In the late ’sixties pressures 
from the base of the CDR system in favour of greater exclusive- 
ness in the enrolment or,retention of members were by no means 
absent and it was sometimes complained that the growth of the 
organisation had resulted in a certain undesirable dilution of 
its political content* At this time the National Directorate 
resisted with some force any attempt to narrow the base of the 
committees. In response to the allegation that "non-revolutionaries” 
were being admitted to the organisation today, a spokesman of that 
body insisted in the course of a televised ’talk-in’ that the 
matter had to be viewed "dialectically”:
In our organisation there are comrades who are 
more conscientious and outstanding than others, 
comrades who participate more actively In the 
tasks of the CDRs than others. ....... It seems
to us that our revolutionary work in respect of 
those who are less active should be directed 
towards turning them into activists; by our own 
example-we have to make the people who do not 
work very hard into activists. It is a 
dialectical process. ....... The fact is, the
CDRs are not the Party, which is a vanguard 
organisation; ....... the Committees for the
Defence of the Revolution are a broad mass 
organisation. And if we don’t educate people 
inside the CDRs, if we ..don’t make room for 
them in an organisation of the Revolution, what 
can they belong to? What education will they 
get?15H
The logic of this position, it seems to this observer, was 
already leading in the late ’sixties towards a progressive 
weakening of the vanguard principle as the basis of the CDRs.
Attacks were frequently made upon "extremists” who "see enemies 
of the Revolution everywhere” and who exploit the open-endedness 
of the concept of ’support for the Revolution’ - its failure to
distinguish the revolution as a process from its current programme
or.leadership - in an exclusivist sense. Extremismo, it was
stressed, did a good deal of damage to the revolutionary cause, .
much more than the occasional admission of a person of dubious
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revolutionary credentials. The intensification since 1970
of the tendency on the part of the revolutionary leadership to 
regard the committees as, in one sense or another, representative 
of the Cuban masses has doubtless served to further weaken the 
concept of the CDRs as a popular vanguard.
To the extent that such a trend exists - incidentally 
complicating beyond possibilitjr the task of interpreting membershi 
statistics - it is to be welcomed. Cuba does not have a system 
of soviet democracy. The revolution has however created in the 
CDRs an organisation of mass proportions which bestows upon its 
members a sense of ’belonging* within the post-revolutionary state 
and even, 5.n a limited way, the right to be consulted. The 
direction of Cuban policy upon such matters cannot be predicted 
vrith any certainty. VJhat is incontestable nevertheless is that 
the future of the revolution, and of the committees within it, 
lies with the simultaneous extension and universalisation of this 
right on every level.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
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important role to play in the sphere of vigilance, they v:ere not 
expected to usurp the functions either of the security organs or 
of the judiciary. Cesar Escalante, "Los Comitds de Defense de 
la Revolucion", Cuba Socialista, ano 1, No, 1 (September 1961).
25. Each CDR adopted the name of one of the martyrs of Cuba’s Wars
of Independence, the political conflicts of the ’20s and ’30s
or the recent struggles against Batista, the CIA, etc. For a 
collection of reports by Cuban journalists on this phase of the 
CDRs, see Pueblo Organizado (Havana: Ediciones Con la Guardia en 
Alto, 1965).
26* Revolucion, 28 September 1962, p. 4 cited by Fagen, op.cit., p. 76. 
The disappearance of about 7,000 committees since the previous 
September in spite of a fifty per cent increase in total membership
indicates that the reorganisation included some consolidation of
base units.
27. "Discurso pronunciado el 16 de marzo de 1962", extract in Castro, 
Sobre los Comites, op. cit.
28. Con la Guardia en Alto, September 1967, p. 7.
29. See Gil Bias Sergio, "La Escuela de cuadros de los CDR", in 
Pueblo Organizado, op.cit., pp. 29-39; Los CDR en Granjas y 
Zonae Rurales (Havana: Ediciones Con la Guardia en Alto, 1965), 
p. lOff. For the content of the CDR courses at Sectional Level, 
see - Material de Estudio para los CIR, Nos♦ 1-5 (Havana: Ediciones 
Con la Guardia en Alto, 1962-65), and on the EIR see Fagen, op.cit., 
Chapter 5.
los Comitesp op.cit
30. Most members who discussed the question with the author in 1969
believed the CDRs to be sul generis and Castro himself once
referred to them as "a Cuban invention”. Along similar lines, 
a spokesman of the National Directorate described the committees
in 1969 as "a. contribution by the Cuban revolution to the ever
richer experience of humanity" and a creation which "other 
peopless when they liberate themselves, will be able to imitate”. 
However he added that the organisation maintains fraternal 
relations with the Popular Patriotic Front of Hungary, with the 
National Fronts in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, and with the 
Bulgarian Patriotic Front; the Cuban organisation felt a 
particular affinity with the last mentioned "because, whereas 
the CDRs were created by Fidel, the Patriotic Front was created 
by George Dimitrov, the great leader of the Bulgarian people".
Omelio Valdes in El Pueblo Pregunta, op.cit., p. 12.
31. Baltasar Enero, "Un invento eubano", in Pueblo Organizado, op.cit.,
; P* 13.
32. For the 1962 figpre on women, Jose Matar, "Dos anos de
experiencia de los Comitds de Defense de la Revolucion", Cuba 
Socialista, ano 2, No. 15 (November 1962). For 1963 figures, 
Revolucidn, 27 September 1963, p. 2 , cited by FagenB op«cit., 
p. 83. This source contains the only available statistics 
showing the socio-economic status of CDR members and activists, 
on the basis of which Fagen (ibid.)-. has constructed the 
following table.
Occupational Composition of the CDR Membership and Cadres in 
September 1963
Occupation Percent of total Percent of all
. -.membership, . cadres
(K = approx. (N = approx.
I,5h0,000) 50,000)'
49.8%
17.1
16.1
10.0
6.5
99.5%
Workers (industrial
and agricultural wage
earners) 30.2%
Housewives 25.4
White-collar employees 
(empleados) 2 0 . 1
Peasants (small
landowners) 6.8
Students 5.6
Self-emplo}^ed persons 3.8
Unemployed persons 2.9
Professionals 2 . 1
Retired persons 1.5
-Small.businessmen • .6
TOTALS 100.0%
Cadres are defined here as those who hold positions in the 
Provincial, District and Sectional Directorates, and therefore 
include both full-time and part-time officials. The most 
notable features of the table are the relatively low participation 
of the peasantry as regards membership, and the contribution of 
"housewives" in both columns.
33. "Conclusions of the Central Committee", GNR, 4 February 1958, p. 2
34. According to a member of the staff of the National Directorate of 
the CDRs (author’s interview, Departamento de Divulgacion, 
Direccion Nacional de los CDR, 30 July 1969) Matar was "sacked by 
Fidel", which is probably accurate in substance. The National 
Directorate is formally responsible to the Central Committee of 
the Party. The latter body however seldom meets and then only 
for the purpose of ratifying decisions already taken by the 
Political Bureau, which has been comprised since 1965 by the same 
group of loyal Fidelistasi Osvaldo Dortic6 s,Raul Castro, Juan 
Almeida, Armando Hart, Guillermo Garcia, Sergio del Valle and 
Ramiro Valdes, in addition to Fidel himself. Tor the names, see 
Cuba Socialistss November 1965 and reports on public events in 
Gl?R up to the time of writing. On Matar*s appointment in Hungary 
Thomas, op.cit., p. 1468.
35. "Conclusions of the Central Committee", loc.cit. Matar was not 
stripped of his Party membership, as were others of those involved 
because of "extenuating circumstances" presumably including his 
long and otherwise satisfactory service at the CDR National 
Directorate.
36# Bohemia, 26 September 1969, p. 52.
37. As of 1 May 1969, total CDR membership was 2,370,600, but by 
28 September it had reached 3,222,147. Sources: Direccion 
Nacional CDR, "Control do Organiemos y Miembros, etapa 2 de 
enero al Iro de Mayo" (mimeo), 15 Hay 1969; Bohemia, 24 
September 1971, pp. 46-53. In Havana province the committees * 
membership grew by as much as forty per cent in little more than 
four months. Calculated from Direcci^n Nacional, op.cit. and
: Granina, 4 September 1969. There are other indications that this 
was a particularly impressive period of CDR expansion in urban 
centres (Havana being the most urbanised province). As we saw 
above, in 1963 the CDRs organised thirty per cent of the adult 
population in rural areas and thirty-four per cent in urban areas; 
if, for the sake of a rough comparison, we take the May 1969 
membership figures and the 1970 Census results on the distribution 
of the population aged 15 and above between rural and urban 
areas, we get corresponding proportions of thirty-four per cent 
and fifty per cent* Calculated from Direccion Nacional, op.cit. 
and "Preliminary Data, Census on Housing and Population", GNR,
10 January 1971, pp. 8-9.
38. See Bohemia, 24 September 1971, pp. 46-53; and GNR. 8 October 
1972 diagram p. 10.
39. Departamento de Divulgacion, CDR National Directorate to author,
30 July 1969.
40. The complaints against the Castro leadership allegedly 
harboured by the "microfaction” included the promotion of Party 
cadres "of petty bourgeois rather than proletarian extraction" 
and "the gradual replacement of long-time Communists* because 
their position is considered pro-Soviet". Speech by Raul 
Castro to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba,
29 and 30 January 1968, in S. Clissold (ed.)s Soviet Relations
with Latin America, 1918-1968 (London: Oxford University Press
and RIIA, 1970), p. 296.
41. "Siete Anos con la Guardia en Alto", op.cit.s p. 15.
42. Calculated from Direccion Nacional, op.cit.
43. A national average of just under thirty-six* By 1972, there 
were 4,236,342 cederistas distributed between about 70 9000 base 
CDRs, which raised the average overall to around sixty members 
per committee. GWR» 8 October 1972, p. 10.
44. Direccion Nacional, op.cit. Sectional Committees in Havana
consisted of three appointed full-time staff (’Coordinator*,
’Organiser* and ’Vigilance Officer*). together with about a dosen 
part-time responsables.
45. See the discussion later in this chapter on the ’turn* of 1970.
46. To the author.
47. To the author.
48. "Discurso pronunciado el 28 de Septiembre de 1961" in Discursos 
de Fidel en los Aniversarios de los CDR» op.cit., p. 35, p. 41.
49. "Discurso pronunciado el 28 de Spetiembre de 1987", Discursos 
de Fidel, op.cit., p. 221. Castro went on to cite the CDRs as 
’’living proof" of the value of learning from experience and of 
desisting from devising "abstract institutions":
Who ever imagined an institutions like this one? Which 
classic work of revolutionary theory ever spoke of such 
an institution? .Which programme, which manifesto, which 
declaration ever mentioned on any occasion anything 
remotely similar to this? It wasn’t in the books!
(Ibid., p. 225)
50. Ibid., pp. 225-6, p. 227.
51. See Discursos de Fidel, op.cit. Castro's 1961 CDR. Anniversary 
speech contained an extended discussion of social parasitism and 
the need for a radical change; those of 1962 and 1963 were 
taken up with international matters arising from the Missile 
Crisis and its aftermath; in 1964 Castro employed his CDR speech 
to launch the first of his campaigns against "bureaucratism" 
(elephantiasis of the administrative system); in 1965 he concerned 
himself with-'.two impending events - the creation of the PCC and 
the opening of the port of Camarioca for purposes of emigration; 
and his 1966 CDR speech .was one of a series in which he broached
at length the disputed question of moral incentives. See also 
"Cuestiones Vitales Planteadas por Fidel en los Aniversarios 
de los CDR”* Con la Guardia en Alto 9 September 1988 9 pp. 34-39•
52. "Discurso pronunciado el 28 de Septiembre de 1961”. op.cit.,
p. 6 8 .
53. Direccion Nacional de los CDR. "Doberes de los Hiembros de los 
CDR” (carnet), pp. 14-24.
54. Maintenance of work-disclpline* co-operation with the managers 
of retail establishments5 assuring the implementation of 
government measures5 self-education in the tasks of tie revolution
; and of development„ technical education for adults s upholding the 
spirit of sacrifice and of honesty , agricultural voluntary labour s 
salvage* blood donations* local governments militia training* the 
duties of parenthood in the home and in regard to the school* 
sports* culture* civil defence and solidarity with other peoples 
in struggle..
55. Con la Guardia en Alto* September 19679 p. 3.
56. The phrase was widely used* but see for instance Omelio Valdes in 
El Fueblo rregunta. op.cit.* p. 26.
57. Fidel Castro* "Discurso pronunciado en el actq conmemorativo del 
VIII Aniversario de los CDR* el 28 de Septiembre de 1968”* 
Ediciones COR .No-. 18 (Havana* 1268)* pp. 21-22.
58. Speech of 13 March 1968 in Martin Kenner and James Petras (eds.)y 
FidolCastro Speaks (London: Allen Lane* 1970)s p. 334.
59. CDR a c r e c o m p l e t e d  their forms in the authorfs presence 
were probably ttTpled in Havana at that time In citing the 
housing shortage and the sparseness of the adults * clothing ration
60. This phrase had previously been used to characterise the kind of 
informal interchange between speaker and audience which often 
occurred in the course of Fidel Castro’s public speeches.
61. The decision was to re-open the night-clubs but not the regular 
bars which were regarded as the haunts of "loafers”* apathetics 
and other social undesirables. Author’s interview* Departamento 
de Divulgacion* CDR National Directorate, 3 January 1969.
62. Targets established by the Provincial Bureau of the CDRs in 
Havana for the emulation period 1 May to 28 September 1969 are 
listed in Appendix I below.
f>3* The Peace Front is cited by Gil Bias Sergio ”Un Comite Constructor” 
and by Baltasar Enero* ”Un Invento Cubano”* both in Pueblo 
Organisado„ pp.cit.* p. 72* p. 13. The articles are dated 
September 1963 and October 1964 respectively. See also Nuestra 
Lucha por la Pas9 which Preface by Juan Marinello (Havana: 
F4iciones Con la Guardiajen jAlto9 1963).
64. Bohemia* 26 September 1969, p. 52; Juan Hierro* "Haratonesde 
Propaganda119 Con la Guardia en Alto* August 1967* pp. 20-21.
65. For 1965 figures* "Sicte Anos con la Guardia en Alto”s op.cit.* 
p. 13. The reading most often and most highly recommended in 
1969 was Fidel Castro’s speeches. An official of the
Matansas Provincial Bureau of the CDRs explained that "there is 
little doubt that a speech by our Commandcr-in-Chicf is a lesson 
for the people", also suggesting as material for discussion at 
Zone level pamphlets *entitled "This is Our History"* "Bet’s get 
to Know Vietnam" and "Vietnam end the Cuban Family"* and ’Che’ 
Guevara’s Bolivian diary* which had been distributed free to 
CDR activists. Carlos Rivero in El Pueblo Pregunta* op.cit.* 
pp. 16-18. The CDR National Directorate published Castro’s 
speeches together with an Introduction in special pamphlet form. 
See for example* Los CDR y la Ofensiva Revolucion aria (Havana: 
Direccion Nacional CDR* 1968).
6 6 . Speech of 13 March 1968* op.cit.* p. 335ff.
67. See Mas Revolucion cn la Kducacidn (Havana: Direccion Hacional 
CDR, 1968).
6 8 . O’Connor* op.c5t. * pp. 275-G. On this also see Rene Salsdrigas, 
"Criterion para una reestructuracic&i politico-administrative de 
Cuba"* Cuba Socialista* ano 3, Ho. 17 (January 1963).
69. On this see Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Labor Sector and Socialist 
Distribution in Cuba (Hew York: Praeger Special Studies* 1968), 
pp. 29-31.
70. Speech of 28 September 1965* cited in Con la Guardia en Alto* 
September 1968, p. 39.
71. Ibid. 9 p* 7; Bohemia* 26 September 1969* p. 52.
Con la Guardia en Alto* September 1967* p. 23.
73. Funciones del Kuevo Adminlstrador Popular (Havana: Direcci6n 
Nacional CDR, 1968), pp, 3-5, 12-15, 26-28. See also "La 
Ofensiva Revolucionaria", Con la Guardia en Alto* March 1969, 
pp. 5-7; and "La Nacicnalisacidn de los Establecimientos 
Pri\radoc en la Ofensiva Revolucionaria", El Mil it ante Comunista* 
special number, June 1968* pp. 35-37.
74. Chairman’s remarks at meeting attended by the author.
75. See for example "Vigilancia Revolucionaria: Tarea Ho. 1 de los
Con la Guardia en Alto, December 1960, pp. 0-9; and 
"Dos Frentes", Con la Guardia en Alto, March 1969, p. 20, Other 
contenders in the eyes of CDR chairmen were voluntary labour and 
consumer-distribution.
76. Thus Granma has reported the following incidents between 1967 
and 1971:
1067: Arrest'-of--a number of CIA infiltrators; light plane 
/ shot doi*m after dropping arms ancl espionage .'equipment ;
1966: vBomb explodes, in a mailbag originating in the United 
States; acts of sabotage including arson in /warehouses 
storing sugars hides, fertiliser and feed; a group of counter­
revolutionaries captured on landing in Cuba from Miami. ■
1969: Another group of infiltrators captured; one agent 
captured with war matdriel and espionage equipment.
1970: Armed landing at Baracoa, Orlehte province; two Cuban
fishing boats sunk and their crew kidnapped: armed landing
cast of the village of Boca deSama, Oriente.
1971: U.S. coastguard arrests four fishing boats in international
waters. Armed attack from the. sea on Boca de Sama. •
See G^E.9 26 December 1971, pp. 10-12.
77. According to "Vigilancia Revolucionaria”, bp.cit., p. 9, CDR 
aid to the ordinary police for crime prevention purposes was 
organised on a regular basis in'1965 .
78. ’’Dos Frentes", op.cit., p. 20. See also "LuCha a Muefte contra 
la delincuoncia"a Granma% 21 April 1969, p. 2 ; and report in 
GNR, 5 October 1969, p. 8 .
79. "Discurso pronunciado en el acto conmemorativo del VIII 
Aniversario de los CDR", op.cit., p. 20, p. 21.
80. Omelio Valdes in Fedro Pupo Perez et ai, "Report on Internal 
Order", GWR, 11 May 1969, p. 8 . See also Sergio del Valle, 
"Speech at the closing session of the First National Forum of
: the Deputy Minister of Internal Order", GWR, 6 April 1969.
81. Viz. The Ministries of the Interior, Education, Labour and Public 
Health; the National Culture Council (CNC) and the Sports and
: Recreation Institute (INDER); the PCC, UJC, FMC, trade unions 
(CTC) and peasant association (ANAP); Local Administration 
(Poder Local) and the Courts. The Secretariat of the Commission 
was composed of'.PCC , -, -Ministry of the Interior , FMC , UJC and 
Ministry of Education. See "Las TrabajadorasSociales",
El Militante Comunista, February 1969, pp. 85-87; and Comision 
• Nacional de Prevencidn Social, Material de Estudio para las 
Trabajadoras Soclaies (Havana: Federacidn' de Mujeres Cubanas, 
1968), pp. 9-11. .'./'v/
82. The Commissions were established in 1967 • following -.a.two• year 
test project run jointly by the FMC and the Ministry of the 
Interior* By mid-1971 there were over 10,100 trained female 
social workers selected from the ranks of the FMC, and at the 
end of 1972 it was reported that 96% of social work cases 
involving misbehaviour by minors were handled by FMC workers. 
"Social Workers: Working for the Future against the Past", GWR,
29 August 1971, p. 8 ; "Activities in relation to 2nd Congress
of the Federation of Cuban Women announced at that Organisation^ 
10th National Plenary Meeting", GWR, 24 December 1972, p. 14.
•83. The-following qualifications were required of candidates
for training: Integration into the Revolution (i.e. CDR 
or FMC membership, or both), an aptitude for crime-
prevention work, no religious beliefs, at least ;
5th grade education, and no problems in the home 
similar to those with which the soc?.al worker 
will be called upon to deal.
Comisidn de Prevencidn Social, op.cit., pp. 17-48.
84. The author was able to examine the files of a Popular Court
in Havana corresponding to one year1s cases and including
some 217 individual accusations (see Chapter 4 below). A 
majority of files contained CDR reports signed either by the 
committees chairman or by 5bs responsable for vigilance.
Almost all of these were brief and contained only essential 
information; a few however extended over several handvjritten 
pages betraying a full and often intimate knowledge of the 
subjectfs life-style and domestic problems.
85. See KacGaffey and Barnett, op.cit.» pp. 60-62.
8 6 . Total membership was 4,236,000. Fidel Castro, Speech of
28 September 1972, GWR, 8 October 1972, p. 2. Castro did not 
give the estimate of Cuban population aged 15 ana above upon 
which this percentage was based. However, in view of the 
Census finding that this total was 5,412,683 at the end of 1970 
(calculated from "Preliminary Data, Census on Housing and 
Population", GWR, 10 January 1971, pp. 8-9) seventy per cent 
would appear conservative.
87. "Committees for the Defence of the Revolution: 12 years, 12 
months Check-up and Summary", GHR, 8 October 1972, p. 10. For 
1963 figure, see note 32 above. According to the first results 
of the 1970 Census, 48.9% of the national population were women. 
Calculated from "Preliminary Data”, loc.clt.
8 8 . 1969 figure calculated from Direccion Nacional CDR, "Control de 
Organismos y Miembros", op.cit. For 1972 see "Committees for 
the Defence of the Revolution: 12 years, 12 months", loc.cit.
89. Data on this subject are summarised in Appendix 2 below.
90. Speech of 28 September 1971, GNR, 10 October 197b; p. 2.
91. Sec ibid*; and Fidel Castro, Speech of 28 September 1972, GNR,
8 October 1972. Also, Jose Gabriel Guma, "Committees for the 
Defence of the Revolution Give Vigorous Support to Construction 
Work", GWR, 24 September 1972, .pp."4-5.' At the time of the 
1970 census, the CDRs did the necessary door-knocking to 
persuade local residents to stay at home to await the census- 
takers. See report in GWR, 13 September 1970, p. 5.
92. Speech of 28 September 1971, op.cit.» p. 3, p. 5.
93. Armando Hart, "Speech at the graduation ceremony for the 1963-69 
course of the Department of Political Science in the University 
of Eavanafs School of Humanities", GWR, 5 October 1969. Cf. 
Karol, op.cit.» p. 518ff, who reads a different significance 
into this speech.
3k. Hart 5 ”Speech .at the gra'duation*’ , op.cit. , p .: k- , p . 5 , p . 6. .
95. Speech of 26 July 1970, G17R5 2 August 1970, p. 5.
96. Speech of 23 August 1970, GWR, 30 August 1970.
97. Ibid*, p.
98. Ibid., p. k, p. 5.
99. Speech of 28 September 1970, GWR, k October 1970, p. 2.
100* See report in GHR, 20 September 1970, p. 7.
101. As of 1969, a loafer (vago) was; defined in law' only by the . 
provisions of the Cddigo de Defense Social of 1936, which cited 
•” Habitual Loafing” in its Chapter 10 as one of the ’’Indices of 
Social Dahgerousness”. According to the Ccidigo, an Habitual 
Loafer was ”he who, having the ability to perform remunerated 
labour, whether physical or mental, remains habitually 
unemployed ..... living froih the labour of others or at the 
expense of the public welfare authorities”. Quoted by Leonor 
Saavedra y Gdmes, La Dellncuencla Infantll en Cuba: sus causes 
(Havana: Editorial Lex, 19k5), p. 21.
102. Author’s discussions with UJC members. See also Granma,
21 April 1969, p. 2 editorial. In September 1970 the Minister 
of Labour, Captain Jorge Risquet, said that the preamble of the 
loafing law had been written over a year previously. Jorge , 
Risquet, ’’Speech at the provincial meeting of the CTC for Havana”, 
GHR, 20 September 1970, p. 11.
103. Sergio del Valle, ’’Speech at the closing session of the First 
National Forum of Internal Order”, op .cit., p. *4.
10k. Fidel, segurol A los vagos dales durot
105. See Jorge Risquet, ’’Speech at the closing session of the National
Plenary on Labour Justice”, GV^, 17 August 1969, p. 2.  ^ In 
October 1970 a .Ministry of Labour resolution discussed in 28,000 
workers’ assemblies established that workplace meetings should 
take place twice-yearly in future to decide collectivelywhat 
should be entered on each emnlovee’s card. Report in GWR,
25 October 1970, p. 5.
106. Jorge Risquet, ’’Speech at the provincial meeting of the CTC”, 
on.cit., p. 1 1 .
107. Fidel Castro, ’’Closing speech at the provincial meeting of the 
CTC for Havana”, GWR, 20 September 1970, p. 2; and Speech of 
20 September 1970, GWR, A October 1970, p. 3.
108. According to the COR, 76v of the assemblies held by the CTC and
the CDRs in Havana province had unanimously approved the draft 
law.without alteration\ 2h% had proposed amendments, but only 
one per cent of the total had suggested that the law be more 
lenient. GWR, 17 January 1971, p. 7; GWR, 28 March 1971, p. 1.
109. Fidel Castro, Speech of 1 May 1971, GWR, 16 May 1971, p. 2,
110. GWR, 11 April 1971, p. 3 editorial. At the national Plenary 
on Labour Justice the following .year it was announced that 
forty-three per cent of the new workers had been allocated to 
agriculture, fifteen per cent to industry, thirteen per cent
to construction and a total of twenty-nine per cent to transport 
and communications, commerce, and public services. Of those 
persons'who had to be brought before the courts under the new 
law, the majority had simply been ordered to a workplace and 
put under the supervision of the workers1 collective there; the 
number of cases necessitating the application of the most 
severe penalties was "relatively low”, and there, had been only 
a small number of subsequent breaches. Jesus Montane, Organising 
Secretar3? of the PCC, "Speech at the National Plenary Meeting on 
Labour Justice", GWR, 23 January 1972, p. 10.
111. Speech of 1 May 1971, op.cit.B p. 2.
112. See Castro’s account in "Meeting between Major Fidel Castro and 
the leaders of the Central Organisation of Workers (CUT).in 
Santiago, Chile, 23 November 1971", GWR, 5 December 1971, p. Ik.
113. For an account of this process, see O’Connor, op.cit., Chapter 7.
Ilk. Ibid., p. 195. For eyewitness accounts of the internal life of 
the CTC in the mid- and late ’sixties respectively, see Adolfo 
Gilly, "Inside the Cuban Revolution", Monthly Review, Vol. 16,
No. 6 (October 196k); and Maurice Zcitlin, "Cuba’s Workers,
Workers’ Cuba, 1969" in Zeitlin, Revolutionary Folitics and the 
Cuban Working Class (New York: Harper Torchbooks, second edition,
1970), pp. vii-lii. For a competent survey, see Roberto E.
Hernanden and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "Labor Organisation and Wages" 
in C. Kesa-Lago (cd.)« op.cit., pp. 209-2k9.
115. See Carlos Fernandes R., "El XII Congreso de la Central de 
Trabajadores de Cuba", Cuba Soclalista, ano 6 , No. 62 (1966);
Easilio Rodrigues, "La politic'a laboral del gobierno revolucionario", 
in ibid.; and Hern^ndes and Mesa-Lago, op.cit. .
116. As Castro put it, "if the workers’ movement isn’t democratic, then 
it is good for nothing". ("Closing speech at the provincial 
meeting of the CTC", op.clt,» p. 5). 'Nor - was any rejection 
implied of the principle, of ’one-man management’ or adoption of 
vrorkers’ self-management on the Yugoslav pattern. Castro explained 
the rationale of the Cuban position in December 1370. The factory 
administrator was "the indirect representative of the workers. He 
represents the workers of the nation in the factory. His position 
isn’t elective, as he has a very specific role. The trade union 
there is the representation of the workers in the factory, a direct 
representative of the workers in that factory". ("Speech of
7 December 1970 at the closing session of the National Plenary
Meeting of Basic Industry", GWR, 20 December 1970, p. 3.) In
Chile in 1971, he reaffirmed Cuba’s rejection of the Yugoslav
approach, describing it, without naming it specifically, as
"criminal demagoguery". "Answers to questions by students at
the State Technological University, Santiago, 29 November 1971",
in Fidel in Chile (New York: International Publishers, 1972), pp. 197-198
117. See report of GKR," 8 November 1970, p. 3. /ill work centres 
were to hold elections, between 9 November and. 9 December 9 with
p the exception of the sugar industry, in view of the impending ’.V 
. ..start , of the'1971 zarra.
118. ibid. ■
119. Castro, ’’Closing speech at the provincial meeting of the CTC'V
Op. C it. 9 p. S. .
120. Jorge Risquet,”Speech at the closing session of the 6th National 
Council of the CTC”, GNR, 2U October 1971., p. if. '
121. Ibid. V'r'v v
122* Fidel Castro, Speech of 26 July 1871, GNR* 1 August 1971, p. 2.
The first time the ^forkerE* Confess was mentioned vras the 
previous May Day. See Castro, Speech of 1 Kay 1971, GNR, 16 May 
1971, p. 2. :
123. In November 1971s. Granma published a .summary of. the rules to be 
observed in the elections for the Executive Committees to serve 
in trade union locals during'the second year after the reform.
The points insisted upon were the following: there should be a
full discussion before nominations are accepted, of-the work of 
the union over the previous year, including its national plenary 
production meeting and its efforts to raise productivity; next , 
there should be sufficient nominations to produce two or three 
candidates for each post, so that a real margin of choice exists;
. there must be a full discussion of each;nominee before voting 
begins: and the voting, which should be supervised by an
elections commission elected froin the workers’ assembly, must be 
by direct and secret ballot. ’’Establece la CTC Normas para 
celebracidn de elecciones eh todas las secciones sindicales”,
V  Granma, 16 November 1971, p. C.
12^. Fidel Castro, Speech of 1 May 1972, GWR, 7 May 1972, p. 2.
125. In this speech, Castro announced that thereuere now i?-0,8M-7 
trade union locals throughout the country and twenty-one national 
unions incorporating over two million workers (79% men, 12%.women)* 
Speech of I Hay 1973, GNR, 13 May 1973, p. 2.
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CHAPTER 3 THE COMING OF THE POPULAR COURTS, I
We are constructing the house of the future 
brick by brick, but we must watch over it 
and protect it, and prevent the enemy who lurks 
in shadowy comers from going about his work - 
those ghosts from the past who still stalk 
about among the ruins of capitalism, dreaming 
of its return.
- Sergio del Valle, Minister of the Interior,
March 1969. .
Popular Courts were first established in the Cuban capital 
on an experimental basis in 1966. Two years later the new 
courts had been inaugurated throughout the city and enjoyed 
exclusive jurisdiction in summary cases. The genesis, rationale 
and implementation of the Popular Court idea, with its reliance 
upon a non-vocational judiciary and emphasis upon ’moral* sanctions 
and community-participation, will be examined in Chapter 3.
Neither the proposal itself, however, nor the practical implications 
of its application can be understood in abstraction from political, 
economic and social developments in Cuba during the latter half of 
the decade of the ’sixties. As we have seen, the year 1966 witnessed 
the inauguration of a new phase in the evolution of the Castroist 
leadership in the course of which Cuban spokesmen asserted their 
independence of judgement vis-a-vis the established orthodoxy of 
the Soviet bloc in matters of political organisation as well as in 
foreign policy and economics. The decision to introduce the new 
courts on a national basis in 1967-68 belongs squarely within this 
phase of Cuban policy and is inseparable from it.^ At the same
time, the social consequences of the creation of Popular Courts in 
Havana and elsewhere cannot be treated apart from the effects of 
other measures of the revolutionary regime in the period in question.
Without aspiring to completeness, the aim of this chapter is to 
provide some insight into the background against which the 
performance of the Popular Courts is to be analysed. For this 
purpose, three problems are selected for special attention: (1)
the causes and consequences of the Revolutionary Government’s 
expropriation in March 1968 of the entirety of the non-agricultural 
private sector; (2) the trend of crime rates in the ’sixties and 
the attitude of the Cuban authorities towards the continuing 
problem of common crime; and (3) the nature and effects of 
Government policy with respect to the capital and its inhabitants.
REVOLUTIONARY OFFENSIVE
On 13 March 1968, in the course of a speech devoted to a 
painstaking analysis of Cuba’s economic prospects and the burden 
of underdevelopment, Fidel Castro launched a new ’’revolutionary 
offensive”. The primary objectives of the Offensive were two: 
an intensification of the national economic effort in the period 
leading up to the sugar harvest of 1970, and a dramatic reassertion 
of the role of central planning and ’moral’ incentives in the 
organisation of the transitional economy. According to the 
Commission for Revolutionary Orientation of the FCC, the immediate 
tasks which presented themselves in the Offensive were:
To combat egotism and all manifestations of 
the ideology of individualism. To combat 
shallowness, and the parasitism of those who do 
not want to work for their living. To combat 
subjectivism, by calling for a profound and 
objective analysis of our problems and the 
solutions to them.
To direct more and more effort into production, 
that is into the fulfillment of the gigantic 
plans of our Revolution in agriculture, industry 
and hydraulic works. And finally, to make an 
organisational effort to improve the provision of 
services to the people.?■
The Commission went on to warn against any tendency permitting
3
the movement to be deflected from these essential objectives.
Rhetoric aside, the Revolutionary Offensive had three major 
long-term consequences. First, it resulted in the abolition of 
transactions between state-owned enterprises expressed in monetary
if
terms. Second, the relationship between the performance and the 
remuneration of state sector workers was significantly and 
deliberately weakened by the procedure of persuading groups of
workers to renounce overtime payment and bonuses in exchange for
5 '
improved pensions. Third, the non-agricultural private sector
ceased to exist following the nationalisation between March and
6
June 1968 of 58,000 private concerns. For present purposes it 
is possible to dwell only upon the last two issues.
The political genealogy of the Revolutionary Offensive is not
difficult to trace. The ideas which became the Cuban orthodoxy
during this phase correspond closely to the positions defended by
Ernesto "Che" Guevara in the debate on economic planning and
incentives which occupied the pages of official journals between 
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1963 and 1965. At the time when they first appeared in print 
they clearly represented the point of view of a minority within 
the Cuban leadership and, what is more, they were not espoused by 
Fidel Castro. As late as 1965, and even 1966, close observers 
of Cuban affairs still wrote to the effect that, whatever Fidel 
thought of Che’s ideas (he had not yet made this clear) he manifestly
Q
did not intend putting them to the test of practice. The silence 
was broken when, in May 1966, Castro began to warn of the danger 
that, in their enthusiasm to prepare the economic foundations of 
the new society, revolutionaries might be led to endanger the
achievement of the very goal for which they were struggling: ”the
g
formation of Communist man”. One possible source of error, he 
indicated, was the Soviet doctrine which stated that the communist 
society would be reached by passing through two stages, the second 
of which - involving the definitive overthrow of bourgeois concepts 
of morality and distributive justice - could not begin until the 
first was complete. Whilst this theory condemned backward countries 
to an indefinite postponement of the final victory, it also created 
the illusion that the accumulation of riches in a single country 
was a sufficient basis for communism:
We modestly think that it is still to be 
considered and answered whether, in a world 
divided between industralised and under­
developed countries, between countries with a 
high labour productivity and countries without 
any labour productivity whatsoever, any nation 
can undertake the building of communism in a 
single country, without the productive forces 
and technology being first developed in the rest 
of the underdeveloped countries of the world.
.......... •.•.• I believe that socialism can be
built in a single country and that communism can 
be built to a certain degree. But communism, as 
a formula of absolute abundance, in the midst of 
an underdeveloped world, cannot be built in a 
single country, without running the risk, 
involuntarily and unintentionally, in future years, 
of immensely rich countries finding themselves 
trading and dealing with immensely poor countries.
Some peoples in communism and other peoples in loin- 
cloths!^*
Castro spoke again at length on this theme in his speech on 
the sixth anniversary of the Committees for the Defence of the 
Revolution in September of the same year. Communism would never 
be achieved, he now argued, so long as people had ”dollar-signs 
in their heads”. ”We do not believe in Utopia”, he insisted:
We do not believe that [communistX consciousness 
can be developed in just a few years, but we do 
believe that it will never be created if we do 
not struggle unceasingly in this direction, if we
do not advance incessantly on this path.11
During 1967 Castro*s public speeches were devoted primarily to 
working through the implications of these ideas on the international 
plane. It was the same thesis however to which he returned during 
and after the Revolutionary Offensive in 1968. Communism would 
require, he explained on 26 July, "the highest degree of social 
awareness ever achieved” because what was involved was no less than 
that "degree of understanding and brotherhood which man has 
sometimes achieved within the d o s e  circuit of his family":
And we should not use money or wealth to create 
political awareness. To offer a man more to do 
©ore than his duty is to buy his conscience with 
money. To give a man participation in more 
collective wealth because he does his duty and 
produces more and creates more for society is to 
turn political awareness into wealth.
The task is difficult, and many will criticise us.
They will call us petty bourgeois, idealists; 
they will say we are dreamers; they will say we 
are bound to fail. And yet, facts will speak for 
us, realities will speak for us, and our people 
will speak and act for us, because we know our 
people have the capacity to comprehend these roads 
and to follow these roads.
Subsequent events notwithstanding, the decision of the Cuban
leaders to place ’consciousness* and moral incentives to the fore
during these years is by no means entirely attributable to their
tendency towards voluntarism and the "Marxism of the Will".
Important objective considerations intervened, including the
consequences of earlier policy decisions. As has been pointed
13out in other contexts, the capacity of a revolutionary regime to 
deploy conventional economic incentives as a means of raising the 
productiveness of labour depends upon its ability to procure 
sufficient supplies of consumer goods for the purpose, or upon its 
willingness to distribute such goods as are available on a non- 
equitable basis. Since early in 1962 in Cuba the supply of 
consumer goods of all types had fallen short of demand (which itself
had expanded* owing largely to the Revolutionary Government’s
early redistributive policies) and had continued to do so by a
margin which increased annually* From the outset shortfalls were
met by means of a comprehensive system of price-controls and
14
rationing on a per capita basis. By the middle of the decade, as
a result, more than a few Cuban households had difficulty in
disposing of their monthly income, even with resort to luxury
15restaurants or the inevitable black market; absenteeism, and 
the permanent withdrawal of individuals from the labour force 
began to affect the economy in a serious manner from this point on. 
The available indices for the period immediately preceding the
1 C
Offensive bear out this point.
The new course adopted, with an abruptness which is deceptive, 
in March 1968 was founded upon the rejection of two ways of remedying 
this situation which recommend themselves theoretically. Implicitly, 
and probably without much hesitation, Fidel Castro and his group 
refused the alternative of introducing price increases affecting 
the range of goods then available. The effect of acting otherwise 
than they did would certainly have been to mortgage the possibility 
of mobilising the mass of the Cuban working class on a political 
basis for many years. Explicitly, and with misgivings of which 
the length and content of Castro’s 13 March speech are testimony, 
the reorientation of Cuba’s economic plans in such a way as to 
increase the availability of, say, consumer durables was also 
rejected. The point was eloquently put by Castro himself. The 
question of moral versus material incentives, he explained:
is not only a matter of principle for us, but 
an objective and real matter. Can an under­
developed country afford to do anything else?
Can we stop investing to close
the enormous gap between us and the other 
countries in order to buy trinkets and superfluous 
paraphernalia so that the purchasing power of 
the peso is greater and so that a man earning a 
peso and buying a trinket thinks he has everything? 
............... Imperialism can offer material
incentives of many types, and, in the face of this, 
what are we to do?*7
It was in this way that the leaders of the Cuban Communist 
Party decided in 1968 to stake the future of the economy upon an 
appeal to the mass of its followers on the basis of levelling 
measures and egalitarian slogans. The expropriation of the 
urban private sector helped to create the necessary political 
atmosphere whilst at the same time serving to stem the outflow of 
labour from the state economy.
That the private sector expanded during the middle * sixties
at the expense of state employment is indicated by surveys conducted
by the Cuban authorities in 1967. As early as 1964, an estimated
75% of retail trade* 95% of transportation, 98% of construction and
■ 18
95% of industrial production had been brought into state ownership.
No detailed and up-to-date information regarding relations between 
the state and private sectors appears to have been available in 
subsequent years even to JUCEPLAN, the Government planning agency.
TQ
A special survey conducted by the National Bank at the request
20of the Party and covering transactions between the state economy
■ 21 'and private non-agricultural producers during the first quarter 
of 1967 resulted, however, in the tracing of some 45#548 private 
producers. The state sector made ’substantial* purchases (10,000 
pesos and above) from 97% of these businesses during the quarter 
whilst state sales to this part of the private sector were 
’substantial* in the ease of 91% of the firms. Havana province
accounted for a disproportionate share of the total volume of 
transactions (49%) and the bulk of this share was concentrated in 
the metropolitan area itself. Other National Bank figures 
indicated that 57% of private sales to state enterprises and 
agencies consisted of services, whereas finished and ’intermediate* 
goods accounted for 28% and 14% respectively. This pattern was
reversed in state sales to the private sector (Services: 2%;
; ’23 :
Finished Goods: 16%; Intermediate Goods: 82%)* Signs of definite 
capital-concentration were nonetheless perceptible. In one case, a 
business established as recently as 1964 for the production of 
agricultural machinery had begun to exploit a market for iron bed­
steads and had grown as a result to the point where, in the first
quarter of 1967, it employed 89 workers and sold goods to the state
■oil ' ■
to the value of 628,020 pesos.
More significant from an employment point of view were the
results of an investigation of retail establishments conducted by
the local governments of the six Cuban provinces in the course of
1967. Throughout the country, a census revealed 74% of the total
number of retail establishments were in private hands (it has been
est imated that these controlled a little below one-third of the
■ 25 -
value of consumer-goods distribution). In a "sample survey11 of 
711 of these establishments, however, the more significant fact 
was discovered that over half of their proprietors had gone into 
business since 1961; moreover 12% of the total had previously been 
engaged in agricultural pursuits, and 27% had been industrial
2g
■workers*.
It was to these findings that Fidel Castro was no doubt
alluding in his CDR-anniversary speech of 28 September 1967,
Because the Revolutionary Government had not * intervened’ small
retail establishments during its early nationalisation programme,
he asked, was it to be understood that the Revolution sought the
proliferation of small business? No, it was not! ”It is one
thing to respect an existing situation and another thing to foster
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and seek to develop that situation”. It is clear that what
concerned the Cuban leadership was not the existence of a private 
sector, but its growth. On 15 March 1958 Castro explained:
What worried us most was not that certain 
businesses left over from before continued 
to exist. That is, we thought it would be 
possible to reduce the number of businesses 
little by little. That they would be sold, 
the owners would retire, that little by little 
private businesses would disappear. But what 
actually did happen? Businesses did not dis­
appear, they increased in number.28
But why could a modest increase in private economic activity not 
be tolerated? After all, it was not denied that the growth of 
the private sector responded to a certain demand on the part of the 
Cuban citizenry, and moreover that the ’demand1 was not entirely 
private in character. Indeed the attention of Party members was 
specifically drawn to this fact:
Our own state enterprises preferred the 
producers of the private sector if they 
were under pressure and short of time to 
fulfill their planned targets....... State
organizations and enterprises had recourse, 
by preference, to the private sector to 
satisfy their requirements} and as a result, 
the state enterprise responsible for the 
manufacture of a given good was never 
presented with the task of producing it.28
Nor was it claimed at any point during the Revolutionary Offensive
that state enterprises could achieve greater efficiency than 
private units.
The nub of the matter was the labour situation. The private 
sector ’’introduced elements of spontaneity and anarchy into the
30
national economy”, principally by using offers of high wages
to attract labour which might otherwise have been employed in
31
national development projects. For this reason, Fidel Castro 
explained, there was no overcoming this problem piecemeal:
We had not wanted those who had spent their whole 
lives in a grocery store or some other business, 
who were accustomed to that life, to be told,
"Well, now this activity must end”. But, in 
reality, this activity could not be abolished without 
pulling it out by the roots. Because what happened 
was that many persons, instead of thinking in terms 
of truly productive work, for the benefit of the 
whole nation, were inventing anything so that they 
could make 10 or 20 times as much as a regular worker 
and live 10 or 20 times better than any worker. This 
is the situation which existed, and that is why there 
was no way to compromise on this matter.32
Here was the central difficulty as the Cuban leaders saw it in 1968. 
The earnings to be had from private trading or working "on one’s
own account" were now so substantial that it was positively disad-
' ■■■■■" 33
vantageous to he an employee of the state. The profits of bars
314,
and vending stalls in Havana were particularly remarkable.
As if this were not enough, a clear connection was claimed to
have been established between private commerce and a wide spectrum
of social and political evils. Seventy-two per cent of bar owners,
it was assessed, "maintain an attitude contrary to our revolutionary
: 35
process" whilst 66% of their customers were "anti-social elements". 
The case of the hot-dog men (timbiricheros) was even worse: the
attractiveness of this business for some Havana people derived
primarily from the fact that it "not only yields high profits but
permits them to be in constant contact with lumpen and other anti-
36
social and counter-revolutionary elements". In addition to 
being based upon illegal, unsanitary or undesirable practices, 
the timbiriches were a focus of attraction for layabouts and mal­
contents and - an infallible Index - 78% of vendors in the interior 
of Havana province were not "integrated into the Revolution" by
3 7
virtue of membership of a CDR or other mass organisation. In 
addition to their own corruption furthermore they corrupted the
3g
rest of the population*
Under socialism, Castro asserted in his 13 March speech, 
petty commerce would always tend to appear "in those cases where
39State organizations do not giver-adequate service to the public". 
However this was not a reason for letting it flourish at the 
Revolution’s expense:
Many people may ask themselves what kind of a 
revolution this is, that permits such parasites 
to exist after nine years of revolution, and 
they would be right in asking.
Gentlemen, we did not make a 
Revolution here to establish the right to trade!
Such a revolution took place in 1789 •
Hhen will they finally understand that this is a 
revolution of socialists, that is a revolution 
of communists.^
By 1968, the Cuban leaders were for better or worse committed to 
making moral incentives work, to fuelling economy and society 
with the sense that all were participating equally in a gigantic 
national effort to overcome underdevelopment* Few things could 
be more ; damaging to this collective morale than the knowledge that 
a great many people were not participating or contributing a service 
whose priority was questionable. On the other hand, few measures
could be expected to be more popular among the revolution^ most 
committed supporters than the expropriation of a new layer of 
"parasites”. The notion that the revolution was directed against 
"parasites” of all sizes and types was a well-established one. In 
his very first CDR anniversary speech Fidel Castro had dealt with 
just this subject at some length. I quote:
Before the revolution there were the big 
parasites and the small parasites, •.... from 
the big parasite - the owner of a sugar mill, 
the owner of a thousand caballerfas of land, 
the owner of a big factory, the owner of 300 
houses, or the ovmer of a housing estate - to 
the small parasites the neighbourhood stool- 
pigeon, the vote-buyer, the lottery-racketeer*41 
and the "lumpen”. A "lumpen" is a declassed 
person who seeks to live not by working but 
parasitically.
To tell the truth, we knew of people .’who had 
to devote themselves to the lottery-racket 
because they couldn't get a job. Because it was 
partly the shortage of jobs that was responsible 
for the parasitism of people who became lottery 
racketeers; and the same was true of an infinite 
variety of parasites - like holders of sinecures,**? 
for instance, who were a classical type of small 
parasite.
What is the revolution but a 
great rebellion of workers and peasants, of the 
generous, honourable and useful people, against the 
parasites, the exploiters, the drones, the spivs 
and the easy-llvers.1*3 '
Thus, in 1968;
The big-time exploiters had been eliminated, but 
there were still a number of medium-sized 
exploiters and a great many petty exploiters. And, 
when all is said and done, whether exploitation be 
big, medium or petty, it must all disappear.****
The implementation of the measure may how be dealt with 
briefly. Ad hoc commissions set up for the purpose had by the 
early summer of 1968 completed the ^nationailsatiorV of 58,012 
private concerns. In most cases no compensation was paid,
although, at the discretion of the National Bank, persons who had
been established in business prior to the revolution or whose
reputation in the neighbourhood was morally and politically spotless
were indemnified with a pension or, where appropriate, encouraged
to remain in their posts as administrators on the payroll of the
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Ministry of Internal Commerce, Some 36,506 people however,
consisting of 19,450 "proprietors, co-proprietors and partners",
8,132 self-employed and 8,924 employees of private concerns, were 
judged not to qualify under this rubric. Sixteen thousand, six 
hundred and seventy-one of them were found to be both physically
- 4 7
fit and not already in receipt of a wage or pension from the state.
By June about 85% of those involved had accepted the new jobs offered
them by the Ministry of Labour, a fact interpreted as "an extremely
encouraging sign and evidence of how the policy of the revolution
' 48 '
towards them has yielded good results". Nearly half entered
one of the two principal sectors of labour shortage - agriculture 
4 9
and construction. The expropriations had achieved their primary 
aim.
GHOSTS FROM THE PAST
In the last years of the *sixties in Cuba crime, like business, 
was a highly political affair. One reason for this was that the 
rhetoric of moral incentives and fraternity in struggle induced low 
levels of tolerance with respect to criminals and crime in the mass 
of revolutionary Cubans. Another reason was that, far from having 
"withered away", certain categories of offence were becoming more 
frequent In this period.
For a combination of reasons, Including both changing socio­
political attitudes and the trend of crime itself, ordinary crime
had become sufficient of a national problem to warrant the calling
of a special Conference on Internal Order in March 1969. The
statistics provided for the conference and published in the Cuban 
50
press allow us to draw some limited conclusions about the effects 
of the revolutionary experience in this area. But it is necessary 
to proceed with some care. For example, the overall trend of crime 
during the first decade of revolutionary power - between 1960 and
51
1968, a decline in the annual rate of 58% - is partly spurious
from a criminological point of view and also conceals conflicting 
trends in different types of crime. The element of spuriousness 
derives from the category of Offences against Life and Limb, which 
will serve as an appropriate starting point.
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The number of Offences Against Life and Limb registered in
Cuba fell consistently in the period for which data are provided,
from 61,000 in 1959 to 60,000 in 1960, 58,000 in 1962 and 17,000 
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in 1968. The decline in the most serious sub-category of offences -
murder and homicide - follows a clear pattern: from 1962 their
54number fell by some 77% in the space of two years. The inclusion
here of offences committed in the last years of the Batista period,
in the service of the counter revolutionary forces or in consequence
of the general turbulence of the period would appear to account for the
very high level of murders and homicides (over 2,500 annually)
maintained during 1959-1961. The absence of these factors in
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later years would also explain the subsequent decline. In the 
case of less serious offences, such as Assault and Light foundings, 
there is perhaps more justification for the interpretation that the 
decline reflects "the progress of the revolution, the improved
social conditions9 the elimination of brothels, of centres of 
delinquency and of the worst kinds of rowdyism”. However it is 
difficult to read anything precise into these figures.
Other of the statistics published in April 1969 are more easy
to interpret. Before the revolution an estimated 11,500 women in
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Cuba had earned their living as prostitutes* The fact reflected 
a demand inflated by the presence especially in Havana of foreign 
’tourists * in large numbers, the connivance of the police and an 
adequate supply of female migrants from the interior of the country
. '-v 50
As one nativeof Oriente province explained.
When women came up to Havana from Oriente they 
used to come looking for decent work, but often 
enough they ended up in la vida* There were 
lots of pimps in Havana in those days - well- 
dressed individuals who sported good watches and 
elegant rings and who appeared to be rich men.
They used to invite a woman out to a night club, 
make love to her and then get her to work for 
them. Girls used to write home to their people 
saying that they were working in a cafe, but 
sometimes this wasn’t the whole truthJ^O
Now, in 1969, it cou3.d be claimed that ’’although there are some 
isolated cases of prostitution in our country, brothels have been 
totally eliminated, and, along with this, procuring - also a crime 
has disappeared". Vigorous government action, including a
"retraining" programme for prostitutes, had been mainly responsible 
backed up by changes in both the prevailing mores and the economic 
climate.
In the years before 1959 both cannabis and ’hard* drugs had
circulated in Cuba. Between 1935 and 1942, for instance, narcotic
addiction was alleged to be widespread in Havana, especially in and
02 ■
around the notorious barrio chiho, near the old city centre.
From one hundred to two hundred convictions for drug peddling 
were handed down annually in three of the component municipalities
go
of the city during these years* In shantytowns like Las 
Yaguas, with a population of nearly three and a half thousand, 
marihuana circulated freely and the trade in it was an important
source of the neighbourhood’s income. "The marihuana, which was
smoked latterly by nearly everyone, the women and the children 
included", according to the testimony of one eK-resident, "was 
supplied for sale in the barrio by the chief of the Drugs Depart- 
ment of the police himself . * . . Energetic action by the 
authorities in 1959 and after was responsible for the following 
numbers of prosecutions for drug traffic and use:
Year: 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
Prosecutions: 1,464 594 284 237 336 300 566 405 810 257
Of course, police:; statistics are not a reliable guide to actual 
consumption and short-term fluctuations are most likely to reflect 
varying levels of police activity in this field. Nevertheless in 
1969 the Ministry of the Interior announced that "as a result of 
our daily experiences in our struggle against users - we know how 
they operate and what the situation is - we can affirm that this 
crime has decreased in Cuba". The same source continues: "In Cuba 
there is no such thing as international smuggling of narcotics or 
drugs. This, to a great extent, is the result of the revolutionary 
process itself. The elements which, in the past, used such drugs, 
were, generally speaking* of the bourgeoisie, with the financial 
means to purchase them. Control on foreign exchange, the monopoly 
of foreign trade, etc., also have a bearing on this". The last 
factor is obviously decisive. (The author’s own enquiries confirm
that whatever illegal drug consumption continued to exist in Cuba 
in 1969 was virtually restricted to cannabis, which grows readily 
in parts of the island and which does not therefore need to be 
imported.)
Prosecutions for certain types of gambling were also frequent
in 1959 and 1960, becoming much less common in the course of the
next eight years. Although the Social Defence Code of 1936, the
major piece of codified criminal legislation which the revolution
inherited, provided for the punishment of Prohibited Gaming, the
law allowed considerable scope for legal gambling of various sorts,
from the rich casinos of Havana and other resorts to the National
Lottery. At the same time, the illegal sweepstakes run by private
individuals using the tickets of the official lottery were tolerated
67by the police, who sometimes received payment in return. Since 
the revolution a permanent campaign has been waged by Fidel Castro 
and other leaders to wean the Cuban people from its "lottery 
mentality" including, in addition to speech-making and propaganda, 
such drastic measures as collecting-up and storing, the island’s 
’fruit* machines. The task has not proved an easy one. In 1968 
it was decided to wind up the National Institute for Savings and 
Housing (INAV), the agency which financed the first housing
programmes after the revolution, because its lottery continued to
68be the source of secondary sweepstakes. With the destruction
gq .
of the economic base of the lottery mentality, * nevertheless, the
net effect of ten years of revolution was to bring about a "notable
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decline" in gambling and its influence upon Cuban national life. 
Before the revolution, begging, too, had been widespread.
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There were at one time an estimated 5,000 beggars in Havana alone,
and an inestimable number of children were used as beggars, as
7 0  ' ■
well as newspaper sellers and lottery-ticket vendors. During 
the ’sixties this problem and its associated evils had all but 
ceased to exist in Cuba. As the Vice-Minister of the Interior 
observed in 1969: "The very development of the Revolution itself 
has brought about the elimination of the causes of begging and 
prostitution through its bettering of social conditions;.......
not only as a result of police-work but basically as a 
revolutionary development".; The full employment inaugurated 
by the Revolutionary Government had cut away one important prop . 
of the island * s tropical debauchery of previous decades. The 
elimination of corruption in public life in general and in the 
police force in particular, and the termination of the Miami- 
Havana tourist circuit, had prepared the conditions for its final 
elimination.'
It is not the case however that the indices of all categories 
of known crime fell between 1960 and 1968. For example the \ 
offence of Misappropriation was. the cause of over 400 cases each 
in 1962 and 1963 but over 3,000 cases in 1967. This increase 
is to a substantial extent a legal fiction, the result of the 
transformation of cases of theft into cases of misappropriation 
as more and more Cubans came into the category of state employees. 
By itself it has no clear significance. The same cannot however 
be said of the other broad category of offence which remains to
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be considered, that of Offences against Property. Offences in 
this category - Robbery, Theft and Swindle - exhibited what was 
officially described as "an alarming tendency to rise".
The most remarkable aspect of the history of Offences against
Property in Cuba since 1959 is not perhaps that annual totals
should have tended to increase but that the inverse should have
occurred in so dramatic a fashion during the two years 1963 and
1964. From a plateau of approximately 36,000 cases reported per
year in 1960-62, Ministry statistics indicate that the incidence
of offences in this category fell in 1963 by more than one half
(17,000 cases) and in 1964 by a further 41% (10,000 cases). It
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began to rise again only in the second half of the decade.
Partisans of the deterrent efficacity of draconian penalties may
take satisfaction from the apparent explanation of this phenomenon.
On the view of the: Ministry of the Interior the decline of
Offences against Property during these two years was attributable
to the announcement in 1963 of Law 1098 - a law calling for the death
sentence for robbery compounded with violence in occupied dwellings,
robbery involving the impersonation of police officers, and robbery
or theft involving the use of minors. The new upturn was to be
explained as the product of (a) the failure of the courts to.
implement fully the provisions of Law 1098, and (b) a shift in
criminal tactics which had resulted in the successful exploitation
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of loopholes in the Law.
Underlying this argument is a more basic reason why in the 
absence of stiff penalties the frequency of Offences against 
Property might have been expected to rise: the increased incentive
to robbery created by conditions of shortage and rationing. By 
the middle of the decade, these conditions had resulted in the 
creation of an extensive black market on which most goods fetched 
prices several times those fixed by the Ministry of Internal 
Commerce. The existence of the black market in turn rendered the
theft of such mundane>  and easily stolen - items as adults1
clothing an unusually lucrative activity, worthy of considerable
79privations and risks. The same set of circumstances, on the 
other hand, made robbery, theft or swindle peculiarly painful to 
its victims. A household deprived of its wardrobe in this way 
in 1969 would have difficulty in replacing it, even if it resorted 
itself to paying high black-market prices. The lengths to which 
Cuban policy-makers have gone in providing deterrents to certain 
types of crime can scarcely be understood outside this context*
In selecting robbery for particular condemnation, Cuban 
officials drew attention to the new social conditions which, in 
their view, had removed all possible justification for it. Thus 
the Minister:
In our country, before the triumph of the 
Revolution, a thief might have had a social 
justification, since the very conditions of 
the exploiting regime condemned him to living 
in poverty, hunger and corruption, but today 
the thief is committing a double crime; first, 
because he does not have to steal to live 
decently; and, second, because his crime is 
committed not against an exploiter or idle 
person, but rather against workers and farmers, 
against our people.®0
And the Vice-Minister:
Today, with infinite work opportunities 
existing in our country, there is no reason 
for burglary. 83-
There were other reasons why the levels of crime tolerable 
in a society such as Cuba in 1969 might be expected to be lower 
than those of, say, a liberal capitalist country. The type of 
work incentives upon which the economy had by default or by policy 
come to rely - based on appeals not to immediate personal gain
but to long-term collective advantage - required for any degree
of success a sense of security incompatible with high levels of
crime. The continued problem of robbery, theft and swindle could
have serious effects upon the morale of the population, particularly
if workers were robbed or their families swindled, as not
infrequently happened, during their absence as voluntary labourers
in the cane fields. It was both because of the recent increase
in the incidence of Offences against Property, and because of the
apparently threatening character assumed by this type of crime,
that "internal order" became an important focus of concern in the
spring of 1969. A Granma editorial observed of the Conference
that "from the preliminary assemblies held at the base, to its
national culmination, it showed the tremendous irritation and
indignation of our people concerning the upsurge of various criminal
■ 82 ■activities, and especially of crimes against property". A
variety of solutions were proposed where the law was concerned,
stiffer penalties were recommended in certain areas to close
■ . 3 3
existing loopholes, and a Commission for the Study of Jurisdic­
tions was established to investigate an observed inconsistencies 
in the legislation in force. On the eve of the conference
Castro himself went as far as to threaten inveterate criminals
with their "radical elimination" at some future date if they did
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not mend their ways.
Particular worries were expressed regarding the participation 
of minors in crime. In Cuba the revolution had created "favourable 
conditions for developing the abilities of all young people and 
children by expanding the entire educational system and by creating 
numerous incentives for encouraging children and youngsters to 
develop on the basis of our moral and ideological standards".
High hopes were held that the new generation of Cubans would prove
morally superior to their parents as well as technically more
proficient in the skills required for their country’s development.
Yet in 1967 Hl% of all criminal cases still involved minors#
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either alone or# more commonly# in the company of adults. In
1968 minors accounted for as many as 27% of convictions for theft and
1 2% of those for robbery, whilst the participation of minors in
the commission of serious offences like robbery with violence had
88shown a "marked increase" in recent years. It was therefore
proposed that further consideration be given to lowering the age
. 89of majority for penal purposes from 18 years to 16 years. The
other type of measure adopted In the fight against crime involved
as we know the consolidation and extension of the ’vigilance*
afforded by the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution.
In March 1969 Fidel Castro expressed a view not just his own 
when he asserted that what would prove decisive in the struggle 
against inveterate criminals would be, in the long haul, the 
success or failure of the Revolutionary Government’s expansion of 
the formal education system. This struggle - he held - would be 
"so much easier# so much less necessary from the moment when the 
country is able to dominate the problem of education from an early 
age", and he added:
We do not believe that this type of criminal can 
be engendered in a society which has achieved 
this objective. Although it is never possible 
to predict what will be the isolated behaviour 
of some men, .......... there is no doubt that
the problem of crime will be extraordinarily 
reduced in keeping with the pace at which there 
is a spreading of education# and# through education# 
of culture# and# through culture, of consciousness# 
into society as a whole.90
At the same time the expansion of the educational system would 
entail concomitant risks ifa through neglectB some children were 
allowed to escape from the net* or to fall behind the rest.
Think of the maladjustments and think of the 
problems which will arise in those individuals 
who9 confronted with a whole mass of people 
which is becoming better and better informed* 
are left behind, not knowing anything.
What will become of them?
They will become society1s problems, candidates for 
delinquency, candidates for conflict with a 
society to which they are unable to adapt* in 
which they are scarcely capable of living.^1
Already the dominant characteristic of juvenile delinquents in
Havana was their backwardness in educational terms. Ninety per
cent of them were found to be lagging three grades or more behind
their contemporaries and 75% had a history of frequent absence 
Q2
from school."
In general Cuban policy towards criminals and crime combined 
a capacity for severity in selected instances, based upon profoundly 
pessimistic premises* with a supreme optimism regarding the 
potential of educat ion and the malleability of the human personality. 
Even where incorrigibles were concerned it was argued that the , 
problem lay in the miseducation to which these men had been subject 
in the past, or in the survival of pockets of the old society 
within the new:
Such a criminal mentality which permits some 
people to steal whilst others work is due to 
the specific milieu in which such persons 
develop, and to the influence exerted upon them 
by others who have not adapted to the system 
and who persist in living in the present with 
the ideology of the past*
One could be still more specific:
The existence of this phenomenon within the 
socialist society is explained by the survival 
of a dead-weight of loafers, lumpens, 
apathetics and youngsters influenced by micro­
environments which still survive and exercise 
their deformatory influence.^
On a theoretical plane it was argued first of all that all crime
was environmentally determined - that bad habits* like good ones*
were socially learnt and therefore in principle capable of.being 
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unlearnt,* Secondly* the argument ran, crime today no longer 
had any objective justification in the nature of the social order: 
it was now no more than a manifestation of false and distorted 
consciousness, and therefore the "education and re-education" of 
criminals, delinquents and other persons who persisted in anti­
social acts was blocked by no insuperable obstacles. Precisely 
because crime was now no more than a problem of ideology and of 
the development of political awareness, it could, with effort, be 
overcome for good.
One field in which this faith was clearly expressed was in
government policy in the late ’sixties with respect to the
country’s penal institutions. The entire Cuban penal framework
was based on a "system of progressive rehabilitation" which
incorporated generous inducements to the inmates of prisons to
96prove themselves capable of reform. An effort was being made,
where political and ordinary prisoners alike were concerned, to
eliminate from prison life the spirit of retribution and to inject
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it with that of "re-education". To this end, "political
instruction" classes for prisoners were nearly universal and, if 
most prisons were in fact rural work-camps or ’farms* (granjas), 
this was not just because agricultural labour was in short supply
nor because the island’s conventional prisons were mostly old* 
insalubrious and overcrowded. It was also because of the Cuban 
leadership’s convictions regarding the educative effect of : 
labour in general and agricultural labour in particular. In 
juvenile reformatories, too, the combination of work and study
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was "the fundamental basis of re-education". Another sphere 
where belief in the efficacity of revolutionary education and re­
education had made its mark was, as we shall see, in the judiciary. 
It is indeed upon this belief that was founded the most novel 
creation of the Cuban revolution in the judicial field: the Popular 
Court. '
THE CITY AS SETTING -
Part of the discussion of the Popular Courts which follows 
in Chapter U draws upon an investigation in depth* of the operation 
of the courts in a selected Sectional division of the city of 
Havana. The nature of the neighbourhood in question will be 
described at the proper time. However at this point it is 
necessary to comment upon one further preliminary question: what
caveats are in order regarding the reliability of generalisations 
based primarily upon observations in the capital city of Cuba?
The proposition is often repeated as a warning to foreign 
visitors to the island that it is impossible to "see the revolution" 
in Havana and that it can be misleading to attempt to form an 
opinion either of the progress or of the problems of the country 
on the basis of experience of life in the capital. There is one 
sense in which this is clearly true, if only marginally relevant
to our specific concerns. After the shift of 1963-6U in Cuba’s 
economic priorities, the bulk of long-term investments found 
their way into the countryside in one form or another. Newly- 
constructed dams and model farms» as well as schools and hospitals 
were soon to be seen distributed across the countryside or in the 
smaller towns of the interior. In sharp contrast, the capital 
was in a state of visible architectural decay by 1969, having 
been deprived of even elementary infrastructural investments.
This situation was frequently explained and justified, even though 
its roots were in a decision of a purely economic order, in terms 
of the (moral) need to reverse the relationship of ’internal 
colonialism* which had obtained between city and countryside ever 
since the arrival of the Spanish on the island at the. end of the 
fifteenth century. It was just, as well as economically expedient 
that the metropolis should ’pay* for the development of its 
hinterland. An early version of the rationale for government 
policies with respect to Havana was given by Fidel Castro to Lee 
Lockwood in 1965. Speaking of pre-revolutionary Cuba, Castro 
explained:.;
If you came to Havana in those days, you saw 
a city with many businesses, many neon signs, 
lots of advertisements, many automobiles.
Naturally this could have given the impression 
of a certain prosperity; but what it really 
signified was that we were spending what small 
resources were left to us to support an elegant 
life for a tiny minority of the population.
Such an image of prosperity was not true of the 
interior, where the people needed running water, 
sewers, roads, hospitals, schools, and trans­
portation, and where hundreds of thousands of. 
sugar workers worked only three or four months a 
year and lived in the most horrible social 
conditions imaginable. You had the paradoxical 
situation that those who produced the wealth; V 
were precisely the ones who least benefited from 
it. And the ones who spent the wealth did not 
live in the countryside, produced nothing, and
lived a life that was soft, leisurely, easy, 
and proper to the wealthy. ...............
Wc inherited an overdeveloped capital in a 
completely underdeveloped country.
This was a recurrent theme in Castro’s speeches during the last 
years of the ’sixties. On 13 March 1968, for example, he quoted 
at length from the study of rural life made by the Agrupacidm 
Catolica Universitaria in 1957, emphasising the finding that 
agricultural workers and their dependants amounting to approximately 
of the national population received a mere 1 0% of the national 
income. Even in 1967, Havana province, with 27% of the island’s 
population still accounted for 38% of its total state wages bill,
35% of consumer goods sales and h9% of commercial services. ^ 0
Until the Batista era of the ’fifties, one consequence of
the pre-revolutionary distribution of income (as between the city
and the interior) had been a steady - if, by Latin American 
101standards, modest - migratory movement from rural areas towards 
the cities. In the ’fifties, migration came to a halt but during 
the first three years after the victory of the revolutionary forces, 
owing to the expansion of the army and other government services 
as well as to the industrial expansion programme, Greater Havana 
started to grow dramatically at the expense of the rest of the 
country. Beginning in 1962, however, the new development 
priorities and the various means of migration-control acquired by
the government during its first years in office not only halted
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this relative growth but turned it into a steady decline. Since 
1963, Cuba has experienced, perhaps uniquely among the Latin 
American nations, a rate of growth of its primate city inferior 
to that of its national population.
TABLE 3
POPULATION OF ‘GREATER.HAVANA AS A PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL 
POPULATION, CENSUS YEARS 1953 AND 1970, AND ESTIMATES 1958, AND 
1962-68.
■Year: 1953 1958 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1970
% 20.8 20.8 22.2 22.2 22.1 21.9 21.7 21.h 21.1. 20.5
Sources: Corapendio Estad^stlco de Cuba, 1968 (Havana: JUCEPLAN9
n.d.); figure for 1970: calculated from "Preliminary 
Data, Census on Housing and Population’'', Granma Weekly 
Review, 10 January 1971, pp. 8-9.
Note: Prior to the local government reform of 1966-67, Greater
Havana included the municipios of Habana, Guanabacoa, 
Marinnoo, Regia, Santa Marfa"del Rosario and Santiago de 
las Vegas. Since the reform, the term Metropolitan Havana 
has been used to refer to the Reglonales Centro-Habana,
Plaza de la Revoluci&i, Diez de Octubre, Guanabacoa,
Marianao and Eoyeros. Official Cuban sources do not indicate 
that the change affects the comparability of these statistics 
however.
The intentions of the Cuban government are not straight­
forwardly anti-urban and dot not rest upon an idealisation of
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rural life as such. They are directed against the expensive
primacy of Havana, favouring the growth of a network of smaller 
cities and substantial villages, organically linked to an economy 
of large-scale, mechanised agriculture. A prominent Cuban demog­
rapher summarises the achievement to date and the prospect for the 
future:
Hundreds of socialist villages with tens of 
thousands of modern houses supplied with 
running water, electricity, and European-type 
community services now shelter workers on the 
popular farms, a population formerly dispersed 
in huts little different from those of the 
Indians who peopled the island in the 15th 
century.
In a few more years this effort will change 
the face of the Cuban countryside. From a
nation with scattered settlement, 'a'- showcase 
capital, and a few dozen sleepy, dusty little 
towns, it will create a new county -with a ; ; 
population clustered in modern villages and a 
. network of medium towns of 2 0 , 0 0 0 to 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  
inhabitants, approximately distributed, 
animated, and aware of their individual function.^1*
It is true, then, that from.before the middle of the. ’sixties 
Havana was being deliberately bled in both an economic and a 
demographic sense, and that from these points of view the city is 
set,apart from the whole of the rest of the country. More 1 
pertinent from our point-of view however is a different, if related, 
claim commonly made about the city. This is that Havana possesses 
particular sociological features which render it politically 
atypical and less "revolutionary" than the rest of the country.
Fidel Castro’s 1968 CDR anniversary speech broached the subject 
in a characteristic way and is worth quoting from at length:
How long did it take, we wonder, for the 
revolutionary spirit to really conquer the capital 
of our country? We should not confuse the victory 
of sentiment, the victory of enthusiasm or the 
victory of the emotions with the victory of 
consciousness. Nor, on the other hand, should we 
blame the masses of our capital who have always 
shown such enthusiasm for everything to do with 
the Revolution. But the fact is that in our 
capital there was an accumulation of many other 
: factors.
In the capital lived the richest families of 
the country, the families of cattlemen, landowners 
and industrialists, in the5.r lavish mansions. It 
was in the capital that the phenomenon of bureau­
cratism in our country was concentrated to the 
highest degree. It was the seat of all adminis­
trative and political activities, and the 
principal seat of all commercial and speculative 
activities; it was moreover the seat of a 
sector of the proletariat which has been charac­
terised with reason on other occasions as an 
aristocracy of labour. Let us say with complete 
clarity that, in spite of the presence of a 
considerable sector of true industrial proletarians .
and extensive zones of the lower strata (capas ; 
humildes) of our population, the .petty-bourgeois•=: r
. spirit prevailed in the capital of our country.
The old spirit of the colonial period, the old 
spirit of the mediatised Republic, .with all 
its vices, and above all the influence of 
Yankee imperialism - culturally, politically, 
ideologically and in every sphere - was very 
marked in the capital of our country. And we 
may say that it has taken years for the victory 
of revolutionary consciousness to come about 
among our masses. ^ 5
The datum provided by Castro the previous March - that Havana
province’s 27% of the national population accounts for 63% of 
106 'all emigres - helps to sustain this view. A few points may 
be added.
Firstly, leaving aside the ’aristocracy of labour ; ’ - a term
used most often after the revolution to refer to the highly-paid
employees of the foreign-owned utilities, oil refineries, banks
and hotels - the urban working class of the ’fifties was far from
homogeneous. In some urban industries, the factory system
predominated but many others employed tens of thousands of workers
in chlnchales - workshops employing no more than five or six men
or women - or in domestic industry. In cigar and cigarette
manufacture, for example, there were in the whole country three
large, mechanised factories but countless small shops. It has
been estimated that 9,000 workers were engaged in factory production
in this sector but 26,000 in small-scale, mainly domestic, industry*
Moreover in Cuba’s three largest industries aside from sugar
milling - clothes and footwear, tobacco products, and wood and
cork products - the ’’typical” worker was a home or sweatshop 
107 ■ 'worker. Although in cities like Havana, then, there existed
a substantial proletariat in the classical sense, it would be 
misleading to think of this group as composed uniformly or even
predominantly of factory workers; as a result of the Revolutionary 
Government’s policy of .’’consolidating" industry, introduced on a 
large-scale in 1S62, many Havana workers were employed in units 
of factory dimensions for the first time in the history of their 
industry.
Secondly, the manufacturing sector as such was only part of
the story; on a national scale, alongside its 327,000 workers
(a mere 16.6% of the economically active population), the Census of
1953 listed as many as 396,000 persons engaged in services or
related activities.Elsewhere it listed by occupational groups
no less than 160,U00 persons dedicated to "domestic", "personal"
or "protective"sservices, as well as 123,200 "salesmen or vendors"
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of which the bulk were "retail or itinerant". " The joint 
effect of stagnation and the economic proximity of the United 
States was thus an expanded tertiary sector consisting in Havana 
to an unverifiable but probably substantial extent of petty 
services» one-man vending stalls or timbirlches» shoe-shiners, 
lottery-ticket vendors and the like. Reinforcing this character­
istic, the instability of Cuba’s sugar economy in its later years, 
also tended to foster in Cubans the virtues of.adaptability 
rather than those associated with steady labour; corruption too, 
which was as much an activity of small entrepreneurs as it was of 
large ones, was sustained by "the lack of opportunities in a 
stagnating economy, the all-pervasive gambling mentality which 
conditioned the outlook of urban Cubans and which was rooted in
the island’s overall dependence on the volatile international
110 : ■
sugar m a r k e t .
Thirdly, and at slightly more length, it is worth indicating
that some at least of the zones of lower class settlement in 
Havana could legitimately be placed on the negative side of 
Castro’s balance sheet. Although pre-revolutionary Havana did 
not experience in the same degree as, say, Caracas or Kingston 
the phenomenon of rapidly growing shantytowns and squatter 
settlements, a number of sizeable barrios de indigentes did 
exist. With names like Las Yaguas, Llega y Pon, El Pulguero,
La Purisitna, Isla de Pinos, La Cueva del Humo, La Timba, they 
were to be found in every part of the city and even, in the case 
of the last mentioned, close to its modern centre, overspilling 
on to what is today the Plaza de la Revoluci<$n. The creation 
and growth of barrios de indigentes occurred on a large scale 
in the ’thirties, triggered by the initiation of the Depression 
in Cuba and accelerated, according to some authors, by the
4
"weakening of the principal of authority- during the political
111upheavals following the fall of the dictator Machado in 1933.
A retrospective account published in 19^5 describes the process 
vividly:
In various places in La Vibora, Jesus del Monte,
El Cerro, the residential quarter of the Vedado, 
in the vicinity of the Central Market and 
wherever there was a vacant plot fsolar yermo], 
there arose unsightly huts made or packing-cases, 
palm leaves [\yaguas ] and refuse of all possible 
sorts, without order and without concert. In 
these discreditable precincts there lodged a 
multitude of needy people bearing the marks of 
hunger, sickness and filth.
We are told of the inhabitants of the barrios in the ’forties: 
that
they beg in public places and from door to door, 
steal with an air of nonchalance, or rummage 
avidly in rubbish dumps in search of food or 
waste materials which they can sell to others
of thoir kind. It is a painful spectacle that . , 
confronts the passer-by when he cores across 
one of these encampments: a- revolting sewer; 
into which the capital has emptied its human 
garbage, to decompose9 physically and morally. :
This author estimated that by 1945 there were more than 2,000
113shacks of this type in Havana, housing 15 to 20 thousand peop3,e.
iiore detailed information was collected about one of the 
most notorious shanty-towns, toovm as Las Yaguas and situated 
in the popular suburb of Luyano”, shortly before it was t o m  down 
in 1963. Las Yaguas occupied a space of about 6,250 square
metres and housed a population of 3,412 (about 740 families) in
■114'- ’1960. The site, a privately-owned vacant plot, began to be
occupied in piecemeal fashion in the *twenties, but the growth or
the barrio took place around two peak years, 1932 and 1954,
reflecting a softening of public and official attitudes towards
the squatters during the respective crises of the dictators
Machado and Batista. Although in regard to the barrios in general
it would appear that both organised invasions and systematic
115-evictions occurred in some periods, the legal owners of the
site of Las Yaguas do not appear to have been able to muster more 
than sporadic harassment of its occupiers and failed to secure 
governmental intervention in their favour in spite of successive 
lav? suits. The shanty-town was created by infiltration, family 
by family, rather than by invasion. Perhaps for this reason 
the capacity of the yagueros for autonomous cooperative efforts 
designed to improve their collective lot appears to have been 
extremely limited in all periods. It is not that the
inhabitants did not know how to make use of the rest of the city 
and its facilities. ;The economic base of the neighbourhood appears
to have consisted partly of petty service activities carried on
within its.own boundaries -'washing and repairs - but this was
supplemented by newspaper salesP begging-and petty-crime.
Residents of Las Yaguas made frequent use of hospitals and
charitable institutions to complement folk-remedies and mutual
support among kin but their main source of contact with the
*outside1 was as the objects of vote-buyers, the police and, from
’ 117time to time* social workers or Catholic activists.
After the revolution of 1959 the authorities moved quickly,
first to bring the barrios under the law by ’’cleaning up” their more
offensive features* then to eradicate them. Most of the larger
shanty-towns were pulled down and their inhabitants rehoused under
the first INAV programmes9 yagiieros being paid to build their own
118dwellings in one or other of the newly-created estates.
According to one en-resident, "the people of the barrio adapted
themselves very quickly to the revolution; from selling their
votes to Batistiano politiciansuthey were converted overnight to
attacking the houses of these politicians in a very ’revolutionary1
manner". She continues: ’’They changed their colour to olive green
119'
like iguanas, even becoming militiamen". Nevertheless, in 
spite of the fact that most of the "criminal elements" had left the 
neighbourhood before the new authorities arrived, the literacy 
campaign of 1961 was notably unsuccessful in Las Yaguas. The 
militia and the CDRs gained a handful of recruits only and these, 
it is alleged, mainly on the basis of the unfounded belief that 
failure to join would mean losing their jobs or forfeiting the 
chance of obtaining new housing. Without exception9 it is 
reported, the people of the neighbourhood regarded membership of 
the CDRs as humiliating and those who joined were referred to
120universally as stool-pigeons (chivatos).
Here, then, we have an additional factor in the balance
against Havana and in support of the view that the city was
sociologically predisposed to resist the advance of revolutionary
politics. It remains here to express some doubts about the
thesis of capital-city exceptionalism as it is ordinarily
advanced. Unquestionably the considerations mentioned create
special conditions and special problems in the city. In the
first place, however, granted that over 20% of all Cubans live
in Greater Havana - and that not less than 40% of them are
located in one or other of the island’s twenty-six urban centres
121 ■of over 2 0 , 0 0 0 population - the cruder version of the view, 
that the first years of revolution left the city, or urban Cuba 
generally, politically untouched are obviously suspect. It 
would be impossible to explain the survival, let alone the immense 
popularity, of the revolutionary regime if this were the case. 
Whatever the final interpretation which is put, for instance, on 
the growth of the CDRs in the ’sixties, it can scarcely be denied 
that political factors proper were involved, and CDR growth, as 
we have seen, occurred disproportionately in Havana. There are 
few indications on these grounds that, taken as a whole, habaneros 
were slower to "understand the process" than anybody else.
It is true that in their efforts to convince the Cuban people 
of the wisdom of the new development priorities after 1963, the 
revolutionary leadership was forced to confront extremely negative 
attitudes held by almost all city-dwellers with respect to the 
countryside in general and agricultural labour in particular. The
notion that the country was p’a los pajaro3 (for the birds), and 
the stereotype of the crude and ignorant guajiro, took some time 
to die. However by 1969 considerable changes had perceptibly 
taken place with respect to this particular element of 
revolutionary conciencia, owing particularly to the initiation 
in the autumn of 1967 of a programme for mobilising large numbers 
of Havana people on a semi-regular basis for work in the ’Green 
Belt’ around the city, where the peasantry had been persuaded to join 
state-directed "mini-plans" for coffee and fruit growing. On 28 
September 1968, Castro was able to argue as follows:
It might well be said that the 28th of September 
last year marked the beginning of a new 
revolution in the province of Havana,; that it 
marked the beginning of a revolution both of a 
material order and of a political order. That 
is to say, there began a real revolution in the 
agriculture of this province and at the same 
time a real revolution in the spirit of the 
masses of the capital of our country.
................... And we truly believe that it
has been this year just past that the triumph of 
the Revolution in the consciousness of the
masses of our capital has become apparent.^*22
Castro went on to say that economic relations between Havana
province and the rest of the country had been transformed in such
a way that now the province ’exported* more to the interior than
it ’imported* from the interior. As for political awareness, a
constant and genuine source of amazement to officials and CDR 
123militants in 1969 was the extent to which Havana people had 
proved capable of changing their basic orientations towards life 
and work in a mere ten years of revolutionary rule.
It is probable that variations in the penetration of 
revolutionary politics as between different types of neighbourhood
in the city are more significant than variations between city
and country as such. According to the National Directorate of
the CDRs, the level and quality of the work of the committees
varies considerably within Havana, though not only politics is
involved. The social character of the neighbourhood in
question has a considerable bearing on the efficiency of the CDRs
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as measured by the National Directorate's emulation campaigns.
Emulation contests tend to be won by committees in the ’traditional*
popular barrios - Cerro, Luyand, Guanabacoa - with their stable
working class populations* Modern housing projects like, the
famous Habana del Este, where professional people rub shoulders
with erstwhile shanty-town residents in tall tower blocks, create
serious headaches for CDR officials anxious to meet regional
' : -125targets in salvage collections and blood donations. Modern
suburbs like Nuevo Vedado which are still largely populated by 
government officials and professionals are difficult to organise 
too - in this case, according to the National Directorate, because 
such people are "often overworked" and find little time for the 
committees. Finally the central quarters of the city spanning 
the area between the Parque Central and the Vedado - present a 
complex and unique set of problems. Far more than any other part 
of the city, these neighbourhoods bear the imprint and the social 
influence of the pre-revolutionary tourist trade. Where middle 
class exile families have left vacant apartments, these have often 
been filled by families from condemned areas; and, finally but 
not least important, this is the Bohemian quarter par excellence, 
containing a greater concentration of intellectuals than any other 
part of the city.
It is nonetheless this last type of neighbourhood, with its 
uniquely heterogeneous population, and consequent sources of 
tension and hostility between neighbours, whose image impresses 
itself upon the retina of the casual observer in Havana. Because 
of the accessibility of these areas they are a likely spot where the 
foreign visitor will alight to "see the revolution". It is to 
them that the warning with which we began really applies.
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CHAPTER 4 THE COMIHG OF THE POPULAR COURTS, II
The problem of justice is eternal and the 
people have a deep sense of justice, above 
and beyond the hair-splitting of juris­
prudence.
- Fidel Castro in "History will Absolve 
Me", as quoted on the title page of the 
Manual of the Popular Courts.
Few issues divided Cubans so soon and so bitterly after the 
overthrow of Batista in January 1959 as y the question of justice 
and the courts. Already in the spring of that year, according to 
the well-known report of the International Commission of Jurists, 
two divergent and clearly identifiable tendencies existed regarding 
such questions among those who, for one reason or another, had 
supported the establishment of the Revolutionary Government a few 
months previously. The one, we are told, was "seeking to reorganise 
the Judiciary according to the democratic patterns established in 
the 1940 Constitution", whilst the other was "demanding ’a popular 
judiciary according to the new aims of the Cuban revolution” 1. Yet 
from the point of view of the revolutionary transformation of the 
capitalist state and its institutional framework, the changes 
introduced in the Cuban legal system as a whole during the first half- 
dozen years after 1959 were few in number and slight in their formal 
ramifications.
The dispute between the ’Constitutionalists* and followers of 
Fidel Castro’s leadership which unfolded in the course of the two 
years 1959-50 both began and finally resolved itself in the form of 
a conflict of jurisdictions between the Supreme Court of the 
Republic and the Revolutionary Courts, the judicial organs of the
Rebel Army. The terrain of this battle was political rather than 
legal philosophy, since from a procedural point of view the 
Revolutionary Courts, which were first used in Havana for the trial 
of Batistiano ’war criminals* early in 1959, were of a conventional 
type. The Revolutionary Courts were first subjected to the dis­
approving glare of the world’s press following two incidents which 
occurred during the first months of 1959, the ’mass trial’ of the 
notorious Jestis Sosa Blanco on 22 January and Fidel Castro’s personal 
intervention in late March to secure the re-trial and conviction of 
a number of Batistiano airmen who had been acquitted in the first 
instance. There is some doubt however as to the number of Cuban
jurists who reacted to these events with the same indignation that
2they provoked abroad. In the light of the documentation provided
3by the International Commission itself, what was more decisive was 
the gradual impact upon members of the ordinary judiciary of diffuse 
pressures intended to make the courts serve revolutionary political 
ends and, at the highest level, the promulgation of successive , 
amendments to the Fundamental Law of February 1959 (substantially a 
restatement of the Constitution of 1940) which, little by little, 
cast doubt upon the constitutional position of the Supreme Court.
It was the maturation of these tendencies rather than dramatic 
institutional innovations which led to the final break between 
revolutionaries and reformers in the judicial sphere in the latter 
part of 1960. In October the Court of Constitutional and Social 
Guarantees was forced to pronounce upon the constitutionality of 
events of the preceding months, and in November Fidel Castro, in the 
name of the Revolutionary Government, obliged senior members of the 
judiciary to opt one way or another on the constitutional question.
A majority chose the Constitution, ‘defected’ from the Revolution
and were replaced.
According to the International Commission of Jurists, a 
contributory factor in the dispute was the prevalence through the 
summer of 1960 of rumours to the effect that the regime was
n
considering the creation of Soviet-styled ’People’s Courts*. In 
reality, the regime, if by this is understood the Fidelista group 
in the government, appear not to have countenanced any such thing 
in 1960. Moreover, and this is the more surprising fact, even 
after Castro’s declaration of the socialist character of the 
Revolution in April 1961 and the proclamation by the Government 
Division of the Supreme Court of "the socialist character of the 
new Cuban revolutionary justice" in August, there were no develop­
ments in this direction. Throughout this phase - one in which 
Soviet organisational models found greater resonance in the Cuban 
leadership than at any time in the ’sixties - the institutional 
forms of Cuban justice were not further altered. Members of the 
judiciary were urged that they could not make a proper interpretation 
of the revolutionary legislation "without a close regard to the
5
social reality which supported this legislation", but conventional
g
judicial organs continued to function in other respects as usual 
alongside the Revolutionary Courts, whose jurisdiction was restricted
7
to Offences against the State.
The substantive criminal legislation in force in Cuba also 
changed remarkably little during the first years, and indeed the 
first decade, of revolutionary power. This consisted of three 
codified elements: the sorcalled Leyes Hambisas decreed by the Cuban
forces during the 1895-98 War of Independence and retained under the 
Republic as a secondary source of law; the Social Defence Code of
1936; and the regulations originally drawn up by the High Command
of the Rebel Army during the armed struggle against Batista and
given force by the Fundamental Law of 1959. These elements were,
however, of very unequal weight, and the major source of law
throughout the ’sixties remained the 1936 Social Defence Code. This
was modified by a series of Acts of the Revolutionary Government,
the most important of which were concerned with counter-revolutionary
offences (Laws Nos. 425 of 7 July 1959 and 664 of 23 December 1959)
and with the consequences of the progressive nationalisation of the
economy (Laws Nos. 719, 732, 858 and 923, decreed between January
o
1960 and January 1961). The only other notable alterations to 
the substantive legislation in force came in November 1961 with the 
passage of Law No. 988, which extended the death penalty to a variety 
of offences including arson, political assassination, sabotage and 
invasion of the national territory by armed groups, and in 1963 with 
Law No. 1098 which, as we saw earlier, had the same effect with 
respect to certain types of common crime. The authors of the 
report of the International Commission of Jurists were impressed by 
"the lack of method underlying the legislative action of the regime", 
but in retrospect what was perhaps most notable feature of this 
action was the modesty of its Intent. By the middle ’sixties, 
neither in procedural nor in substantive law had a systematic effort 
been made to give the Cuban legal system a specifically socialist 
shape. The coming of the Popular Courts after 1966 therefore marked 
a major new departure for the makers of Cuban policy in the judicial 
sphere.
THE POPULAR COURTS: THE IDEA
The Popular Courts were the product both of circumstance and
of the most deeply-held convictions of the Fidelista leadership
regarding the nature of Justice and its role in the creation of a 
new society in Cuba. On the practical side8 the emigration of 
large numbers of judicial personnel in and after 1959 created a 
severe shortage of qualified lawyers on every level of the 
j u d i c i a r y a n d  some means had to be found of overcoming the 
difficulties which inevitably resulted from this situation. At the 
same time* more than merely emergency measures were called for:
What was the function of justice in the past?
It was to defend the right of the bourgeoisie 
to extract greater and greater profits from the 
labour of the workers. It was to defend the 
right of the banks and the biggest capitalists 
to expropriate small proprietors and the smallest 
capitalists. It was to protect the right of the 
latifundist to receive a part of the peasant*s 
product in a rent, in money or in kind, as well 
as to evict tenants from the land and homesteaders 
from their homes at his pleasure. It was to 
condemn all those who struggled for a new system 
without poverty and without exploitation, and to 
punish the least misdemeanour committed by a poor 
man whilst ignoring the crimes of the official 
thugs, torturers and murderers of the Tyranny* In 
a word, the function of justice in the past was to 
defend the rights of the rich against the 
aspirations of the poor.3-1
Today, on the contrary, the function of justice was to protect the 
interests of the mass of the people and to contribute to the 
formation of a social order of a new type. Consequently, new 
structures and methods for its administration needed to be evolved. 
Not only Marxism, moreover, but a long tradition of indigenous Cuban 
thought decreed the form that the new justice should take. As the 
poet and 'Apostle* of Cuban Independence, Josd Marti, once wrote:
Among free peoples, the law has to be clear.
Among peoples which are their own masters, the 
lav; has to be popular. ^
It is in this thought, and in the Martian reflections of Fidel Castro
13himself at the time of his Moncnda trial, that are to be found 
the ultimate ideological roots and inspiration of the Popular Courts.
The origin of the Popular Court idea may be traced back to 
discussions held between Castro and students of the Havana law school
in •
as early as October 1963. . At this time it was proposed that
experiments be undertaken with a view to designing a new type of
court to supersede the Trihunales Coreccionales over which single
magistrates still presided throughout the country with jurisdiction
in summary cases. The first Tribunal Coreccional had sat in
Havana at the turn of the century under the First Intervention by
the forces of the United States and was presided over, to the
undying horror of nationalist Cubans, by a monolingual U.S. Army
captain named Pitcher. In addition to these painful associations*
however* the Coreccionales were felt to have a number of important
structural defects. Firstly* they incorporated no right of appeal*
in spite of the provisions of the Constitution of 19^0 which declared
this to be a universal right; secondly* magistrates sitting singly
were particularly exposed to the corruption which had been common
before the revolution; and* thirdly, but not least importantly, the
social prejudices of the magistrates and their distance from the life-
conditions of the mass of the people were such that the justice meted
15out by them was often both arbitrary and ineffectual. The new
courts should seek, by contrast, to bring the administration of 
justice close to the people and to deal with the minor offences and 
contraventions in their jurisdiction finot with sanctions of the 
traditional sort but with measures conceived in a profoundly 
educative spirit”. To this end, Castro emphasised at his meeting 
with the students, the preliminary work should be carried out ”in 
close and intimate contact with life and with social reality”, not
upon the basis of "armchair formulae" which were "alien to the
I  C
revolutionary style of work".
Characteristically, the locations chosen for the first
experimental courts were the mountainous regions of Oriente province
and the Ci^naga de Zapata in Las Villas, both inhabited by a
dispersed and impoverished peasantry. Among these initial subjects
the * Popular Courts * appear to have been sufficiently successful to
justify their introduction in other rural areas after 1963, but it
was not until 1966, in the new phase of Cuban policy which has been
identified in preceding chapters, that the decision was taken to
generalise their use. Two pilot courts made their appearance in 
17Havana in 1966 but it took until the Spring of 1968, coinciding
with the beginning of the Revolutionary Offensive, to set up Popular
Courts in every neighbourhood of the capital. In the meantime,
the institution had acquired definite features which set it apart not only
from the old Corcccional but also from normal judicial practice in
nost socialist countries.
In 1968-69, Popular Courts functioned in Havana under their
own management committees established at sectional level and
responsible to the Ministry of Justice. Their competence extended
to a wide range of offences, from larceny and assault to minor
infringements of sanitary and other regulations, all previously under
the jurisdiction of the Tribunales Coreccionales and carrying maximum
sentences of six months imprisonment. The amended Code of 1936,
reproduced in manual form for the use of Popular Court judges, was
employed as the principal legal source, and, like their predecessors,
the new courts were empowered to hear cases initiated in writing
18either by the police or by private citizens* There, however, the
The originality of the Popular Courts derived from a combination 
of their composition, their procedure and their approach towards 
sentencing. First of all, they were composed entirely of non- 
vocational, unpaid judges who were elected in the first instance 
from among the ordinary inhabitants of the Court1s area of juris­
diction by mass assemblies open to all local residents. Nominees 
as judges, who worked on a part-time basis in the evenings, were 
required to be both of spotless political reputation and morally 
irreproachable, the effect of the latter consideration being to 
exclude, among others, negligent parents, adulterers and homosexuals. 
Age and educational qualifications of 2 1 years and sixth grade were 
also imposed with the result that, in some rural areas, candidates 
were hard to find without a certain relaxation of the regulations.
In most urban areas, judges were recruited from among the better 
educated workers and housewives. Since the jurisdictional area of 
each court m s  small - in the country, the environs of a village or 
hamlet, in the city a neighbourhood of about 7,000 population - 
candidate-judges were typically well-known, and discussion of their 
merits (and occasionally of their demerits) at election meetings 
was ordinarily vigorous.
The freedom of local assemblies to elect whom they preferred
as ’popular judges’ was not unqualified. Nominees proposed and
approved in this way were expected to pass an aptitude test and
attend a crash course of evening classes lasting ten days before
appearing before a joint Commission of the Ministry of Justice and
19
the Party for a final vetting. The significance of the procedure 
was to assure the selection of capable, honest, hard-working and
politically committed individuals. In practice few candidates 
proposed by mass assemblies appear to have been eliminated at the 
later stage, suggesting that ’unsuitable* candidates were already 
recognised as such at the local level. The courts, which were 
thus ’popular* in the double sense that their presiding judges 
were typically of humble or at least working-class origin and that 
the participation of the local populace in their selection was 
assured, induced high hopes in their sponsors*
The fact that the masses, in a profoundly 
democratic way, choose and elect those who 
become popular judges is a decisive blow 
for the conception, widely held amongst the 
people, that justice is something official, 
something which Is administered from above,
and alien.20
The most important procedural innovations upon which the Popular
Courts rested were designed to establish close links between them
and the neighbourhood or village to which they corresponded. Thus,
first of all, persons against whom charges had been brought were
expected to appear before the court in their locality of residence
even if, as sometimes happened, the alleged .offence had been
committed outside its area of jurisdiction. Secondly, Popular
Court sessions were always held publicly, and with maximum publicity
most often in a local hall, street or park - with a view to obtaining
2 1the largest possible audience. Thirdly, it was customary for the 
President of the court, a position held in rotation by the judges 
attached to it, to open every session with some lengthy remarks about 
the philosophy and procedure of popular justice, these being intended 
primarily for the ’education* of the assembled citizenry and to 
involve them in the proceedings from the outset. Thus, as the 
Popular Court judges* Manual has it:
The Popular Courts spring from the people, 
are chosen by the people and at the same time 
draw the masses, ordinary people, into the 
government of the State* The justice adminis­
tered by the Popular Courts is the justice of 
the people, applied by the people themselves, 
through the courts which they themselves
choose.22
A number of other procedural safeguards were insisted upon, 
since they had either not existed or had often been flouted under 
the old system. Before each case was heard, the accused was 
advised of his rights, which were as follows. First, he might 
object to any one, or all, of the sitting judges on the grounds of 
personal enmity, friendship or kinship, and have him stand down. 
Secondly, he might elect to be defended by a third person, lay or 
professional. And, thirdly, after the hearing he might appeal to 
a special court composed of two different judges together with the 
professional Assessor of the municipality. In Havana in 1969 it 
was seldom that the accused availed himself of his first two rights, 
but appeals were frequent in the more serious cases.
The purpose of holding Popular Court sessions in the most public 
possible way was not only to educate local residents', it was also 
in order to bring the moral weight of the local community into play in 
the cross-examination and, above all, in the sentencing of guilty 
parties. Although the lav? still in force in the late ’sixties 
empowered the courts to impose fines, Popular Court judges made a 
point of abjuring the use of monetary sanctions in all circumstances.
To start with, fines were obviously a type of sanction which punished 
without educating; what was more, since most offenders had dependents, 
they tended to punish the families of the guilty as much if not more 
than the guilty subject himself. For these two reasons, the
Imposition of fines was alien to the spirit of the Revolution in 
general and popular justice in particular. In accordance with 
this spirit, the Popular Courts stood for the principle that the . 
best sanctions were "moral" ones. The principle of retribution 
was not rejected absolutely*
The punishment of offences and contraventions 
committed by persons who continue engaging in 
anti-social behaviour and who retain the 
habits, or the scars, of the old exploitative 
and oppressive society is necessary to their
reformation.23
But there was punishment which reformed the person on whom it was 
imposed, and punishment which merely repressed. With this in mind 
all convicted offenders were admonished publically, as a.matter of 
principle, and sometimes at great length, by the president of the 
Popular Court. Commonly no additional sanction was imposed, the 
guilt or shame felt by the object of a public admonition being 
considered sufficiently ’educational1 by itself. Where other 
sentences were deemed necessary, judges were expected to show 
ingenuity as well as a sense of justice in ’making the punishment 
fit the crime’* In Havana in 1969 some judges took special pride 
in obliging an offender judged to be the victim of his own illiteracy 
or lack of formal education to attend evening classes until he or 
She had improved his grade of schooling. In other cases offenders 
were obliged to spend, say, three Sundays in unpaid agricultural 
labour alongside volunteers, or to make other open expression of 
his shame. Where self-imposed unemployment was deemed a contrib\itory 
factor in the commission of an offence, its author might be obliged 
to report for paid but nevertheless unpopular agricultural work during 
a period of months. Only the most serious offences and persons in 
whom shame was not forthcoming were sent for detention in prison-farms
which - in spite of the efforts of the penal authorities to render 
them centres of effective re-education - were regarded by Popular 
Court judges as a last resort.
The reliance of the Cuban Popular Courts on a non-vocational
judiciary9 public participation and ‘’moral sanctions” is not of
course entirely without precedent in the judicial history of other
socialist countries* The Cuban approach nevertheless inverted
current Soviet practice in at least one respect. In the People* s
Courts of the USSR* vocational judges are assisted by *People’s
Assessors* - elected representatives of mass organisations who sit
in the courts in an advisory capacity* In Cuba* elected judges
were assisted by professional lawyers who acted as Assessors on
points of law but who were not permitted to act as judges except in 
25appeal cases. A closer Soviet parallel is to be found in the.
*Comrades* Courts* which made their appearance in factories» 
collective farms and neighbourhood units in and after 1961* Here 
elected non-vocational judges presided over courts whose competence 
was broadly similar to that of the Popular Courts in Cuba and whose 
decisions were valued principally for “their educational effect on
og
the offender and the spectators”.** These ’courts* however were
not s like their Cuban counterparts 9 an integral component of the
national judicial system and came under the direction of the corres-
27ponding local trade union-, farm- or housing collective-committee.
In the People’s Republic of China, People’s Assessors, elected
or appointed by mass organisations or military units, have been used
in various phases of the revolution in conjunction with the People’s 
20Court system. However, regular courts relying substantially on 
non-vocational personnel were employed on a large scale before the
Cultural Revolution only in one period, during the Judicial Reform
29 ,Movement of 1952-53. (The quasi-^udxcial Comrades1 Adjudication
Committees1 formed on an experimental basis in Chinese factories
and mines during the period 1953-57 correspond not to the Cuban
Popular Courts but to the Consejos de Trabajo formed in Cuban
30work centres in 1965.) Nevertheless the spirit of Chinese judicial
practice is probably closer to that of the Popular Courts in Cuba
than anything to be found in the Soviet bloc. The traditional
Chinese emphasis on conciliation and the Confucian concept of 11
31are of course absent from the Cuban cultural background. A clear 
convergence between the two models is to be noted nevertheless to 
the extent that the tenets of the '’mass line* in China require that 
justice and the courts be 1brought to the people1 and involve mass 
participation v?herever possible. At a deeper level, the two concepts 
of the fundamental purpose of judicial proceedings are similar, both 
insisting upon the "education and re-education" of the subject, upon 
his intemalisat ion of socially accepted standards of behaviour, and 
the achievement of this result by means of "moral" sanctions and
32
community-participation rather than by coercion.
In China those periods characterised by the ascendancy of the 
"internal model” of law and the decline of the "external model” 
derived from Western and Soviet theory have also been marked by a
3
systematic unconcern for codified legislation and procedural niceties. 
In the Cuban Popular Courts in the late 'sixties, beyond the formal 
procedural requirements already mentioned, emphasis was placed upon 
informality, Vfhich was regarded as an essential ingredient of the 
process of "education and re-education". Procedural flexibility, 
underpinned by the feeling that legalistic rules are more often than 
not an obstacle to the expression of the masses1 "profound sense of
justice"s was particularly notable in one area* A widely accepted 
principle of modem procedural lav: in the 'Anglo-Saxon* countries 
maintains that the assessment of guilt and the determination of an 
appropriate sentence should be distinct and separate processes; 
whence the procedural rule that the criminal history of the accused, 
and other information required for sentencing purposes, should not 
be revealed until and unless his guilt is proven. In the Popular 
Courts this requirement was not usually respected, both for 
practical reasons and for philosophical ones. Judges were of course 
expected to establish the facts of a given case objectively and 
without prejudice. Nevertheless, in circumstances where judge and
accused might well be acquaintances, few courts could expect the 
luxury of ignorance where the accused's history and circumstances 
were concerned. Nor was this sought after. In addition to 
educating the populace and helping to make moral sanctions effective, 
the wedding of the courts to the local community was valued precisely 
because it permitted judges to acquire a thorough knowledge of the 
personal backgrounds of all the parties in a given case. In this 
way, it was argued, the popular character of the new courts helped
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to render them "more profoundly just".
Part of this reasoning had to do with sentencing. In order to 
devise genuinely educative and hence preventative sanctions or public 
admonitions, it was essential for judges to have at their fingertips 
certain essential information about the accused. For this purpose 
the courts compiled files on each case which were studied by the 
sitting judges before the corresponding session commenced. Contained 
in the files were (a) the initial accusation, (b) witnesses' 
statements and (c) reports on the background of the persons involved. 
Popular Court cases could be initiated in any one of three ways: by
private citisons, by the police (DOP) or, in cases of perjury or
•contempt, by .the courts themselves* In cither of the first two
instances, a-written accusation was required to be dictated at the
local DOP station and then lodged at the offices of the court.
Written statements by witnesses,could also be submitted at this
stage. On receiving the accusation, the court judges issued
35summonses to all those concerned, and at the same time requested 
reports on some or all of these persons from the pertinent 
authorities. The latter could include the police or the Consejo 
Superior de Defense Social in more serious cases; more often it 
meant the administrator of a person's workplace, together with the 
chairman of his local CDR. The information provided in the reports 
was expected to touch upon the domestic situation, work-record, 
social habits and political history of the subject as well as his 
criminal record, if any.
Whilst the principal purpose of the files was to permit 
intelligent sentencing, Popular Court judges were not concerned in 
practice or in theory to make any sharp division between the 
(confidential) information provided in them and the 'facts of the 
case', as revealed in court. Often, the cross-examination of the 
accused and of witnesses during the hearing was as much concerned 
with the 'background* of the case as with the alleged offence itself, 
reflecting the view that to judge a man for what he is as well as for 
what he has done was just and good, both from his own point of view 
and from that of society. What sense did it make to judge a person 
for a single, possibly isolated, act, when what really mattered was 
the sum total of his actions and the relations between them? Was not 
a persistent loafer who stole from his neighbour guilty of a greater 
offence than a respected worker who did the same thing in a moment of
temptation? In the face of arguments such as those, the 
distinction between considerations relevant to the assessment of 
guilt and those affecting sentencing usually became blurred beyond 
recognition in Popular Court hearings.
In the last analysis the Popular Courts have to be evaluated 
not only by the criteria of legal philosophy but also, and not less 
importantly, by those of a revolutionary order which seeks to employ 
its judicial institutions, together with every other instrument of 
social domination at its disposal, to help right the wrongs of the 
past and lay the foundations of a new society. In Cuba, to renounce 
the use of the courts as, amongst other things, agencies of social 
and ideological change would be to underestimate the dimensions of 
the task in hand. At the same time important differences between 
conventional 'Anglo-Saxon* and Latin American concepts of law may be 
relevant to an appreciation of the apparent procedural 'laxity* of 
the Popular Courts.
From the time when the Cuban Revolutionary Courts were first 
noticed by the Western press in 1959, the respective assessments of 
Cuban revolutionary justice espoused by Cubans on the one hand and 
foreign legal experts on the other have diverged sharply. Alleged 
Cuban arbitrariness and neglect of the elements of procedural lav:
36were a contentious issue long before the coming of the Popular Courts.
It has been argued in this context, however, that it is a mistake to
interpret such differences of opinion in terms of a simple conflict
37between the upholders and the enemies of the 'Rule of Law'. What 
is at issue, on the contrary, is two opposing but equally well- 
established conceptions of Justice, Law and the relations between 
the two. The position adopted by Fidel Castro in the affair of the
Batistiano airmen in Spring 1959 was a good deal leas shocking to
members of the Hispanic tradition of jurisprudence than it was in
Uorth American legal circles; indeed Castro’s remarks on this
occasion can be understood as."an eloquent statement of the
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traditional Latin American conception of law". According to
this conception* enacted legislation (or ley) is both ethically and
juridically dependent upon the abstract concept of justice or
’right1 (derecho).. The heavy influence upon Spanish legal thinking
of the Roman concepts of Lex and Xus is such that the English term
’law* (and hence ’Rule of Law’) is incapable of adequate translation.
One consequence of this fact is that Latin Americans have often been
liable to the charge of disregarding the law even whilst remaining
strictly within the framework of-their own countries’ legal
traditions. Wore especially a relative unconcern with the niceties
of procedural law - and even the positive assertion that procedural
guarantees are sometimes obstacles in the path of Justice - is
characteristic of Latin American judicial thinking, not of Cuban
39aberration from this tradition.
Partisans Of the Popular Court idea in 1969 did not deny that 
the institution had weaknesses both intrinsic and extrinsic in kind. 
Sometimes, for instance, worker-judges failed to command the respect 
automatically accorded to professionals, a consideration which' had 
to be weighed against the greater moral authority in a revolutionary 
society of a man himself of the social origin of the accused. A few 
judges possessing a natural flair for cross-examination fared as well 
as their vocational counterparts might have done but these were the 
exception. The weakness of most popular judges in the technical 
skills of the courtroom was compensated only by the public character
of the proceedings , which, it was sometimes claimed , made it 
impossible for a lie to be sustained in a Popular Court.
But what advocates of the courts insisted upon was that their 
efforts should be judged not against abstract yardsticks but in the 
light of practical experience and against the backcloth of the 
particular political and social upheavals under way in Cuba at the 
time. As we have already seens the introduction of the Popular 
Courts throughout the country coincided with the onset of a phase 
in Cuba*s recent history in which egalitarian slogans and a stress 
upon *moral* sources of motivation came to the fore to a greater 
extent than at any time before or since. This was a phase in 
which the Fidelista leadership deliberately sought a confrontation 
not only with their ideological foes at home and abroad but also 
with the vostiges of capitalism in Cuba at a more mundane level 
beginning with a Revolutionary Offensive against the small private 
trader and ending with a more drawn-out but no less serious 
engagement with the criminal and the ’’loafer”. To these elements 
we have also added some less dramatics more permanent features of 
the social context in which the Popular Courts perforce operated 
in Havana itself.
In the section which follows , an attempt is made to shovr hov? 
these contextual elements impinged upon the administration of justice 
in the case of the Popular Courts in one Sectional division of Havana 
in 1968-69. By describing in detail the experience of a single 
neighbourhood9 it is hoped to arrive at a more concrete and realistic 
account of the Popular Courts as they actually functioned in this 
period, and to permit a meaningful assessment of their role in the 
social transformation of Cuba. Material for this section has been
drawn from three sources: (1 ) extended informal interviews with 
Popular Court judges and CDR activists in the neighbourhood in 
question, (2 ) direct observation of court proceedings, judges* 
meetings and other local events, and (3) the records of one court 
corresponding to the cases heard during the period May 1968 to May 
1969. The author was a frequent visitor to the neighbourhood 
between January and October 1969 and was made an honorary member 
of the CDRs in the locality. A number of the participants in 
the events to be described here offered him their friendship as 
well as their time and patience, all in considerable measures, and 
this is a fact which the reader must bear in mind. In accordance 
with convention, the Section has been given the fictitious name *San 
Ramon1 by which it is referred to throughout.
THE POPULAR COURTS: A CASE
The San Ration Section of Havana, a popular residential district 
of about 35,000 inhabitants, lies some three kilometres to the south­
west of the old city centre. Separated by approximately the same 
distance from the Vedado, with its modem tourist and business 
amenities, the neighbourhood forms a part of the dense belt of 
proletarian settlement which stretches out behind the central axis 
of the city on the shoreward side.
Seventy years ago, like much of what is today metropolitan
Havana, San Ramon was occupied only by the elegant villas and
pretty farms of the rich, becoming incorporated into the city proper
only after the turn of the century, during the first years of the 
i*0Republic. Something of this history is reflected in its outward
appearance, which is distinguished architecturally by the interleaving
of delicate Spanish colonial styles with newer influences of North 
American origin* The quality of the housing is varied. Some of 
the older and more imposing buildings have decayed beyond repair, 
partly through age and partly as a consequence of their hasty 
conversion into crowded tenements to meet the pre-revolutionary 
demand for cheap accommodation. At the other extreme, San Ramon 
does not lack a few modern blocks where before the revolution well- 
paid industrial workers could rent modest but sound apartments. But 
the commonest type of dwelling is of intermediate quality, consisting 
of small solares or cases de vecindad where a dozen or more families 
occupy apartments around a central patio equipped with collective 
facilities. Unlike some of their city centre counterparts, the 
solares of San Ramon typically have a well-scrubbed and airy aspect, 
though they are often overcrowded. A minor component, finally, of 
the total housing stock of the neighbourhood consists of belts of 
wooden houses and roughly-constructed shacks erected along a disused 
railway line and on other waste land, a reminder, no more, of the 
shanty-town which once occupied much of the adjacent terrain.
Most of the people who live in San Ramon work outside the 
neighbourhood. Although within its boundaries there are a printing 
works, numerous small workshops and warehouses, and a multitude of 
corner shops or bodegas, cafds and bars, it is primarily a 
residential area. To the extent that it possesses a natural centre 
(and most Sections in Havana are administratively-created entities 
rather than integral social units) this is provided by a grassy 
square, which alone disturbs the pattern of straight intersecting 
metalled streets. The meeting places of the twelve CDR zone 
committees in the Section - converted shops or colonial mansions, in 
most cases - come to life in the evenings, along with the bodegas
and the restaurants along the main street which flanks San Ramon*
At other times the neighbourhood is quiet, disturbed only by the 
occasional groaning General ISotors bus or rickety taxi.
In 1969 there were a total of 235 block CDRs in San Ramon, 
approximately one between each pair of street intersections. The 
total CDR membership for the Section (13,766) was distributed more 
or less evenly between the zones, each of which organised between 
31% and 62% of the corresponding population of all ages. (See 
Table 4.) The reputations of the different zones from the point 
of view of CDR organisation and activity varied between "average" 
and "good". Zone Number 12 had a particularly high standing, 
having earned honorific titles for overfulfilment of emulation 
targets on a number of recent occasions, though in other respects 
it did not appear in any way untypical of the district. Consisting 
of a dozen or so street intersections and encompassing a population 
of a little over 2 ,0 0 0 , the zone included thirteen block committees. 
Of these, nine traced their origin to Autumn 1960 and were formed, 
according to their chairmen, immediately after Fidel Castro1s 
appeal on 28 September. A further two CDRs claimed to have been 
founded in 1961, whilst the remainder dated from 1964 and 1968 
respectively, when over-large ‘blocks1 were divided into more 
manageable units.
Ten out of the thirteen committee chairmen in Zone 12 were 
women - five of them houswives, two of them primary school teachers, 
and the others a cleaner, a cafeteria attendant and a caretaker. The 
men were employed respectively as a grocery assistant, a policeman 
and a fishing port operative. On the author’s estimate, nine of 
the chairmen would have been regarded by other Cubans as ’white*,
TABLE 4
SAN RAMON SECTION CDRs, SPRING 1969
Eone
Number
Number of 
Block CDRs Membership
Total Membership as a 
Population Percentage of
Total Population
1 25 1,575 4,414
o*0
36
2 19 1,499 2,421 62
3 32 1,559 3,201 49
i* 2 0 1,442 3,024 48
5 18 985 3,576 28
6 18 1,116 3,586 31
7 18 1 , 0 1 2 2,748 37
8 17 724 1,731 42
9 23 1,261 3,670 34
1 0 16 946 2,560 37
1 1 16 779 2,155 36
1 2 13 868 2,195 40
Section
Totals 235 13,766 35,281 39
Source; Based on CDR internal census figures provided to the 
author.
two as ^mulatto* and two as 1 black*. Their educational feacBgrousd 
ranged from primary teacher-training down to third grade, the modal 
attainment being sixth grade, six of them having raised their 
educational levels by at least two grades in night school since 1959. 
Eleven of the chairmen said that they had belonged to no political 
party or trade union before the revolution, the deviants belonging 
to the Liberals and the PSP respectively. The average time for 
which they had been incumbents of their positions was two and three- 
quarter years.
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The Zone Committee responsible for directing the activities 
of these CDRs had been created as a result of the restructuring of 
1966, and met about once a month in the converted mansion which had 
previously served as the Section headquarters. The eleven members 
of the committee, some of whose personal and biographical charac­
teristics are summarised in Table 5, were more likely than CDR 
chairmen to be male, white and a member of a pre-revolutionary 
trade union. Three of them also held the position of CDR chairman 
in their ovm block.
What kind of people did not belong to their local CDRs in 
Zone 12? Zone militants who were asked this question tended to 
give political rather than sociological answers. A widespread view 
however was that those who refused to become "integrated into the 
Revolution" were usually gente desclasada - declassed people - who 
had held privileged positions before the revolution as foremen, 
office workers or employees of foreign firms. Such persons, it was 
argued, "lack guts and lack principle because they are declassed 
and don’t recognise the great and essential tasks before us". Tlhen 
pressed, the same informants were prepared to admit that apathy was 
not wholly a question of marginal status-positions and frustrated 
ambitions. Old people generally participated little in the CDRs, 
but also "many of the weak elements are our brother workers; there 
are lots of workers with very materialistic attitudes, because the 
way in which our society developed before the revolution made a lot 
of people very materialistic". Another category of political 
deviant frequently mentioned was that which consisted of "lumpen 
elements". Although it is arguable that, as employed in Cuba, this 
concept denotes a specific set of political attitudes rather than a 
social group or category, cederistas used the term frequently in
certain social contexts and very seldom in others.
In San Ramon, the appellation lumpen was most commonly heard 
in connection with "La Corona",1^  a tumbledown tenement-house which 
was the bete noir of 2one 8 . Built as a substantial villa towards 
the end of the last century, La Corona had been converted latterly 
for use as a clinic and as a school, finally being transformed in 
the *fifties into a solar providing housing for well over fifty 
families in small apartments or single rooms. In 1869 there were 
still fifty-two households living on the three floors of the building, 
in its outhouses or in wooden constructions erected on its roof.
Before the Urban Reform of October I960, the average rent paid for 
rooms had reportedly been of the order of seventeen pesos per month, 
or about twenty per cent of the monthly wage of an unskilled
if2
labourer, and evictions had been frequent. Novi nobody paid rent
in La Corona and evictions were unheard of, but time had not 
improved either the aspect of the place or the quality of the shelter 
it provided, and the shortage of housing prevented most of the 
Coroneros from finding alternative accommodation. It was hoped that 
the Government would declare the building uninhabitable so that the 
occupants might be moved to one of the new housing projects on the 
outskirts of the city. With this expectation neither the local 
maintenance authority nor the families themselves had devoted their 
resources to its upkeep, and it was even said of the latter that 
they deliberately sabotaged the plumbing with a view to bringing the 
day closer when they would be rehoused.
The people of La Corona had always been among the poorest in 
the locality, a position they shared with the inhabitants of "La 
Lomita", the settlement along the railway line. In the new blocks 
not far from the solar, some families had been able to afford
monthly rents of up to fifty pesos, which was at least half of what 
raost Coroneros earned in a month. Even in 1969, the personal 
incomes of the sixty-five wage-earners in La Corona tended towards 
the national minimum of eighty pesos (see Table 6 ) and this had to 
be distributed among a total population of 210. Rationing and the 
provision of free recreational, educational and public health 
facilities had had a levelling effect, yet there were not a few in 
La Corona who regarded these things as unsolicited luxuries which 
scarcely outweighed the loss of the bright lights and easy atmosphere 
of the old Havana. This was true most particularly of the four 
households which had been dependent for their income on small vending 
businesses until the nationalisation measures of Spring 1968, and 
of the numerous others which, during the years before the revolution, 
had drawn an income from occupations por su cuenta of varying degrees 
of respectability.
TABLE 6
"LA CORONA": MONTHLY MONEY WAGES OF WORKING POPULATION, MALE AND FEMALE
Pesos per Month Males %_ Females
80-100 
100-11*9 
150-199 
200+
Totals 42 100.0 23 100.0
23 5|.8 20 87.0
11 26.2 3 13,0
7 16.7
1 2.4
Source? Based on San Raradn, Zone 8 , CDR census.
Not all the "problematic elements" in Zone 8 of San Ramon
lived in La Corona, but a remarkable concentration of them were
to be found there* The heads of twenty-five, or nearly half, of
the households were CDR members but there were two or three
activists at most. One member of a family which recently moved out
was even a candidate for Party membership but of the majority it
could be said that "they do not understand the revolutionary process"
(no comprenden el proceso). The first CDR established in the street
on which La Corona stands had been based in the building and headed
by a resident who was later implicated in the drug-peddling activities
of her numerous sons and publically deprived of her position. In
1969 the committee was run from one of the other buildings in the
block in the face of the frank hostility of many Coroneros who
regarded its chairman, somewhat uncharitably as the local stool-
44pigeon for the DOP. What made the place "problematic" from the
point of view of the CDRs was not the political backwardness of the 
people by itself so much as the conjunction of this factor, in a 
mutually reinforcing fashion, with social problems of a more or less 
serious type. The contents of the Popular Court files for the 
locality, as we shall see presently, appear to confirm the universal 
opinion that La Corona was un ambiente muy malo. Several residents 
were prima facie alcoholics, and it was complained that when beer 
was on ration some of them took to manufacturing mofuco - a mixture 
of untamed spirit with sugar. Five men and one woman normally 
resident in La Corona were currently serving prison sentences of 
various lengths after being convicted of criminal offences and twelve 
households out of fifty-two had a record of recent detention. A 
number of youths were regarded by cederistas as potential delinquents.
The lumpen inhabitants of La Corona were not typical of San
Ramon as a whole, nor were their relations with the CDR. Even La
Lomita, the small.shanty-town along the railway line, managed to
sustain a number of active committees organised effectively tfrom
within1 and consequently lacking the aspect, dominant in the former
case, of particularly energetic social-work agencies. One feature,
however, of life in La Corona was of general significance in the
neighbourhood and is worth remarking upon before vie proceed• A
factor which unquestionably contributed to the disreputability of
the Coroneros1 life-style in 1969 was the cramped physical
conditions which resulted from the accommodation of as many as 2 1 0
people in the equivalent of under fifty rooms of average dimensions.
To this must be added the inadequacy of the collective sanitary and
washing facilities, and the lack of privacy afforded by the often
roughly-constructed partitions between apartments. In 1953,
however, the Cuban Census found that throughout the country nearly
one-fifth of urban dwelling units consisted of single rooms, with
45
an average of five occupants each. The solar - a rundown mansion
divided into small units, with collective facilities - was typical 
of lower class dwelling in the cities generally and in Havana 
particularly, as, to a large extent, has continued to be the case 
since 1959. Although, as was indicated earlier, the solares of 
San Ramon did not as a rule deserve the highly derogatory connotations 
which the term has acquired in recent years, the commonest form of 
housing in the district fell into this category in 1969.
Much of what is often attributed by Cubans to Cuban national 
character may be directly related to the overcrowding and open 
layout typical of the solar. Writing not about Havana but about 
San Juan, Puerto Rico, Rogler has summarised the effects of over­
crowding and the "outdoor, open quality" of life in the slums and
caserios of that city in the following way:
To the husbands and wives in our study, the 
neighbourhood presents a series of problems: 
it disturbs the privacy that families want; 
it makes the family vulnerable to intrusions 
by neighbours; it enables the intimate 
activities of a family to be exposed to the 
forum of neighbourhood opinion; it permits the 
individual to be evaluated repeatedly, not only 
as a neighbour but also in his performance of 
family roles; it exposes the family directly 
and indirectly through the mechanism of gossip.
As a result, bitter feelings emerge. The person 
feels he is being disrobed by a judge and jury 
of critical neighbours with whom he has little 
or no favourable emotional identification and 
from whom no special exemption can be sought.
Gossip, insults, indirectas, and physical 
conflict enmesh his life in the neighbourhood.
Though he may seek to isolate himself from them, 
escape is practically impossible.1^
Rogler*s study was concerned to identify factors alleviating and
aggravating severe psychiatric distress among lower-class Puerto 
if *7
Ricans. In the solar, as in the caserio, very little is
private, members of different households often living and sleeping 
a few feet away from their neighbours, separated from them by a 
thin board partition. The ecology of daily existence renders 
impossible anything but a gregarious style of living and one in 
which chismeria, gossip, neighbourly rivalries, feuds and open 
conflicts play a conspicuous role. In this connection, the official 
pamphlet "Notions of Criminology” observes:
Among the various environmental factors studied 
by criminologists are housing and, in general, 
the possible influence upon men’s behaviour of 
the material conditions in which they live. In 
regard to housing, more important than physical 
or sanitary conditions is that kind of forced 
promiscuity which lends itself to the commission 
of offences, particularly sexual ones.......
It continues:
The crowded conditions faced by families in
Jjg
solares and ciudadelas favour the 
establishment between them of relationships of 
friendship or enmity, with the result that 
disturbances, brawls, insults, etc. frequently 
occur - sparked off, generally, by the use of 
common facilities (lavatories, water taps, etc.)
The policy of our Revolution is to have an end 
with this legacy of capitalism inthe same way 
that it has finished with the so-called barrios 
de ind igentes.......**9
In the meantime, however, the solar presents a problem which has 
to be confronted in other ways. .
The Popular Courts came to San Ramon in the Spring of 1968, 
soon after the launching of the Revolutionary Offensive* Most 
cederistas in the neighbourhood, and other local residents too, had 
attended the assemblies called to elect the first ‘judges* for the 
new courts and many turned out for the selection of additional 
judges in 1969. Candidates, it was pointed out, should be of a : 
high moral calibre, must have a reasonable educational level "without 
having to be any kind of intellectual”, and should have a humane 
interest in social problems of the type dealt with by the Courts.
They should, of course, be revolutionaries, because, after all, only 
revolutionaries could really comprehend social questions; people 
who still had selfish attitudes and personalist motives could not 
start to solve collective problems* But it was not necessary to 
be a Party member or anything of the sort in order to qualify, for 
there were many revolutionaries who didn’t have Party cards, and 
no comrade should hesitate to accept a nomination because he was 
not perfect or because he lacked experience. Gaining experience 
in practice was what the Revolution was all about.
For purposes of Popular Court administration, San Ramon Section 
was divided into three "Localities”. Locality number 2, which was
investigated in greatest depth* consisted of the CDR Zones 
numbers 3* 8 and 12 and included a population of 7*127 (see Table 
4 above). The first elections for the court which was to have 
jurisdiction in the locality resulted in the training and confirm­
ation as judges of an elderly railway worker - a man of trade union 
and PSP background; a young factory worker who studied part-time 
at the Worker-Peasant Faculty of the University of Havana and was 
an ’’aspirant” to Party membership; a student in his late twenties; 
and a middle-aged negress of whom it was said that she was a
devotee of santeria, but "a thoroughly good revolutionary all the
„  50 same". .
The typical court session was held in the open-fronted CDR 
Headquarters in Zone 12* though on one memorable occasion it was 
decided to set up shop in the spacious backyard of La Corona, 
thereby to ’’bring justice to the people” in a manner which would be 
easily understood. The judges sat in threes behind a table under 
a flag and a portrait of ’Che* Guevara taking turns as President of 
the Court. Audiences from a dosen to fifty people occupied the
benches opposite. Efforts were made to ensure that children aged 
under twelve were excluded from the courtroom, no smoking was 
permitted and the court was expected to rise at the beginning of 
the session, but there were few other formalities. Silence was 
maintained throughout if one of the stronger personalities was 
presiding, and intermittently if not.
The proceedings always began at about seven-thirty in the 
evening with a speech of five to ten minutes by the court1 s 
president, which invariably dwelt upon the nature and purpose of 
’popular justice* and the greatness or the ’beauty* of the task
with which the courts had been entrusted. The job of the courts 
was to combat crime, together with all the other bad social habits 
which were the legacy of the old society, with a view to eliminating 
them for good. But the Popular Courts had a special way of 
tackling the problem - by wagering upon the shame felt by offenders 
and trusting to the efficacity of moral sanctions. They could be 
harsh and uncompromising if necessary, but that depended on whether 
those convicted of a first offence proved themselves willing to be 
re-educated and to heed the warnings of their neighbours.
Each case, which occupied between twenty minutes and two hours, 
was dealt with in the following sequence. First of all, the 
accused and,’where appropriate, his accuser were made to stand to 
the side of the bench on opposite sides. The full texts of the 
written accusations and statements were then read aloud by the judge 
serving as the Secretary of the Court, and the accused was informed 
of his rights. This having been studiously done, verbal statements 
were accepted from the parties concerned and from such witnesses as 
wished to come forward, followed by a lengthy cross-examination of 
each. Having once satisfied themselves of the facts of the case 
the judges withdrew to a private place to consider their verdict and, 
not least important, the nature of the admonitions and sanctions, 
if any, which were called for. The Assessor of the Section, a 
young professional lawyer, was sometimes available for consultation 
at this stage. In case of guilt, a public admonition was always 
delivered by the President of the Court, since, as a wall-poster 
in the Sectional office of the Popular Courts announced "A Good 
Admonition Supports the Sanction and Renders it more Efficacious"; 
in case of innocence, the accuser himself was often admonished at 
some length, together with witnesses suspected of partiality in
their testimony. Most of those subjected to this type of chastise­
ment suffered it in silence, the occasional indignant protester 
usually receiving an additional sentence for his pains.
When the Popular Courts first began to function in San Raiwin, 
the judges claimed, the effect was electrifying: "The lumpen and 
the loafers scarcely knew what hit t h e m A f t e r  the first few 
months of court sessions* the neighbourhood became unusually quiet 
and orderly. By counting the numbers of accusations filed in 
Locality number 2 each month between May 1968 and April 1969 
inclusive, the author was able to check out the suggestion also 
made by judges that the frequem^ of cases declined dramatically as 
a consequence of vigorous action by the new courts. Table 7 
presents the pertinent data, with sub-totals representing the 
numbers of persons ’convicted* and ’acquitted’ in each of the 
monthly groups. No trend of the type suggested is apparent from 
the table, though it remains a possibility that these figures 
conceal complex developments such as a real decline in ’hard* cases 
offset by a growing inclination on the part of the ordinary 
citizenry to seek judicial solution to personal feudd and other 
minor matters. The monthly totals of convictions also fail to 
exhibit a trend.
Table 8 shows the total numbers of persons accused, convicted and 
acquitted during the whole period May 1968- April 1969 according to 
belito or Contravenei6n in question. In cases where more than 
one offence was alleged - for instance, Assault with Verbal Abuse - 
accusations, convictions and acquittals were counted for the sake 
of simplicity under the more serious offence. The classification 
of offences accords with the Manual de los Tribunales Populares de
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TABLE 8
POPULAR COURT, LOCALITY 2, SAN RAMON: ACCUSATIONS, CONVICTIONS 
AND ACQUITTALS, MAY 1968 - APRIL 1969 INCLUSIVE, BY PRINCIPAL 
OFFENCE OR MISDEMEANOUR
Persons Persons Persons
Accused Convicted Acquitted
■A. OFFENCES (Delitos)
Assault (Maltrato de obra) 49 42 7
Light Woundings (Lesiones Leves) 13 . .1 1 - - 2
Threatening Behaviour (Amenazas) 14 ' ' .8 6
Insulting Behaviour (Injurias) 7 4 . 3
Disrespect for Authority 4 4 0
Disobedience to Agents of 
Authority 3 ' : 3 : 0
Theft (Hurto) 14 1 2 2
Swindle (Estafa) 2 1 1
Prohibited gaming 3 . 3 , ' 0
Offences against the People*s 
Economy (various) 3 i ; . 2
Clandestine Trading 22 21 1
Perjury 3 3 0
False accusation 3 3 0
Violation of sentence 3 3 : o
Total of Offences 143 1 1 2 24
B. MISDEMEANOURS (Contraveneiones)
Coaction 5 ■ 4 1
Verbal Abuse (Maltrato de palabra) 22 18 4
Parental Neglect (of minors) 6 6 0
Public Disorder 13 13 0
Public Indecency 12 8 4
Damage to Property 7 6 1
Contravention of Sanitary 
Regulations 9 7 2
Total of Misdemeanours 74.'. 62 12
GRAND TOTALS 217 181 36
Source: Explanations given in the text*
• DJL
Base, which itself comprises long extracts from the Codigo de 
Defensa Social of 1936 together with amendments and additions 
deriving from legislation enacted more recently. The distinction 
between Offences (Delitos) and Misdemeanours (Contravenelones) has 
the same source. The further categorisation of offences indicated 
by the Code - viz. Against Property, Against the Person, Against 
Public Order, etc. - is omitted as overly cumbersome.
Table 9, however, shows sub-totals and percentages for two 
groups of offences ana misdemeanours composed with a view to their 
sociological significance. The high proportion - well over half - 
of total accusations and convictions attributable to acts of physical 
violence or verbal Violence1 by one citizen against another is
52
immediately striking. A second substantial group emerges if
the two Offences against Property included in the jurisdiction of 
the Popular Courts - Theft and Swindle ~ are considered together 
with black market and other economic offences. Nearly twenty per 
cent of convictions belonged to this category.
According to the speech made in 1966 by the Public Prosecutor of 
Cuba concerning the Popular Courts, the commonest offences and mis­
demeanours dealt with by them were Light Woundings, Insulting
53Behaviour, Theft, Public Disorder, and Damage to Property. It 
would seem likely that idiosyncratic classification accounts for the 
relative importance in the figures for Locality 2, San Ram^n, of 
Assault, as against Light Woundings, and of Verbal Abuse, as against 
Insulting Behaviour, a partiality being shown by court judges in 
favour of the more serious offence in the former case but the less 
serious in the latter. Other discrepancies - such as the relative 
insignificance in our statistics of Damage to Property - are more ; 
likely to express objective differences as between urban and rural
/ TABLE 9
‘ACCUSATIONS AND CONVICTIONS: SELECTED SUB-TOTALS
Persons  ^ Persons c, ■
Accused v Convicted
; Assault ' . 49 42
Light Koundings 13 11
Threatening Behaviour 14 / 8
. Insulting Behaviour 7 4
Coaction 5 . ■' - 4 V"';
Verbal Abuse 22 18
Public Disorder 13 13
. ' ' ; 1 2 3  56.7 ' 100 - 55.2
■ Theft ."r-. 14 12
.Swindle ..■ ■ 2 . • 1
Offences against the
People’s Economy 3 1
Clandestine Trading 22 21
41 18.9 .35 19.3
Other 53 24.4 46 25.4
TOTAL 217 100.0 181 -99.9
Source: Table 8 .
environments; there were, it will be recalled, only two Popular 
Courts operating in Havana in 1966, and only four in urban areas 
in general.
Some further general observations are in order before we go 
on to illustrate the content of the cases heard in the locality 
during 1968-9. Although the court riles were expected to contain 
full biographical details oh all parties to a given case, these 
data were in reality too incomplete in regard to accused or. convicted
persons to permit the drawing of any notable conclusions, 
particularly in view of the absence of information about the 
Locality’s population at large. In all cases, however, the 
accused’s address was supplied. An investigation of those 
addresses most frequently appearing in the files led to.a con­
firmation of the view often expressed in San Ram<5n that the people 
of La Corona were responsible for more than their share of offences 
and misdemeanours. Individuals resident in La Corona accounted 
for sixteen convictions out of the total of 181, which is a rate of 
76.2 per thousand of population, compared with 25.4 per thousand 
for the Locality as a whole (for La Corona, N = 210; for Locality 2,
N ~ 7,127). Five of these cases involved Assault, two were for 
Threatening Behaviour, two for Verbal Abuse, two for Theft, and 
the same number for Public Indecency (Contraveneidn de Buenas 
Costumbres y el Decoro Publico); there were, in addition, one case 
of Public Disorder and two Sanitary Contraventions.
Of the various "Indices of Social Dangerousness” (i.e. of 
proneness to crime) established by the Code of 1936, "Habi-tual 
Alcoholism" was mentioned in the files of seven cases resulting in 
conviction, whilst "Habitual Loafing" occurred eight times. Coroneros 
accounted for as many as five of the former but only one of the 
latter cases. Forty-seven of the total of 181 convictions were ; 
recorded as involving people with a history of previous conviction, 
though the information was not always sought. Finally, the 
participation of minors was not outstanding overall (seventeen 
convictions, or 9.4%) but high in the particular case of Theft 
convictions (five, or 43.3%).
In order to illustrate the nature of the social situations and 
problems which were responsible for Popular Court cases in San Ram^n
and the ways in which the courts typically sought to deal with 
them, we may draw upon tiro sources: the texts of the statements 
contained in the files for May 1968; to April 1969, and the author’s 
observation of all the court hearings in Locality 2 during the 
overlapping period Januarjr-August 1969. Beginning with the cases 
of physical or verbal attack which accounted for over half the 
total, the information provided in the files was sufficient to 
indicate that at least thirty-six convictions out of 1 0 0 in this 
group were caused by disputes between close neighbours occurring in 
or around their place of residence. Not all of these cases were 
cparked-off, like Number 1 2769 for Assault, by the alleged theft of 
a scrubbing-brush from the collective wash-basin of a solar or,, 
like Case 76/68 for Assault, according to the testimony of the 
local CDR, by.”some chickens which the accuser kept in the 
passageway, causing a nuisance to the accused’s mother, who is 
the caretaker of the building". Nevertheless, a large number of 
the cases heard would never have come to court if it had not been 
for malicious gossip, long-standing feuds and other underlying factors 
related to physical overcrowding of the type indicated earlier. Case
Number 57/69 is typical. The case was initiated by a middle-aged
negress resident in a solar against the man living in the next room. 
The accuser stated to the police:
That at approximately 6 p.m. today she was ironing 
in her dwelling when the citizen Andres Gonzales, 
resident of the came address, room 3, came to her
door, using the worst phrases that it is possible
to hear, and saying that he was going to finish off 
all the blacks in the solar. At this, she told him 
not to get. fresh with her. Then the said citizen 
entered her room and tried to assault her, at which 
she held out her iron to defend herself; and it was 
then that he fell onto the floor, owing to the 
intoxicated state that he was in.
She added:
That obviously the citizen took advantage of 
the fact that her husband and son were not at
home to do this. When he drinks, he makes a
habit of saying the most terrible obscene words 
opposite her room. And, since she is at home 
alone with a minor, she is frightened.
This case was heard together with a counter-accusation, Humber
58/69, in which the man in question alleged:
That he was in his residence quietly having a 
beer with some friends, when suddenly he heard 
the said citizen having a fight with her godchild.
At this, he went out and told her she should stop 
fighting with the minor, because today was 
Saturday and they were relaxing at home and didn’t 
want any disturbances, at which the citizen gave 
him a slap. Then she went inside her room and came 
out with an iron and attacked him with the same, 
trying to burn his face*
In court, the man and the woman were condemned respectively for 
Verbal Abuse ana Light Uoundings, end each was given a suspended 
sentence of 60 days paid detention in a prison-farm.
Twenty-seven out of 100 convictions for physical or verbal 
violence arose from brawls or disputes among members of the same 
household. At least five of these were the product of a single 
type of situation, frequent in Havana in the late ’sixties because 
of the housing shortage and the somewhat inflexible system employed 
in the distribution of housing - the continued cohabitation of 
divorced or "separated" spouses; The tensions arising from such a 
situation were clearly responsible, for instance, for Case Number 
33/69, where a number of the Young Communist League and his ex-wife 
came to blows, armed respectively with a csrving-lcnife and a bucket 
of water.
A final significant sub-category of cases, most of them for 
Publ5.c Disorder (and accounting from the near entirety of convictions 
for this misdemeanour), were the result of brawls or arguments in
bodegas and other retail establishments. Queues were an 
ubiquitous feature of life in Cuba in the late ’sixties and con­
sequently the setting of numerous broncas in San Ramon. The CDRs, 
of course, are responsible among other things for the maintenance 
of good order and discipline in neighbourhood shops and cafes, 
whence such scenes as described in file Humber 9/68. The accuser, 
the responsable for Finance in the CDR Zone, declares:
It being approximately 6 p.m. today, she was in 
the cigarette queue opposite her home and9 when 
she had collected her cigarettes, she went round 
to the back of the queue again (which is allowed); 
other people queued again too. But the citizens 
whom she only knows by the names of Teresa and 
Luisa did not go to the back of the queue but 
instead, together with a third citizen, stayed up 
at the counter so as to avoid queueing again. For 
this reason the declarer told the third citizen 
that respectable young ladies didn’t do what they 
were doing, and that they had to get in the queue.
Uhen the declarer also told the citizen that she, 
the declarer, was the financier of the neighbourhood 
and that she could not stand by ana let this happen, 
the citizen affirmed: "Some financier! You are a 
prostitute!” etc., and straight away gave her a 
slap. Subsequently, the declarer having lost 
consciousness, the citizens Teresa and Luisa came 
and attacked her.......
Whatever their cause, the violent disputes upon which Popular 
Court judges in San Ramdn were obliged to pronounce invariably 
involved a routinised show of bravado and a certain virtuosity in 
the language of insult. Use wa3 made of the full spectrum of 
terms relating to the honour, paternity and sexual normality of 
the subject, and the people of San Ramdn were quick to call one 
another not only brothel-keepers, rehabilitated whores and sons of 
the same, but also tortilleras and maricones (lesbians and 
’queers’). An important focus of attention in Popular Court 
admonitions was the need for individuals and society to overcome 
the twin heritages of guaperaa and chusmeria, respectively the
cultural value which leads Cubans to measure their manliness (and 
their womanhood) by their quickness to engage in verbal or physical 
combat, and *commonness* of conduct in general. A frequent 
line of argument used by judges involved pointing out that, today, 
"the real tough~guys" were the guerrilla-fighters of the Sierra 
Maestra and the Bolivian highlands and guaperrfa reflected a false 
and degenerate concept of manhood. Likewise one could be poor 
and humilde without being uncouth, and,; now that it was the 
humildes who were in power, what possible justification was there 
for chusmerxa? Uhere an offender guilty of exhibiting these 
attitudes was also poorly educated - the possessor of First or 
Second Grade, or illiterate - judges invariably dwelt upon the fact 
in order to make general points about the importance of education 
in the new society.
It was noticed above that nearly twenty per cent of convictions 
in Locality 2 involved either Offences against Property or one of 
the recently created Offences against the People’s Economy. Cases 
of Theft and Swindle were treated along the lines described in 
Chapter 3, with emphasis on the transformation in the ethical 
status of these crimes as a result of the socialisation of the means 
of production. Five cases of Clandestine Trading were counted 
during the year in question, four of which resulted in convictions, 
though only one of these involved a black-market organisation of 
significant scale. In this case (39/69), eighteen individuals 
received sentences of one kind or another. The principal defendant, 
a forty year old umlatto listed as "unemployed" and as of First Grade 
schooling, had been detained in the province of Matanzas in the act 
of exchanging substantial quantities of industrial goods for 
agricultural produce. Subsequently gold objects, textile fabric,
nylon stockings, gloves and jewellery were found at his home in 
Havana* Seventeen witnesses were called in the trial and each was 
made to recount transactions with the principal accused over a 
period of some years. Coffee had been sold at ten pesos a pound - 
about three times its price in the bodega; a bottle of Bacardi rum 
had been exchanged for a single chicken, a pair of shoes for three 
chickens, and so on. The court’s summing-up in the case focussed 
upon the "stupidity” of the minor offenders in accepting such a 
degree of price-exploitation but distinguished sharply between 
"exchange for use" and "exchange for business", condemning the 
principal defendant as a "danger to society" because of his 
"mercantile mentality".
In general harsh condemnation was reserved for people who 
operated on the black market on a full-time basis and t^ ho could be 
accused thereby of living "parasitically" off the rest of the 
population. indulgence tended to be shown, especially outside the 
courts, towards casual participants - perhaps because just about 
everyone had erred onto the black market in some moment of weakness 
Petty sales involving only "amateurs" were strictly speaking illegal 
but in fact quite common, and no serious attempt was made to police 
them. Case 80/69 resulting in a conviction for Clandestine Trading 
is typical of the three relatively minor cases recorded. To the 
embarrassment of all parties, it involved a 52 year old CDR chairman 
a native of a village in Las Villas province, with Sixth Grade and a 
job as a cleaner at 74 pesos a month. His misfortune was to have 
been arrested by a policeman in the act of selling a scrubbing-brush 
for two pesos. In his defence he argued that to sell a scrubbing- 
brush at two pesos was not "speculation"; he had bought eight of 
them at 1.50 pesos each from a man whose name he had forgotten, but
he workdd for a living, and this is the first ’problem1 he had 
had. The judges called it "abuse of the needs of the people" and, 
pointing out that these were probably stolen goods, dwelt at some 
■length on the theme that a cederista should know better.
Who were the "loafers" responsible for eight convictions in 
Locality 2 between May 1968 and April 1969? Here we rely heavily, 
as the courts did, upon the highly-charged and colourful CDR reports 
submitted before the hearings. The following is a good example.
The accusation in this case was a sixty-one year old CDR chairman 
with Sixth Grade education and working as the driver of an ice-
lorry for 160 pesos a month. The subject of the accusation was his
own stepson, who was aged forty-eight, with Second Grade education 
and "unemployed". The accusation, which was classified under 
Threatening Behaviour, was
That £the accused J started to say things like 
’why didn’t they all go off to Fidel Castro’s 
house, so that they could have milk every day* - 
because the accuser’s two sons, who belong to 
the PCC, went to eat at Fidel’s house. And he 
started to say that he was going to set the
house alight, and that he would get a knife and
finish them all off.
The statement went on to explain:
He £ the accuserjhas had various problems with 
.[the accused 3 and they have had one court case 
when he broke up the CDR noticeboard. He is a 
dangerous individual, because he has been in 
prison several times, and for this reason the 
authorities ere requested to take some action, 
as he is a lumpen who does not work.
The Vigilance responsable of the local CDR dictated the following 
report on the accused at the police station:
He has never worked in the nine years that she 
has known him. He was in prison several times 
under the previous regime of the Batistato
because of problems with the police; he has 
always spent his time in gambling and vices, 
and it was said that he had a drugs business.
His morality is thoroughly undesirable, for he 
mixes with elements with negative attitudes 
towards the Revolutionary process, and his 
friends leave much to be desired. In the zone 
he has had problems with the chairman of the 
CDR, who is at the same time his stepfather, 
striking him on one occasion. His relationships 
are with gambling elements like one Martinez ("The 
Cripple"), two of the brothers Padilla of [address] 
and Josd Padrdh of £address] , several of whom are 
presently detained for gambling. He is single, 
though it is not known whether he has a woman.
He drinks frequently and is a habitual alcoholic, 
making breaches of the peace in the IITIT fish 
restaurant. He is not integrated in any 
revolutionary organization; he has always 
declared that his people (the negative ones) give 
him everything he needs, not like his brothers and 
his stepfather who are revolutionaries but who go 
hungry, and that it is thanks to his friends that 
he eats and drinks and has a peso in his pocket.
His religion is unknown but he always wears a red 
handkerchief in his pocket.55 In broad daylight 
he gets together with Martinez "the Cripple" and 
another man called "the Dog"; the last mentioned 
was sent to a camp in Camagiiey for vagrancy, but 
he declares that 'he will not go there again even 
if they shoot him*. In addition he has several 
more ftiends who get together in the IHIT fish 
restaurant to gamble on the buses that have the 
highest number. He never showed any interest in 
studying or in working, but he did always like to 
be on the fringe of the law.
A final document included to help the court to make up its mind in 
this case consisted of supplementary comments dictated by the 
accuser in his capacity as CDR Chairman. Of all his sons, he 
complained that only this one "refused to work and to be guided by 
good advice".
Because whenever they found him some sort of job, 
he made up a series of excuses and gave it up 
after a few days. He never wanted to study either; . 
at that time the district was full of lottery stalls, 6 
drug peddlars and mofuco dri n k e r s , 57 and it was with 
these people that his son liked to associate.......
At the beginning of the Revolution, seeing that the 
opportunities were being closed-off for continuing to 
live the life to which he was accustomed, he declared
himself an enemy of the Process; and his stepfather 
and his brothers, who were integrated into the same, 
were called to account for him. Although the block 
committee is based in his house, he has taken 
advantage of the absence of his stepfather at work 
; and the illness of his mother to bring into the 
same a series of lumpen individuals to engage in 
illicit trading and to drink alcoholite.5 8
The case was heard at the very first session of the Popular Court
in Locality 2 on 17 May 1968. The accused, according to the
terse note in the corresponding file (5/68), admitted the facts,
and was sentenced to sixty days' detention in an open prison-farm
subject to the guidance of the Provincial branch of the Consejo Superior de
Defensa Social, the main advisory body on penal matters.
Mot all the cases recorded as having a background of "loafing" 
were as apparently intractable as this one or characterised by the 
same compounding of social and political deviancy. But the 
instance was not unique even in Locality 2. Case Number 72/69, 
involving a youth aged twenty and of First Grade schooling accused 
of threatening to set alight the house of the young woman next door 
(incidentally referring to her as a "Communist stool pigeon" and a 
"Communist swine"), also illustrated the development of a species of 
anti-Communism which has little to do with the *-ism*. -With two 
previous convictions for car-stealing, an absent father and a 
brother taken off forcibly to perform his Military Service, the ; 
subject had remained, as the President of the Court put it, "marginal 
to everything that has happened in the Revolution". Admonishing 
a number of witnesses associated with the local CDR for permitting 
such a state of affairs to develop, the court placed him 'at the 
disposition o f  the Consejo Superior de Defensa Social.
One last file among those examined calls for some comment since 
it illustrates a feature of Cuban social attitudes and policy which
is to be discussed in Chapter 5. The case, Number 8 6/6 8 9 
classified under Public Indecency, was never brought to trial but 
in the documents assembled for this purpose it is already possible 
to perceive the elements of its probable denouement and conclusion. 
Cases of Public Indecency (Contraveneion de Buenas Costumbres y el 
Decoro Publico) were typified in San Ramon by Number 62/69, arising 
from the arrest of a ran suspected of pressing up to a girl in a 
crowded *bus, and Number 57/60, the product of something similar in 
a cinema. No exceptional gravity was attached to a conviction in 
this category under normal circumstances, but to be a young homo­
sexual in Havana in 1969 was to expect normal treatment in few areas 
of public social life and least of all in the courts. The accused, 
a white seventeen year old born in Santiago de Cuba, possessing 
secondary education but unemployed, was arrested by a BOP patrolman. 
The policeman declared:
That today he was patrolling Trinity Street, 
and when he reached the corner of the said 
street he observed the above-named citizen 
who had his trousers down nearly a quarter of 
the way and was rearranging his underpants.
[The patrolmanJ therefore asked the said 
citizen to account for himself, to which he 
replied that he was doing this because nobody 
would see it. At this he proceeded to conduct 
the citizen to this Unit.
The accused made the following statement in the police-station:
That when he arrived at the corner of Trinity 
Street, owing to the fact that his belt was a 
bit loose and that consequently his trousers 
were slipping down, he proceeded to pull them 
up. And at that moment the patrol-car went 
past. The patrolman called him over in an 
incorrect manner and then took him to the Unit, 
and at no point did he take his trousers down 
in the manner that the patrolman states.
In order to make sense of the case, it was essential to read the
appropriate CDR report, which attested that the subject had
abandoned his studies but was not workings adding under* the 
heading of "Family Relationships"
His family say that these are good and decent, 
but that he turned out queer [salid afeminadoj.
And, under "Relations with the ■Community":
These are not known, since he associates with 
Vedado elements and belongs to the Hippy Gang 
[la Banda de los Jipij.59 He is not integrated 
and is a homosexual.
Almost certainly the source of the patrolman*s affront was the 
style of trousers worn by the young man - tight and cut low at the 
waist - and the depravity indicated by his appearance. It is 
unlikely that the Popular Court would have thought differently.
However the documentation on the case terminated abruptly; "File archived 
The minor is already detained in Camaguey as a scum [lacra j and a 
queer, and as a member of the Hippies".
The sanctions imposed by the Popular Court in Locality 2, San 
Ramon, in the cases we have been considering are listed as Table 1 0 .
As previously noted, public admonitions were a universal and integral 
part of sentencing procedure in the Courts and one of the principal 
bases of the claim that they represented a genuinely new departure 
in the administration of justice in Cuba. It may now be observed 
that close to forty per cent of convictions in Locality 2 called 
forth no other sanction than an admonition. Twenty-eight per cent 
of convictions, on the other hand, led to the deprivation of the 
offender of his liberty, but in two-thirds of these cases no 
detention of any kind was involved. A further nineteen per cent of 
the total were sentences of this type, but suspended conditionally 
upon the offender*s not being convicted again for the same or a 
similar transgression. The usual period during which suspended
TABLE 10
POPULAR COURT, LOCALITY 2, SAN RAMON: PRINCIPAL SANCTIONS IMPOSED 
IN CASES DATED MAY 1968 - APRIL 1969
■ • • f*Principal Sanction Number of Proportion of
Offenders^ the Total
Public Admonition (ONLY) 72 39.0
DEFRIVATIO?3 OF LIBERTY
Detention in prison-farin, 6 months 2C
Detention in prison-farm, 1-5 months 15^
Paid agricultural labour without
detention, 1-3 months 3
Unpaid Sunday labour without
detention, 6-15 days 19
Unpaid Sunday labour without
detention, 1-5 days 12
SUB-TOTAL 51 28.2
DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY - SUSPENDED
Detention in prison-farm, 6 months 9
Detention in prison-farm, 1-5 months 24
Paid agricultural labour without
detention, 1-3 months 2
SUB-TOTAL 65 19.3
VARIOUS
Referred to the Conseco Superior de
Defensa Social 6
Attainment of educational Grade 9
Restriction of movement 1
Confinement to domicile 7
Deprivation of Social Rights 
Fines -
SUB-TOTAL 2?
TOTAL 181
12.7
100.0
Source: Explanations in the text.
Notes:
a. Excludes subsidiary sanctions.
b. Only those cited in the formal accusation submitted in 
writing before the hearing.
c. One of these was with full wages.
d. Ten of these were with full wages.
sentences remained operative was from one to two years in the case 
of prison-farm sentences and six months where only compulsory 
labour was at issue.
A number of the sentences listed as 'various' require some 
further explanation. The attainment of a given educational Grade, 
usually the equivalent of one year's schooling above that already 
possessed by the subject, was normally required of offenders whose 
educational background was particularly poor, and was expected to 
be complied with by means of attendance at the local Worker-Peasant 
Education classes* 'Restriction of Movement' involved the 
specification of locations - in the single case observed, the house 
of the offender's ex-wife - which could not be visited during a 
stated period, under pain of Contempt. 'Confinement to Domicile' 
consisted of the inverse type of restriction and was applied for 
periods of up to thirty days, normally in cases where an offender 
had acquired notoriety for disputes in public places. Two types 
of sentence laid down in the Code of 1939 for offences and mis­
demeanours in the jurisdiction of the Popular Courts - fines and 
the deprivation of offenders' social rights - were deliberately 
eschewed because they were regarded as unlikely to contribute to 
the "education and re-education" of the subject.
The figures presented in Table 10 do not include admonitions 
and other sanctions to which accusers, witnesses or members of the 
public were subject in some court hearings. According to the 
records examined, either accusers or witnesses, or both, were formally 
admonished at the conclusion of sixteen hearings, whilst in four cases 
persons cited as accusers in the corresponding files were sentenced 
to penalties ranging from four Sundays* unpaid labour to ninety days
detention suspended. foin one year. Finally, only four , convicted
persons exercised their right of appeal, receiving a retrial at
Section level in a court composed of judges from other Localities
and presided over by the professional Assessor for San Ramon. In
three cases, the original decision was upheld but the fourth led 
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to an acquittal.
Cederistas in San Ramon in 1969 were, as might be expected, 
pleased with the results of the introduction of the Popular Courts 
in their area. Of the thirteen CDR chairmen in Zone 12, who were 
specifically questioned on this point, nine expressed the view 
that the sentencing of the local court was * just1» ’correct* or 
’good*, a number of them volunteering comments to the effect that 
this manner of administrating justice provided an excellent 
education for the people. The remainder believed that the sentencing 
of the Popular Court was too mild, either in general or in particular 
cases, though two of them added that this had to be so in order for 
the educational functions of the institution to be performed. Ashed 
whether, in keeping with the claims made by the judges about 
Locality 2 as a'whole, the situation in their streets had "improved" 
since the introduction of the new courts, a majority (seven) dis­
claimed ever having had any "problems" in their blocks which, they 
explained, were quiet blocks. Others were more or less emphatic 
in agreeing that the respect in which the citizenry held the Popular 
Courts had created order and tranquility in the neighbourhood as a 
whole•
JUSTICE, PARTICIPATION AND THE LAU: AN EPILOGUE
The major drawbacks of the Popular Court system from a judicial 
point of view have been alluded to in various places. The first
difficulty observed arose from the heavy reliance placed by the 
system-upon the’innate* qualities and capabilities of the ordinary 
students, workers and housewives who presented themselves as judges. 
Though not necessarily constituting a fatal objection to the 
Popular Court as an institution, it is clear that, in the absence 
of the levelling of talents associated with professional legal 
training, some worker-judges displayed the firmness and skill 
required by the court-room situation in abundant quantities* whilst 
others conspicuously failed to do so. A second problem* connected 
with the first in as much as the sense of justice* as an ’innate1 
quality, is also distributed unevenly in most populations, has to 
do with the procedural informality which typified the Popular Courts. 
In particular, I have stressed the telescoping of cross-examination 
and sentencing. The increased risk of injustice entailed by this 
procedural development has to be weighed against the advantages 
claimed for it. Thirdly* it was observed in a footnote above that, 
whilst private individuals making an accusation in a Popular Court 
were required to press charges in person, the same was not insisted 
upon where a case was initiated by the police. In San Ramon, in 
fact, charges made by the DOP were always accepted in writing. The 
judges regarded the question as one of minor significance, reflecting 
to a degree to tdiich the author is unsure traditional practice in 
Cuba, and, when pressed, they pointed to the ejicellent record of the 
DOP. Without denying, however, that the standards of honesty and 
social responsibility achieved by the Cuban police since 1959 are 
probably outstanding by international as well as local standards, it 
is possible to perceive potential abuses in this area. One instance 
where the cross-examination of a policeman was patently called for 
was described above in another connection.
The purpose of thin epilogue is to indicate two developments
under way since 10705 one affecting directly the future of the
Popular Court system; including some of the features just mentioned;
the other touching upon the wider theme of participation and the
law. Both developments had their beginnings in the national Forum
on Internal Order held in Havana in March 1969. At the conclusion
of this conference; a number of innovations were recommended;
ranging across all the major spheres of activity of the police; the
61social-work agencies and the penal authorities. Two points were 
particularly insisted upon however; the first being the need to 
tighten-up* the substantive criminal legislation in force in certain 
areas, taking account of the trend of crime statistics. Ho time­
table was set for the introduction of new legislation and no 
indication was given as to the methods to be employed in drawing it 
up. Linked with this, secondly, was a proposal to begin a study 
of existing organs for the administration of justice in Cuba "with 
a view to unifying them into a single juridicial system in keeping 
with the needs engendered by the impetuous advance of our Revolution".
The existence of several organisations for the 
administration of justice and the lack of 
uniformity in the policy of penalties are 
important factors affecting our whole judicial 
system. The diversity of penalties for the 
same type of crime and the differences in how 
rigorously or flexibly they are applied have 
an adverse effect both on any project aimed at 
combating crime and on the work of rehabilitation
itself.62
Specifically, we infer, the proposed "unification” of the judicial 
system would result in the elimination of differences in the
severity of sentences handed down respectively by the Revolutionary
63Courts and the ordinary Juzgados and Audiencias. At the same 
time it would be expected to involve the extension to the whole of 
the judiciary of the concepts of justice and sentencing currently
enshrined only in the Revolutionary Courts and the Popular 
6*f
Courts.
For two years nothing further was heard of the matter.or of
the commissions established to look into it. In June 1971,
however, at a meeting held to mark the Tenth Anniversary of the
creation of the revolutionary Ministry of the Interior, Fidel
Castro reaffirmed that ”in the coming years, together with the
struggle against the counter-revolution, the struggle against common
crimes and other anti-social activities must assume an equally
important position”, adding that it would be necessary "to unify
jurisdictions so that we may know exactly under which of the
65various organs of the judiciary a given activity or crime falls”.
The rejection of the voluntaristic orientation of Cuban policies 
in the late ’sixties, which characterised all of Castro’s public 
statements after summer 1970, was also present here:
Ue are now faced with the problem of organising 
the courts, systematising all of that, aiding 
the people’s courts, integrating the 
tribunals in criminal cases and insuring that 
the people have a working knowledge of our laws.
In ever»y revolutionary process there is a paradox; 
in a given class society, whose laws are class 
laws, there arises a revolutionary process which, 
in its eardly phase, is characterised by being 
iconoclastic toward the established laws -the 
system, its laws, everything must bo destroyed - 
and this results in a certain habit of disregard 
for the law. Again we are faced with two truths: 
the first truth is that capitalist legality must 
be destroyed, and the second truth is that 
socialist legality must be established. &7.
Castro went on to speak of the need for Cuba to rely to a greater
extent than in the past upon legal and other experts, in order to
create ”an intelligent and scientific order” for the new society
68under construction.
In August 1971, Granma announced that the Secretariat of the
Judicial Commissions was. now circulating for discussion by "legal
workers” throughout the country a set of basic proposals for the
69unification of the judicial system. A number of points in these
proposals are worthy of note. Firstly, all four existing juris­
dictions are to he included in the reform: the Ordinary, Revolutionary,
Popular and Military Courts, and the new system is to be the sole
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judicial power in Cuba. Secondly, there being no contradiction
in a revolutionary state between the independence of judicial
officials and the subordination of the courts to the supreme organs
of power, the new judiciary will be responsible and subordinate to
the Council of Ministers. The authority to draw up regulations
for the day-to-day running of the courts is to be vested in a Ruling
Council of the People*s Supreme Court, comprising the President of
the Supreme Court, the Presidents of the latter*s four branches and
the Minister of Justice. The divisions of the Supreme Court will
be concerned respectively with criminal, civil and administrative
71matters and with state security. Thirdly, the unified judiciary
will consist at every level of both professionally qualified and non-
professional judges, all judges being subject to election by
"delegates of the people selected by different organisations”. At
the same time ”non-technical participation by the people at all
levels of the courts” is to be instituted with a view to preventing
7 0
the "professionalisation" of the judiciary. Finally, private law 
practices are to be abolished and justice is to have a "class- 
character” , being dispensed ”on behalf of the people and in defence 
of their interests” .73
71*
At the time of writing, it remains for the final proposals to 
be submitted to the bodies which will have decision-making power in 
the matter - the Political Bureau of the PCC and the Council of
Ministers. - Regarding the future of the Popular Courts,
nevertheless, two things are clear. On the one hand, these
organs are to disappear in the form in which the}* operated in the 
 late * sixtiess to he replaced by courts which draw to a greater 
ext On the other hand.
however, the experience of the Popular Courts ,.has manifestly made
Cl mark upon revolutionary Cuban legal thinking, and, whilst the
reform contains important concessions to Soviet orthodoxy on such
questions, there are important respects in which it may be regarded 
as a generalisation of the lessons of this experience to the whole 
of the judicial system*
It remains in this epilogue to indicate the direction of the 
other development mentioned at the beginning affecting "participation** 
and the legal system in Cuba. In December 1972 it was announced 
that the Politbureau of the Party had resolved "that the people 
discuss’* the drafts of a number of new laws drawnup by Commissions 
for Juridical Studies ^ nder the chairmanship of veteran Communist 
Bias Roca* The new. laws - recognisably the product of the proposals 
made in 1969 - called for greater severity in the penalties corres­
ponding to offences '’against the national and people’s economy 9 
against the normal development of sexual relations (rape, molesting, 
etc.), against family order and against the healthy development of
children and young people", and the employment of military uniforms
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or insignia in the commission of certain crimes. Also included 
for discussion were to be the draft of a law establishing sixteen 
as the age of majority for purposes of criminal responsibility, and 
legislation required in connection with the reorganisation of the judiciary. 
The texts of five out of seven of the required Acts were published 
and under discussion in assemblies in trade union locals and CDRs
76throughout the country early in 1973.
The content of some of the legislation in question will call 
for comment in Chapter 5 below* At this point it will suffice 
to notice that the manner in which its enactment is being proceeded 
with represents an interesting extension of the practice first 
introduced in the case of the "anti-loafing” law of 1971 and fore­
shadowed in the evolution of the CDRs in the late ’sixties. The 
aims and rationale of this style of government were indicated in a 
provocative fashion by Fidel Castro in answer to questions by a 
member of the Chilean National Party in Santiago in November 1971:
Our Revolution is not perfect. We still haven’t 
reached higher forms. We still haven’t reached 
forms of expression of what we would call 
democracy. But x:e do say that in our country the 
people feel that they are a part of the Revolution9 
part of the state....... In our country, the
important decisions are no longer discussed in a 
Parliament. No! They are discussed in the work- 
centres, in the mass organisations. The Revolutionary 
Government began by governing by decree. But, by 
now, every important law that has to do with the 
main interests of the people is discussed by millions 
of people through our work centres, our mass 
organisations and our military units, by everybody. 
....... Nov? tell me# could bourgeois parliamentarian ism
ever be more democratic than this??®
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CHAPTER 5 PARTICIPATION AND SOCIO-CULTURAL CHANGE: SOME PROBLEMS
Preceding chapters have traced in detail the changing fortunes 
and significance of the Castroist concept of participation as 
manifested in the evolution and practice of the CDRs and the Popular 
Courts. Throughout this discussion a constant theme has been that 
the purpose of these organisational forms is not merely to promote 
the identification of the mass of ordinary Cubans with the Revolution 
and its leadership, but also to serve as means for transmitting new 
social values and models of behaviour to the population at large.
Both the committees and the courts, it has been suggested, are 
expected to make a long-term contribution to the diffusion of an 
interrelated set of social priorities, beliefs and precepts judged 
to be appropriate to a society engaged in the simultaneous tasks of 
overcoming economic underdevelopment and building the communist 
society. So far, I have treated the content and genesis of the new 
values either as unproblematic or narrowly within the perspective 
of short-term socio-economic changes in the last years of the decade 
of the ^sixties. It has already been hinted, however, that certain 
features of the cultural nexus within which the CDRs and Popular 
Courts operate are far from unproblematic and warrant further 
investigation. The aim of this chapter is to fill certain lacunae 
of this type which have made their appearance in the course of the 
discussion.
One of the outstanding political events of the years immediately 
following the ’turn1 in Cuban policy of summer 1970 was the convocation 
between April 23 and 30 1971 of the First National Congress on 
Education and Culture. The purpose of this meeting, which was 
attended by 1,800 delegates representing the country’s teachers,
cultural agencies and.mass' political organisations, was to discuss 
and determine the orientation of the educational and cultural 
policies of the revolutionary regime for the coming years.V At 
the opening of a nev? *high school in the countryside* on 25 April, 
Fidel Castro explained that the Congress could adopt all pertinent 
decisions in the confidence that they would be endorsed by the 
Party leadership and the Government, and he went on to describe the 
deliberations of the assembled educators as "the concrete practice 
of the mass line m  the revolutionary process”. The themes of the
meeting included most prominently the importance of educational 
advance as a lever for the achievement of economic development, the 
need to pay attention to the ideological formation of future 
generations, and the threat to the Revolution posed by new and ever
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more subtle forms of "cultural colonialism". The final declaration 
adopted by the delegates constitutes a fundamental document for the 
student of social and cultural change in contemporary Cuba. -
Contained in the Declaration are a number of recommendations 
affecting technical aspects of the educational system and its growth. 
More significant in the present context though are the views also 
expressed regarding a number of "environmental factors" which are 
held to be among the determinants of educational progress in Cuba 
and which are discussed under the fallowing rubrics: "links between 
the home and the school", "relations between the school and the 
workplace", "fashions, customs and extravagant behaviour", "religion", 
"juvenile delinquency", "sex", "free time and extra-curricular 
activities", "the mass media" and "cultural activities". In what 
follows, it is not proposed to exhaust this list of topics, or to be 
restricted by it. Instead, three problems have been selected for 
discussion, corresponding to what has been called "the characteristic
5trilogy of the Caribbean social drama". The first of these 
questions, concerning sexual, familial and related values, is 
pronounced upon with some force by the document; the second, 
relating to the present status and future role of the popular 
syncretist religions, is discussed obliquely; whilst the third - 
the question of colour and of contemporary Cuban 1race relations1 - 
is conspicuous by its complete absence both from the Declaration 
and from the deliberations of the Congress.
In their attempt to create the foundations of a new social 
order by diffusing throughout the population the values of self- 
sacrifice, collectivism and egalitarianism, the revolutionary 
leaders in Cuba do not enjoy the luxury of a sociological tabula 
rasa. As we have already seen, they are obliged to come to grips, 
as best they can within the limits imposed by the economic and 
social resources of the island, with a wide range of social problems 
in the conventional sense of this term, many of them 1 inherited1 
from the immediate pre-revolutionary decades. At the same time 
they must utilise, mould, combat or otherwise come to terms with 
other, more regular features of the national socio-cultural heritage, 
In general a great deal-hinges upon the intelligence, audacity and 
creativeness with which this is done, and nowhere is this more true 
than in regard to our trilogy? sex,religion and colour. In the 
pages which follow, I wish to suggest that the record of the revolut­
ionary regime to date in the formation of policies adequate to deal 
with traditional Cuban attitudes in these areas in a progressive 
fashion has proved extremely uneven. In the conclusion of the 
dissertation, the successes and the failuresof the Revolutionary 
social and cultural policies will be located once more in the context 
of the problem of political organisation.
The parallelism or many elements of the Cuban socio-cultural 
background with the phenomena observed in other territories of 
the Caribbean will be apparent from the outset. Generalising 
about the region as a whole, Gordon Lewis has been able to write:
The frontier conditions of Caribbean life 
made the family a fragile institution at best.
The sugar and slave economy, uprooting whole 
generations from their African background, gave 
rise to the esoteric cult religions - voodoo, 
obeah, the saint cults - of an Afro-Caribbean 
variety. Racial intermixture, finally (the 
inevitable consequence wherever the sex drive 
finds itself in a slavery environment), 
produced massive complexes of color psychology 
in the regional-life, with serious results both 
for the quality of personal self-esteem and of 
social life.6
The literature devoted to assessing the impact of plantation slavery
upon colonial Cuban society is relatively substantial and has been
swollen recently by the addition of a number of historical studies 
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of a high quality. In contrast, the evolution of Cuban family 
patterns, religious practices and 'race relations' in the period 
after the abolition of slavery (in 1880) and during the first half 
of the twentieth centuryremainsa drastically under-researched 
field. On many specific points it is simply impossible to say 
whether Cuban patterns accord with or diverge from those which have 
been carefully described and recorded in other parts of the region; \ 
Since 1959, of course, additional factors have intervened in helping 
to make Cuba, the largest of the Antilles, the most neglected by 
sociologists. If this chapter indicates the scope of our ignorance 
as much as the measure of our knowledge of twentieth century Cuban 
society, a major part of its purpose will have been achieved.
SEX, MACHISMO AND THE SOCIALIST FRONTIER
And what did they imagine? That we live under
a bourgeois liberal regime? No! We haven't 
a liberal hair on our heads. We are 
revolutionaries! We are socialists! We are 
collectivists! We are communists! ..... And 
we repeat: Of liberalism, nothing! Of 
softening, nothing! A revolutionary people, 
an organised people, a combative people, a 
strong people - these are the virtues which 
are needed in these years. All the rest is 
pure wishful-thinking. It is to underestimate 
the task we have before us, to underestimate 
the enemy, to underestimate the historic 
importance of these years, to underestimate 
the struggle.
- Fidel Castro, September 1968.
No systematic study of Cuban family- and kinship-patterns in
o
the twentieth century has yet been made. On the available 
evidence however it is clear that in most essentials the pre­
revolutionary Cuban family approximated to the norms observed 
elsewhere in the Hispanic Caribbean. That is to say, the dominant 
values in the society contained a strong element of Spanish male 
authoritarianism modified and underpinned by the homespun ideology 
of machismo. The position of women was defined in relation to 
an ideal of submissiveness and constrained by a system of beliefs 
Which wedded the concept of honour to that of virginity. As in 
other settings, however, where Hispanic concepts of honour and shame 
were imposed upon an underlying population in the context of 
plantation slavery, the 'dominant' values and norms told only a 
small part of the story. Thus the commonest forms of domestic 
arrangements outside the upper strata of society, and particularly 
among the black lower strata, were similar to those observed 
throughout the Caribbean area:9 both common law unions jamancebamientoj 
and extra-residential mating were statistically frequent and morally 
acceptable alternatives to matrimony. According to the Cuban 
census of 1899, consensual unions accounted for about thirty-three 
per cent of the total and the rate of illegitimacy was approximately
forty per cent. Both proportions were markedly higher for blacks 
than for whites. Statistics quoted by the Foreign Policy 
Association's Problems of the Hew Cuba indicate that in 1932 there 
were 10,356 white marriages but only 1,720 among the coloured 
population. On the other hand there were nearly as many 
illegitimate births reported among blacks as among whites, although 
Negroes constituted less than one-third of the population.^
Important differences appear to have obtained as between urban 
and rural districts. In 1953, common law marriages were reported by 
the Census to be slightly more numerous than legal marriages in rural 
areas, whilst in urban centres nearly three times as many people
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claimed to be legally married as said they were married by consent .
On the other hand, fen per cent of all women over the age of fourteen
were heads of their households in the most urbanised province
(Havana), whereas the corresponding proportion for the most ruralr
province (Pinar del Rio) was only six per cent.^  The tendency
towards the 'matrif ocality* of the domestic group was not therefore
distributed in accordance with the incidence of common law’ marriages.
Still less were consensual unions to be identified with unstable
domestic situations or casual affairs. Popular, attitudes in
both town and country reportedly distinguished sharply between common
law marriages and extra-residential mating, the principal impediment.
13to legal marriage among the poor being the cost of the ceremony.
In 1968, Verena Martinez-Alier conducted interviews in a village in 
the foothills of the. Sierra Maestra where ninety-five per cent of 
the couples were living aplazados, that is, in consensual unions.
In the opinion of these, overwhelmingly 'coloured*, couples, marriage, 
and particularly marriage in Church, was cosa de lujo or cosa de los 
ricos. The expense mandatory upon the male in order for him
to avoid incurring the criticism of his neighbours (in addition 
to the cost of the ceremony, he-was obliged to provide a house 
and furniture) was such as to place matrimony beyond the reach of 
most of these families* Marriage was regarded as the ideal 
state but there was general agreement that na good aplasamiento 
is better than a bad marriage”. The author encountered a
similar defence of consensual unions in Havana in 1969 among middle- 
aged black couples who described themselves as arrimados.
Legally, common law marriages imposed obligations on spouses 
similar to those of regular unions, but in practice such arrangements
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were more binding on the woman than on the man, especially in the 
cities where informal social pressures were less strong. More 
generally, women were subject to the developed sexual double­
standards of the machismo complex, though the culturally-defined 
response of women towards their situation varied according to social 
status. In the urban lower strata, partly no doubt because of the 
tradition of matrif ocality in this group, female submissiveness was 
largely replaced as an ideal by the sub-cultural value of hembrismo, 
which placed a premium upon sexual irresistibility and physical or 
verbal demonstrativeness as the measures of womanhood. Nevertheless,
male and female attitudes were such that only fourteen per cent of
16the labour force in the late * fifties was composed of t-romen.
Although women obtained the right to vote in 1934 (before this 
happened in the majority of Latin American countries) few were 
prominent in politics before 1959, and the belief that the proper 
females roles were restricted to those of mother and wife severely 
limited the access of women to most other positions of importance 
in public life.
A number of significant changes occurred in these patterns
after 1959. The sheltering of young women in order to safeguard
their virginity was a practice which was still reported in Havana
in 1969. Howevers the emigration en bloc of upper- and middle-class
families during the early years of the Revolution had the effect
of removing one of the principal social bulwarks of the virginity
syndrome* On the other hand, the policy initiated by the
Revolutionary Government with a view to strengthening the institution
of matrimony, which involved the simplification of both marriage
and divorce proceedings and the provision by the state of the
17wherewithal for the celebration of weddings, resulted in an 
increase in formal marriages. Between 1958 and 1968 the number 
of marriages registered annually grew almost three times, from 
30,658 to 84,620, though the number of divorces increased twice as 
fast, from 2,251 to 15,357.18 The incorporation of women into 
the permanent labour force has been a major priority of the 
revolutionary regime, the tenets of orthodox Leninism on the *woman 
question* and the labour shortage which has plagued the Cuban 
economy since the early *sixties coinciding on this point. In the 
*sixties, the recruitment of women workers was placed under the 
aegis of the Federation of Cuban Homan (FMC) and was aided notably 
by the creation of day-nurseries (circulos infantiles) in most 
villages and neighbourhoods throughout the country, but these 
efforts were only moderately successful. The participation of 
women in the labour force increased from 14.2 per. cent on the eve 
of the Revolution to 15.6 per cent in 1968, but between the pre­
revolutionary years 1953 and 1957 it had also risen, from thirteen 
per cent to fourteen per cent. A major campaign initiated by the 
FMC in 1968, however, led to the recruitment of 94,000 women into 
the labour force between November of that year and August 1969, 
raising the proportion of females in the total to 17.7 per cent,
and by November '1972 some MOO.700 women had taken jobs under this 
programme, Hinety-one per cent of those incorporated-into 
productive work had remained on the job up to this time.
Other activities sponsored By the FMC to promote the partic­
ipation of women in the political and economic life of the country 
include the mobilisation of its 1,615,000 members (sixty-three per 
cent of Cuban women aged between fourteen and sixty-five in 1972) 
for voluntary labour in agriculture, politleal study circles and 
activities in solidarity with the Vietnamese revolution. In 1 9 7 2 5 - 
in addition, 173 #000 housewives and FHCtnenjbers were attending 
Adult Education courses, 152,500 were organised in Militant Mothers 
for Education brigades designed to boost parental support for the
nation*s schools, and FMC social workers handled ninety-six per cent
20of all casos of "misbehaviour” by minors. The number of women 
prominent in Cuban public life, however, has not increased 
drraaticslly since 1959. The best known figures - Celia Sanchez 
(Secretary to the Presidency), Vilma Espxn (President of the FMC), 
Haydee Santam.aria (Director of the Casa de las Americas , the cultural 
institution) and Melba Hernandez (Chairman of the Cuban Indochina 
solidarity committee) - belonged to the inner circle of the 26 July 
Movement from the days of the Sierra or earlier, and two (Espin and 
Santamaria) are the wives of Politbureau members (i.e. Raul Castro 
and Armando Hart respectively). Women are absent from the 
Political Bureau and Secretariat of the PCC, and are represented by 
only five out of a total of one hundred Central Committee members. 
Aside from the first three names just mentioned, these include an 
*old* communist from the PSP, Clementina Serra (Director of the Day­
care Centres), and one other, Elena Gil. The number of Government 
posts of ministerial rank held by women increased by 1 0 0 per cent
with the appointment in 1970 of Horn Frc&neta as Minister of Light 
Industries, the only female cabinet-member previously having been 
Celia Sanches, Despite the equal participation of women in the 
membership of the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution, 
the Rational Coordinator of the organisation has always been a 
man, though today his Deputy, Maria Teresa Malmierca0 is a woman.
According to Hugh Thomas:
The cult of virility or machismo, may have 
almost vanished, along with prostitution 
(and seKual habits have somewhat changed too) 
but in most Cuban households in the past 
women in fact reigned supreme. Outside the 
house men rode about in Oldsmobiles or Buicks 
with machine guns, became gangsters, spoke of 
Liberty and Destiny, frequented bars, brothels and 
casinos, but perhaps that was all only theatrej 
and in real life women ruled. Now the gap 
between reality and imagination has closed but 
possibly real feminine power is less* given 
that in personal relations Cubans still seem
conservative.....21
Nothing further is said to back up this interesting speculation
(it is certainly false that machismo has 1'almost vanished"). Nhat
is evidently the case however is that a good deal remains to be
done along the lines necessary to make Cubans, male* and female,
face up to the deeper, non“economic, facets of women’s oppression.
Indeed it can scarcely be said that a start has been made upon this
task. The propaganda of the FMC, as disseminated for instance
through its magazine Mujores, is directed almost exclusively at the
economic pivot find otherwise seldom broaches topics other than
22those of traditionally feminine interest. ' Even Fidel Castrofs 
arguments on the subject appeal as much to traditionalist reactions 
towards the depravity of women in the past as to considerations of
23
natural equality. ' The tendency of the Cuban leadership towards 
a narrow *economismf in approaching problems of socio-cultural change
will be remarked upon again further on in thin chapter.
One obstacle to the deepening of the movement towards sexual 
equality initiated by events in Cuba after 1959 derives from the 
ambiguous orientation of the regime towards the cultural complex 
of machismo. It is not merely that, being a popular and democ­
ratising process, the revolution has brought popular values to the 
fore and persons of humble origin into positions of power and 
'influence-.' 'v/'-It-'fs\^ iso:'true to say that, in the form of a political 
valuer machismo has served the revolutionary leadership in important 
ways In consolidating its hold over the sympathies and aspirations 
of the mass of its followers. John P. Gillin has summarised the 
qualities associated with the ideal of machismo In Latin America in 
the following terms:
The macho is expected to show sexual prowess, 
zest for action, including verbal "action”, 
daring, and, above all, absolute self- 
confidence. He may express his inner con­
victions by resorting to physical force, as . 
in the case of bandits and revolutionary 
military leaders, or he may do so verbally as 
a leading intellectual, lawyer or politician.
Hot all machos are caudillos (leaders) but all 
caudillos must be m a c h o s. ^ y
Rhilst it would be absurd to explain away the popularity of Fidel 
Castro and other revolutionary leaders in these terras, it cannot 
be denied that Castrofs combination in his person and style of not 
a few of the qualities of the traditional macho has proved a , 
considerable political advantage to him. Hor is it possible to 
comprehend the sizeable personal following acquired by ’Che1'
Guevara in Cuba If it is imagined that the Heroic Guerrilla and 
prototype of the "new man” was regarded other than as a superlatively
25 ■
masculine figure. The Revolutionary Government has both given
expression and lent legitimacy to elements of the machista ethic by
its promotion of sport, its idealisation of the guerrilla fighter, 
and its stress upon military values in both military and non- 
military contexts. In the Popular Courts, as we have seen, the 
revolutionaries have sought to combat the expression of lower-class; 
machismo in street-comer guaperia not so much by attacking its 
root as by redirecting it totmrds new, revolutionary objects.
Perhaps most important of all* in their efforts to restructure 
urban-rural relationships* Fidel Castro and his comrades have drawn 
upon the machismo implicit in the way in which the country-dwoller 
traditionally viewed the city and its inhabitants. Replacing the 
popular Image of the ignorant and faintly comic guajiro (peasant) 
with that of the strapping and tireless machetero, the Cuban leaders 
have drawn upon one of the few widely accepted social values capable 
of counteracting the otherwise irresistible lure of the city and the 
easy life. The notion that, in addition to being the home of 
corruption, debauchery and other forms of moral pollution, pre­
revolutionary Havana was in some sense the centre of all that was 
effeminate in the life of the nation has proved an indispensable 
prop to the thesis that the countryside was exploited economically 
by the capital.^
Arguably, no society at Cuba1s stage of economic development
can afford not to draw upon the full range of cultural values at
its disposal which foster the effort* abnegation and will of its::
people. The sentiment expressed by the quotation at the head of
of this section cannot be dismissed lightly. It may also be that*
rather than a specific product of the Iberian cultural heritage,
what is distinctive about machismo in Cuba, as in Mexico, is in
27reality universally present in * frontier1-situations. In this 
case, to the extent that the ^pening-up* of Cuba*s interior
continues"not only to call for the development of male comradeship 
in rigorous physical conditions but also to involve a growing 
sense of nationalism in the context of sentiments of inferiority 
vis-a-vis the more developed society, of the United States, the 
regeneration of machismo may inevitably proceed on a par uith the 
revolution itself for gcttig years yet. The consequences of this 
fact for social development in other spheres cannot however be 
expected to be entirely positive.
Fates Worse than Death
It is not just the more subtle * and the more intimate, aspects 
•...of the oppression of; women that are at stake here. In a discussion 
in 1969 of popular attitudes towards the commission of sexual :
offerees against childrens the Cuban Deputy Minister of the Interior 
had the following to say: -
In all such cases - corruption of minors, rape 
or minors, criminal attack on minors (in other 
words, rape of a male minor) - the indignation 
of the citizenry is aroused to fever pitch.
That is why, as a result of the sheer baseness 
of the crime, since the damage that is done to 
a minor by corrupting him is practically worse 
than murdering him -he is in fact dead, even 
though he is still alive - the people become 
so indignant that they demand the death sentence
in certain cases.29
The speaker went on to explain that although the incidence of sexual
crimes in Cuba was not ”a phenomenon of such magnitude as to impress
anyone” serious studies would be undertaken with a view to increasing
30the maximum penalties permitted by the law in this category. The 
strength of the language employed here was unquestionably due to 
the fact that not only simple heterosexual rape but also, more 
particularly, homosexual assault was under discussion. When the 
draft of new legislation was published for public debate early in
1973, this pattern of concerns was revealed in the fact that 
whilst penalties of five to thirty years imprisonment or death 
were recommended for the rapeof (female) minors aged up to twelve,
■: the same punishment was suggested in cases of Pederasty with
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Violence if a minor under sixteen years of age was involved. In 
the context of popular Cuban conceptions of masculinity, to be the : 
object:_d§ sodomy is to be fatally andirremediably tarnished. 
Indeed, according to a widespread belief, for an adolescent to be 
’’caught from behind1’, if only once, is to be rendered incapable 
in the future of rnormalt sexual activities and relationships.
♦Once a queer*» even if involuntarily, *always a queer* - or so it 
is commonly supposed.
In one sense, ironically, there may be some ‘truth,in this in
■ 32the Cuban context. As Martin Loney has correctly observed, the 
Cuban attitude to homosexuality is that if is a form of human 
degeneration; but we can be more precise than this. The marked- 
preoccupation with.homosexuality exhibited by most adult Cuban 
males can only be explained by the fact that it is largely by 
reference to the negative stereotype of the mar icon that it is 
possible to identify the positive ideal of the macho. It is hot 
necessary to make a systematic study of child-rearing on the island 
in order to confirm that the figure of the * queer* in introduced to 
the male child at the earliest possible stage, becoming the devil 
himself during early adolescence and remaining a fundamental bogey 
for many throughout adult life. Parents do not conceal from the 
child, or, equally importantly, from his siblings, their pre­
occupation lest he ’’turn out queer”. Maternal injunctions to the 
, child to avoid in all circumstances placing his hands on his hips
are '.-followed' by advice' • concerning the • extreme indignity'and incult 
to hismanhood which will result if he permits himself to be as 
much as touched on the buttocks by another ran. or by a woman.
Boys are expected to chowtoughness, self-confidence and aggressive 
personalities, and those who fail to acquire thece characteristics - .. 
are quickly *labelled1 as deviants by their peers. The possibility 
that premature labelling ray lead very rapidly to a switch in the 
subject's self-identification andbehaviour in the manner of a self- 
fulfilling prophesy is clearly an omnipresent one in such a setting.
Homosexuality constitutes a serious social problem in contem­
porary Cuba5 not because it is particularly common (this is conceiv­
able. but naturally nothing.is known about rates of homosexual-' 
practice on the island) but because of the social attitudes and 
public policies in which homosexuals are ensnared. The thesis 
just hinted at that the causes of homosexuality may include the 
culturally-determined expectation that all individuals will conform 
to one or other of two polar -stereotypes of behaviour was regarded 
in 19G9 as an exceedingly advanced if not positively dangerous idea, 
even in otherwise enlightened circles. The national press 
. occasionally carried didactic articles which -somewhat''hesitantly .. 
and self-consciously suggested that the problem might be susceptible 
of psychiatric explanation, the most widely-accepted interpretations 
favouring biological causes. One result has been that homosexuals 
have been subject topperiodic harassment and intimidation not only 
at the hands of other citiscns - including.those organised in the 
CDRs - but also at those of the Ministry of the Interior. For two 
years in the mid-sixties, young homosexuals of military age were 
drafted automatically into.special work camps (Unidades Hllitares 
para Ayuda a la Froducclon or UMAP) run by the Army. Even after
the UIjAP camps v;erc closed it was riot uncommon for known homo­
sexuals in Havana to be convicted on dubious charges or held for 
a number of months in a prison-fana pending trial* The draft 
legislation published in 1973 had the effect of fornialising a 
situation which already existed de facto in this respect by laying 
down two to nine months* detention-as the penalty incurred by
He v?ho practices pederasty , actively or 
passivelys in a habitual and flagrant 
fashion, or makes public ostentation of that 
activity, or solicits or molests another 
with his demands?,
Or:, '
He who, by displays of immodesty or any other 
act of public indecency, offends against 
propriety and good customs.3^
Beginning in 1963. homosexuals were systematically removed 
from positions of responsibility in the educational and cultural 
fields on the grounds that they might exercise an improper influence 
upon the formation of the nation * s youth. By the end of the decade 
it was impossible for knovrn homosexuals to be appointed as directors 
of theatrical or dance companies by the Consejo Nacional de Culture, 
which centralised responsibility for the entire cultural sector, 
though, in Cuba as elsewhere, the presence of homosexuals at all 
other levels of the theatrical world remained very marked. The 
Declaration of the 1971 National Congress on Education and Culture 
apparently signalled the initiation of a further stage in the purge, 
and is worth quoting at some length. At the Congress,
The social pathological character of homosexual 
• deviations vras recognised. It was resolved that 
all manifestations of homosexual deviations are 
to be firmly rejected and prevented from 
spreading. It was pointed out, however, that a 
study, investigation and analysis of this complex
problem'should talways determine the measures 
to be adopted.
It was decided that homosexuality should not 
be considered a central problem or a fundamental 
one in our society9 but that its attention and
solution are necessary.35
Because of.'the' "complex” character of the problem, the measures 
taken to combat it should include a long-term educational effort, 
and specifically: (a) the extension of co-education in Cuba’s 
schools, (b) the provision of appropriate "scientific”, sexual 
education for parents, teachers and pupils, (c) a campaign to 
contribute to the acquisition of a scientific knowledge of sex by 
adolescents, and (d) the promotion of discussions among youth "in 
those cases where it becomes necessary to delve into the human 
. aspect of sex relations". At the same time, however:
It was resolved that it is not to be tolerated 
for notorious homosexuals to have influence 
upon the formation of our youth on the basis 
of their ’artistic merits’.
Consequently, a study is called for to 
determine how best to tackle the problems of 
 ^ the presence of homosexuals in the various 
institutions of our cultural sector.
It was proposed that a study should be made 
to find a way of applying measures with a 
’.view’ to transferring to other organisations 
those who, as homosexuals, should not have 
any direct influence oh our youth through 
artistic and cultural activities*
It was resolved that those whose morals do 
not correspond to the prestige of our 
Revolution should be barred from any group 
of performers representing our country abroad.36
One consequence of the implementation of such a policy in the past
has been a steady decline in the otherwise high standards and
innovativeness of Cuban theatre and ballet, each of which depended
for much of its vigour in the first years after 1959 upon homo- 
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sexuals. Literature has been less directly affected by the 
purges, but the attitudes which inspire them have been present in
the form of murky undercurrents'in each of the 'well-known literary 
38 '
•affairs* to date. Another effect of the policy has been the
gratuitous creation of a new group of political dissidents whose 
attitudes towards the ongoing revolution reflect their insecurity 
and frustration. In 1969 a few homosexuals remained convinced 
that their,plight.was the result of a peculiar end temporary 
perversion of socialism in Cuba* but the number who are prepared to 
make this act of faith can be expected to dwindle in coming years.
CULTS * CARNIVALS AHD . •CONSCIOUSNESS*
Last year during the festivities* there were 
certain cases which resulted from strange 
superstitions of a religious nature* certain 
sects which require blood. If they want to 
see blood, let them donate it and contribute 
to the public health campaigns.
- Fidel Castro, June 1971.
The rapidity and thoroughness with which the evolution of the 
Cuban revolution between January 1959 and the middle of 1961 led 
from a successful liberal-nationalist rebellion to the definitive 
destruction of the socio-economic foundations of capitalism on the 
island requires for its explanation an appreciation of a number of
historical and structural peculiarities of the pre-revolutionary
39order. As several scholars have suggested, the creation in the 
space of scarcely more than two years of a fully-fledged Communist 
state resting upon a near-complete etatisation of economy and 
society begins to assume credibility and intelligibility only in the 
context of the absence in twentieth century Cuba of a semi-feudal 
oligarchy of the type found in most South American countries and 
the extreme dependence of the local capitalist classes vis-h-vis 
foreign business. The combination of these two factors - each 
closely connected with the evolution of the sugar industry from the
1880s onv/ards - createdstructures of social and political domination 
, which'' Were '•ill-equipped .to’ withstand - the impact of a popular 
nationalist upheaval. On the one hand, the Cuban revolution had 
the distinction of being the first socialist revolution to have 
occurred in a country where the wage-earning proletariat was not 
only politically experienced and influenced by a large Communist 
party but also by a substantial margin^the most numerous class in 
the population. On the other hand6 neither social-democratic nor 
liberal parliamentary parties were able to establish themselves as 
the primary mode of political expression; of the Cuban masses s 
political violence and the formation of loyalties on a persohalist 
or generational basis were normal features of national life, and, 
finally, the armed forces remained by Latin American standards 
weakly professionalised and lacking in organic links with the middle 
classes.
No list of this nature would be complete, however, without
reference to the peculiar feebleness of the institutional framework
of the Roman Catholic Church. Following the Spanish-Cuban-American
War of 1835-38, the Church lost much of the influence which it had
enjoyed during the colonial period and its disestablishment preceded
(in 1900) even the formal inauguration of the Republic. Although
about eighty per cent of the people were nominally Catholics,
approximately one-tenth of them practiced their religion and the
real base of the Church consisted of "a small, loyal band of largely
i|0
urban and upper-income faithful’'. A survey conducted in 195U
by the Agrupaci<in Catolica Univorsltaria indicated that only sixteen 
per cent of marriages were formalised in a church. Although ninety- 
one per cent of Cuban children were reportedly baptised, 1 a Jsarej 
fifty per cent received first communion. Of those interviewed.
72.5 per cent described themselves as Catholics but, of these,
only 24.0 per cent claimed regular attendance at Sunday mass. The
situation was relatively worse in rural areas, where fifty-two per
cent declared themselves to be Catholics and fully forty-one per
cent stated that they were ‘’indifferent” as to religious affiliation.
Even among the former group, twenty-seven per cent admitted they
ui
had never seen a priest.' In 1955, in fact, there were only 693
priests in Cuba, including both parish priests and members of
a 2
religious orders, or one for every 8,800 inhabitants.
Because of; the Church’s lack of a mass base, Christian Democracy
was absent as a political force in Cuba and.lay organisations such
as Catholic Action did not develop significant proportions. In turn,
religion was scarcely an issue at all during the first years after
1S59 and the Church played only a small role as the focus of
generalised opposition to the leftward drift of the revolutionary
regime. Following a period of relatively cordial relations between
the Revolutionary Government and the Church during 1959, about 140
priests were expelled from the country for political reasons in
1960-61, religious processions were banned and Catholic schools and
universities were nationalised along with the rest of private
education. These events, however, reflected the ability of the
regime to deal with the Church more or less as it wished, rather than
the existence of a successfully concerted Catholic opposition. The
emigration during the period of as many as 400 priests, many of them
foreigners by birth, has also usually been interpreted as confirming
the shallowness of the social roots of the Church outside the upper 
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• classes.
Beginning in 1962, confrontation and conflict, albeit muted.
between the Church and the revolutionary authorities; gave way with 
extraordinary rapidity to a phase of cool but uneventful co­
existence based upon a tacit understanding between Fidel Castro 
and the Vatican. This tendency became more marked after 1965,. 
and since 1968 there have been indications of a desire on the part 
of the Church in Cuba to establish a closer and more positive under­
standing with the government on the basis of a common commitment to 
egalitarianism, cooperation and economic development. The
experience of the Protestant sects has been more mixed. Hone
played an important role' in the opposition to the early radicalisation 
of the Revolution and the Evangelical churches have shown themselves 
even more adaptable and receptive to their changing environment than 
the Catholic hierarchy. On the other hand a number of fundamen­
talist sects have come into sharp conflict with the government over 
specific revolutionary measures and laws. The Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
active in Cuba since 1937, have been accused of encouraging their 
followers to refuse to comply with the law on military service or to 
salute the national flag. In addition, they have objected to
doing voluntary labour on Saturdays and have engaged in "ideological
46diversionxsm” and militant anti-communist preaching. Two other
groups, the Evangelical Gideon’s Band and the Seventh Day Adventists,
have adopted similar attitudes and are consequently regarded as
"obcurantist and counter-revolutionary sects” which must be
47"unmasked and fought” by Cuban revolutionaries. However,
since even in the 'fifties only about six per cent of Cubans belonged
■48to Protestant churches of all denominations, the Declaration of 
the First National Congress on Education and Culture is probably 
correct in minimising the problem constituted by the activities of 
members of these religions.^
Pro-revolutionary Cuba war, a society in which church-religion 
played a smaller'-role-than'in-almost any other Hispanic country 
and this fact has affected the course of the Revolution in 
innumerable ways. It would be wrong to conclude from this however 
that the society was characterised to the same extent by secular, 
rationalist attitudes. The reality of the matter is that, as in 
other Sppnish-spoaking Caribbean countries, the gap between Cubans’ 
self-identification as Catholics and the extent of their Catholic 
religious practice conceals the importance of a number of syncretistic 
cult-religions which combine in varying proportions Christian, 
spiritualist and African beliefs and function effectively, if not. 
in theory, in competition with the Church. It is with these
cults, the product of a complex mestisaje of European and African 
influences of diverse origins, that we shall be primarily concerned 
in this section. A brief historical sketch will be necessary in 
order to locate recent developments in their proper context.
Africa in Cuba: The Background
Modern specialists on the ’transculturation’ of African beliefs 
and religious practices in the New World give general assent, 
whatever their differences of accent and interpretation, to the
proposition that more was retained of African culture in the course
50 ,
of this process than was once supposed. There xs also a certain
consensus to the effect that, in spite of remaining during slavery
and particularly after it one of the 'whitest' societies in
51Plantation America, Cuba is one of the two or three most striking
52
examples of continuing African cultural influence in the region. 
According to the census of 1953, the Cuban population consisted 
72.8 per cent of ’whites’, 12.4 per cent of ’blacks' and 14.5 per
, . Do
cent of mestizos. Writing in the early ’fifties, however, a
prominent student of Afro-Cuban culture insisted as follows
'The:'weight of the African influence in the 
very population which is taken for. white is, 
even though this might not be apparent at 
first sight, incalculable. In reality this 
influence is more evident today than in the 
colonial period. One cannot pursue the 
investigation of life in Cuba very far without 
coining across an African presence which does 
not stop at the colour of men’s skins,54
In modern times, African, retentions have been claimed to be 
perceptible in Cuban popular mannerisms, hair styles, methods of 
cultivation and cuisine, but more substantial, and subject to 
more reliable methods of confirmation, are those influences affecting 
respectively religion, music and language.
A number of considerations help to explain the continued
relative importance of African cultural elements in twentieth
century Cuban society. Firstly and most obviously, the relatively
late expansion and rise to prosperity of the plantation-based sugar
industry in Cuba - the apogee of slave-imports to Cuba came a full
half-century after 'the -Haitian 'Revolution •- --was' such that , as in
Brasil, substantial numbers of slaves were arriving on the island
direct from Africa as late as the eighteen-sixties. Between 1061
and 1864 alone, an estimated 49,532 slaves arrived (illegally) in
Cuba, the total slave population at this time being of the order 
56of 370,000. Slavery itself, moreover, was not formally
abolished in Cuba until 1880. Consequently, in the nineteen-
sixties, there were still citizens of Cuba who were b o m  into slavery,
and a few whose parents had been brought in chains from Some part 
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of West Africa. Secondly, due to a varying combination of 
manumission and natural growth, the free coloured population of
Cuba remained substantial even at the height of the era of
plantation slavery in the nineteenth century, representing a
proportion of the total coloured population between 177H and 1877
.■58
of never less than twenty-five per cent. Although the free
coloured community was subject to repression and racial exclusion
of both an official and an unofficial nature, the precise extent
of which varied from time to time during the period and remains
59to some extent a subject of contention among historians, free
coloureds nonetheless gained entry to a wide range of urban crafts
and professions, coming close to monopolising certain skilled 
60
trades. Finally, a number of distinctive features of Spanish
colonial policy helped to assure a degree of religious and cultural 
autonomy not only to the economically independent free coloureds 
but also to the slaves themselves. One such feature was the 
practice, inspired in the belief that the incidence of slave- 
suicides was thereby reduced, of locating newly-imported slaves or 
bozales in accordance with their supposed ethnic origin. Another 
was the official recognition of cabildos or 1councils1 representing 
slaves and free coloureds of a given nation or land.
The so-called cabildos de nacidn were unquestionably the major
62vehicle of African cultural continuity in nineteenth century Cuba. 
Comparable with the cabildos or cofradias established by Africans 
under Spanish law at various dates in Seville itself, in Buenos 
Aires, Cartagena and Peru, they functioned not only as associations 
providing mutual-aid and recreation but also as the means by which 
blacks in Cuba re-created elements of African political organisation, 
including in some cases the institution of kingship*. Nominally 
membership of the cabildos was restricted to Africans by birth but 
Cuban-born, or criollo, blacks frequently participated illegally.
In the nineteenth century, successive Spanish Captains-General
with a careful eye to the diversion of potential slave-revolts
into less harmful channels both permitted slaves to play drums and
hold festivities in African style on Sundays and the feast-days of
the Catholic calendar and established the custom of receiving
official delegations of the cabildos on specified dates. Epiphany
(El Dia de los Reyes) was particularly noted in this connection,
the attendance of the accredited *kingsT or leaders of the cabildos
de nacidn at the palace of the Captain-General being accompanied
by elaborate processional festivities or compareas. Although the
cabildos were admitted for the last time to Captain-General *s
palace in 1862, the traditional salidas continued intermittently
until 1884 when, in the troubled times between Cuba*s first and
second Independence Wars, they were banned by the colonial .
authorities. Under the double impact of government repression and
the abolition of slavery the cabildos went into decline after the 
■ 631880s, though several remained on the official register of
property-owners well into the twentieth century, as indicated by
a law suit in Santiago de Cuba in 1929, After losing their
connection with the old cabildos, the comparsas re-emerged in the
twentieth century as the basis and inspiration of the carnivals
of Santiago and Havana, with their rumbas, congas and other
'65characteristic processional dances.
Three strands of African culture have been particularly 
influential in Cuban history, the religious traditions known 
respectively as Regia Ocha and Regia Conga, and a secular tradition 
associated with the Abakuci or nanigo all-male secret society. The 
first is attributed to the Yoruba - or lucumx, as they have been 
known in Cuba since the days of slavery - and is most commonly
referred to simply as santeria (saint-cult). The cults of Regia 
Conga, or palo (the stick), derive partly from the religious culture 
of Bantu-speaking peoples of what is today the Congo and northern 
Angola. The Abakua fraternities, finally, are unique to Cuba, 
having no direct equivalent on either side of the Atlantic, though 
they appear to be modelled on the secret societies of the Cross 
River ports of modern eastern Nigeria and draw heavily upon Efik 
:"mythology. .V.-,
As was universally the case where African religious beliefs came
' 66 into contact with Catholicism in a New World setting, the tendency
towards syncretism was marked at an early stage in the development
of the Yoruba and ’Congo* traditions in Cuba. In;-the case of
santeria, the origins of syncretism in the efforts of African slaves
to conceal their ’pagan* religious practices behind a Christian
facade are clearly perceptible in its form. The initiation rituals,
divination techniques, chants and myths bear no comparison with
those of Christianity, but the calendar employed is that of.the
Church and devotees of santeria have traditionally been required to
' f t  *7
be baptised before initiation into the cult. However syncretism
took place not only between African and Christian elements but also
characterised the relationships between the religion of the Yoruba,
that the ’Congos* and other minor influences in Cuba, such as vodun
(or ’voodoo’) of Dahomeyan and Haitian origin. As in other parts
of the Americas, it was the Yoruba tradition which emerged most
forcefully from this process, with its distinctive content least
68impaired and most clearly recognisable.
A number of factors may account for the cultural dominance of 
the Yoruba in Cuba, a phenomenon also particularly marked in the 
North-East of Brasil. Firstly, it is probable that a relatively
large number of slaves imported to Cuba during the first Half of
the nineteenth century originated in the region of influence of
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the Yoruba empire of Oyo. But this is Insufficient by itself ,
since,it is known that the ethnic origin of the Cuban slave
population was extremely varied, including notable contributions
from at least 95 different African peoples occupying most parts of
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the coastline from Senegal to Angola. Equally important„
perhaps s was the peculiar affinity shown between the Yoruba cult
of the orlshas on the one hand and New World Catholicism on the
other. The religion of the lucum/s, with its “developed mythology,
formed by natural forces interpreted anthropomorphically, with
deified heroes, with organised hierarchies of deities and even
local gods15, lent itself to a process Of reciprocal borrowing with
the Catholicism of the Spaniards which left its fundamental structure
and character intact. The nature of popular Catholicism in the
form in *?hich it was introduced to Cuba needs to be borne in mind:
Alongside the official Catholic dogma represented 
by‘ the priests, there arrived with the rest of 
the personnel from the Peninsula certain kinds 
of popular Catholicism which were much given to 
the adoration of images and especially to the 
various devotions of the Virgin Mary9 whose cult 
bordered on idolatry. Together with numerous 
medieval superstitions and legends, this 
excessive adoration of images constituted a 
practical Catholicism which was far removed from 
the official dispositions of the Chur ch. *7 2
The structural similarity between the Yoruba pantheon and the Trinity 
and saints of this practical Christianity was such that parallelisms 
and equivalents were not hard to find. The need for devotees of 
the African religion to conceal their practices behind outwardly 
Christian forms - a need which persisted throughout the period of 
slavery in spite of the neglect to which the religious education of
73plantation slaves was subject after the sugar boom got under way 
supplied the necessary motive. Thus the humanised deities or 
orishas of Yoruba belief, Shango, Oshun, Yeinanja and Babalu-Aye -
to name only the most popular in Cuba - were directly identified
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with St. Barbara, Our Lady of Charity, the Virgin of the Rule
and St. Lasarus. The somewhat distant God of the Catholics was
assimilated with ease to the Yoruba sky-god Olofin, Olodumare or
Olorun (depending on the usage) who, having created the world,
delegated his powers to direct the forces of nature and intervene
in the affairs of men to the orishas. In turn, the 1sonsf of
Olofin—  Obatala (or Orishala) and Oduduwa (or Odua) - became
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identified with the other members of the Holy Trinity. In each 
case the identification of orishas with saints was accompanied by 
a complex, and not always consistent, interweaving of the corres­
ponding mythologies and ritual associations.
Throughout the process of syncretism which produced modern 
santeria, the Yoruba element remained dominant. By comparison, 
the *Congolese* religious heritage underwent a far more rigorous 
transformation in its Cuban setting as a result of syncretism with 
both the Yoruba religion and Catholicism. . Once again the phenomenon 
appears to have been a general one, not restricted to Cuba. As 
Bastide has observed, although the Bantus undoubtedly constituted 
in certain places and at certain times the dominant element in New 
World slave populations, few traces of their religion, as distinct 
from their folklore, have survived. Three possible explanations 
have been suggested. First, whereas ethnic groups such as the 
Fon, Yoruba and Mina were often chosen as ?house slaves1 and thus 
became relatively numerous in the towns - where cabildos and 
similar institutions fostering the continuity of 1national* identities
were able to be organised - the Bantus were primarily valued as
Tfield-hands*, tending therefore to remain on rural plantations.
Second, this group showed itself most susceptible to conversion
to Christianity. Third, the Bantu religions were not only less
systematised than those of Nest Africa but were also based on a
form of ancestor-worship which could not survive the disruption of
lineage-groups inevitably caused by slavery. Once this framework
had been destroyed, all that was left was animism, without the
support of the kind of systematised mythology found among the Yoruba
or the Fon. This would appear to account for the primitive
character of the palo religion as practiced in Cuba, as well as its
marked, and in general unreciprocated, borrowings from the Yoruba-
/ 78Christian pantheon of santeria. The paloros were known and
feared in Cuba (as, to come extent, they still are) primarily for
the power of their magic. The ex-slave Esteban Montejo recalls
that the influence of the congo sorcerers or brujos (literally,
* witches1) in the baracoons was such that even the overseers had
recourse to them. ’’The difference between the congo and the
lucumi”, it was said, 11 is that, whilst the lucumi tells fortunes,
7g
the congo gets results”.
The third major influence of African origin which calls for
discussion here is, as already indicated, a secular one and the
bearer of the unique distinction of having remained substantially
free from Catholic contamination. The first AbakucL secret society
was founded in 1830 by criollo, or Cuban-born, blacks who were
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excluded from membership of the cabildos de nacion. Although an 
Afro-Cuban invention rather than an African ’survival1, the society 
bore more than a superficial resemblance to the Ekpe(or Egbo)
■ .... w11, tit rjmmtt ' .
trading fraternity established by the Efik at Old Calabar during
8 o
the era of the slave trade, *" and indeed the original adepts
identified themselves as carabali, a probable corruption of the
name of their port of embarkation, as.well as cfi (Efik) and bibio 
83(Ibibio). If Ekpe was ’’something between a wizard's gathering,
a municipal executive, and an early African version of a business-
84 f — ’man's club'", the Abakua or nanigo society served the free blacks
and Mulattoes of nineteenth century Cuba as a source of mutual aid
in the difficult business of penetrating racist and other barriers
to their entry into the skilled trades and professions. Partly
no doubt for the purpose of protecting itself, the brotherhood was
characterised by elaborate initiation rites, absolute secrecy and
a rigorous code of honour based on the principle of solidarity between
initiates. In the mid-nineteenth century, wheh members of the
Society, disguising themselves in their peculiar form of hooded
garb, participated otherwise openly in the salidas of the cabildos
on Epiphany, the nanigos were much feared in polite society, and
even among the black masses themselves. Of their initiation rites
it was said - wrongly, it is now thought - that they involved brutual
trials of physical endurance, and it was also believed that they
85
were ritual murderers. The truth was somewhat less dramatic
Applicants for membership of the Society, or indieimes, were expected 
to submit to an exhaustive investigation of their life-histories 
with a view to establishing beyond doubt their qualities of reliabilit}' 
and manliness (hombria); upon acceptance, candidates were expected
86to render a substantial monetary payment to the collective coffers.
The initiation rite itself was directed in the first place towards 
insuring the acceptance by the candidate of the principles and 
rules of the Society and, secondly, towards the renewal of the 
ritual purity of the sacred drum Ekue which formed the centrepiece
their neighbours, the drum Ekue contained a divine ’’secret” to which 
only its possessors could be privy. The Baroko ritual, the only
quasi-religious element in the life of the Society, involved the 
sacrifice of animals, but to the extent that nanigos frequently 
committed homicide, this is probably to be explained as the product 
of rivalries between the various branches or potencies of the 
brotherhood and of the developed sense of loyalty fbstered by it.
In order to bring this survey of Afro-Cuban religions to the 
point where it is possible to assess recent changes, we need to have 
the answers to the following questions. To what extent did African 
cults survive, with or without syncretism, into the twentieth 
century and up to the time of the Revolution? How is the persistence 
of elements of African religious traditions in Cuba to be explained? 
And, what was the nature of the relationship between the cults and 
the wider society in the period before 1959?
Lydia Cabrera's opinion to the effect that the African influence
in the popular culture of Cuba was more considerable in the nineteen-
fifties than in colonial times has already been cited. Hhat is
certainly the case is that virtually the entirety of recorded
knowledge on the beliefs and practices of santerfa, palo and Abakua
derives from studies published in this century, beginning with
88Ortiz's Los Negros Brujos in 1906. The majority of these works,
based for the most part upon the testimony of knowledgeable
89
informants, belong to the period since the nineteen-thirties.
After a three month field-trip to Cuba in 1948, the Africanist 
and specialist on Yoruba divination, William R. Bascom, reported:
Santeria is a vital, growing institution, 
practiced throughout the entire length of
the islands in both rural and urban areas; . 
in the latter in fact, it is probably the 
strongest* In recent years it seems to have 
been expanding, recruiting additional members 
from the Negro, the mixed, and even the white
population.9°
Bascom attested that, at this time, it was possible to find Cuban 
Negroes in towns and cities from one end of the island to the other 
who were capable of sustaining a conversation in Yoruba, and whose 
speech was able to be identified by Nigerians as belonging to a
91
local dialect still spoken in their country* Although the ’focus1
or emphasis of Cuban santeria differed from that of the Yoruba
' 92religion practiced in modern Nigeria, striking similarities of 
belief and practice were found.. Notably, a comparison of the 
formulae employed in divination respectively by the Cuban babalawos
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and by their counterparts in Ife, Nigeria, yielded identical results. 
Bascom and his wife recorded mention of over forty ’’African saints”
(out of the N00 or so orishas recognised in Yorubaland) in a single
gi|
interview with one informant.
The generalisation, corresponding to the discovery which
surprised Herskovits in Trinidad, that santerxa has been strongest ^
in recent decades in large urban centres such as Havana, Santiago
and Matanzas is supported by Cuban ethnographers. Writing at about
the same time as Bascom, Fernando Ortis also noted that African
survivals were found with greater ’ethnographic authenticity’ in the
96outlying neighbourhoods of the cities than in the rural areas.
Nor is evidence for notable African retentions continuing into the 
second half of the twentieth century restricted to the case of the 
Yoruba tradition. In addition to Yoruba-speakers, informants have 
been found in recent times who are capable of conversing in the Efik 
dialect of Ibibio and in the language of the Fon of Dahomey. Elements
of a recognisable Bantu language from the region of the old
g7
kingdom of Kongo have also been recorded. However, it is
unquestionably the culture of the Yoruba which has proved most
persistent* In the late 'sixties, we are told by the Director of
the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore of the Cuban Academy of
Sciences, there were still elderly informants who claimed that
their ancestors came from the Yoruba cities of Ife, Egbado, Ilesa 
98or Oyo. The present author was able to be introduced to a
santeria group and witness part of a presentacion (initiation ritual) 
without undue difficulty in 1S69.
The transformation undergone by the belief and practice of
santeria and palo during the twentieth century appears to have been
slight, in spite of the incorporation into the ranks of the believers
during this period of large numbers of whites, note;air of them of
lower-class origin. A partial exception here is the influence of
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spiritualism, of which;a number of variants are present in Cuba. 
Kardecist spiritualism of the type known in Europe and North America 
and referred to locally as espiritismo de mesa began to take root in 
Cuba from the eighteen-fifties, spreading rapidly during the final 
decades of the last century, due in part to the catastrophic decline 
of the influence of the Church in this period* In the twentieth 
century it continued to be important, without seriously challenging 
the Afro-Cuban cults or gaining the proportions of the movement in, 
say, Puerto Rico. A second variety of spiritualism of uncertain 
origin characterised by the combination of Kardecist elements with 
Catholic symbols and chants and known by its adepts as cspirltismo 
de cordon has been found to be common in parts of Oriente province 
where the African cults were traditionally weak. Both variants 
were originally founded upon a strong rejection of African belief,
but a tendency for cspiritismo do cordon to become crusao or 
"crossed” -with African cults, particularly palo, has been noted 
in.recent decades, permitting a degree of mutual influence between 
the two currents. In 195H a total of 1.0% of a sample of Cubans 
reported that they were spiritualists of one denomination or 
another.'*'0^
The patterns of cult-religion reported in Cuba in recent decades 
are the product of a continuous and widely-reported presence lasting 
from slavery to the present day. For obvious reasons, on the other 
hand, little is known about lengthy periods in the history of the 
nahigo fraternity, and on more than one occasion literate white 
society believed that it had ceased to exist until it was ‘’rediscovered” 
by a persistent investigator. nevertheless the following elements 
may be pieced together. Although, like the Ekpe association of 
Old Calabar, the Abakua society of nineteenth-century Cuba was based 
universalistic principles rather than narrow ’tribal’ or ’national* 
loyalties, it was some time before whites could be accepted as 
members. It was the nanigos who were responsible for the entry 
into Cuban popular usage of the word makri, a ter*m applied to whites 
whose insulting connotations are approximately those of the English 
word ’nigger*. The participation of whites as equal members of the 
fraternity was first sponsored by one Andres Petit, a Mulatto of 
Haitian parentage variously described as a Christian ’holy man* and 
a palo priest as well as a n^nigo leader. The considerable 
opposition encountered by Petit was overcome in some measure by 
requiring that white indieimes who owned slaves ameliorate their 
treatment of them and make substantial payments, which were then used 
to buy the slaves’ freedom. Nonetheless, as might be expected, 
several serious incidents of Interracial conflict among Abakua
members were caused by the first experiences of entry by whites,
In a remarkable study of the Abaku^ society among the dock
102 ' /workers of the port of Havana, Rafael Lopez Valdes has shorn how 
in the early decades of the present century nanigo groups (juegos or 
potencias) played a central role in the organisation of the then 
largely unskilled and casual labour in this sector, Abakua 
potencias became established in dockland around the turn of the 
century, and perhaps even earlier, groviing in importance as the 
occupants of positions of authority or plazas in the hierarchy of 
the brotherhood succeeded in becoming foremen or recognised sub­
contractors of labour. By the ’twenties, the Society had achieved 
a monopoly of the distribution of jobs in the port to the extent 
that it was reported that in the "territory" of a given potencia, 
often a whole neighbourhood, jobs were only available to its members. 
The role of Abakua leaders as purveyors of patronage periodically 
produced violent encounters between hanigos and other, more often 
than not white, sub-contractors and their followers in this phase. 
However it was only as a result of the steady growth of trade unions 
and political organisations during the ’thirties - a process which 
in turn provoked the introduction en masse by employers of white 
strike-breakers from rural areas - that the influence of the Society 
began to be undermined. It was not destroyed definitively until 
the abolition of sub-contracting in 1942. After that - at least 
until the trade union repression of the late ’forties - Individual 
hanigos became trade union leaders, but now their roles as patron and 
as ckobio (brother) were of necessity more clearly dissociated.
Despite this setback to its presllge and power, the Abakua 
society remained strong in the ’fifties including among its members,
according to Cabrera9 not only lower-class Negroes, Ilulattoes and 
:, whites but also office~workers, teachers, soldiers, politicians, 
tradesmen and professionals of all types. There were even nanigos 
who were members of aristocratic families, and, at election time, 
the Society was capable of controlling a not inconsiderable number 
of v o t e s . S e v e r a l  Abakua words had passed into the vernacular 
and were commonly employed even by upper-class Cubans who were 
unaware of their lowly pedigree.
The survival into recent decades of an organisation capable of 
providing for its members such tangible rewards as does the AbakucC 
secret society requires no special explanation. The case of the 
cult-religions is slightly more tantalising from the point of view 
of historical interpretation. Nevertheless, students of the wider 
spectrum of Afro-American religious faiths have not been altogether 
reticent in suggesting global socio-psychological explanations, some 
of which have obvious relevance in the Cuban setting. Bastide, 
summarising the conclusions of various Brasilian studies, writes:
If these sects survive - and even expand - it is 
because they answer some real need..,.. The vast 
majority of the Negro population forms a community 
apart, the lowest strata of society, and for want 
of education (and hence professional qualifications) 
cannot rise in the class hierarchy. Such people 
find much that they need in these sects: in the first 
place, an atmosphere of security, a protection against 
lifeTs hazards, and also a chance to better themselves, 
in so far as they can mount from rank to rank in the 
priestly hierarchy. Finally they enjoy a prestige 
status which they could never hope to attain in 
society at large.105
Lydia Cabrera expands upon this point in characteristically baroque 
style in connection with the Abakua brotherhood, about which she 
says: .
If it has been able to survive both the condemnation 
and persecution to which it was subject under Spanish
rule in'the later years of the last century 
and the blows it received, if intermittently,
• ' at the beginning of this century - it's
proselytes tending on the contrary to increase 
in number,: on a par with the increase in the 
number of students attending the University of 
Havana - the explanation of this curious•. 
phenomenon is not only to be sought in the 
racial background and culture of our people.
It is necessary to keep clearly in mind the 
universal and timeless attraction which the 
mysterious holds for the general run of men: 
the innate ambition to rise in the world, to 
belong to a superior station inaccessible to 
the rest, and the satisfaction -within the 
confines of the mysterious world of the sect, 
in which the impenetrable Secret is shared and 
guarded with others of the elect - of this need 
for superiority -forpower- which is rooted 
in the deepest and'most ancient reaches of the 
human soul; not forgetting the pleasure of 
frightening other people, of imposing.one*s will 
by means of fear...... A Hokongo^0 6 may be a
poor devil; he may be destitute; but in his 
Potencia he is the Chief, and an immortal chief 
at that....
Another outstanding student of the Afro-Caribbean religions makes, 
with Bastiae, the sociological observation which tends to be 
obscured by Cabrera:
Afro-American religions share with most other 
religions an impressive array of psychological 
: functions, but black religions in the New World
have some special consequences for devotees because 
of the historical conditions out of which they 
have arisen and the social structures within 
which they have their existence. Participation 
in the;;cults has afforded emotional release from 
the economic, political and social humilitations 
and hardships which have been the lot of lower-
class Afro-Americans . 108
If this is the case we may proceed9without pausing to catalogue 
the full range of benefits possibly conferred by the cults on 
their members, to identify the major characteristics of pre­
revolutionary Cuban attitudes?in this area.
From what has been said already, it will be clear that to the
extent that Cuba possesses a national religious heritage it is only
in a highly problematic sense that this.may be described: as \ 
Catholic. Although, as we have seen, it was'reported by a 
Catholic organisation in the mid-*fifties that as many as 72.5% of 
Cuban adults regarded themselves as Catholics and that a full 91v 
of Cuban children were baptised, the significance of this finding 
is far from clear. Even if we make the assumption that it is 
reliable, it obviously needs to be placed in the context of a number 
of further observations. Firstly, practicioners of cult-religions 
in Cuba have traditionally insisted upon their membership of the 
Church and indeed have usually gone so far as to regard baptism as 
an indispensible preparation for initiation into one or other of 
the cults. Conversely, however, popular attitudes towards the 
orthodox practice of Church-Catholicism - including such central 
elements as regular attendance at Mass, Confession, and the 
sanctification of marriages by a priest - have tended towards the 
view that such matters are "for the rich", or alternatively "for the 
whites". Whilst recognising in Church-religion a superior or 
elaborated form of their own belief, the opinion of devotees has 
been that, on.a practical level, an acceptable and appropriate 
expression of Christianity among los humildes is that which is 
embodied in santeria, Regia Conga and the like. Moreover, despite 
appearances, the actual influence of Christianity in cult practices 
has been slight. As Bascom observed in regard to santer/a,
All informants, without exception, stated 
unequivocally that they were Catholics, yet 
they stressed the importance of those very 
elements of their faith and ritual which set 
it apart from that of the Catholic church.....
While Catholicism is outwardly embraced, it is 
inwardly rejected.*^3
The reality or the matter is that the Cuban religious heritage 
consists of two major elements, the Catholicism of the Church and
and the ’Catholicism’ of the cults, the latter being:by .far.-the : 
most important as far as the mass of the population is concerned.
If this is the case, it is the more remarkable that it is only 
in relatively recent times that the Afro-Cuban religions have come 
to be regarded by polite society as other than an unhappy aberration, 
the product of the primitive psychology of the lower orders or a 
shameful manifestation of the nation’s social backwardness. As 
late as 1954, Lydia Cabrera complained that it was impossible to 
voice the opinion, let alone publish it, that Cuba was the inheritor 
of two cultural legacies, the one African, the other Spanish. ^ 0 
Bascom returned to the United States at about the same time with 
the impression that "white Cubans of Spanish origin with few 
exceptions den}' the existence of African survivals in C u b a " . N o r  
were intellectual circles entirely free from these influences. Afro- 
Cuban studies emerged in the early decades of the present century 
as a branch of criminology and, to a lesser extent, of abnormal 
psychology, as is vividly illustrated in the titles of the works
ll1^ .
published in this period, t Although Fernando Ortis, the 
’founding father’ of Afro-Cuban studies, is correctly credited with 
the early introduction to Cuba of a Malinowskian concern for the 
collection of data from informants at first-hand, the most influential 
studies of the Master bear the intellectual stamp of an older 
tradition of anthropology - a positivist evolutionism not lacking
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in implicitly racist assumptions. The transition to the
perspective that the African element in Cuban culture warranted 
investigation in its own right and on the basis of its intrinsic 
merits did not begin until the formation of the Sociedad del Folklore 
Cubano under Ortis’s auspices in 1923, and was not marked until this
was replaced.by-the Sociedad do Estudios Afrocubanos in 1937. It 
.was in a-study which appeared in Cuba in 1940 that Ortis consciously 
opened a polemic against the ethnocentric bias in the concept of
in it -
’acculturation’ as applied to the Afro-American heritage, but as -
late as 1939 he was himself obliquely accused of perpetuating such .
a bias by virtue of his continued use of the terms brujo (literally,
witch) and brujeria (witchcraft) in connection with the Afro-Cuban 
' . 115priesthoods. This latter weakness, indeed, continued to
manifest itself in Ortis’s later, mainly musicological, writings
TIB ■
which appeared in the early ’fifties.
The processional festivities or comparsas- of the Havana
carnival occurred intermittently during the Republican period. Though
constituting a major annual event in the calendar of the Afro-Cuban
cults of all denominations, the carnival was subject to the ups and
downs of changing political scene and until 1937 the issue of whether
or not to permit it to take place was decided annually in accordance
with the complexion of the political interests in the government.
In 1937, following a lengthy interruption, a body of public opinion
succeeded in having the legal status of the.comparsas permanently
restored. After a break during the Second World War they reappeared
in 1946 at the centre of a new storm of controversy, only to be
banned once again together with other street demonstrations following
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Batista’s coup d ’etat of March 1952.
Africa in Cuba: The Revolution
In a number of important respects the revolution of January 1959 
provided a long-awaited boost to the morale and self-respect of all 
those Cubans connected in one fashion or another with the world of 
the cults. Like almost everybody else, practitioners of santeria
welcomed the guerrillas from the Sierra,' and it'is -more than . 
possible, in view of the religious significance of el monte in 
the lucumi tradition (that is, as the home of the gods)„ that the 
descent or Fidel Castro and his men from the mountains to the
■j .
plains had an additional dramatic;dimension for many devotees."
It is almost certainly false that santeria rltuils were performed 
in the encampments of the rebel array in the mountains, but probably 
a relatively high proportion .of its members, including some 
officers, held some form of /iffo-Cuban b e l i e f . T h e  ban upon 
the cultsf >’fiestas1, or religious ceremonies, which had been 
introduced during the Batista dictatorship was lifted immediately 
and the carnivals of Havana and Santiago recommenced.
The most important innovations which took place after 1959 
however were those which affected the recognition publically given 
to Afro-Cuban religions as an element of the national cultural 
heritage. The creation at the end of 1959 of a Cuban National 
Theatre equipped with a well-staffed Department of Folklore was 
the first such step. The assumptions and aims of the Department, 
which in addition to preparing Afro-Cuban themes for theatrical 
presentation ran a highly successful series of seminars and 
meetings of aficionados during October 1950 - Nay 1961, are best 
described in the words used by its Director at the time:
One of the most characteristic cultural expressions 
of our people - its music and its dance - was also 
one of the most exploited and corrupted under the 
system which, thanks to the Revolution, we have 
recently left behind. The prejudiced use of our 
folklore, and the distortion and falsification to 
which our values have been subject, almost : 
convinced us that the tourist routines which were 
in vogue were our highest and most genuine form 
of artistic expression. It was imagined that what 
the people wanted to see was dancers rendering the 
rumba with ostrich-feathers in their hair, or 
foreign models pretending to be possessed. But
V;._ -between. these- false' 'expressions and the woman , 
of the people or the santera who truly performs 
.her ritual, there was all the distance which, 
separated a latifundist or a nouveau-riche 
politico from a worker,.a peasant or a student.....
What .is now being proposed ie that we take the 
expressions of our people and, without impairing 
them, present them anew. It is true of course, 
that much of Cuban folklore consists of elements 
of distant African origin which even today remain 
intimately connected with an intricate structure 
of beliefs. In these cases, we shall stand back 
from the private and personal side of the religion 
and try to present the pure values of its music,
its dance and its poetry.i20
On an intellectual plane, these efforts were founded upon the belief 
that: V;-. ■
In America, the African and his culture are hot 
elements which have been grafted, incorporated 
or superimposed but parallel and equal cont­
ributions to the forging of the new nationalities 
produced by the era of capitalist expansion.1 2 1
The energetic pursuit of new perspectives on Cuba*s African 
heritage and the imaginative popularisation of the studies of Ortiz 
and others, both of which were characteristic traits of the initial 
stages of the movement, can only be understood in the context of 
the general artistic and intellectual revival which occurred in Cuba 
in the first years after 1959. Similarly, the reorganisation of 
the folklore ’'industry1 at the end of 1961 belongs to the period, 
beginning in the summer of 1961, in which greater institutional 
constraints were placed in turn upon each of the main cultural sectors. 
The legal document which at the end of 1961 formally created a 
National Institute of Ethnology and Folklore under the auspices of 
the new'- Consejo. Hac'ional de Culture (CMC) was conspicuously solemn 
regarding the role of this institution:
Whereas: The social and economic changes trough! 
by the Revolution will in their turn produce 
fundamental changes in the customs of our people, 
which will be reflected in the cultural situation
' in Cuba;-whereas: Cuba is nov? in a position to 
overcome all those obstacles which have in the 
t past prevented the development of a culture 
which is solidly based in our people and 
therefore integrated .and consubstantial with 
our nationality; whereas: Therefore, it is 
necessary to allocate responsibility for a 
task of such importance to the strengthening 
or the Revolution and to the. creation of a 
towering national consciousness.
Whereas: The concerns of ethnology and folklore 
consist in the scientific tasks of investigating, 
recording and providing information regarding 
the structure of the basic cultural expressions v 
of a people, with a view to making these function
in the total integration of the nation in
question. ....122
And so on....... The Institute became part of a new Soviet-styled
Academy of Sciences in 1962 and at the same time the theatrical
functions of the Folklore Department of the National Theatre were
transferred to a Conjunto Folklorico Hacional under the control 
123of the CNC. The result was the creation of a group of
investigators who, though talented, were at once more soberly 
scientific, less youthful;and, partly because they were less 
personally Involved in the life of the cults, less given to one­
sided glorification of the Afro-Cuban ambiance. Additionally, as
its Director later observed, a fundamental concern of the. Institute 
from the beginning were the processes of contemporary change
. ' l O t j .  '
. involved in the task of socialist construction; a dilution of 
the movement which brought the more obscure traditions of the Cuban 
people to the centre of the stage was thus inevitably involved.
How far did developments such as those mentioned meet with the 
collective approval of practicing santeros, paleros and hanigos? 
Part of the answer to this and related questions is that, with the 
exception of the Abakua society, the Afro-Cuban currents are not 
organised in such a way as to permit their adoption of a collective 
or ’official* point of view. To the extent that there is the
■is comprised by the babalawos, of which there were about 2 00
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concentrated m  Havana at the time of Bascom’s study.*' As
specialists in divination,.however, the babalawos possess a high
status and considerable influence in their own sphere but lack
■.entirely'the kind of generalised authority claimed by the leaders
of a church. The same is true mutatis mutandis of intermediate
grades of santeros and santeras known respectively as Babalocha
and Iyalocha. The meetings held annually by the babalawos,
finally9 are conceivably capable of becoming vehicles for political
statements, their purpose being to arrive at prophetic pronouncements
about events of the coming year. -However, by tradition, babalawos
have restricted themselves to a vague and generalised formulations
which, aside from being irrefutable, are not well adapted to the
126expression of political views. The Abakua fraternity, for its
part, though in principle capable of mobilising its forces on a 
political basis, has apparently rigorously abstained from political 
involvement since 1959.
In the absence of formal statements, the ’unofficial1 views of 
intellectuals who remain close to the cults in the neighbourhoods 
where they were born represent an important index in their own right. 
In 19G9 some people in this category regarded the elevation of the 
culture of the Afro-Cuban religions to the level of ’folklore1 and 
a component of the national consciousness as an ambiguous compliment, 
equivalent to the spiritual castration of santeria and the other 
cults. A good many more viewed unfavourably the passage of the 
early grupos de aficionados and the institutional separation of the 
study of Afro-Cubanisms from their artistic expression in theatre 
and dance. Others still suggested that, whatever the merits and
deficiencies of:the "Conjunto Folkl<£rico,' it had been a roaring 
success with the rank-and-file of cult .devotees, many of .whom 
returned to witness the same performances,on several occasions.,.
Whatever the truth in this regard, the point at issue obviously 
concerns a single aspect of the impact of the Revolution on the 
cults, and one which from the point of view of the daily religious 
life of the faithful is probably of minor significance. It is to 
the no less important question of the formation and development of 
the policies of 'the;revolutionary'regime towards the more mundane : 
ramifications of the Afro-Cuban revival that we must now turn our 
.attention.:'.
At a first approximation, relations between the cults and the
revolutionary authorities are capable of a relatively simple
characterisation. At least since its espousal of Marxism-Leninism,
the Revolutionary Government has proclaimed and, by and large, has
observed a strict freedom of worship applying to the cults in the
same measure as to other religions. At the same time both the
Government and the Party have reserved the right to combat all
religion on an ideological plane, the Party in particular being
expected to perform the role of an advance-guard of militant
atheism. No holder of religious beliefs, including those of the >
cults, may be permitted to become a Party member. The educational
system has an explicitly anti-religious orientation and, as far as
cult-religion is concerned, its aim is to convey the idea that
these currents represent un atraso - a backward survival - which
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is demonstrably falsified by modern physics, chemistry and biology. 
'The.author of an article on santeria published in the journal for 
rank-and-file Party members, El Mllltante Gomunista, in 1968 took
the view that the survival of this cult was due to: .
... the abominable teaching which was provided 
before the Revolution and, in the case of 
believers who belong to the broad popular masses - 
though this religion is not restricted to them by 
any means - the terrible conditions of life, the 
poverty and the hopelessness of which capitalist 
exploitation made them the object.128
Santeria could be described as a primitive religion in as much as
it had not arrived at the point of elaborating abstractions,
continuing to work directly with objects and subjects. By
implication, santeria was therefore proportionately more ripe for
129 ' 'the rubbish heap of history than church-Christianity. In the
late ’sixties, however, it was only Party members and children who 
were;exposed to this type of reasoning, explicit anti-religious 
propaganda being scarcely perceptible either in the daily press or 
in radio and television programmes.
In the CDRs in Havana activists were keen to minimise the
extent to which Afro-Cuban religions had a following in their own .
localities. At the same time it was insisted that as a matter of
organisational principle the committees did not enquire as to the
religious commitments of their members, and in San Ramon it was
even suggested that, for this reason, it might be Inappropriate for
the author to interview cederistas on the subject of religion. In
practice there were few dwellings in San Ramon which were entirely
free of the array of Virgins and other religious images which have
traditionally decorated Cuban homes. A number of activists,
including a Popular Court judge, belonged to santerfa families, and
in at least one case a block committee was based in the same household
as a local cult-group. In the absence of extraneous sources of 
130conflict, relations between the cults and the CDRs appeared to be
both cordial and uneventful. Two Popular Court cases among 
those analysed in Chapter 4 involved accusations to the effect 
that one party had employed witchcraft practices against the other.
The attitude of the judges in these cases consisted in a studied 
avoidance of this aspect of the dispute in question.
It remains to draw attention to two not unimportant sources 
of friction between the revolutionary authorities and the Afro- 
Cuban groups, the existence of which may mean that the pattern of 
tranquil and easy-going relationships depicted so far has tended 
in recent years to be more apparent than real. The first such 
consideration results from the fact that the life of the lucumx 
cults and, to a lesser extent, of the palo groups is not entirely 
without an economic aspect. A word of explanation is necessary 
on this subject.
The central figure in the day-to-day religious practice of
devotees of santeria is the lowliest grade of ’priest* or ’priestess’,
131the babalorisha or iyalorisha - or, colloquially, santero or santera.
The principal function of this person - in Cuba today it is most
i_32 ■ '
often a woman - is to supervise the ritual by means of which new
devotees are initiated into the cult* Popularly known as hacerse
el santo, the process whereby the novice is ’presented’ to a selected
133orisha and becomes his spiritual descendant, lasts for several
days and entails months of preparation during which the iyaw<£ is
■ 134required to shave his or her head and wear all-white garments.
The ’presentation* itself calls for a painstaking ritual purification 
of iyawrf and a toque de santo, a fiesta with drummers in attendance, 
in the course of which he or she is expected to be ’possessed’ or
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’mounted* by the orisha (dar el santo, or sublrse el santo). A
good deal of food is consumed at such gatherings, and a good deal 
more is required to be ’offered* to the orisha on pain of 
displeasing him.
This is the crux of the problem. By tradition, it is the 
santera who fixes the quantities of food necessary for the ceremony, 
for paying the drummers and the like and whose prerogative it also 
is to retain whatever is left over in her own larder. It is the
duty of the iyaw<£ to provide the food or the equivalent in money.1 3 3 
In 1968, however, the Revolutionary Government nationalised all 
remaining private retail outlets and secured an absolute state 
monopoly on internal commerce. Since that date, foodstuffs in 
the quantities required for a ’good* presentation - i.e. one that 
satisfies the orisha in question - have been available only on the 
black market and at black-market prices (the price of an initiation 
was quoted at between 500 and 1000 pesos in 1969). Possibly for
this reason by 1969 the Ministry of the Interior, whose local 
station is required to give permission for the holding of any 
meeting of this type, had severely curtailed the permitted duration 
santeria fiestas. Two days was their typical length in Havana
at that time, a paltry period by traditional standards.
Although santeras interviewed by the author were restrained 
in their criticism of this situation, it was obviously a severe 
blow to their professional standing and prosperity. There was 
another source of bitterness too: the Revolutionary Offensive of 
1968 resulted in the expropriation of a number of shops and cottage 
industries devoted to the sale and manufacture of ritual objects 
and regalia of all types indispensible to the practice of the 
religion. In consequence, a number of items had become unobtainable, 
being offered for sale only to tourists. A cause of additional
indignation was the fact that the Vatican’s regalia shop one door 
away from the principal lucumi store (on Reina Street) had been 
spared the same fate. For their part the Government and the Party 
leadership have made it clear in recent years that they are not 
prepared to tolerate cult-members breaking the law in the pursuit 
of their religion. The pamphlet on criminology which was cited 
in previous chapters notes in this connection:
All these religious beliefs, the expression of 
ignorance and obscurantism, are fertile ground 
for swindlers and social parasites of all 
sorts to make a living out of the ignorance of 
others.137
In the closing session of the First National Forum on Internal 
Order in 1969, the Minister of the Interior Sergio del Valle had 
cause to make the following statement:
We are materialist atheists from a scientific 
and philosophical point of view, and our entire 
education is now directed along this line, yet 
this has in no way led to the curtailment of 
freedom of worship. Of course, freedom of 
worship is one thing, and what goes on behind 
the facade of the altars, rites and images of 
any religious sect, the fostering and development 
of criminal, antisocial and counter-revolutionary 
activities, is another..... We respect their 
ideas - without ceasing to combat them on 
ideological grounds - as long as they stay within 
the strict limits of religion. But as soon as 
they overstep those bounds and act against the 
order or the security of the state, we will repress 
them and punish them - not for what they believe or 
don't believe, but rather for what they do, for
their actions and their conduct.138
At the meeting at which these words were spoken, another, 
related topic was subject to some discussion. This question - 
the source of the second type of friction that I want to identify 
here - arose concretely from the observation that, according to 
the Ministry’s statistics, more than half of the convictions for
manslaughter in Havana were regularly attributable to members of
/*■* 139’’certain religious sects”, and notably to nanlgos, In certain
periods, moreover, such people had been responsible for up to
seventy-five per cent of convictions for homicide and attempted
horaicides the number of minors involved in such cases being
unusually large.1 **0 Two. years'later, the First National Congress
on Education and Culture noted in connection with a preliminary study
of the causes of juvenile delinquency ”the incidence of problems
arising from some religions or sects, especially some of African
origin (hanigo or abacud)” .11*1 Fidel Castro alluded to something
similar in his caustic comment, quoted at the head of this section,
142on the Tenth Anniversary of the Ministry of the Interior.
This finding was not entirely unexpected. The criminological 
pamphlet just cited informs the intending social worker:
abakua must have courage, he must fear nothing 
and nobody, and he cannot ignore an affront.
Because of this machismo the abakud tend to 
exteriorise their manhood in criminal actions; 
that isrto cay, they are psychologically predisposed 
towards violence.
But there is more to it than that. Since Abakua is a secret 
society and not merely a cult, it exhibits another important trait:
The abakua ... have their own ’moral code1. The 
brothers or ekoblos belonging to a single 
potencia are ruled by the principle of 
unconditional solidarity, such that each is 
obliged to protect his brothers...... This is a
distorted concept of solidarity and comradeship, 
because, in this way, an abakua would never 
denounce an ekobio whatever the crime that he 
had committed. And if, for example, a member 
a potencia has been killed, it is the right 
and duty of his brothers to avenge him; that is, 
they will take the law into their own hands.....
An abakua who has been wronged or insulted by 
another has to cleanse his honour, generally with 
blood, and should he fail to do this his manhood 
is placed in doubt among his comrades: the 
morality of the group requires that it should be 
so and, at the same time, the abakua feels that 
he will always be backed-up by the solidary
action of the other members of the group.^ 3
This account is not the invention of the Comision Nacional de 
Prevencion Social. The existing ethnographic studies testify 
to its accuracy. Cabrera’s informants told her: "To say nanigo
is to speak of a brave man, one who knows no fear and who despises
lhh /all danger”. The Abakua personal ideal is summed up in the
original meaning attached to the adjective chebere - a combination,
according to Cabrera, of pride, self-sufficiency, presumptiousness,
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vanity, impulsiveness and self-worship. Likewise, all students
remark upon the developed sense of loyalty which nanigos exhibit 
both in relation to the fraternity as a whole and more particularly 
towards the ir own potenc ia.
A large part of the trouble with the nanigos, as the Comision 
begins to suggest, is that they live by what for all practical 
purposes may be described as a peculiarly refined and unadulterated 
variant of the widely accepted values and norms of machismo. That 
Abakua ethics do not lack the features attributed to machismo 
earlier in this chapter is indicated by the following passage from 
one of the little gems of ethnography published in Actas del Folk­
lore in 1961.
The Abakua concept of manhood is relatively simple 
and quite separate from the individual's greater 
or lessor social talents and achievements. One may 
have merits as a kinsman or friend, artistic merits, 
even education or erudition; but this adds nothing 
to one’s status as a man, nor does it modify it*
He is a man who is not effeminate and assumes no 
feminine ways - he whose sexual relationships have 
been based, strictly and rigorously, upon an arche­
typical pattern of behaviour, even in the presence 
of his wife. There are specific components of the 
repetoire of variations in love-making that are 
proscribed in the sexual conduct of the Abakua male.
The erotic versatility of certain highly developed 
cultures, like, say, those of Europe, would fill
the most liberal Abakua with revulsion... ♦.
To be homosexual is a kind of moral death, 
according to Absku£ conceptions..... In the 
social field, too, one has to be a man. This 
concern is expressed in a certain tenseness, 
an attentiveness to the accurate assessment of 
what one must tolerate and what a man may not 
tolerate if he is to be regarded as such by the 
members of his group. The candidate Abaku^ 
will appear to us, for this reason, a hostile 
and easily irritated being. At best he will 
seem to be a person with a propensity for
getting into scraps; but this will always have
to do with the fact that he is someone whose 
sense of virility is tenaciously founded in 
specific and well-defined conceptions - conceptions 
conditioned by a tenacious struggle against the 
hostile environment in which the poor man, by 
virtue of the enormity of class distinctions, is 
brought up.3-^
The official crime statistic which has been quoted would seem 
to suggest that the Abakua society is not dead. By reputation 
it was still strong in 1969 in its traditional centres, the cities
of Havana and Matanzas (Hugh Thomas has quoted a well-known Cuban
musician who commented in 1959 ftHay abakua pa rato! Habra abakua
: in 7 .
mientras haya tarobor"). More specifically it was reported to
the author by a reliable informant in one popular neighbourhood 
with a high percentage of blacks in its population that here the 
highest aspiration of many of the youths in their mid-*teens was 
to become nanigos. Thus groups of teenagers spent the most
treasured moments of their free time practising with tall West 
African drums, in something of the same way that their contemporarie 
in North American or Western European cities were cultivating motor 
bikes or electric guitars. This activity, sometimes accompanied 
by boxing or baseball, led in an ascending line through various 
masculine exploits - encounters with the police not excluded - to 
the crowning achievement of being accepted as a fully-fledged
It is only to be expected that, just as Cuba has its ’hippies*,
it will - at least * during the period of transition1 - also have
its low-status semi-delinquent youth sub-cultures. Consideration
of whether or not sentiments of racial inferiority and exclusion
are contributory factors in such situations will be postponed for a
moment. What is apparent is that, whatever else has changed,
many city neighbourhoods in Cuba remain pockets of culturally-
deprived, low income, badly-housed people. Abakua, because of its
glorification of physical values and its capacity to satisfy the
status-yearnings of the youth, may be expected to continue to
operate as a pole of attraction for such people - as well as for
others who do not have these characteristics, it should be added.
At the same time, to the extent that the core values of the aspiring
nanigo do not differ radically from those of society at large but
that, equally surely, ’’being like Che” appears to present an
impossible task, the chances that deprived youth will adopt
Th 81 illegitimate means1 as the solution to their dilemma will 
continue to be high.1119
THE QUESTION OF COLOUR
Blanco es una profes ion, 
riulato es un ofxcio,
Hegro es una salaci^nliSO
- Cuban popular saying, 
mid-twentieth century.
Without a shadow of a doubt the last member of our trilogy 
of problems of socio-cultural change is the most difficult to 
handle satisfactorily. In the first place, it is not an issue 
upon which a great deal has been said in speeches or written about 
in newspapers, pamphlets and books. Quite the contrary: the role
of colour* in Cuban society past or■present. has not been spoken of 
in public bv Fidel Castro since.1959; on the available evidence, 
the delegates to the First National Congress on Education and 
Culture exchanged not a word on the subject; relevant newspaper 
reports are scarce; and the number of articles - not to speak of 
books - devoted to the question which have rolled off Cuban printing 
presses since the Revolution can be counted on the fingers of one 
hand. Secondly, even if this were not the case, the task of
estimating the impact on social relations in this area of the 
measures and policies initiated by the revolutionary regime would 
be a hazardous one. Not only is the field of ’race relations * 
intrinsically subject to a wide variety of pitfalls when it comes 
to assessing short-run changes in attitudes and behaviour, but in 
the case of revolutionary Cuba we lack entirely the main pre­
requisite for such an assessment, a solid basis of background 
studies and documentation. Thus, even if we are-able to overcome 
the initial problem of evaluating the reliability and validity of 
the available contemporary evidence - much of it casual or anecdotal 
in nature - the interpretation of these findings remains a source 
of considerable difficulty.
With this warning in view, the pretensions of the section 
which follows cannot but be modest. My motives for wishing, in 
spite of everything, to draw together such new observations or 
insights as it is possible to muster on the issue of contemporary 
Cuban ’race relations’ derive from ..two main considerations. One 
is the palpable importance which this question has within the 
framework of the long-term development of the Revolution, an 
importance which is in no way reduced by the neglect heaped upon it 
by official sources in recent years. The other is the generally
unsatisfactory character of most of the available non-Cuban 
xrritings which deal in any detail with this aspect of the 
revolutionary experience. The argument of the following pages 
is therefore in the nature of a rescue operation, the urgency of 
which justifies its being undertaken without most of the necessary 
safcty-equipment.
The history of foreign comment on the achievements and the
failings of the Revolutionary Government with respect to domestic
racial prejudice and discrimination is an intriguing subject in its
own right and one which is replete with lessons, most of them
negative, as to the dangers which the student of the subject
confronts. On the central question at issue - that is to say,
the extent and significance of the changes which have occurred in
this sphere since January 1959 - observers have been more or less
equally divided. They have also proved with few exceptions
susceptible to the appeal of extreme formulations and cut-and-dried
judgements. Thus, following a short visit to Cuba in the summer
of 1960, the editor of a well-known left-wing periodical in the
United States reported that the revolution had ’’uprooted” racial
discrimination and that the black people of Cuba had won ’‘full
152economic, social and political equality”. Although the
'153commentator in question subsequently qualified this assessment,
his original statements have been repeated more recently by other
visitors. According to one, by the late ’sixties it could be
said of Cuba’s Negroes that they ’’share equally in the goods and
services and civic respect of their society” and that they “have
154been fully integrated in the schools and on the job”. Another
observer reported as of 1969 that Cuba constituted "an inspiring 
example that black and white can live together in peace and harmony"
156revolutionary Cuban race relationss however, there.exists:-a.
Black Legend which tells a very., different story. According to 
the -■testimony .of thebest-known exponent of this view - Carlos'More, 
a black Cuban exile of Maoist persuasion - changes in the pattern 
of .racism.: iri Cuba since the Revolution have affected "the form of 
its expression1* rather than its substance: :
In fact, v:hat goes by the name of ’revolution* 
in Cuba is no more than the domination of one 
c l a s s of one race, over another class and 
another race, whose values and potentialities 
are opposed to the designs of the ruling class.
Without going so far as to suggest with this ^author that it is the 
national bourgeoisie , not the proletariat, that is power in Cubay 
a number of observers have likewise suggested that the much-vaunted 
liberation of Cuban blacks under the Revolution is an illusion,
After a stay of several years in Cuba, the black North American 
militant Robert Williams denounced in 1967 what he interpreted as 
a restoration of pre-revolutionary patterns of discrimination:
The Negro is becoming again a pathetic victim to 
race prejudice and discrimination.Afro-Cubans 
are beginning to feel the pinch of subtle but fast 
returning racism.158
John Clytus, another. American who worked in Cuba as an English
teacher and translator between 196h and 1967, has recently published
a scathing account of his experiences of continuing racialism in
■ 159Cuban economic, political and soc5.al life.
Between these two versions of the fate of Cuban blacks and
mulattoes,;since the Revolution, more measured or more scrupulously
qualified assessments have not been entirely absent, but they have
iso ■
been relatively few in number. A fact which may not be
irrelevant to an explanation of this phenomenon is that the 
principal critics of the revolutionary regime over the question \v 
of colour have so far, without exception, been black, whilst its 
apologists have by and large proved to bewhite. It is also. , :
true that the latter have often drawn their conclusions on the 
basis of relatively brief visits to Cuba5 and it is not 
impossible, as. Carlos More has alleged, that such sympathetic 
travellers have often arrived on the island*"predisposed towards seeing 
*a perfectly integrated society* in operation under Socialism":
Thevisitor is no longer concerned with reality, 
since his fundamental need is simply to find 
confirmation either for his ideological 
principles or for his preconceptions as to what 
a ’perfectly integrated society* looks like 
under Socialism.162
The possibility cannot be excluded, on the other hand, that the
process of disillusionment undergone by the critics has blinded them
to certain positive achievements of the Revolution in ameliorating
racial inequalities. If this is the case, what is obviously
called for is a careful sorting and weighing of evidence with a view to
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the construction of a more accurate composite picture. Before
anything of this kind is attempted here, however, it is important 
that we notice the fact that the existence of two sharply contra- 
dictory views on the qualitjr of the prevailing patterns of race 
relations is neither a strictly new phenomenon in the Cuban context, 
nor one which is unique to Cuba among the Latin American nations.
On the contrary, this state of affairs - distinguished on the one 
hand by the popularisation of an image of absolute interracial : 
tranquility and harmony and on the other by an emphatic rejection 
or Inversion of this view of the matter - has good claims to be 
considered the norm in exchanges between Latin Americans and North
Americans on the subject of race relations in the formers * home­
lands. The origin of the problem is that, evidently, Latin 
American race relations are very different from those which, as 
everybody knows, typify the society of the United States. Writing, 
about one of Cuba’s neighbours in the Caribbean, Gordon Lewis 
observes:
There is a widespread belief in Puerto Rico
that ..... there is no local problem of race
prejudice. The belief usually adopts one of 
two methods of evidence. The first is to 
argue ..... that if there is discrimination 
' it exists only in fsocial * or fclassf areas.... .
The second is, overtly or by implication, to 
accept the North American criteria of 
discrimination, based as they are upon an open 
black-white dichotomy, and then apply it to 
Puerto Rican conditions..... The general 
consequence of both modes of argument is to 
facilitate an optimistic tone whenever the 
problem is discussed. The optimism is 
frequently accepted uncritically by outside 
observers or even resident Americans as proof 
that all is well 16**
The case of Brazil is of course still more notorious as an instance 
where the undisputed distinctiveness of observed patterns of 
discrimination, particularly if viewed in the light of the 
experience of the United States, has led to the creation and 
persistence of an elaborate myth of racial tolerance and democracy.
Innumerable other examples could be thought of. The 
possibility already arises however - and I want to suggest that 
this is more than a possibility - that one factor responsible for 
the enormity of the discrepancy we have observed between different 
reports on the race relations situation in Cuba today is continuing 
confusion as to the characteristic properties of the ’traditional’ 
pattern of discrimination on the island. Clearly, for a thorough­
going evaluation of the progress made in this area since the
■an empirical fashion those notorious practices which have ' 
successfully heen stamped out, together with those which, in ' 
modified or blatant form, continue to prevail. It is equally 
important that specific reforms and social trends be placed in 
the context of a correct analysis of the deeper, structural 
characteristics of the pre-revolutionary system of race relations - 
including, crucially, those features which distinguished it from 
the patterns of racial exclusion and segregation found In the U.S.A. 
Some of the observers cited above have provided some indication 
as to their assumptions at this level. Thus, according to one 
defender of revolutionary policy, not only was it the case before 
1959 that ”the working class of Cuba was not as saturated with the
poison of racism as that of the United States” but, furthermore,
■ \ \ - " I C C
’’only the aristocratic upper crust gloried in its whitends's ’I.
This claim, 'which from the point of view .-of a white North American 
offers a certain plausibility has been partially endorsed by Hugh 
Thomas, who might have been expected to know better:
The Constitution of 19^0 barred all race 
discrimination. This worked reasonably well.
The situation was described by Castro in a press 
conference on 23 January 1959 when he said, in 
reply to a North American journalist, that ’the 
colour question* in Cuba did not exist in the 
same way as it did in the U.S. 5 there was some - 
racial discrimination in Cuba but far less.....
Castro might also have gone on to say that, in 
so far as it did exist, racial discrimination 
was chiefly a middle-class phenomenon. The 
Cuban middle class was always rather conscious 
of^Horhh American habits. Such racial 
discrimination as there was appears to have been 
imitative of North America rather than to have 
sprung from anything special to Cuban circumstances.
In the smarter hotels of Havana, frequented by the. 
American business community, racial prejudice was 
yet another example of the way that some Cubans 
were always exiles even in Havana..... That racial 
prejudice in old Cuba was not overwhelming is 
suggested by the fact that Castro never mentioned
the matter in any of hir. speeches or 
programmes before the revolution. To read 
History will absolve me would suggest that 
Castro was addressing a racially homogeneous 
nation. 6
According to Thomas’ scheme of things, the relative absence of 
indigenous racial prejudice and discrimination in pre-revolutionary 
Cuba may be attributed to the fact that Cubans of Spanish descent 
were not ’really* white:
Since race is so much a problem of noticeable 
physical attributes, the predominantly sallow­
skinned Spaniards, with their strong draughts 
of Moorish and Jewish blood, probably blended 
more easily, at least with mulattoes, than did 
the pink or beige Ango-Saxons, Celts, Germans 
and Slavs who constitute the majority in the
U.S.167
Were it the case, of course, that the problem of colour in 
Cuba before the revolution was simply an American cultural import 
or the product of the particular failings of the middle classes, 
then the White Legend concerning developments since 1959 would 
scarcely require further confirmation. According to other students, 
including Carlos More, however, a continuous history of intense 
racial prejudice and of discriminatory practices bordering at times 
on attempted genocide links Republican Cuba with the heyday of slavery 
Pre-revolutionary Cuba could be characterised without exaggeration - 
we are now given to understand - as a racist society without
1 pp
essential differences from that of the United States. Is this
nearer to being the truth of the matter? Clearly the question needs 
looking at before we can expect to arrive at any judgements on the 
contemporary scene.
The Heritage of the Past: Colour, not Race
There are still few discussions of comparative race relations
in-the Americas which' deal as succinctly and:as elegantly with ■
the core of the matter as Charles;Waglcy’s classic statement on /:
169the problem. , \ According to.Hagley, it is helpful to begin by
observing a number of ”simple and relatively well-known facts” >-
about the patterns of racial intermixture and discrimination which
prevailed in-the New World during the first several centuries after
the Conquest. These are, to condense the argument still more
drastically than Wagley permits himself to do: (1) Throughout the
Americas, sizeable mixed-blood or hybrid populations were created
from an early date; miscegenation was not a monopoly of Spanish
or Portuguese males but occurred in every part of. the continent,
even in those regions, such as Argentina or Western Canada, which
are today predominantly populated by whites. (2) Colonial society
reacted universally to the process of .miscegenation by creating "a
complicated social hierarchy in which racial appearance:,or ancestry
was perhaps the most important criterion of rank”; in the early
colonial period, it was customary in every corner of the Americas
to attempt to classify persons of mixed ancestry into social
statuses according to the precise proportion of Negro (or Indian)
/blood* or antecedents they possessed. (3) Finally, as time
passed, as the number of discoverable combinations and permutations
of descent increased, and as anomalous instances began to multiply
in which the criterion of ancestry yielded results which conflicted
with the evidence of physical appearance or socio-cultural status,
170the system became unworkable and impossible to maintain.
’’During the nineteenth century’V  Nagley writes, ’’there was a 
trend everywhere of resolving this conflict: between the classification 
of people simultaneously by physical appearance, ancestry, and
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socio-cultural status”. The result was the eventual creation
distinct modes', of ’race relations*. In the United States,
first of all, the dominant white group was able to establish a' A
’rule of descent’ according to-which any individual who has a
known Negro ancestor is. a Negro. Contrasting sharply with this
system, characterised as it is by an almost exclusive reliance
upon the criterion of ancestry, was that which emerged, with
variations and;some important exceptions, in those .societies of
the Spanish-American highlands with large Amerindian populations.
Here the pattern consisted in the allocation of individuals to
groups on the basis of social or cultural criteria such as
language, custom, di’ess and community-membership, to the exclusion
172 ’of considerations of descent or appearance. Finally, in
Brasil and the Caribbean region, a third ’option* of social 
development made its appearance:
In this region, emphasis has been placed upon 
physical appearance rather than ancestry or 
social and cultural criteria...... The
.criterion of ancestry seems important in the 
Caribbean and Brazil, as in Mexico and 
Guateu&Ia;, among those segments- of the 
population who seek to prove the purity of 
their European derived lineage. For the large 
mass of the people, ancestry seldom acts to 
place an individual in a particular social 
race. But the indelible mark of physical 
appearance, with the higher prestige accruing 
to Caucasoid features and the lowest to Negroid 
features, remains as an important set of 
criteria by which to classify people into social 
races. Throughout this whole region, such 
features as color, shape of lips, hair texture 
and the shape of the nose are closely analysed 
in order to place an individual in the proper
social race.173
Emphasis upon 'colour', as distinct from genetically- or 
culturally-defined 'race *, has further consequences which set the 
Caribbean/Brazilian pattern apart from the two alternatives
previously identified. In the first place, whereas both the 
highland-Indian and the North American modes of race relations 
resulted in the creation of sharply-defined ’’racial” groups which 
might be said to interact vis-a-vis one another, Brasilians and 
Nest Indians - by the sheer force 6f their preoccupation with'the 
subtleties of physical gradations - tended to bring about the 
dissolution of groupings of this kind. The point here is 
emphatically not to assert that people living in this region fail 
to discriminate between their fellows on a ’racial* basis or to 
deny the prevalence here as elsewhere of racial prejudices of a 
perfectly ordinary type. What requires to be emphasised is well
put by Marvin Harris in connection with the case of Brazil:
A moment’s reflection should suffice to bring 
.into prominence the fact that without a method 
for clearly distinguishing between one group 
and another, systematic discrimination cannot be : 
practiced. The sine qua non of any thorough- 
going minority system is a foolproof method for 
separating a population into respective super- 
ordinate and subordinate groups. In order t o i '  
prevent the members of a certain group from 
freely choosing their jobs, voting, enrolling in 
a school, or joining a club, it is absolutely 
indispensable that there be a reliable way of 
knowing who is a member of the group to be 
segregated and who is a member of the group’ that 
is to do the segregating.
In view of the immense variety of phenotypes both objectively found 
and socially recognised in the region, no such criterion is : 
available. The resulting situation is also pithily summarised by 
Harris:
It is one’s class and not one’s race which 
determines the adoption of subordinate and 
superordinate attitudes between specific 
individuals in face-to-face relations. It is 
class which determines who will be admitted 
to hotels, restaurants and social clubs; who 
will get preferential treatment in stores, 
churches, night clubs and travel accommodations; 
and who will have the best chance among a group
of marriage suitors. There are no racial 
groups against which discrimination occurs.
Instead* there are class groups. Color is 
one of the criteria of class identity; but
it is not the only: criterion.I?5
As Wagley has it, Brazilian and Caribbean colour-categories ’’are 
a way of describing and classifying individuals according to 
physical appearance, but this is but one way that these societies 
classify, people".
The position of an individual in the hierarchy 
of social race confined with education, economic 
status,, occupation, family connections, even 
( .-manners vand artistic abilities places one in his 
or her proper rank,
Whether or not it is also the case that this system has as a matter 
of historical fact afforded "a situation favourable to individual
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mobility", it is clear that it fosters a different set of
attitudes towards social mobility, there being no equivalent here
of the process of "passing as white" as observed in the U.S.A.
"An individual does not fpassf ..... from Negro to white; Rather
by means of improving his education, financial position, and other
qualities capable of modification within a lifetime, he may move
up in the class structure while still remaining *low1 in the hier-
'178archy of social race". . We might add that the degree to which 
his colour remains a severe handicap varies not only from place to 
place but, just as importantly, according to the social context in 
question. Thus, for example, a dark skin which may present few 
obstacles to success in a military career may constitute a severe
impediment in informal social settings and an almost impassable
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barrier to the consummation of a 'good* marriage.
The foregoing summary is obviously deficient in historical 
depth and sociological detail. The central distinction it maJces,
between systems’based on a ..descent' rule and those which, by 
contrast, attach primary importance to individual variations in 
outward appearance, has nevertheless already proved its usefulness 
to students of comparative race relations, f permitting them to
pinpoint that which they are called upon to explain and to discard 
oinessentiali or, alternatively, fraudulent aspects of the contrast 
between, for example, contemporary Brasilian and North American 
patterns. The same dist inction will serve us here as an important 
point of reference in characterising pre-revolutionary Cuban 
developments.
It is not open to doubt that the pattern of relations between 
whites, blacks, mulattoes and persons of intermediate description 
which finally formed in twentieth century Cuba was of the Brazilian/ 
Caribbean and not the North American type. ; Support for this 
statement will be provided further on. Before proceeding, however, 
some remarks are called for concerning how this central fact (if 
such it is) is to be explained historically. Although this is 
not the place for anextended discussion of the issue, it is 
unfortunately true that several of the commentaries on contemporary 
Cuban race relations which were cited above have been coloured by 
theories whose respectability has been placed in doubt, to say no 
more, by recent historiography. The follovring findings of . 
recent studies are relevant to an explanation of the genesis of 
the colour-class system in Cuba. First, the theses originally 
advanced respectively by Tannenbaum and Elkins according to which 
Spanish,legal system and the Catholic church successfully intervened 
between master and slave, thereby substantially modifying and 
humanising slavery in the societies which they influenced, now 
appear drastically mistaken for Cuba, at least as far as the
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nineteenth century is concerned. Second, although for reasons
which include the;sexual imbalance in the white population
misegenation continued to be frequent in late colonial Cuba, formal
marriages between persons of different 'colour1 encountered a
resistance which may even have intensified towards the end of the
era of slavery. Opposition among white families to "unequal
marriages" was motivated by traditional Hispanic notions regarding lim
'^piezcL de sangre and the 'stain' of Negro blood, as well as by
182considerations of the security of the state. Third, the
institution of coartacion, which was responsible for the manumission 
of slaves in relatively large numbers in Cuba in the eighteenth 
century and earlier, came under severe attack during the sugar boom 
of the nineteenth century. As a consequence of pressures - which 
became particularly intense during the 'thirties and 'forties of 
the last century - directed towards terminating emancipations and 
repressing persons who had the good fortune to have obtained their 
freedom in a previous period, the free coloured population of the 
island actually underwent an absolute decline between 1817 and 
1827, and again between 18H1 and 18^6.
The above considerations *help to dispense with a number of 
standard but erroneous explanations for the failure of slave society 
in Cuba to be succeeded by a system of race relations based on a 
rule of descent. Of. the historical facts which remain in good 
repute and which are of clear relevance to the problem in hand, 
one would appear to be the most important by far. This is that, 
despite harassment and their subjection to systematic racial 
discrimination, the free coloured population remained substantial 
throughout the later decades of slavery, and may even be said to 
have prospered. Although in the period previously indicated Cuba
may for a moment have come close to experiencing the kind of 
tendency towards a narrowly-drawn racial segregation which emerged 
in the North American*States after 1830, this moment passed. As .
f 3_gij.
in.the case of Brazil, the reasons appear to be demographic and
economic. The expansion of Cuba's sugar economy in the
nineteenth century occurred against the background of severe
manpower shortages, which tended to grow as slave-labour became
increasingly uneconomic and hard to obtain and following the
failure of successive ventures designed to alleviate the situation
such as the importation of Chinese and Yucatecancontract-labourers.
As the manpower shortage grew more acute, the demand for wage
labour steadily increased. In the absence of substantial white
immigration from Spain or elsewhere, these positions, as well as a
variety of roles which afforded greater economic independence, came
' 185to be performed predominantly by free coloureds.
In accordance with the line of reasoning developed by Marvin 
Harris for Brazil, Cuba emerged into the twentieth century with a 
colour-class system of discrimination because,,in view of the 
prevailing demographic and economic realities, it was impossible, 
either before of after slavery, for the dominant white group to 
force individuals of intermediate ancestry back into a sharply 
separated Negro category by application of a rule of descent.
This account of the matter, it should be noted, allows us to proceed 
Without recourse to the assumption that Cuban vjhites were either 
free of racial prejudice or incapable of discriminating against 
their fellow citizens on the grounds of their colour.
To identify the pre-revolutionary Cuban system of race relations 
as a colour-class system of the general Caribbean/Brazilian type,
but at the same time to deny that the identifying features such 
systems include a lack of racial prejudice or a failure to dis­
criminate, is, I suggest, to have the main prerequisite for a 
realistic account of the problem which concerns us in this section.
At the most general level, this perspective enables us to refuse 
the alternatives offered respectively by More and Thomas- namely, 
either that the question of colour in pre-revolutionary Cuba 
amounted essentially to a scaled-down version of the American 
Dilemma, or that there was no strictly indigenous prejudice or 
discrimination. At another level, it permits us to view in a more 
sober light a number of specific features of twentieth century Cuban 
race relations which, explicitly or implicitly, have contributed 
to the formation of the two Legends about race and the Revolution.
It is to these features and to the actual working of the pre­
revolutionary colour-class system that we must now give some attention.
According to the Cuban census of 1953, 72.8 per cent of the
national population was white, 12.4 per cent black, 0.3 per cent
yellow and 14.5 per cent mestizo. Since the classification of
individuals contains a subjective element - in 1953 the judgement
of the Enumerators - it has usually been assumed that these figures
overestimated the 'whiteness1 of the total population, and one
published estimate has gone as far as to suggest that the proportions
may have been 30 per cent white, 49 per cent Negroid, 1 per cent
187oriental and 20 per cent mestizo. The term mestizo in the
Cuban context normally meant Mulatto, though many people of mixed 
blood showed perceptible oriental traits; and the latter term was 
traditionally used in everyday settings.
In addition to biancos, negros andrmulatos, Cubans habitually
distinguished (as they still do) a number of further phenotypes, 
paying attention to the quality of the hair and the shape of the 
features,, as well as to the colour.of the skin. A mulato claro 
was distinguished from a mulato prieto, but also from a rnulato 
chino (with oriental features),.a mulato indio (with "Indian" 
features) and a mulato ruso (a ,fRussian" Mulatto, with fair hair). 
Negroes of average complexion were distinguished from very dark 
blacks, who were described literally as negros retintos or half- 
humorously as negros azules ("blue" Negroes). Ancestry played 
ho part in determining which label was appropriate in a given 
instance,. with the effect that the offspring of a single couple 
could be, and often.were, placed in quite different categories.
At the same time, whereas Caucasoid features were consistently 
highly valued, Negroid features were regarded as defects. As 
elsewhere in the Caribbean and in Brasil, Negroid hair was referred 
to as pnl° malo (bad hair) or alternatively as pasas (raisins), 
whilst *African'lips and noses were described by the mildly 
. pejorative terms bemba and hato. Women invariably paid scrupulous 
attention to the combing of their daughters' hair in the belief 
that this would encourage the growth of "good hair". Not only 
women but also some *light' Mulatto males straightened the ir hair 
artificially, and in general sensitivity towards the details of 
physical appearance was reputed to most developed among Mulattoes.*3”88
The modern history of Cuba is replete with instances of 
individuals gaining prominence in military affairs and in politics 
in spite of the handicap of their 'colour*. Although well-known 
free coloured personalities made important contributions to Cuban 
history even before the middle of the last century, among them the 
Mulatto poet Gabriel de la Concepion Valdes , known as 'Placido*,
this first occurred on a significant scale during the two major 
wars which secured the island's independence from Spain (1868-78 
and 1895-90). Along with the Mulatto Antonio Maceo who became 
the second-ranking commander and by far the most popular leader 
of the Cuban forces, the following names of non-white Cubans 
became household words in this period: Jos^ Maceo, Flor Crombet,
Guillermo Moncada, Juan Gualberto Gomes;, Quintin Banderas, Martin 
Morda Delgado, Quirino Zamora and Mariana Grajales. Though few
of these figures survived the war of 1095-98, Juan Gualberto Gdines 
played an important role in national politics under the so-called 
'mediatised* Republic as the leader of a depleted group of radical 
Cuban nationalists. In a later period, the Mulatto Fulgencio 
Batista dominated Cuban politics for close to three decades, whilst 
Lazaro Pena and Bias Roca, both Mulattoes, and Jesus Menendez, a 
dark black, achieved leading positions in the Communist Party. The 
influence of non-whites in the spheres of music, dance and poetry 
was, less surprisingly, considerable. However non-whites also 
achieved extraordinary success in penetrating the middle class 
professions.
By 1943 there were 560 black or Mulatto lawyers in Cuba,
compared with three or four during the years 1899-1907. There were
also by this time 424 non-white doctors, one-fifth of the total,
compared vrith ten out of every 1,000 in 1899-1907, and non-whites
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accounted for more than one-fifth of the teaching profession.
These are significant facts but, in view of the preceding discussion, 
their precise significance requires to be spelt out with some care.
What they do not to any degree indicate, still less 'prove', is 
that white Cubans in the period 1868-1959 were free of racial 
prejudice or that they desisted from attributing status on the basis
of the colour of a m a n ’s chin. For this reason, Carlos More*s
elaborate insinuation to the effect that certain of Antonio ■ Macaors'.’
white comrades-in-arms not only resented his success on the grounds
of his colour but were also responsible for his death is essentially 
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beside the point. Khat they demonstrate unequivocally, on the
other hand, is that in certain social contexts in pre-revolutionary 
Cuba - specifically public life and the professions - factors such 
as talent, education and ambition were capable of outweighing the 
single consideration of colour in the manner typical of a colour- 
class system.
Naturally the system did not permit the advance of the mass of 
the coloured population, and even less the mass of blacks, to a 
position of equality vrith whites. According to the census of 
1931, non-white Cubans owned a mere 7.79 per cent of agricultural 
property, the rest remaining in the hands of white Cubans (70.77 per
1 G1
cent) or foreigners (21.44 per cent).
Before the Revolution, coloured people were in 
their vast majority cane-cutters, shoe-shiners, 
sweepers, lottery-ticket vendors, newspaper- 
sellers, car-park attendants, stevedores - in a word 
the arms and muscles which performed the most 
disagreeable and least well-paid jobs. One did 
not see Negro administrators, managers, cashiers, 
office employees, advertising agents, etc........
A black girl could not work in a store, in a 
beauty salon, a cinema, a jewellers1 shop, a 
fashion house, a restaurant or the office of a 
big hotel. She could be neither a model nor an 
air hostess. On the other hand, negresses and 
mulatas wore in great demand as entraineuses, 
prostitutes both common and de luxe, dancers in 
the grand cabarets, etc.192
According to the last available census statistics (1943), black
employees were substantially less well-paid on average than white 
193workers. In part, this was simply the product of the economic
and social disadvantages automatically inherited by ex-slaves and
their descendants. Partly, too, it was caused by a pattern of
immigration which in the course of the twentieth century operated
consistently to the disadvantage of non-whites. In the early
decades of the century Spanish immigrants, and to a'lessor extent
; the sizeable Chinese community,;came to monopolise many of the
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retail and service trades by sheer weight of their numbers. On
the other hand, at the bottom of the scale of economic security
and social prestige, the immigration to Cuba of Haitian-and
Jamaican labourers contracted for unskilled labour on the sugar
estates could not but have an unfavourable effect upon the ethnic
distribution of employment sat the same time serving to depress the
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economic situation of poor Cubah-bom blacks. Finally, however,
the absence of coloured people from certain types of office 
employment and high-prestige service activities reflected the crucial 
fact about the colour-class system as it operated in Cuba that the 
relevance of physical appearance varied markedly according to the 
social context in question.
Two further features of the pre-revolutionary pattern of 
discrimination are characteristic of colour-class systems in 
general and are of central importance to any assessment of develop­
ments in Cuba since 1959, though they have been either neglected or 
misunderstood by most commentators. First, if the relevance of 
colour was a variable factor, there was no context in which a 
person^ physical appearance was more significant and less capable 
of being offset by countervailing considerations than in intimate 
personal relationships and, above all, in matters of matrimony. 
According to one report,
Mixed marriages and inter-racial sexual relations 
(between coloured men and white women) v?ere 
infrequent adventures. Those who had sufficient 
audacity and psychological maturity to undertake
them always did so on their own account and at 
their own risk, because a couple in such a 
position found itself destined to ostracism . 
and solitude.196
There is a real sense in which discrimination in the selection 
of marriage partners remained in the twentieth century as it had 
been in the late nineteenth century the core of Cuba’s colour- 
class system. Although concern over the maintenance of limpieza 
de sangre largely disappeared with the destruction of the land- 
owning oligarchy in the eighteen-eighties, ceasing to be realistic 
for all but a handful of families whose ’aristocratic * pretensions 
remained relatively untarnished, ordinary Cubans continued to 
exhibit an intense preoccupation with the external manifestations 
of colour when it came to the procreation of their offspring.
This was reflected in the widespread use in such connections of 
the phrase para adelantar la familia (’in order to improve the 
family’), and even para adelantar la raza (1to improve the race’).
In no other social sphere was discrimination rigorously practiced, 
so ardently defended and so hard to resist. It is somewhat 
surprising therefore that the topic has received no comment what­
soever in discussions of the colour question In Cuba, even among 
those most concerned to demonstrate the congenital racism of the
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society.
The second characteristic, or rather consequence, of pre­
revolutionary Cuba’s colour-class system which should be noted 
finally is that, like other systems of Its kind, it proved highly 
resistant to the growth of organised sectional groupings representing 
the interests of either non-whites in general or blacks in particular. 
Motives for the organisation of coloured Cubans in their own defence 
and for their own social and economic advancement were obviousI37 
not lacking, nor were specific provocations. Both were placed In
evidence by. one -of themost dramatic' political events of tile first
decade of the Republic, the suppression by government troops of an-
alleged *black uprising? in Oriente province in 1912. The episode
■which"was accompanied by bloody scenes, and hysterical public.reactions
not unreminiscent of events in the United States in the came.period
and'not without certain encouragement from that quarter, led.to the
termination of the.brief life of. the Partido Independiente' de Color,
an organisation without parallel in Cuban history formed in 1907 .
under the guidance of the Independence Uar veteran Juan Gualberto '
Gaines. Though intended to-advance the interests of non-whites by
political means, the Party was almost certainly not a ;’racist1' formation,
as its opponents claimed. \'nevertheless the events of 1912, following
close on the heels of the passage through the Cuban Congress' of the
so-called Korda Amendment, which forbade the formation of political
movements composed of persons of the same race or colour, were not 
198 . 'repeated.
What is remarkable about the rising of the Partido Independiente 
is not that it happened but that it was so quickly forgotten. VJhat 
is significant about the Korda Amendment, similarly, is that it 
remained unchallenged, and indeed unrequired, oh the statute-book 
of the Republic throughout the whole period up to 1959. Lest it V 
be thought otherwise, these were not years in which Cubans of 
different colours always lived and worked together in peace and 
harmony. No less an authority than the Foreign Policy Association 
reported the situation in the mid-thirties in the following terms:
Racial prejudice in Cuba has not been nearly so 
acute as in Anglo-Saxon countries. It seems 
true, however, that it has increased during the 
past few years. This is attributed partly to 
the unconscious influence of the American point 
of view and partly to economic distress. !-Jhcn 
an economic system is unable to provide adequately
for the wants of every class in the population, 
the dominant group inevitably employs the 
racial argument to maintain its economic 
position at the expense of lesser colored 
groups....... Following the dovmfall of Machado,
fear of a Negro uprising again took hold of 
certain sections of the Cuban population.
Having suffered perhaps even more severely than 
the whites in the recent depression, many Negroes 
naturally attempted to improve their economic 
position at a time when a wave of revolutionary 
sentiment swept the island....... During the
post-Machado period some Cuban Negroes attempted 
to abolish social discrimination. In January 
1934 Negroes in Trinidad entered the section of 
the central park reserved by custom to the
whites....... As a result of this incident, rioting
occurred, one Negro being shot.
Yet the truth is that no black political party was formed as a 
consequence of events such as these, and no politician, black, 
Mulatto or white, was able before 1959 to mobilise coloured Cubans
on the basis of appeals to sectional interest or aspirations. As
Thomas observed, even Fidel Castro’s declarations of the early 
'fifties made no mention of the problem of colour; this fact 
however, rather than indicating that no such problem existed, is 
eloquent testimony of the peculiar resilience of a colour-class 
system of discrimination.
To end this discussion of pre-revolutionary Cuban race 
relations - and at the end is where this observation rightfully 
belongs - it should be said that foreign, mainly North American, 
attitudes and mores did influence the behaviour of Cubans in this 
as in other spheres. Though largely immeasurable, the effect upon 
the pretensions of white Cubans of the proximity of Miami and New 
Orleans, as well as of the presence in large numbers of citizens of 
the United States as soldiers, tourists, estate-managers and 
businessmen, cannot have been negligible in any period. It clearly 
reached a height never subsequently attained during and immediately
following the First and Second Interventions by U.S. forces in the 
early part of the century (1899-1902 and 1906-1909),20^ but we have 
already heard the opinion of one outside source regarding the 
causes of deteriorating race relations in Cuba in the 'thirties.
The strictly enforced colour bar found in first-class hotels and 
restaurants in Havana until the advent of the Revolution was at 
least in some degree produced by Cuban accommodation to 'Anglo-Saxon* 
sensibilities. The fact that upper-class clubs and private beaches 
applied a rigorous colour bar in addition to other socially- 
exclusive membership requirements (the elite Country Club rejected even 
President Batista on the grounds of his off-white complexion and 
'Indian* features) may be partly explained, as Thomas has suggested, 
as an imitative response to the customs of the American-British- 
Canadian community. To a lesser extent the same is possibly true 
of those other pre-revolutionary institutions which were subsequently 
accused of practising formal or informal racial discrimination, 
including private schools and universities, and private hospitals 
and clinics.2^"
Two caveats are essential here, however, if confusion is to be 
avoided in the discussion which follows. The first is that, 
whatever their origin, such practices were not in themselves alien 
to Cuba's colour-class system. Contrary to Hugh Thomas' suggestion, 
it was characteristic of the normal operation of this system to 
enforce equally rigorous discriminatory norms in certain types of 
social setting. In reality the most notorious centre of racial 
exclusion in pre-revolutionary Cuba was not Havana, where the 
American presence was greatest, but the interior province of Las 
Villas where expatriate influences were relatively insignificant.
It was in the city of Trinidad, one of the first colonial capitals
of Cuba and by reputation the most defiantly Hispanic municipality
on the island, that, in accord with a tradition which remained in
force until the arrival of the guerrilla column in 1958, whites,
inulattoes and blacks were obliged to stroll of an evening along
separate tiers of the Central Park. The local oligarchy of Santa
Clara, the principal city of the same fiercely traditionalistic
region of Cuba, maintained an identical custom without the aid of
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North Americans until the early months of 1959. The only social
milieu whose reputation for racial exclusiveness was comparable to 
that of upper-class Las Villas was the onewhich was associated 
with the Cuban cattle-ranching families of the province of Camaguey.
The second point which needs to be insisted upon, on the other 
hand, is that, whilst such instances of practical convergence 
between the longstanding traditions of Cuban bourgeois families and 
the customs of the expatriate community are damaging to Thomas * 
point of view, it is a mistake to interpret them as evidence for 
the almost equally simpliste version offered by Carlos More. As 
a system of race relations, pre-revolutionary Cuban patterns of 
discrimination differed in fundamental respects from those charac­
teristic of the United States, as we have seen. To say this is 
not to defend the Cuban system but merely to describe the logical 
and structural consequences of its non-adoption of a descent-rule.
It follows nevertheless that the rigorous colour bar operating in 
informal settings in the higher reaches of the pre-revolutionary 
Cuban social order possessed a sociological significance quite 
unlike that of superficially similar North American practices. In 
a word, whereas the latter represent a norm observed by every social 
layer in a wide variety of functional contexts, the former deserves 
attention precisely as the limiting-case of a system in which the
relevance of colour in social relationships is highly variable 
and contextually-dependent. An appreciation of this point is
essential to a realistic assessment of developments in Cuba since 
1959.
Colour and the Revolution: The Absent Centre
The question of colour was not a major issue in Cuban politics
before 1959. So deeply ingrained, in fact, was the feeling that
'racial* identities had no place in public discussions affecting
the civic life of the country that even the proto-revolutionary
statements and manifestos of the 26 July Movement neglected the
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problem almost entirely. Rather than reflecting an allegedly
benign racial situation, however, these facts were the product of 
a system of discrimination of a particular sort which, by virtue of 
its adoption of fine gradations of physical appearance as the 
criterion of 'racial* identity, tended directly or indirectly to 
bring about the dissolution of colour-based groupings at all levels 
of social, economic and political life. In the absence of corporate 
black or coloured social entities, neither an independent black 
consciousness nor the associated spectrum of white political 
responses was able to emerge in the twentieth century.
If this analysis is correct, why did the question of colour 
become an issue with the advent of the Revolution? In large 
measure, I want to suggest, the reasons were circumstantial, arising 
from the unique set of political relationships in which the Cuban 
revolutionaries became entangled during the first months and years 
after January 1959. The fundamental factors which militated 
against the formation of clear alignments on the colour question 
before the Revolution continued despite appearances to be operative
after it. For this reason if for no other the policies of the 
revolutionary leadership for eliminating domestic racial discrim­
ination and prejudice have had uneven success as a definitive 
solution to the colour problem. In the last analysis it must
probably be recognised that the policies themselves have not been 
immune to the subtle illusions fostered by a colour-class system 
of discrimination.
The question of colour was posed in Cuba from the moment when
Fidel Castro arrived in Havana as the recognised chief of a battle-
weary but exuberant and aggressively self-confident revolutionary
army which, if not preponderantly composed of blacks and mulattoes,
was almost certainly substantially less white than the national 
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population. Ugly incidents occurred almost immediately when
blacks wearing the uniform of the Rebel Army were turned away from
the Havana Hilton and other exclusive hotels and restaurants in the
capital and elsewhere where their white comrades-in-arms had been 
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admitted. For a long moment there was no official response to
these incidents on the part of the new government* On 13 February 
however, Fidel Castro stepped in to take charge personally of the 
direction of the Revolution, forcing the resignation of Jose Hiro 
Cardona as Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government and 
assuming this position himself. There followed another brief
interval but on 22 March the new Cuban leader took to the speaker's 
rostrum to make his first extended public statement on the subject 
of the domestic colour problem.
Castro began by observing that the mentality of the Cuban 
people was still "conditioned by many beliefs and many prejudices 
from the past", expressing the view that if they wished to overcome
this backwardness they would have to begin by admitting its existence. 
The people had had to fight many different battles on the road to 
their final liberation and would have to fight many more yet, he 
said, and one of these was the battle against racial discrimination. 
There were two types of racial discrimination. One was that 
which took place in recreational or cultural establishments, the 
other ~ which was worse - was that which took place in work centres:
The first thing we have to fight is racial . 
discrimination in work centres, because, if the 
one type of discrimination limits access to 
certain circles, the other is a thousand times 
more cruel, for it limits access to places where 
a living is earned, it limits possibilities for 
the satisfaction of needs, and thus we'commit 
the crime of denying, more than to anyone else, 
to precisely that sector which is the poorest 
the right to work; we commit the crime that, 
whereas colonial society made the black work as 
a slave and made the black work harder than 
anyone, made the black work without any form of 
recompense, in today's society, which some have 
chosen to call the democratic society, he is 
prevented - or rather , they try to. prevent him - 
from working to earn a living. And so, whereas 
the colonial regime worked him to death aiid beat 
him to death, we want to make our black brother 
die-of starvation.
It ought not to be necessary to make a law to 
establish a right which every man has simply by 
virtue of being a human being and a member of 
society. It ought not to be necessary to make a 
law against a simple prejudice.
In Cuba, Castro added, the fact was that he who was not more or 
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less dark of skin" because he was descended from Africans was 
somewhat dark because he was from Spain - which was colonised by 
the Moors, who came from Africa. It was necessary "to put an end 
to racial discrimination in work centres, to mount a campaign to 
put an end to this hateful and repugnant system, with the slogan:
"V/ork opportunities to all Cubans without discrimination of race
or sex1’. As far as social establishments were concerned, integrated
recreational centres would be created and, above all, in the future 
the public educational system would educate whites and blacks 
together in a spirit of brotherhood, not of exclusivism.2^
According to an eyewitness, the effect of the speech was 
dramatic:
The white bourgeoisie in its entirety, and the 
white petty bourgeoisie in its majority 
(including the well-to-do mulattoes)a even those 
who at that time would have given their life for 
the Revolution, were seized with panic, as if 
the Prime Minister of Cuba had announced that an 
atomic bomb would fall on the island the following 
morning. In the rich neighbourhoods of Havana,
Santa Clara, Camagiiey, Santiago, etc., there was 
a general uproar. The counter-revolution bristled 
to a man, putting about the rumour that Fidel 
Castro had invited coloured men to invade the 
aristocratic sanctuaries of the country to dance 
and revel with any vestal virgins who, up to that 
moment, had been successfully preserved from the 
terrible radiation which is emitted by black skin.
This biological menace, this sexual cataclysm, 
threatened not only white flesh but also Religion, 
the Family, Private Property and the marvellous 
indices of the stock market. The whole sinister 
mythology developed in the days of slavery returned 
to the surface of men's consciousness........The
volcano of negrophobia was in eruption.......
Highly respectable white ladies left the country 
repeating that, since Fidel Castro's speech, the 
blacks had become impossible.209
Restrained as they might have been, Castro's first words on the 
colour problem threatened to have consequences which their author 
had probably not anticipated. In order to allay the worst fears 
engendered by the speech, a televised press conference was arranged 
to take place three days later. Returning to his subject the 
Cuban premier once again on this occasion roundly condemned "those 
who call themselves Christians but who are racists, those who 
claim they are followers of Marti but who are racists, those who 
believe themselves to be educated but who are racists". Now
however he stressed that the Revolution did not propose to oblige 
anyone to dance-with anyone else against their will - as if to 
underline the exclusive emphasis in his previous speech upon the 
public forms of racism manifested in the "two types" of discrim­
ination. He also spoke at some length about the heroism of Mestre, 
a black who had fought, in the attack on the Moncada barracks back
in 1953, and dwelt pointedly upon the merits of the mulatto
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comandante Juan Almeida. The 'line* was the same but the tone
was notably more diplomatic, even perhaps apologetic.
Thus it was that the position of the Cuban revolution on the 
colour question was defined. In these two speeches in the early 
months of 1959 Fidel Castro both identified the aspirations of his 
movement in relation to domestic racial discrimination and estab­
lished the limits beyond which it could not go. Henceforth he 
referred to the problem in his speeches only in passing and in a 
manner which suggested that with the successful completion of the 
campaign to end discrimination in workplaces and social centres 
there was little if anything which remained to be done. At the 
end of the Revolutionary Government's first year of office, he cited 
in defence of the record of the Revolution the fact that the once 
private beaches were now open to all Cubans "regardless of colour,
without stupid prejudices" and that employment opportunities were
■211likewise open equally to Cubans "of every colour". Speaking to
the prisoners taken by the revolutionary forces at the Bay of Pigs,
many of whom were black or mulatto, Castro dwelt upon the same 
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theme. It was the Second Declaration of Havana of February
1962 however which set the pattern in the clearest fashion for all 
future Cuban statements on the colour question, focussing attention 
upon the manifest evils of North American race relations and
emphasising the- common'exploitation to which imperialism subjected
all the Latin American peoples - Indian, mestizo, black and white 
; 213alike. Thus it was; in the context of a bitter attack on the
policies of the United States that, on the occasion of the third 
anniversary of the CDRs, Castro pointed to the apparently manifest 
■truth'
... that here, among the people, among the 
masses, in the schools, the hospitals and the 
theatres, on the beaches and in other centres 
of recreation, in cultural centres and work-- 
centres, there is not a shadow of discrimination. 211*
In conversation with Lee; Lockwood in 1965, the Cuban leader 
stated baldly:
Hhy hasn't the United States been able to 
eradicate discrimination? It is because racial 
discrimination and the exploitation of man by 
man are two things intimately joined. In Cuba, 
the exploitation of man by man has disappeared, 
and racial discrimination has disappeared too.215
Few Cubans in the late nineteen-sixties would have gone as far as 
to claim that the nationalisation of the means of production had by 
itself caused a significant change in patterns of discrimination. 
Many, on the other hand, were prepared to argue that, combined with 
the longer-term educational efforts made by the Party and the 
communications media, the campaign of 1959 had served as a powerful 
lever for changing interracial relationships. Many more agreed with 
Rene Depestre that the psychological impact of the great cooperative 
enterprise undertaken by the revolutionary regime had been such as 
to weaken racist currents in the society:
In its everyday praxis as ..well as in its great 
periodic moments of exaltation (mass meetings, 
celebrations, marches, commemorations of heroes 
and martyrs, etc.), the Revolution leads towards 
a spontaneous humanisation of interracial 
relationships which comes together very well 
with the conscious labour of education carried out
by the.'.cultural organs of.the Party or* at the 
level of the popular organisations and the trade 
unions, within'the.^framework of institutions 
like the cinema, television, radio, the press, 
publishing houses and the various activities of 
the Consejo Nacional de Culture.216
Whatever their views as to, the. causes of this change, most . CDR v 
members interviewed by the author in 1969 endorsed with minor 
qualifications the government opinion that racial discrimination 
in Cuba had "disappeared11.
Advocates of the view that the pre-revolutionary system of
race relations underwent a drastic reversal in and after 1959 point
in support of their contention to a number of different sorts of
change wrought by the Revolution. First and foremost it is usual
to cite the elimination of open discrimination in public places,
social centres and industrial» agricultural and service enterprises
which, it is argued, has taken place both directly, as a consequence
of the action of politically conscious managers or officials, and
indirectly as the by-product of the opening of the premises of
217socially exclusive private associations under state control.
In fact, there are no strong treasons in this instance for doubting 
that the changes claimed have indeed taken place. In the face of 
what is widely knovm to be the policy of the Revolution, few 
responsables would dare to engage in overt discrimination and, just 
as important, in the absence of effective competition between 
nationalised enterprises the spur of economic interest which 
previously underpinned, for example, the exclusion of black women 
from employment in department stores and offices is no longer present 
The simple truth which lies at the back of the traditional Marxist 
argument regarding the interdependence of racial oppression and 
social class-exploitation is relevant here. There remains the
possibility'of course that on an inter-personal level, and ' 
therefore more covertly, and in spite of the absence of economic 
reasons or justifications for this behaviour, persons in authority, 
especially in institutions previously barred to dark-skinned 
Cubans,may continue to afford significantly different treatment 
to individuals of different physical appearance. Similarly it is 
not inconceivable that the attitudes acquired by Cuban blacks as a 
defensive response to overt discrimination in the past may still 
operate as effective mechanisms excluding them from certain types 
of careers and leadership positions. For what it is worth, black 
Cubans reported the existence of both phenomena to the author in 
1969. A more central question, it will be suggested further on 
however, concerns the precise importance which should be attributed 
to changes of the type mentioned. For the record, the most 
convincing argument for viewing discrimination in employment as the 
key to the transformation of Cuba’s colour-class system has been 
well put by Depestre and turns upon the need felt by revolutionaries 
to find a practical, workaday expression for their anti-racism:
Before Major Fidel Castro, other white revolutionaries - 
first and foremost Josd Marti - had condemned 
racial discrimination and on various occasions had 
called upon those Cubans who practised it to revise 
their false conception of their dark-skinned 
compatriots. But such criticisms of racism were 
conducted on an abstract, speculative, Hegelian 
plane and were not related to the class struggles 
in Cuban society or to a concrete historical 
initiative....... In the new conditions of Cuba,
the leader of the Revolution was able to call upon 
white patriots not merely to renounce their illusions 
and erroneous opinions about the blacks but also to 
modify concretely their relations with them on a 
decisive terrain, that of labour.2jL§
A second category of post-revolutionary changes usually 
mentioned in connection with the alleged abolition of racial 
discrimination in Cuba has to do with what may be thought of as
part of the■infrastructure of colour prejudice, the unequal 
distribution of goods and services and other life-chances as’., 
between individuals of different colour. Once agains the 
elementary point is not in dispute: by improving the lot of Cubans 
poor in relative if not in absolute terms9 certain early measures 
undertaken by the Revolutionary Government * including most importantly 
the Agrarian Reforms of 1959 and 1963 * the Urban Reform of 1950, 
the literacy campaign of 1961, wage-increases and social security 
improvements, the provision of services gratis or at nominal cost 
and the gradual spread of rationing, cannot but have favoured black . 
Cubans inasmuch as blacks previously suffered more than their
' 219share of poor housing, rural unemployment, illiteracy and low wages.
The major query which needs to be registered here arises from the:
observation that some of these improvements not only were limited
in their extent but also have a *one-off* character, being inherently
and despite the best of intentions incapable of repetition.
Although the redistributive phase of the Cuban revolution undoubtedly
brought significant and lasting improvements for instance in the two
key areas of job distribution and housing - providing not only
regular employment but positions of responsibility in the management
of state farms to countless coloured agricultural labourers, and
all but eliminating exclusively white residential neighbourhoods -
there is no suggestion that the overall *racial* distribution of
220employment, still less of housing, was altered dramatically.
Moreover it is an open question - an intriguing question which no
statistics published to date permit us to answer - whether the
equality of opportunity fostered by the new Cuban educational system
and by the distribution of new dwellings to meritorious workers will
221result in a long-term trend towards racial equalisation. The
balance.-of. evidence .from other -societies indicates that, in the
absence of ’positive discrimination1 in favour of previously
222’oppressed groups, such changes are by no means automatic.
A third and final type of change said to have been effected
by revolutionary regime is harder to pin down but has nonetheless
often been alluded to by black Cubans within earshot of foreign
observers. The most precious conquests achieved by coloured
people under the Revolution, it has been argued, are those affecting
the intangibles of dignity and self-respect. A number of factors
have contributed on this level to a change in the perception and
self-perception of blacks in Cuban society: the mere adoption of a
clearly anti-racist stand by the revolutionary leadership, permitting
possible or expected victims of discrimination "to lean on the moral
223strength of the Revolution"; the aggressive campaign pursued by
Castro against the oppression of North American Negroes and his
22ty
support for militant black liberation movements abroad; and the
elevation of the African elements in Cuban culture to their rightful
225 'place as a part of the national cultural heritage. . "
Critics of the policy of the Cuban leadership on the colour 
question, principal among them Carlos More, have been particularly 
incensed by this last set of claims and have devoted considerable 
space to rebutting them. TJie existence of a body of opinion 
deploring the use made by the authorities of the religious culture 
of santeria, palo and other cults was noted in an earlier section 
of this chapter. According to More, it amounts to nothing less 
than a manifestation of attempted cultural genocide, particularly 
if viewed alongside the revolutionary leaders’ disdain for the study 
of African history, their distant but nonetheless respectful attitude
tov/ardn the ' Judaep-Chrictian religions and their constantstress
upon the ethnic; and cultural ’Latin-ness* of the Americas south of 
'226the: Rio Grande. - Although it’ is certainly correct to'point
out theycry:limited character of Cuban government efforts to ■ 
restore a sense of racial pride to people of African descent - in 
: the late ''♦sixties school.text-books and propaganda material for 
adults both;typically abjured themes of this sort- in the view of 
the present writer there are at least.three reasons for rejecting;
.this accusation as it stands. First, the indulgence-shown by More 
towards the religious and magical content of Afro-Cuban,culture 
is difficult to square .with this author’s supposed militant atheism.
. Second, the immunity towards ’Latin* cultural influences which is 
implicitly attributed to Afro-Cubans and other Afro-Americans is 
not consonant-with the facts. Third, it is in all events 
unrealistic to expect the leaders of a contemporary Third World country 
to relinquish one of the most effective levers available to them 
for mobilising the population in the effort for economic development,
:the inevitably homogenising force of nationalism. Carlos Morels 
on surer ground when he points out the spuriousness of direct, albeit 
propagandistic, comparisons of the plight of Negroes in today’s United
States with that of the coloured population in pre-revolutionary
' ' 227Cuba, though, as we shall see, the point is unsufficiently developed.
The contention of the critics, finally, that the alleged anti-racism
of the Cuban government contains in reality important elements of;
228expediency, condescension and paternalistic racism leads us 
directly to the main thrust of the Black Legend of race relations in 
Cuba since 1959.
Whereas upholders of the interracial status quo in contemporary 
Cuba;have leaned heavily, as More indicates, upon "the famous5 theme
229 . 'of access to the beaches", ' its opponents have also concentrated
their fire on a single topic: in this case the under-representation
of ’Afro-Cubans1 in the leadership of the revolutionary movement -
from its inception and in the higher levels of the Party and the
administrative, educational and cultural apparatuses since 1959.
In Pore’s view, the right of the oppressed to govern themselves
being fundamental and other civil rights merely derivatives it is
230before anything else the absence of blacks from the cabinet* which
establishes the continuity between pre- and post-revolutionary
patterns of discrimination. The presence of the Afro-Cubans Juan
Almeida in the Party leadership and Lasaro Pena (until 1966) at the
head of the Cuban Workers* Federation (CTC) has the same significance,
it is argued, as the adoption of Negroes by the U.S. State Department.
Both More.and Clytus insist that these individuals are permitted
entry to the top echelons of leadership precisely as "window dressing”
and in order : to provide a permanent refutation of charges of racial 
231prejudice. This allegation, like the customary retort that
sufficiently meritorious coloured candidates cannot be found, is 
of course practically irrefutable. What interests us primarily 
here however is the mistaken idea that the most appropriate test of 
significant change in Cuba’s ’traditional* system of racial discrim­
ination is the proportion of blacks or mulattoes in the government.
The view I propose to advance is that, in doing battle with 
supporters of the White Legend, More and Clytus fail almost entirely 
to strike their target since, lacking an adequate perspective on 
the character of the pre-revolutionary colour-class system, they 
direct most of their,fire in the wrong direction. More’s vision 
is the more seriously obstructed, in spite of his Cuban birth, by 
the tacit assimilation of twentieth century Cuba to the North American
model of.discrimination. An index of thin tendency is the use
made - throughout his article of the politically suggestive but '
sociologically misleading characterisation of individuals as
’Afro-Cubans’ and the avoidance of the somewhat clumsy but more
realistic terms ’black’9 ’mulatto’, etc., leading perforce to an
account of the failure of independent black political movements
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which rests heavily upon a ’betrayal-repression’ model." " Clytus,
who describes at some length his experiences of the aesthetic,
personal and sexual judgements typically made by Cubans in relation
233to colour, comes nearer to the mark.
The real drawback of the White Legend of Cuban race relations 
is that although, as one observer has put it with charming naivete, 
the Revolution has succeeded in ’’knocking out Jim Crow”, it can
23hscarcely be said that ’’before the revolution Jim Crow flourished” 
and it is certainly not the case that the system was ever based on 
Jim Crow. It is not true either, however, as was indicated earlier, 
that the centre of the old colour-class system, the point at which 
colour-discrimination was most systematic and least qualified, was 
the political system. On the contrary, politics and the professions 
were the two principal avenues of upward social mobility for blacks 
and mulattoes; if indeed it has been the practice in recent years 
to exclude dark-skinned persons from high political office, the fact 
cannot be represented as a continuation of traditional Cuban racism 
but must be condemned as a monstrous new development without parallel 
in the dismal history of the Cuban Republic. This being the case, 
we shall be forgiven if we fall back on the hypothesis that the 
monopolisation of important ministerial posts in the Revolutionary 
Government by whites simply reflects the social origin of the leading 
cadre of the 26 July Movement and the near-monopoly of decision­
making power/siill hold. by • this group..
It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that if the
Cuban Prime Minister were black we should not have incontrovertible
■ • ' ' 235 'proof that the traditional colour-class system had broken down.
The most significant and the only foolproof index of qualitative
change in a colour-class system is on the contrary, I wish to
suggest, the Incidence of 1mixed1 marriages, of formal unions
between persons of markedly different physical appearance, -and, more
exactly, of roughly equal socio-economic standing. This would be
the case,;of course, independently of the observer *s views as to
the desirability or reprehensibility of miscegenation either as a
236rule or in the particular case of Cuba. Such evidence as there
is on trends in mixed marriages is not encouraging. Unhappily in
Cuba as in most countries it is not possible.to find relevant
statistical data and it is necessary to rely on casual impressions.
Clytus has reported: "I constantly saw black women strolling with
237white men, but I saw no white women with black men". The
observation is valid to the extent that Cubans do spend much of 
their free:time on la calle and increasingly do so as couples. It 
is possible that : ’mixed’ couples tend not to go out as frequently 
as those consisting of men and women of approximately similar colour 
but this would tend to reinforce the finding that attitudes remain 
much as they used to be. Moreover any index, such as the results 
of attentive observation of couples in the street, which includes 
within its purview more or less casual sexual encounters may be 
expected to overrepresent the frequency of mixed marriages.
The present observer’s impressions were, if anything, less . 
positive than Clytus ’. In public places in Havana, whether in the 
central quarters or in the working-class suburbs, men and women of
sharply different appearance in any of the possible combinations 
•were rarely seen together. ' Less extended periods of observation 
in.-the cities of Santa Claras Cienfucgos, Holguin and Santiago 
yielded nothing to suggest that the capital v*as exceptional in this 
respect. Couples consisting of white foreigners and dark Cubans -■ 
which were exceedingly common in Havana in 1969 - frequently net 
with reactions from watchers and passers-by varying from wry grins 
or humorous racist comments to what appeared to be frank disapproval. 
The latter type of attitude seemed to be most in evidence in the 
cities of the interior, though this may reflect the fact that 
foreign visitors were less often seen there than in Havana. In 
San Hainan section, one regular household consisting of a white man 
and a dark black woman was known to the author, the man being, 
significantly, of low status and a resident of the tenement block 
La Corona.
If Cubans were no longer overwhelmingly concerned with
"improving the family" (or with avoiding "setting it back") they did
still seem, then, to behave as if they were. There are a number of
reasons why attitudes regarding colour might be eiqpected to have
altered little even in a decade or more of social revolution. The
first and the most frequently invoked in such contexts is the sheer
inertia of the island’s cultural inheritance or, alternatively, the
236’relative autonomy of the superstructure’. '' After all, if the
entire Western Christian linguistic heritage is permeated with racist 
239symbolism, there are innumerable ways in which implicit colour 
prejudices can survive vigorously but almost unnoticed in a society 
which is still not a century away from slavery. Thus talk of ’bad 
hair1 is almost convincingly rationalised by reference to the 
difficulty of combing Negroid curls. The fact that at Carnival time
features ~ is explained; .away, as the product of purely aesthetic 
judgements. .Aesthetic criteria which denigrate all things 
Negroidare often so firmly rooted that they appear to have 
.independent' validity.
It is not* the case however that in pre-revolutionary times 
Cubans discriminated by colour in their selection of marriage 
partners exclusively for psuedo-aesthetic reasons and we.should be 
wary of taking for granted that the only possible explanation for 
the continuation of this practice is a superstructural ’lag*. In 
truth - a fact illustrated by the prevalence of. folk-stereotypes 
ascribing chronic unreliability to the black male, promiscuity to 
the dark female, status-sensitivity to mulattoes - this type of 
discrimination was based upon a number of broadly realistic 
assumptions about what being a Negro or a dark mulatto, or the 
spouse or. offspring of one, normally entailed in terms of life chances 
as well as social prestige. Prejudices these expectations might 
have been, but they were not baseless. It was not for nothing '
that in the refrain quoted at the head of this section the social 
existence of the black was described as a salacion.^^^ Today, 
reality no longer sustains to any degree certain traditional beliefs 
such as that :-Jhich led countless mothers to warn their daughters 
that Negroes might steal their virginity but would never marry
042them. The fact however that we have had to express some doubts
as to the extent to which the Revolution altered the pattern'of 
distributive racial inequality means that more than mere cultural 
'inertia may be involved here.2^3
A third and final reason why Cubans continue to select their
marriage partners in the old manner,thus sustaining the core of 
the pre-revolutionary colour-class system, will not be neglected.
But first it should be noticed that my contention regarding the 
premature invocation of the relative autonomy of superstructures 
may apply not only to marital decisions but also to the sphere - 
probably the neat remove from matrimony from the point of view of 
the intensity of traditional colour discrimination - of informal 
personal, but non-sexual, relationships, ’in Havana in 1969, man- 
to-man relationships at a personal level between individuals of 
sharply different colour were invariably relaxed and unremarkable , 
but then it was probably only among the social elite or in a few 
well-defined types of situation that this norm was ever departed 
from in twentieth century Cuba (a fact which 9 I repeat„ indicates 
nothing about the incidence of prejudice but a good deal about the 
character of discrimination). A case from the neighbourhood of 
San Ramon is suggestive of the way in which the essential dynamics 
of the colour-class system may persist in new forms and despite 
appearances at the interpersonal level. In San Ramon the intimacy 
of black-white personal relations seemed to be directly related to 
whether or not the subjects regarded themselves as political 
comrades , in practice by virtue of active participation in the CDRs, 
and whether the relationship in question was structured principally 
by this fact. Relations between active cederistas of contrasting 
physical appearance were often close. In the CDRs and among Cuban 
revolutionaries, it was ejiplained, colour is irrelevant; what 
matters is whether or not a person is a companero 9 a good comrade , 
one who can be depended on and whose heart is in the right j>lace. 
Depestre among others has pointed to this attitude as an example of
the "spontaneous humanisation of interracial relationships" which
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he says has been produced by the Revolution. " The interpretation
lower organs of the CDR.system occupy a social space not previously 
• structured by an}' formal organisation, but there is another' 
possibility: that with the institutionalisation of the committees
a new sphere was created in which Cubans saw fit to practice their 
venerable custom of paying attention to a variety of attributes in 
assessment of one another, some or a combination of which could . 
offset and even 'abolish* a defective physical appearance.
The attitude of white CDR members in San Ramon towards non- 
raembers who,were also black was consistent with this hypothesis. A
general tendency for whites to be inordinately incensed by black
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counter-revolutionaries has been suggested by sensitive Cubans.
An element in the notoriety in San Ramon of La Corona similarly
appeared to be the fact that it housed a proportionately higher
number of dark Negroes than the surrounding buildings. In reality
less than one-third of household heads in La Corona was 'black*,
. ' ■ 246"according to the CDR census, the largest group being 'white*.
Nevertheless some eederistas habitually . * explained * the polit ical
sentiments, ignorance, chusmeria and alleged debauchery or the
people of the building in a time-honoured Cuban manner - by rubbing
the skin of the left forearm with the finger and nodding in the v :
• . 247 'appropriate direction.' The same uneducated but fervently
revolutionary CDR activist who could be observed barracking with 
seemingly perfect ease in the present of a black comrade could also 
ejaculate impatiently about La Corona: "You can’t do anything with 
those blacks! ..... The blacks in there are destroying everything!
..... They are all m o n k e y s ! " 2 ^ ®  In the case of the tenement, in 
other words, colour could be regarded as a highly salient attribute, 
granted its inhabitants* singular lack of positive qualities capable
The several sophisticated anti-racists in San Ramon attributed 
the existence of racist undercurrents in relations between La Corona 
and the committees to the educational or ideological backwardness 
of some CDR members. Similar attitudes , they implied, would not
be found in the more selective ranks of the Party,.which may be 
true. Once again however it is possible to doubt whether the 
spread of education and the deepening of ideological indoctrination 
will be sufficient to eliminate colour prejudices so long as there 
continues to be an objective correlation between colour and 
important foci, of social problems of.the. typo represented by La 
Corona. To be cure, what is to be combatted is an inheritance 
from the past, but the past does not, unhappily, weigh exclusively 
upon r.ien*c consc5.oucness.
This brings us to the point where we can no longer ignore the 
final factor which has contributed to the failure of Cubans to modify 
their behaviour patterns in the key sectors of the colour-class 
system. It trill be'-recalled that in 1959 Fidel Castro at no point 
singled out discrimination at the interpersonal and familial levels 
as primary targets for the revolutionaries. Indeed it is not 
impossible to understand his second speech as specifically excluding 
these areas from inspection by would be assailants of pre-revolutionary 
racism. In all events the policy pursued since 1959 has effectively 
neglected to tackle either directly or indirectly the sources of colour 
discrimination in personal relations between Cubans. Perhaps because 
at the deepest level of awareness many educated revolutionaries, 
black, white and mulatto, remain unconvinced that ’black is beautiful*,
tendency for women's magazines. propngancki-po store and the like
to retain the implic :uraption that ’real people’ arc white.
Despite the;efforts of a conscious group of young black intellectuals
io vro'rk mainly ■ in the theatrical and cultural scctor
ollow through the aesthetic implications of the nev; racial equality
the manufacture of black hut othervri.se Caucasoid dolls , have
too often proved gauche in the extreme. ..Although internal Party 
literature and the pamphlets used in the training of social workers ,
policemen and judges are often self-consciously anti-racist, a
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narrow definition of the phenomenon is;invariably employed, < and,
Statesin the last analysis official Cuban statements contain a :
good deal of the traditional and* needless to say, unjustified self-
righteousness viith which Latin American leaders have viewed the 
Caliban in the north. The notion that some degree of positive 
discrimination along the lines of colour as well as .of. classfmights. 
be desirable (even if immediately impractical) has to the present 
writer’s knowledge’ never been mooted in Cuba. Finally and most
important of all, as several commentators have noticed there exists
■ 251a species of taboo of frank public discussion on the colour question.
Since, as it has been defined, racial discrimination has been abolished,
it is easy to accuse those who • insist that all is not well of
gratuitously creating division in the ranks of the Cuban people, of
being inverted racists, or even of being agents of imperialism.
In one sense the picture which it is intended to convey here is 
as unattractive as what I have called the Black Legend of post- - 
revolutionary race relations. 'What has been suggested is that in 
the most critical -area of the colour-class system not only has little
as for the government’s stand on racial oppression in the United
changed but no effective leadership has been provided. At the
same time, however, the parspect ive vjhich has been adopted permits
us to show rather more indulgence in judging this failure on the
part of the revolutionary regime than has usually been shown by its
critics. It is in fact quite unnecessary to have recourse to the
hypothesis of a'white racist conspiracy within the Cuban revolution.
Surveying the history of the gradual emergence of a sophisticated
anti-racist consciousness in recent decades in the United States of
America and elsewhere, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that,
were it not for the growth of a militant and independent social
movement of blacks, very little at all might have been achieved.
Yet, as has repeatedly been stressed in the foregoing pages, colour-
class systems of discrimination seem to be endowed with the ability
252to delay indefinitely the rise of such movements." For this
reason alone it is perfectly possible that it will turn out less 
easy in the long run to bring about the definitive suppression of 
the heritage of slavery in countries like Cuba and Brazil than in 
more obviously racist societies such as the U.S.A.
If it is the case that black liberation will have to come about 
in Cuba, with all the difficulties thereby entailed, without the 
prior emergence of a mass black self-consciousness, the worst aspect 
of the current situation is clearly the impossibility of an 
intelligent and thorough discussion of the problem within the 
framework of the revolutionary order. A certain amount may perhaps 
be achieved by enlightened young black intellectuals engaging in 
’guerrilla actions1 designed to provoke reflection without openly 
challenging the established myths. ' Ultimately however the
solution to the colour problem - and the same applies to other 
issues of socio-cultural change which have been discussed in this
upon the 'development of institutional forms which assure revolutionary 
Cubans the right not -merely to defend past conquests but also to. 
extend the Revolution into new-fields* if necessary challenging its 
present policies and leadership in so- doing.- It is foolish to 
condemn the Castroist .regime for having-created a less than perfect 
society in under a decade-and-a-half of revolutionary change. It 
would be equally short-sighted however to assume that with the 
passage of time the desired improvements will occur automatically 
and without conscious effort. Revolutionary societies being what 
they are* a great deal will depend upon the flexibility* maturity , 
and innovative capacity which is shown by the Cuban political system 
in coming years, and it is to this subject that we must return in 
conclusion.
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CHAPTER 6 SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this dissertation has been to examine the role 
in the social and political transformation of Cuba of two of the 
most distinctive and original institutional products of Fidel 
Castro’s revolution: the Committees for the Defence of the 
Revolution, and the Popular Courts. A major part of the enquiry 
has taken the form of a detailed description of the genesis, 
evolution and day-to-day. functioning of these institutions, drawing 
both upon evidence of a documentary type and, where appropriate, 
upon illustrative material derived from the intensive investigation 
of organisational life in a selected Havana neighbourhood.
Elsewhere, on the other hand, an attempt has been made to tackle 
the relationship between political organisation and social change 
in revolutionary Cuba from the opposite angle, a lengthy chapter 
(Chapter 5) having been included which dissects revolutionary 
policy and practice in regard to three key sectors of socio-cultural 
change.
Two tasks remain to be undertaken in these concluding pages. 
Firstly it will be helpful, even at the risk of a certain repetition, 
to reassemble some of the more significant findings which emerge 
directly from the discussion in Chapters 2-4 above concerning the 
role and character of the committees and the courts. Secondly, 
although the issues discussed under this rubric do not lend themselves 
to a satisfactory summary discussion, our principal finding regarding 
sex, religion and colour in contemporary Cuba - namely that very 
uneven progress has been made in these areas - calls for some final 
comment. Specifically what is needed is a statement on the relation­
ship between this observation and the general remarks about the 
problem of organisation in Cuba with which this study began.
In the foregoing chapters what might appear to be an inordinate 
amount of space has been devoted to the documentation of two 
institutions, comprising a single sector of the organisational 
framework of the Cuban revolutionary order. The rationale of this 
approach was given at the outset and hinges upon the peculiar 
parameters of the problem of post-capitalist political organisation 
as it has come to be posed in Cuba. Castroist political practice, 
we suggested, has the dual characteristic of being guided by a 
political theory which is systematically ambiguous with respect to 
the problem of bureaucratic rule versus workers1 democracy but of 
being prone, on the other hand, to unexpected and often highly 
unorthodox shifts in policy which are justified by reference to the 
need for revolutionaries to resist a trend towards reliance upon 
’administrative methods’. This generalisation, which even the 
casual observer of Cuban affairs ignores at his peril, places a 
premium on an attentive attitude towards the actual practice of the 
regime on organisational questions. The CDRs and Popular Courts 
are especially worthy of attention as two significant products of a 
major concern of the Fidelista leadership: to assure the
’participation’ of its mass following in the enterprise of 
socialist construction.
With these considerations in view, the following findings of 
our examination of the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution 
seem to be worth reiterating. First of all, the apparently 
continuous evolution of the committees since their inception in 
late September 1960 in fact conceals three distinct phases of 
leadership policy. The first (1960-66), chracterised by the temporary 
ascendancy of political perspectives originating in the pre­
revolutionary PSP, tended towards the creation In the CDRs of an
organisation which, while possessing distinctive properties due to 
its particular history, was not altogether unlike the ‘Front* 
organisations typical of the Soviet-dominated countries of Eastern 
Europe. A second phase, heralded in 1966 by the dismissal of the 
first National Coordinator of the committees, was distinguished 
by the increased priority assigned to ‘participation* as a goal 
of the organisation, reflecting the increased assertiveness shown 
in this period by the specifically Fidelista current in the Cuban 
leadership. In 1970, finally, the CDRs were not unaffected by 
the global reorientation of leadership policy towards a new “mass 
line” which followed the economic crisis of that year. Although 
it would not be entirely misleading to describe the ‘turn* of 1970 
as the extension to the trade unions and other sectors of precisely 
those organisational precepts which had guided the work of the CDRs 
in the late ’sixties - Castro himself seemed to present the matter 
in this way - a significant new step was also contemplated: the
formal establishment of the committees as representative bodies 
possessing quasi-govemmental functions at neighbourhood level.
Important as some of these medium-term changes in the orientation 
of the CDRs may be judged to have been, they should not be permitted 
to obscure the important constancies which the organisation has 
exhibited since its origins. A second significant finding, then, 
is that over a long period the CDRs have functioned as a highly 
effective mechanism serving, as Cubans put it, to “integrate into 
the Revolution” large numbers of ordinary Cubans whose levels of 
revolutionary commitments and political understanding might otherwise 
have remained low. This fact more than any other explains the 
importance attributed to them by Fidel Castro and why the anniversary 
of their foundation remains one of the most important political
events in the revolutionary calendar. The effectiveness of the 
committees on this level is due in large measure to the practical 
contribution to the well-being of the local community that they 
are commonly perceived as making by Cubans of varied backgrounds 
and otherwise contrasting ideological reflexes. Another facet of 
the CDR system which is important in this context is the use that 
is made of it by the Fidelista leadership,vto secure a relatively 
unimpeded flow of political ’information* in both directions between 
the apex and the base of the revolutionary polity.
To conclude that the committees serve as effective political 
'integrators* is not of course to concede the claim that they are 
actually, or even potentially, organs of workers’ democracy in 
the accepted sense of this phrase; Without thereby wishing to deny 
that the establishment of the committees has resulted in a net gain 
for ordinary Cubans when it comes to assessing their power to 
control and shape their immediate social environment, it must be 
stressed as a third major finding of this study that the decision­
making authority which has so far been accorded to rank-and-file 
ceaeristas has been severely curtailed both in a geographical sense 
and with respect to the types of issue that are involved. Precisely 
because of the tendency towards the localisation of control at the 
community level which is inherent in the structure of the 
organisation and which has been developed in new directions in each 
stage of its evolution, the CDRs are ill-suited as the vehicle for 
solving the problem of bureaucracy in the central sectors of the 
state and society.
What is true in this regard of the CDRs is of course true, 
mutatis mutandis, of local community participation in the adminis­
tration of justice in the manner of the Popular Courts. It was
neither the intention nor the result of the inauguration of the 
new courts on a nationwide basis in 1967-68 to effect a de­
bureaucrat is at ion of the judicial arm of the state as such.
Rather, two achievements of note may be credited to the Popular 
Court experiment on the basis of our findings, both of them likely 
to prove of long-run significance in the evolution of the 
revolutionary legal system. Firstly it provided a practical 
demonstration of the feasibility within the framework of the 
revolutionary order of taking justice 'to the people* in a number 
of new ways, including the most literal way of all - by setting up 
courts with jurisdiction over localities of a few thousand 
inhabitants. Secondly, by virtue of their effective use of a 
wide range of ’moral* sanctions, the Popular Courts set a precedent 
in the sphere of sentencing procedures which it will be hard for 
Cuban jurists to ignore in the future and which will almost 
certainly be incorporated in some form in the judicial reform 
currently under way. Against this must be set what appears to have 
been the major negative lesson of the Courts: the uneven quality
of the judiciary produced by an exclusive reliance upon non- 
vocational personnel - though this experience too appears to have 
been assimilated by the architects of the new, ’unified* judicial system. 
Finally, we have found, Popular Court practice suffered from a 
number of procedural defects, the most serious of which was a 
failure to provide safeguards against injustices committed knowingly 
or.otherwise by the police. It is to be hoped, but not to be 
expected with any certainty, that this problem will be dealt with 
in the near future.
Within the limits of this dissertation it has been possible 
to discuss the global reorientation of Cuban policy since the 
dramatic events of summer 1970 only in a cursory fashion; and with 
a close view to its consequences for the evolution of the CDRs.
A systematic assessment of the long-term implications of develop­
ments such as the reform of the trade unions, the ’organic 
separation* of the PCC and the UJC from state- and mass-organisations, 
and the adoption of a people’s-parliament approach towards new 
legislation (as well, of course, as the equally striking changes 
which have occurred in this period in Cuba’s international positions) 
remains a high priority for Cubanists. Qn balance it is unlikely 
that future historians will be able to say that the practical 
results of the turn measured up to the promise contained In Fidel 
Castro’s first speeches following the failure of the zafra. 
Nevertheless an important positive feature both of Castro’s 
programmatic statements and of the reforms themselves seems certain 
to merit special attention. Whatever its many other weaknesses as 
a solution to the long-term problems of socialist construction in 
; Cuba, the new orientation was based clearly and squarely upon the 
recognition that, in a transitional, post-capitalist society, 
economic problems and political problems are indissolubly linked.
The fate of the development programmes of the Revolution will depend, 
that is to say, not only upon the degree to which solutions are 
found to a number of technical deficicnces of .Cuban planning
(and there can be no question of minimising this aspect of the 
matter) but also upon the successful realisation of reforms at the 
level of political organisation.
The importance of this insight, containing as it does the 
germ of a thoroughgoing critique of bureaucratic rule which has
the merit of departing from eminently practical premises, cannot 
be overemphasised. The suggestion that I wish to offer in this 
concluding note, however, is that it is not only the economy whose 
progress is conditional in this fashion upon reforms in the 
political-organisational sphere. It is high time that some 
recognition also be given to the heavy dependence of the basic 
elements of social progress in transitional societies upon the 
strengths and weaknesses of the political system, upon the political 
form which is given to the ’dictatorship of the proletariat* in a 
given case. As far as our specific findings regarding sex, 
religion and colour are concerned, the point to be stressed is that 
revolutionary Cubans often deceive themselves when they ascribe the 
failings of official policy in these fields to historical conditions 
which are incapable of modification in the short term.
. Two considerations to do with the structure of the Cuban 
revolutionary polity are manifestly relevant to any discussion of 
the obstacles to the continued social radicalism of the process 
set in motion in 1959. (The same considerations, let it be said, 
arise from any comparison of the actual practice of Cuban socialism 
with the guiding principles of classical Leninist theory on the 
subject.) First, the mass organisations, among which the CDRs, 
are not structured in such a way as to permit the kind of large- 
scale exchange, confrontation and cross-fertilisation of ideas and 
practical proposals which is indispensible if the difficult task 
of stamping-out centuries of accumulated social prejudice and 
narrow-mindedness is to be tackled with any hope of success. As 
we have seen, the committees function primarily as transmitters of 
new values and models of social behaviour and only to a slight 
degree as innovating agencies in their own right. The same can
in reality be said of the FMC, the trade unions (before or after 
their reform) and each of the other mass organisations which plays 
an important part in Cuban political life. To be sure, the 
difficulties attendant upon the modification of these structures 
or the creation of new institutions in such a way as to produce a 
system based, for instance, upon democratically-elected bodies of 
the soviet type are enormous. Cuban history, whether before or 
since 1959, has bequeathed to the revolutionaries of today all too 
few experiences of forms of political authority which emanate 
directly from the mass of the working class, with the result that 
proposals along these lines are popularly regarded as little short 
of recipes for anarchy. What is sadly lacking however is a clear 
perspective among the more perceptive of the country’s leaders of 
the need to begin advancing, albeit cautiously, in such a direction 
before it is too late.
The second observation whose relevance to the problem in hand 
cannot be disputed is in one sense still more elementary. It is 
almost beside the point to insist that Cubas’s mass organisations 
serve as transmission-belts for decisions and priorities worked 
out elsewhere when, as is still the case eight long years after 
the foundation of the FCC, the same is true of what is nominally 
the vanguard organisation of a revolutionary working class. The 
devaluation of the contribution to the tasks of socialist 
construction potentially to be made by a properly-constituted 
Leninist party (or parties) - a phenomenon reflected in the failure 
of the PCC to hold a national congress, the infrequency of its 
Central-Committee meetings and the absence of real internal 
democracy in its deliberations at every level - is perhaps the 
single most deplorable feature in the present context of the recent
evolution of the Cuban political system. Nothing that was said 
in Chapter 5 above was intended to imply that the final socio­
cultural liberation of man in Cuba will prove anything but a long 
and difficult struggle in the course of which, for long periods, 
sincere revolutionaries may be unable to see a way forward from 
their present dilemmas. It is precisely because the issues are 
difficult that it is necessary to begin discussing them now. It 
is also for this reason, and because many of the difficulties in 
question have a deeply-ingrained ideological character, that it is 
necessary to insist particularly, in the Cuban context as in any 
other, upon the central importance of the role ascribed by classical 
Leninism to the party of the vanguard: the provision of that
quality of political leadership which can only be sustained by an 
organisation whose internal democracy is as vigorous as its 
discipline is strict. Speaking on 26 July 1973 at a ceremony held 
under the walls of the former Mbncada fortress to mark the passage 
of twenty years since the inception of the revolutionary struggle 
in Cuba, Fidel Castro asserted that it was the "bounden duty of all 
revolutionaries" to work to improve the Communist Party, "to raise 
its authority and discipline, to perfect its methods of leadership
and its democratic character and to raise the cultural and
2 '■ ■■ political level of its cadres and members". It is to be hoped
that these words were not spoken in vain.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
1 . For an analysis along these lines which accords essentially 
with the present writer’s views on the subject, see Jacques 
Valier, "Cuba 1968-1971: le developpement des deformations
de l’deonomie politique, No. 6 , January-Harch 1972, pp. 112
141.
2. "Speech at the main ceremony marking the 20th Anniversary of 
the attack on the Koncada garrison, 26 July 1973", GWR,
5 August 1973, p. 5.
APPENDIX 1 EMULATION TARGETS FOR URBAN CDRs, PERIOD 1 MAY TO
28 SEPTEMBER 1969
Vigilance
1 . To have discussed the new Vigilance Programme with every 
member of the CDR and to have at least 80% committed to 
performing guard duty.
2. To mount a guard on the day for which the CDR is responsible.
Organisation
1. To have held a block assembly to publicise the targets for 
28 September.
2 . To have all the ’fronts* allocated.
3. To have as members of the CDR all those living in the block who
are in agreement with the Revolution.
1. To have an up-to-date noticeboard on the block.
2. To have a functioning block Study Circle using the suggested
discussion materials.
3. To make a minimum of two wall-postors dealing with the tasks 
of Vigilance and of the zafra of 1970.
4. To have decorated the block.
1. To have participated actively in agricultural voluntary work, 
accumulating not less than 2 0 0 hours on the block.
2. To discuss with each family the leaflet "The Havana Family on 
the Road to the Ten Million Tons”.
Education
1 . The CDR must be free of cases of absenteeism from Primary and 
Secondary schools.
2. To have selected to Exemplary Parents of the block.
3. To have all the illiterates in the block attending the local
CDR Reading Circle.
Public Health
1. To mobilise one blood donation.
2. Everyone to have had an intra-utcrine smear test.
3. To have collected 300 empty medicine bottles.
4. To have held two Health Talks.
Services
1. To participate in activities designed to improve the service 
in retail establishments.
2. To participate in Information Assemblies.
3. To report any deficiencies observed by the CDR.
Local Adminstration
1. To keep the locality clean and attend to the maintenance of 
its parks and squares.
2. To contribute a labour force to the tasks of the Local 
Administration.
3. To have somebody in the block responsible for street-cleaning. 
Economy
1. To have somebody responsible for economies.
2, To have held a discussion with every family in the block about
the need to economise on the use of electricity.
Civil Defence
1. To have an up-to-date block plan for Civil Defence*
2. Everyone to have read the recommended material on Civil Defence,
Salvage
To have collected 100 cosmetics bottles, 300 other bottles, 150 lbs. 
of paper and cardboard, and 1 oz. of used postage stamps.
Sports
1 . At least three activists to be made responsible for children^ 
events in the block.
2. At least 5 members to have taken a sports aptitude test.
3. To have mounted--at least one sports event on the block.
Culture
To have held one cultural event on the block.
Finance :
To have a 100% paid-up membership and all dues paid on time to the 
Zone Committee.
(Source: Direccidn Provincial CDR,:La Habana, "Distincidh 28 de 
Septiembre - Tareas a cumplir por un CDR Urbano15 (leaflet), Havana, 
1969.)
APPENDIX 2 SELECTED INDICES OF NATIONAL CDR ACTIVITY, 1961-1972
(1) EDUCATION
Year Membership of the Exemplary Parents
in Education Movement
1960 21.800
1970 247,799
1971 315,491
1972 447,277
(Source: Fidel Castro, ’’Speech of 28 September, 1971”, GWR,
10 October 1971, p. 2; ana "Committees for the Defence of the 
Revolution: 12 months, 12 years check-up and summary” 5 GWR,
8 October 1972, p. 10.)
(2) PUBLIC HEALTH
Year Health Talks: Annual Totals
1962 106,005
1963 263,000
1964 454,000
1968 750,218
1971 390,861
1972 619,924
Year Blood Donations: Annual Totals
1962 
1965 
1969
1971
1972
(Source: Castro, "Speech of 28 September 1971’V  op.city, p. 2;
"Committees for the Defence of the Revolution: 12 months, 12 years", 
op.cit., p. 11; and "Committees for the Defence of the Revolution: 
For a Healthy People", GWR, 1 October 1972, p. 4.)
(3) SALVAGE
Year Glass Bottles Salvaged: Annual Totals
8,930,673 
33,620,513 
76,444,553 
88,000,000
1962
1967
1971
1972
8,109
10,019
105,932
127,906*
130,125
(3) SALVAGE (cont’d)
Year v Paper and Cardboard Salvaged: Annual
Totals (Tons)
. 1961 ■ 2,212 ■-
1971 12,196
1972 30,000
(Source: Castro, "Speech of 28 September 1971", op .cit., p. 2; 
and "Committees for the Defence of the Revolution: 12 months, 12 
years", op.cit., p. 11.)
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ANAP Asociacion Nacional de Agricultores Pequenos (National
Association of Small Fanners)
CDRs Comitds de Defensa de la Revolucion (Committees for
the Defence of the Revolution)
CIR Circulos delnstruccion Revolucionaria (Revolutionary
Instruction Circles)
CHC Consejo Nacional de Cultura (National Culture Council)
COR Comision de Orientacion Revolucionaria (Commission for
Revolutionary Orientation of the Party)
CTC(~R) Central de Trabajadores de Cuba ..(■- Revolucionaria)
(Central Organisation of Cuban Workers)
D(G)0P Departamento (General) de Orden Publico (Department of
Public Order of the Ministry of the Interior. The 
ordinary police force)
EIR Escuelas de Instruccion Revolucionaria (Schools of
Revolutionary Instruction)
FEU Federaci^n Estudiantil Universitaria (Federation of
University Students)
FMC Federacion de Mujeres Cubanas (Federation of Cuban Women)
GWR Granina Weekly Review (see bibliography)
INAV Instituto Nacional de Ahorros y Vivienda (National
Savings and Housing Institute)
JUCEI Juntas de Coordinacion, Ejecucion e Inspeccion (Boards of
Coordinations Execution and Inspection)
JUCEPLAN Junta Central de Planificacion (Central Planning Board)
MINCIN Ministerio de Comercio Interior (Ministry of Internal
Commerce)
OLAS Organizacic£n Latino-Americano de Solidaridad (Latin
American Solidarity Organisation)
ORI Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas (Integrated
Revolutionary Organisations. Founded 1961. The first 
product of the attempt to fuse the PSP, the 26th July 
Movement and other revolutionary groups)
PCC Partido Comunista de Cuba (Communist Party of Cuba.
Founded 1965)
PGP
PURS
UJC
UMAP
Partido Socialista Popular (Popular Socialist Party.
The name adopted in 19HU by the pre~revolutionary 
Cuban CP)
Partido Unido de la Revolucion Socialista (United 
Party of the Socialist Revolution. Replaced the ORI 
in 19G2)
Union de J<£venes Comunistas (Young Communists’ 
Federation)
Unidades Militares para Ayuda a la Produccidn (Military 
Units for Aid to Production)
Abakua : 
aficionado 
aElEEaraiento ;; 
arrimadc . 
babalawo 
barrio - .
Barrio Chino
barrio de indigentes
Batistiano
bodega •
bozal
bronca
brujo
caballeria
cabildo
carnet
caserio
cederista .
central
chinchal
chismeria
chusmeria
ciudadela
coartacion
cofrad^a
eomadre
An Afro-Cuban secret society 
Amateur, ’enthusiast’
Common-law marriage
In common-law union
Divination specialist in santeria
Neighbourhood
Chinese Quarter
Shanty-tovm
Follower or henchman of Fulgencio Batista 
Corner shop
Newly-imported African slave 
Row, punch-up
Lit. witch. Commonly applied indifferently 
to Afro-Cuban sorcerers
Land measurement of 33 ^ / 3 acres
Form of mutal aid association recognised 
under Spanish colonial legislation
Membership card
Public housing project (Puerto Rico)
Member of a CDR
Sugar mill and its ancillary installations
Workshop
Gossip
’Common’ behaviour
Large tenement building
Spanish colonial institution regulating 
the manumission of slaves
Fraternity (19th century)
Ritual co-parent
comandante
comparsa
Coronero
criollo
ekobio
Giron
granja :
gua j iro
guaperia
gusano
hcmbrismo
humilde
indieime
lucumjf
machetero
machismo
maricon
mestizaje
mestizo
mulato(a)
hahigo
normacidn
orisha
palero
Major. The highest rank in the 
revolutionary Cuban armed forces
Processional festivity (19th century)
Inhabitant of La Corona (see Chapter>)
Cuban-born person of either African or 
Spanish descent
A ’brother1 in the Abakua fraternity
Playa.Giron. The site of the main 
battle which led to the defeat of the 
Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961
Farm, In judicial contexts, prison-farm
Peasant .
The behaviour of a tough guy or bully
Lit. maggot. Counter-revolutionary
Exaggerated cult of female sexuality
Humble; whence, ordinary, poor
Candidate-member of the Abakua fraternity
Candidate for initiation into santeria
The Yoruba, as they are known in Cuba
Individual of allegedly lumpen-proletarian 
disposition and behaviour
Sugar-cane cutter
Exaggerated cult of male sexuality
(tabu) Homosexual
Miscegenation
Person of mixed blood
Mulatto
Member of the Abakua fraternity
Establishment of industrial output 
standards
Yoruba deity
Practitioner of Regia Conga cult
Popular name for Regia-'Conga'cult
Cuban unit of currency. Nominally 
equivalent to the US dollar
’On one’s own account', self-employed
Abajcurf grouping
Police raid
A person charged with a given activity 
or responsibility,
The exit of the populace into:the 
streets for festive purposes (19th century)
Lit. Saintworship. An Afro-Cuban 
religious cult
Practitioner or leader in santeria
A building containing small dwelling-units 
with collective sanitary facilities
Vending stall;
Loafer, '■ ’bum’
La vida. Low-life, prostitution 
’Voodoo’
Sugar harvest
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acosta, Maruja and Hardoy, Jorge E. "Urbanization Policies in 
Revolutionary Cuba1', Latin American Urban Research (Coral 
Gables, Fla.: University of Florida Press), Vol. II, 1972, 
pp. 167-177.
Actas del Folklore (Boletfn mensual del Centro de Estudios del
Folklore del Teatro Nacional de Cuba), Havana, January 1961- 
December 1961.
"Activities in relation to 2nd Congress of the Federation of Cuban 
Women announced at that organization1s10th Plenary Meeting",
GWR, 24 December 1972, p. 14.
"A Discusi(5n: Proyectos de Ley elaborados por las Comisiones de
Estudios Judiciciales" (Havana: n.d., n.p. - probably January 1973).
Agrupaci<in Catdlica Universitaria, "Encuesta nacional sobre el
sentimiento religioso eh el pueblo de Cuba" (Havana: Agrupacion 
Catdlica Universitaria, 1954).
Por qud reforma agraria? (Havana: Agrupacion Catolica 
Universitaria, 1958); reprinted in Economfa y Desarrollo, No. 12, 
July-August 1972, pp. 188-212.
Aguilar, Luis E. Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1972).
AlRoy, Gil Carl. "The Peasantry in the Cuban Revolution", The Review 
of Politics, Vol. 29, No. 1, January 1967, pp. 87-99.
Amaro Victoria, Nelson. "Hass and Class in the Origins of the Cuban 
Revolution", in Irving Louis Horov?itz (ed.), Hasses in Latin 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 547-576.
Amaro Victoria, Nelson and Hesa-Lago, Carmelo. "Inequality and Classes", 
in Carmelo Hesa-Lago (ed.). Revolutionary Change in Cuba 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), pp. 341-374.
Ames, David V?. "Negro Family Types in a Cuban Solar", Phylon
(Quarterly Review of Race and Culture, Atlanta, Georgia), Vol. XI, 
1950, No. 2, pp. 159-163.
Angell, Alan. "Castro and the Cuban Communist Party", Government and 
Opposition, Vol. 2, No. 2, January-April 1967, pp. 241-252.
Arozarena, Marcelino. "Los cabildos de nacion ante el registro de la
propiedad", Actas del Folklore, year 1, No. 3, March 1961, pp. 13-22.
Barnet, Miguel (ed.) B io g r a f d e  un cimarron (Havana: Instituto de 
Etnologia y Folklore, 1966).
Barreal Fernandes, Isaac. "Tendencias sincr^ticas de los cultos
populares en Cuba", Etnologia y Folklore, No. 1 (1966), pp. 17-24.
Bascom9 William R. "The Social Role of the Yoruba Cult Group”,
American Anthropological Association, Memoir No. 46, 1944.
"The Focus of Cuban Santeria", Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 
Vol. VI, No. 1, Spring 1950, pp. 64-68.
"Two Forms of Afro-Cuban Divination”, in Sol Tax (ed.),
Acculturation in the Americas, Proceedings and Selected Papers 
of the XXIX International Congress of Americanists, Vol. I 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1952), pp. 63-69.
"Yoruba Acculturation in Cuba", Les Afro-Am^ricains (DaKar:
Mdmoires de 1*Institut Franpais d ’Afrique Noire, No. 27, 1953), 
pp. 163-167, translated and reprinted as "La aculturacidn yoruba 
en Cuba”, Publicaciones del Centro de Estudios Africanlstas 
(Havana: Instituto de Etnologia y  Foiklore), SdrTe" Yv, No. 1,
. October 1966. ■
The Yoruba of South-Western Nigeria (New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1969).
Ifa Divination (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1969). 
Bastide, Roger, "Dusky Venus, Black Apollo”, Race, Vol. 3, 1961,
pp. 10-18.
"Color, Racism and Christianity", in John Hope Franklin (ed.),
Color and Race (New York: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
1968), pp. 34-49.
African Civilisations in the New World (New York: Harper and Row,
1971)•
Benedetti, Mario. "Situacion actual de la cultura cubana", Marcha 
(Montevideo), 27 December 1968, translated and reprinted as 
"Present Status of Cuban Culture", in Rolando E. Bonachea and; 
Nelson P. Valdes (eds.), Cuba in Revolution (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1972), pp. 500-526.
Bermddez, Armando Andres. "Notas para la historia del espiritismo en 
Cuba’1, Etnologia y Folklore, No. 4 (1967), pp. 5-22.
Bernardo, Roberto M. "Managing and Financing the Firm", in Carmelo 
Mesa-Lago (ed.), Revolutionary Change in Cuba (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), pp. 185-208.
The Theory of Moral Incentives in Cuba (Alabama: University of 
Alabama Press, 1971).
Blackburn, Robin. "Prologue to the Cuban Revolution", New Left Review, 
No. 21, October 1963, pp. 52-91.
"Cuba and the Super-powers", in Emanuel de Kadt (ed.), Patterns of 
Foreign Influence in the Caribbean (London: Oxford University 
Press and Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1972), pp. 
121-147. '
Biasier, Cole. "Social Revolution: Origins in Mexico, Bolivia, and 
Cuba", Latin American Research Review, Vol. II, No. 3, Summer 
1967, pp. 28-64.
Bohemia (Revlsta semanal), Havana, 1909-.
Eonachea, Rolando E. and Valdes, Nelson P. (eds.), Cuba in Revolution 
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1972).
Boorstein, Edward. The Economic Transformation of Cuba: A First-Hand 
Account (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968).
Bustamante, Jose Angel. "El sacrificio totemico en el Baroko Nahigo", 
Revista Bimestre Cubana, Vol. LXXIII, July-December 1957,
"Actitud de la familia ante el niho enfermo en Cuba", Archivos 
de Neurologia y Psiquiatria, Vol. 8 , No. 1, January-March 1958.
"Patroncs de crianza del nino en la clase baja urbana de la 
Habana", Archivos de Neurologia y Psiquiatria, Vol. 8 , No. 2. 
April 1958.
Cabrera, Lydia. El Monte; igbo finda, ewe orisha, vititinfinda (Notes 
sobre las supersticiones y el folklore de los negros criollos y 
del pueblo de Cuba). (Havana: Ediciones C.R., 1954).
La Sociedad Secreta Abakua, narrada por viejos adeptos (1954; 
second edition, Havanas Ediciones C.R., 1958).
Camuzzo, Rogelio. "En una nueva ciudad un nuevo tipo de ciudadano", 
in Pueblo Organlzado (Havana: Ediciones Con la Guardia en Alto, 
1965), pp. 185-192.
Carneado, Josd F. "La discrimlnacidn racial en Cuba no volverct",
Cuba Socialista, year 2, No. 5, January 1962, pp. 54-67.
Castellanos, Israel. Medicina legal y crlmlnologia Afrocubanas 
(Havana: Molina, 1937).
Castilla Mas, Belarmino. "Speech at the opening of the National 
Congress on Education", GWR, 9 May 1971, p. 2.
Castro, Fidel. "Discurso pronunciado el 28 de Septiembre de 1960", 
in Discursos de Fidel en los Aniversarios de los CDR, 1960-67 
(Havana: Instituto del Libro, 1968).
"Discurso pronunciado el 28 de Septiembre de 1961", in Discursos 
de Fidel en los Aniversarios de los CDR, 1960-67 (Havana: 
Instituto del Libro, 1968).
Sobre los Comitds de Defensa de la Revolucion (Havana: Ediciones 
Con la Guardia en Alto, 1964).
"Speech made at the presentation of the members of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba" (October 1965), in 
Fidel Castro, Major Speeches (London: Stage One, 1968), pp. 5-27.
Castro, Fidel. "Speech made at the May Day celebration, 1 May 1966", 
in Fidel Castro, Major Speeches (London: Stage One, 1968), pp. 
31-58. -
"Speech made at the ceremony marking the Sixth Anniversary of 
the CDRs, 28 September 1966", in Martin Kenner and James Petras 
(eds.), Fidel Castro Speaks (London: Allen Lane, 1970), pp. 293- 
■ ■ . 3 1 2 *
"Discurso pronunciado el 28 de Septiembre de 1967", in Discursos 
de Fidel en los Aniversarios de los CDR, 1960-67 (Havana:
Instituto del Libro, 1968).
Major Speeches (London: Stage One, 1968).
History Will Absolve Me (London: Cape, 1968),
"Speech at the University of Havana on the eleventh anniversary 
of the attack on the Presidential Palace, 13 March 1968", in 
Martin Kenner and James Petras (eds.), Fidel Castro Speaks (London: 
Allen Lane, 1970), pp. 329-405.
"Speech made at the inauguration of the Juan Manuel Marques semi­
boarding school in Boca de Joruco on 15 March 1968", in Fidel 
Castro, Major Speeches (London:Stage One, 1968), pp. 285-305.
"Speech at Santa Clara on 26 July 1968", in Martin Kenner and 
James Petras (eds.), Fidel Castro Speaks (London: Allen Lane,
1970), pp. 406-424.
"Discurso pronunciado en el acto conmemorativo del VIII Aniversario 
de los CDR, el 28 de Septiembre de 1968", Ediciones COR No. 18, 
Havana, 1968.
"Discurso pronunciado en el acto de graduacion de 455 alumnos 
del Curso 1967-68 de la Universidad de Oriente, diciembre 8 de 
1968", Granraa, 9 December 1968, pp. 2-3.
"Discurso pronunciado en la escalinata de la Universidad de la 
Habana, 13 de marzo de 1969", Granma, 14 March 1969, pp. 2-4.
"Speech at the mass rally in celebration of the 17th anniversary 
of the attack on the Moncada, on 26 July 1970", GWR, 2 August 
1970, pp. 2-6.
"Speech at the rally celebrating the 10th anniversary of the 
founding of the Federation of Cuban Women, on 23 August 1970",
GWR, 30 August 1970, pp. 2-6.
"Closing speech at the provincial meeting of the CTC for Havana,
2-3 September 1970", GWR, 20 September 1970, pp. 2-6.
"Speech at the rally to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the 
Committees for the Defence of the Revolution, on 28 September 
1970", GWR, 4 October 1970, pp. 2-4.
Castro, Fidel. "Speech at the closing session of the National Plenary 
Meeting of Basic Industry, on 7 December 1970", GWR, 20 December
1970, pp. 2-6.
"Speech at the inauguration of a junior high school in the 
countryside at Jaguey, Matansas on 25 April 1971", GWR, 2 May
1971, pp. 7-9.
"Speech at the closing of the First National Congress on Education 
and Culture", GWR, 9 May 1971, pp. 7-9.
"Speech in the rally to celebrate May Day on 1 May 1971", GWR,
16 May 1971, pp. 2-8..
"Speech of 6 June 1971 at the meeting to mark the X Anniversary 
of the creation of the Ministry of the Interior", GWR, 13 June 
1971, pp. 2-6. ;
"Speech at the rally to celebrate the 18th anniversary of the 
attack on the Koncada garrison, on 26 July 1971", GWR, 1 August 
1971, pp. 2-7.
"Speech at the rally to celebrate the 11th anniversary of the 
Committees for the Defence of the Revolution, on 28 September 
1971", GWR, 10 October 1971, pp. 2-5.
"Meeting between Major Fidel Castro and the students of the 
University of Concepcion, Chile, 18 November 1971", GWR, 28 
November 1971, pp. 12-14*
"Answers by Major Fidel Castro to questions by students at the 
State Technological University, Santiago, Chile, on 29 November 
1971", in Fidel in Chile (New York: International Publishers,
1972), pp. 186-198.
"Speech at the closing session of the 4th Congress of ANAP, on 
31 December 1971", GWR, 9 January 1972, pp. 2-4.
"Speech at the May Day parade and workers* rally on 1 May 1972", 
GWR, 7 May 1972, pp. 2-5.
’’Speech at the rally to celebrate the 12th anniversary of the 
Committees for the Defence of the Revolution, on 28 September 
1972", GWR, 8 October 1972, pp. 2-4.
"Speech at the viind-up of the International Workers* Day parade 
and mass rally on 1 May 1973", GWR, 13 May 1973, pp. 2-4.
Castro, Raul. "Speech of 29 and 30 January 1968 to the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba", in Stephen Clissold 
(ed.), Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1910-1968: A 
Documentary Survey (London: Oxford University Press and Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1970), pp. 294-302.
"Speech at the opening of the second meeting of Party organization 
in the Revolutionary Armed Forces, on 25 September 1970", GWR,
4 October 1970, p. 9.
CDR, Direccion Nacional. "Deberes de los Miembros de los CDR"
(carnet), Havana, 1968.
"Control de Organismos y Miembros, etapa 2 de enero al lro de 
Mayo", (mimeo), Havana, 15 May 1969.
"Celebraran en enero primer encuentro nacional de normacion y 
organizaciOn del trabajo", Granina, 23 November 1971, p. 4.
Chailloux Cardona, Juan M. Sintesis histories de la vivienda popular: 
Los horrores del solar habanero (Havana: Biblioteca de Historia, 
Filosofxa y Socioiogla, 1945).
Clecak, Peter. "Moral and Material Incentives", in Ralph Miliband 
and John Saville (eds.), The Socialist Register 1969 (London:
Merlin Press, 1969), pp. 101-135.
Clissold, Stephen (ed.) Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1918- 
1968: A Documentary Survey (London: Oxford University Press and 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1970).
Cloward, Richard A* and Ohlin, Lloyd E. Delinquency and Opportunity:
A Theory of Delinquent Gangs (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1961).
Clytus, John. Black Man in Red Cuba (Coral Gables, Fla.: University 
of Florida Press, 1970).
Comision Nacional de Prevencion Social, Material de Estudio para las 
Trabajadoras Sociales (Havana: Federacidn de Mujeres Cubanas,
1968).'
Coraites de Defensa de la Revolucion, Direccion Nacional. "Control 
de Organismos y Miembros, etapa 2 de enero al 1**° de Mayo"
(mimeo), Havana, 15 May 1969.
Comites de Defensa de la Revolucion, Direccion Provincial. La Habana. 
"Distincion 28 de Septiembre - Tareas a cumplir por un CDR 
urbano" (leaflet), Havana, 1969.
"Committees for the Defence of the Revolution: For a Healthy People",
GWR, 1 October 1972, p. 4.
"Committees for the Defence of the Revolution: 12 years, 12 months 
Check-up and Summary", GWR, 8 October 1972, pp. 10-11.
Compendio Estadijstico de Cuba, 1967 (Havana: JUCEPLAN, 1968).
Compendio Estad^stico de Cuba, 1968 (Havana: JUCEPLAN, n.d.)
"Conclusions of the Central Committee", GWR, 4 February 1968, p. 2.
Con la Guardia en Alto (Revista mensual, Organo de los Comite's de Defensa 
de la Revolucionf, Havana, 1962-.
Conquest, Robert. Justice and the Legal System in the USSR (London: 
Bodley Head/Soviet Studies Series, 1968).
"Creacion del instituto de etnologia y folklore", Actas del Folklore, 
year 1 9 Nos. 10-12, October-December 1961, pp. 33-35.
Crombet, Jaime. "Summary of the Report of the National Committee of 
the Young Communist League", GWR, 9 April 1972, pp. 2-3.
Cuba and the Rule of Lav? (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists
1962).
Cuba, Ministerio de Justicia, Direccion Nacional de los Tribunales 
Populares» Manual de los Tribunales Populares de Base, 
prologue by Bias Roca (Havana: Ministerio de Justicia, 1966).
Cuba, Oficina Nacional de los Censos Demografico y Electoral, Censos 
de Poblaclon^ Vivienda y Electoral, 1953, Informe General 
(Havana: Oficina de los Censos, 1953).
"Cuba: Revolution and the Intellectual - The Strange Case of Heberto 
Padilla", Index (London), Vol. 1, Ho. 2, Summer 1972, pp. 65-88, 
101-134.
Cuba, Santiago Los Tribunales Populares (Havana: Ministerio de 
Justicia, 1966).
Cuba Socialista, Havana, September 1961-February 1967.
"Cuestiones vitalesplanteadas por Fidel en los aniversarios de los 
CDR", Con la Guardia en Alto, year 7, No. 9, September 1968, 
pp. 34-39.
Curtin, Philip D. and Vansina, Jan. "Sources of the Nineteenth
Century Atlantic Slave Trade", Journal of African History, Vol. 
1964, pp. 185-208.
Davidson, Basil. Black Mother: Africa - The Years of Trial (Second 
edition, London: Gollancz, 1968).
Debray, Rdgis. Revolution dans la revolution? Lutte armee et 
lutte politique en amdrique latine (Paris: Maspero, 1967).
"Declaration by the First National Congress on Education and Culture" 
GWR, 9 May 1971, pp. 3-6.
Degler, Carl N. Neither Black Nor White: Slavery and Race Relations 
in Brazil and the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1971).
Depestre, Rend. "Carta de Cuba sobre el imperialismo de la mala fe" 
Casa de las Americas (Havana), No. 34, January-February 1966, 
reprinted in Rend Depestre, Por la Revolucidn, Por la Poesia 
(Havana: Instituto del Libro, 1969), pp. 71-130.
Deschamps Chappeaux, Pedro. "El Lenguaje Abaku^", Etnologia y 
Folklore, No. 4 (1967), pp. 39-47.
Diaz, Alberto Pedro. "Para iniciarse en la sociedad abakua", Actas 
del Folklore, year 1, No. 4, April 1961, pp. 17-20.
"Guanamaca, una comunidad haitiana", Etnologia y Folklore, No. 1 
(1966), pp. 25-39.
Dfas Fabelo, Teodoro. Olomm (Havana: Teatro Nacional de Cuba, 1961).
Discursos de Fidel en los Aniversarios de los CDR, 1960-67 (Havana: 
Instituto del Libro, 1968).
Dominguez, Jorge I. "Sectoral Clashes in Cuban Politics and
Development", Latin American Research Review, Vol. VI, No. 3,
Fall 1971, pp. 61-87.
Dorticos, Osvaldo. "Control economico y normacion: tareas de primer 
orden", Economia y Desarrollo,No. 11, May-June 1972, pp. 6-49.
"La Teorfa: instrumento indispensable de la prdctica 
revolucionaria", Economia y Desarrollo, No. 11, May-June 1972, 
pp. 5 0 - 6 8 . .
"Dos Frentes", Con la Guardia en Alto, year 8 , No. 3, March 1S69, p. 20.
Draper, Theodore. Castro’s Revolution; Myths and Realities (New York: 
Praeger, 1962).
Castroism: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1965).
Dumont, Rene. Cuba, Socialisrne et Ddveloppement (Paris: Editions 
du Seuil, 1964*).
Cuba: est-il soclaliste? (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1970).
Dyer, Donald R. "Urbanism in Cuba", Geographical Review, Vol. XLVII, 
April 1957, pp. 224-233.
Echarry, Alfredo, "Frente a una herencia del pasado", Juventud 
Rebelde, 16 August 1970, p. 6 .
Economia y Desarrollo (Publicacidn bimestral del Instituto de Economia 
de la Universidad de la Havana), Havana, September/October 1970-.
Elkins, Stanley H. Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and 
Intellectual Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959).
El Militante Comunista (Comision de Orientacion Revolucionaria del 
Partido Comunista de Cuba), Havana.
El Pueblo Pregunta sobre los CDR (Havana: Instituto del Libro, 1969).
"En Cuba - Un 28 de Septiembre", Bohemia, year 61, No. 39, 26 September 
1969, pp. 50-52.
"En el Septimo Aniversario" (editorial), Con la Guardia en Alto, 
year 6 , No. 9, September 1967, p. 3.
Enero, Baltasar. "Un invento cubano", in Pueblo Organisado (Havana: 
Ediciones Con la Guardia en Alto, 1965), pp. 11-17.
Ensensberger, Hans Magnus. "Portrait of a Party: Background, Structure 
and Ideology of the PCC", International Socialism, No. 44, July- 
August 1970, pp. 11-19.
Escalante, Cesar. "Los Comites de Defense de la Revolucion", Cuba 
Socialista,. year 1, Ho. 1» September 1961.
"Establece la CTC Normas para celebracion de elecciones en todas 
las secciones sindicales", Granina, 16 November 1971, p. 6 .
Etnologia y Folklore (Academia de Ciencias de Cuba), Havana, 1966-.
"Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers Established", GWR,
3 December 1972, p. 2.
Fagen, Richard.R. . "Charismatic Authority and the Leadership of 
Fidel Castro", Western.Political Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2,
June 1965, pp. 275-284.
"Mass Mobilisation in Cuba: The Symbolism of Struggle", 
International Affairs, Vol. XX, 1966, No. 2, pp. 254-271.
The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1969).
"A Perspective on the Transformation of Political Culture in 
Cuba", in Stefan A. Halper and John R. Sterling (eds.), Latin 
America: The Dynamics of Social Change (London: Allison and 
Busby, 1972), pp. 187-219.
Fagen, Richard R., Brody, Richard A. and O’Leary, Thomas J. Cubans in 
Exile: Disaffection and the Revolution (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1968).
Fermoselle-Lopez, Rafael. "Black Politics in Cuba: The Race War
of 1912" (Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, Washington, 
D.C*, 1972).
"The Blacks in Cuba: A Bibliography", Caribbean Studies, Vol. 12, 
No. 3, October 1972, pp. 103-112.
Fernandesi Florestan. "The Weight of the Past", in John Hope Franklin 
(ed.), Color and Race (New York: American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, 1968), pp. 282-301.
"Immigration and Race Relations in Sao Paulo", in Magnus Morner 
(ed.), Race and Class in Latin America (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1970), pp. 122-142.
Fernandes R., Carlos. "El XII Congreso de Ta Centred, de Trabajadores 
de Cuba", Cuba Socialista, year 6 , No, 62, October 1966.
Fern^ndez-Santos, Francisco and Martinez, Jose (eds.), Cuba: una 
revolucidn en marcha (Paris: Ruedo Iberico, 1967).
Fidel in Chile (New York: International Publishers, 1972).
"Final Declaration of the 2nd National Congress of the Young Communist 
League", GWR, 23 April 1972, pp..7-9.;.:
Foner, Philip S. A History of Cuba and Its Relations with the 
United States (2 vols., New York: International Publishers, 
1962-63).
Forde, Daryll (ed.), Ef.ik Traders of Old Calabar (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1956).
Foreign Policy Association. Problems of the New Cuba (New York:
Foreign Policy Association, 1935).
Franco, Jose Luciano* La presencia negra en el Huevo Mundo (Havana: 
Casa de las Americas, 1958).
"Frente a ocho ahos de calumnias ocho anos de trabajo creadorIr,
Con la Guardia en Alto, year 7, No. 9, September 1968, pp. 5-9.
Funciones del Nuevo Admlnistrador Popular (Havana: Direccion Nacional 
do los CDR, 1968).
Garcf a Alonso, Aida. Hanuela de Hexlcana (Havana: Casa de las 
Americas, 1968).
Garriga, Rafael. "La lucha contra cl delito", Juventud Rebelde,
22 May 1969, p. 2. .
Gerassl, John (ed.) Veneeremos? The Speeches and Writings of
Ernesto Che Guevara (London: I7eidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968).
Gillin, John P. "Some Signposts for Policy", in Council on Foreign 
Relations, Social Change in Latin America Today (New York:
Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 14-62.
Gilly, Adolfo. "Inside the Cuban Revolution", Monthly Review, Vol. 16, 
No. 6 , October 1964; reprinted as Inside the Cuban Revolution 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964).
Goldenberg, Boris. The Cuban Revolution and Latin America (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1965).
Gonzales, Edward. "Castro’s Revolution, Cuban Communist Appeals,and 
the Soviet Response", World Politics, Vol. XXI, No. 1, October 
1968, pp. 39-68.
"Relationship with the Soviet Union", in Carmelo Mesa-Lago (ed), 
Revolutionary Change in Cuba (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1971), pp, 81-104.
Gonzalez Huguet, Lydia and Baudry, Jean Rene. "Voces ’Bantus’ en el 
vocabulario ’Palero*", Etnologia y Folklore, No. 3 (1967), pp. 
31-64.
Granados, Manuel. Adire y el ticmpo roto (Havana: Casa de las 
Americas, 1967).
Granma (Organo oficial del Comitd Central del Partido Comunista de 
Cuba), Havana, October 1965-.
Granma Weekly Review (Official Organ of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Cuba)# Havana, 1966-. (Cited as GWR.)
Green, Gil. Revolution Cuban Style: Impressions of a Recent Visit
(New York: International Publishers, 1970).
Guevara, Ernesto ’Che*. "L’exemple cubain: cae exceptionnel, ou 
avant-garde de la lutte contre l’imperialisme", in Ernesto 
Che Guevara, La guerre de gudrilla (Paris: Haspero, 1967), pp. 
187-203.
Guma, Jose Gabriel. "Unification of the Judicial System", GWR,
5 September 1971, p. 8 .
"Committees for the Defence of the Revolution Give Vigorous 
Support to Construction Work", GWR, 24 September 1972, pp. 4-5.
Gutelman, Michel. L 1 agriculture socialist a Cuba: enseignements et 
perspectives (Paris: Maspero, 1967).
Hall, Gwendolyn H. Social Control in Slave Plantation Societies:
A Comparison of St. Domingue and Cuba (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
Press, 1971).
Harris, Marvin. Patterns of Race in the Americas (Hew York: Walker 
and Co., 1964).
Hart, Armando. "Speech at the graduation ceremony for the 1963-69 
course of the Department of Political Science in the University 
of Havana’s School of Humanities", GWR, 5 October 1969, pp. 4-6.
Hauser, Philip (ed.), Urbanization in Latin America (Paris: UNESCO, 
1961).
Hemdndes, Roberto E. and Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. "Labor Organization 
and Wages", in Carmelo Mesa-Lago (ed.). Revolutionary Change in 
Cuba (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), pp. 
209-249.
Hernandez Pardo, Hector. "Elba Seven Hours after her Election",
GWR, 19 July 1970, p. 4.
Herskovits, Melville J. "African Gods and Catholic Saints in New 
World Negro Belief", American Anthropologist, Vol. 39, 1937,
No. 4, pp. 635-43.
The Myth of the Negro Past (Revised edition, Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1958).
Herskovits, Melville J. and Herskovits, F.S. Trinidad Village 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947).
Hierro, Juan. "Maratones de Propaganda", Con la Guardia en A3.to, 
year 6 , Ho. 8 , August 1967, pp. 20-21.
Hoetink, H. The Two Variants in Caribbean Race Relations: A
Contribution to the Sociology of Segmented Societies (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1967). .
Horowitz, Irving Louis (ed.), Cuban Communism (Hew York: Transaction, 
1970).
Horowitz, Irving Louis. "The Political Sociology of Cuban Communism", 
in Carmelo Mesa-Lago (ed.). Revolutionary Change in Cuba 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), pp. 127-141.
Huberman, Leo and Sweezy, Paul M. Socialism in Cuba (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1969).
Jeness, Linda. Women and the Cuban Revolution (New York: Pathfinder 
Press, 1970). -
Joshua, Isy. Organisation et rapports de production dans une " 
dconomie de transition (Cuba) (Paris: Centre d 1 fltudes de 
Planification Socialists,'1968).
Jover•Marimdn, Mateo.: "The Church", in Carmelo Mesa-Lago (ed. ) 5
Revolutionary Change in Cuba (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1971), pp. 399-426.
JUCEPLAN, Direccion General deEstadistica, Resumen de estadisticas 
de poblacidn. No. 1 (Havana: JUCEPLAN, 1965). ::
Juventud Rebelde, Havana, October 1965-.
Kahl, Joseph A. "The Moral Economy of a Revolutionary Society", in 
Irving Louis Horowitz (ed.), Cuban Communism (New York:
Transaction, 1970). pp. 95-115.
Karol, K.S. Guerrillas in Power: The Course of the Cuban Revolution 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1971).
Kenner, Martin and Petras, James (eds.) Fidel Castro Speaks (London: 
Allen Lane, 1970).
Klein, Herbert . S. Slavery in the Americas: A Comparative Stud.y of 
Virginia and Cuba (London: Or^ford University Press, 1967).
Knight, Franklin W. Slave Society in Cuba During the Nineteenth 
Century (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970).
"Cuba", in David W. Cohen and Jack P. Greene (eds.), Neither 
Slave Nor Free: The Freedman of African Descent in the Slave 
Societies of the New World (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1972), pp. 278-308. - ^ .
Lachatanere, Rdraulo. Oh mio Ycmaya (Manzanillo, Cuba: EL Arte, 1938).
"El Sistema Religioso de los Lucumi^s y otras influencias k
africanas en Cuba", Estudios Afrocubanos, Vols. Ill, IV and V 
(1939, 1940 and 1945-46), reprinted in Actas del folklore, year T, 
No. 2, February 1961, pp. 3-10; No. 5, May 1961, pp. 11-15;- No.
6 , June 1961, pp. 3-8; and No. 7, July 1961, pp. 9-2 0 .
Manual de Santeria: el sistema de cultos ’Lucumis1 (Havana:
Caribc, 1942).
"Rangoc Eantus en la Santeria", Viernes (Havana, 30 September 1950, 
reprinted in Actas del Folklore, year 1, No. 8 , August 1961,
.p p - 3-5.. ■ . ~
La Habana, Municipio de. (ed.) Las compar&as populares del carnaval 
habanero: cuestion resuelta (Havana: Molina, 1937).
”La Nacionalinacion de los Establecimientos Privados en la Ofensiva 
Revolucionaria”, El Hilltantc- Comunista, special number,
: June 1968,
"La Ofensiva Revolucionaria”, Con la Guardia en Alto, year 8 , No. 3, 
Harch 1969, pp. *4-9.
”Las Trabajadoras Soclales”, £1 Hilitante Comunista, February 1969. 
pp. 85-87.
Lateste, Albain. Cuba, hacia una nueva economia politlea del socialising? 
(Santiago de Chile: Editorial del Pacifico, 1968).
Latham, A.J.H. Old Calabar, 1600-1891 (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1973).
Leng, Shao-chuan. Justice in Communist China: A Survey of the
Judicial System of the Chinese Peoplefs Republic (Dobbs Ferry,
N.Y.: Oceana Publications for Duke University Rule of Law
Research Center, 1967).
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. Selected Works: A One-Volume Selection
(London: Lav?rence and Wishart, 1969).
Leon, Argeliers. ”La expresi<£n del pueblo en el TNC”, Actas del 
Folklore, year 1, No. 1, January 1961, pp, 5-7.
”E1 Instituto de Ethologifa y Folklore de la Academia de Ciencias”, 
Etnologia y Folklore, No. 1 (1966), pp. 5-16.
’’Presencia del AFrieano en la culture, cubana” (mimeo, Havana; 
Instituto de Etnologia y Folklore, 1969),
sica popular de origen africano en America Latina”, America 
Indigena. Vol. XXIX, No. 3, July 1969, pp. 627-86*4,
Ledh PJrez, Halevy. ”Bibliografia sobre el Negro en Cuba”,
Publicaciones del Centro de Estudios Africanistas (Havana:
Instituto de Etnologfa y Folklore), Sdirie III, No. 1, September 
•1966.
"Lewis, Gordon K. Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean 
(Shortened editi-on, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968).
Lewis, Oscar. La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of
Poverty - San Juan and New York (London: Panther Books, 1968).
Leyva, Ricardo. ‘’Health and Revolution in Cuba”, in Rolando E.
Eonachea and Nelson P. Valdes (eds.), Cuba in Revolution (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1972), pp. *456-*499.
Li, Victor H. ”The Evolution and Development of the Chinese Legal 
System”, in John M.H. Lindbeck (ed.), China: Management of a 
Revolutionary Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1971; London: Allen and Unwin, 1972), pp. 221-255.
Lockwood, Lee. Castro*s Cuba, Cuba’s Fidel (New York: Random House, 
1967; Vintage Books, 1969).
Loney, Kartin•' "Social Control in Cuba", in Ian Taylor and Laurie 
Taylor (eds.) 5 Politics and Deviance (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1973), pp. *42-60.”  ‘
Lc>pes Valdcis, Rafael L. "La Sociedad Secreta 1 Abacua’ cn un Grupo 
de Obreros Portuarios", Etnologia y Folklore, No. 2 (1966), pp.
; '5-26.; ■
Los CDR en Granjas y Zonas Rurales (Havana: Ediciones Con la Guardia 
en Altos 1965). , \\
Los CDR y la Ofensiva Revolucionaria (Havana: Direccion Nacional de 
los CDR, -1968).
"Lucha a muerte contra la delincuencia", Granma, 21 April 1969, p. 2.
MacGaffey, Wyatt and Barnett, Clifford R , Twentieth Century Cuba 
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1965); previously
• •published as Cuba (Mew Haven, Conn.: I1RAF Press, 1962).
Maitan, Livio. "A Crucial Stage for the Cuban Revolution",
Intercontinental Press. Vol. 8, No. *40, 30 November 1970, pp.
■Vr 10*41-10*46, ■ :
Mandelj Ernest, "Le grand ddbat economique", Partisans, April-June
■■•. IS67. , , ■ ■ • ~ \,
Hangin, William. "Latin American Squatter Settlements:: A Problem
and a Solution", Latin American Research Review, Vol. 2, Ho. 3, 
Spring 1967, pp. 65-98.
Martinez-Alier, Juan. "Debate sobre la gesticin socialista en Cuba - 
Par£ntesisu» in Francisco Ferndndes-Santos and Jose Martinez 
( e d s . Cuba: una revolucidn en marcha (Paris: Ruedo Iberico, 1967) 
pp. 237-2*40.
"The Peasantry and the Cuban Revolution From the Spring of 1959 
to the end of I960", in Raymond Carr (ed.), Latin American Affairs 
(St. Anthony’s Papers, No. 2, 1970), pp. 137-157.
Hartinez-Alier „ Ve-rcna. "Color , clase y matrimonio en Cuba en el 
Siglo XIXP, Revista de la Biblioteca Nacional "Jose Marti"
(Havana), Vol. X, No. 2, Hay-August 1968, pp. *47-112.
"Elopement and Seduction in Nineteenth Century Cuba", Past and 
Present, No. 55, Hay 1972, pp. 91-129.
Martinez E., Alberto. "El Plan de la Economdfa Nacional para 196*4",
Cuba Socialista, year *4, Mo. 31, March 196*4, pp. 1-22.
Mas Revolucidn en la Educacion (Havana: Direccion Nacional de los CDR,
■ ~1968)~ ~ ~
Matar, Josd. "Dos anos de experiencia de los Comites de Defensa de 
la Revolucidn", Cuba Socialista, year 2, No. 15, November 1962.
Matas, Julio. "Theater and Cinematography", in Carmelo Hesa-Lago (ed.) 
Revolutionary Change in Cuba (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1971), pp. *427-*4*45.
Material de E3tudio para los CIR, Nos. 1-5 (Havana: Ediciones Con 
la Guardia en Alto, 1962-65).
Matthews, Herbert L. Castro: A Political Biography (London: Allen
. . Lane, 1969). ' "
.■■'.’’Meeting-’between Major Fidel Castro and the leaders of the Central 
Organisation of Workers (CUT) in Santiago, Chile, 23 November 
1971”, GWR, 5 December 1971, pp. 12-1*4. V
Mendez Capote, Rende. Memories de una Cubanita q ue Nac i o con el 
siglo ■ (Havana; Ediciones Union, 196*4).
Merkx, Gilbert W. and Valdds, Nelson P. "Revolution9. Consciousness 
and Class:. Cuba and Argentina”, in Rolando E.VBonachea and 
Nelson P. Valdes (eds.), Cuba in Revolution (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1972), pp. 82-112. :
Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure (Revised 
edition, Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 19571!
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. The Labor Sector and Socialist Distribution in
Cuba (New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1968).
"Availability and Reliability of Statistics in Socialist Cuba”,
Latin American Research Review, Vol. IV, Ho. 1, Spring. 1969, 
pp. 53-91 (Part I), and No. 2, Summer 1969, pp. *47-81 (Part II).
"Ideological Radicalization and Economic Policy in Cuba”,
Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 5, No. 10 
(Original Series: 060), 1969-70, pp. 203-216.
"The Revolutionary Offensive", in Irving Louis Horowitz (ed.),
Cuban Communism (New York: Transaction, 1970), pp. 73-93.
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo (ed.) Revolutionary Change in Cuba (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971).
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. "Economic Policies and Growth”, in Carmelo Mesa-Lago 
(ed. ), Revolutionary Change in Cuba (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1971), pp. 277-338.
"Present and Future of the Revolution", in Carmelo Mesa-Lago (ed.), 
Revolutionary Change in Cuba (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1971), pp. 501-525.
"Ideological, Political and Economic Factors in the Cuban 
Controversy on Material Versus Moral Incentives", Journal of 
Interamerican Studies, Vol. 1*4, No. 1, February 1972, pp. *49-111.
Mints, Sidney W. "Groups, Group Boundaries and the Perception of 
’Race*" (review article on H.; Hootink", The Two Variants in 
Caribbean Race Relations), Comparative Studies in Society and History 
Vol. 13, 1971, pp. *437-1450.'"' ' ” * ~ ; \
Montane, JesiTs. "Speech at the National Plenary Meeting on Labour 
Justice, on 11 January 1972", GWR, 23 January 1972, pp. 10-11.
Montcro de Bascom, Berta. "Influencias africanas en la Culture
cubana”,' Clenclas Sociales (New York: Panamerican Union), Vol.
V, No. 27, June 195*4, reprinted as Publicaciones del Centro de 
Estudios Africanistas (Havana: Instituto de Etnologia y Folklore),
sirie V, No, 1, Hoverobef 1966.
More, Carlos. "Le peuple noir a-t-il sa place dans la revolution 
cubaine?". Presence Africaine, No. 52,'196*19- pp. 177-230.
Moreno, Francisco Josd. "Justice and Law in Latin America: a Cuban 
example", Journal of Interamerican Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, July 
1970, pp. 367-378.
Moreno, Jose A. "From Traditional to Modern Values”, in Carmelo Mesa- 
Lago (ed. ) 5 Revolutionary Change in Cuba (Pittsburgh: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), pp. *471-*l97.
Moreno A, Fraginals, Manuel. El Ingenio: El complejo econcfmico social 
cubano del asucar (Havana: Comisidh Nacional Cubana de la UNESCO, 
196*4). ■ ~ ■■
Morse, Pvichard II. "Trends and Issues in Latin American Urban Research, 
1965-1970 (Part II)", Latin American Research Review, Vol. VI,
No. 2, Summer 1971, pp. 19-75.
Morton-Uilliams, Peter. "The Yoruba Kingdom of Oyo", in Daryll Forde 
and P.M. Kabcrry (eds.), West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth 
Century (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 36-69.
Nelson, Lowry. "Cuban Population Estimates, 1953-70", Journal of 
Inter-American Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, July 1970, pp. 392-*400.
Cuba: The Measure of a Revolution (Mew York: Oxford University 
Press, 1972).
"Nociones.. de. _.CriminologiaM, . in Comisidn Nacional de Prcvencion 
Social, Material de Estudio para las Trabajadoras Sociales 
(Havana: Federaeidn de Mujcres Cubanas, 1968). .
Nuestra Lucha por la Pas, preface by Juan Marinello (Havana: Ediciones 
Con la Guardia en Alto, 1963).
O’Connor, James. The Origins of Socialism in Cuba (Ithaca, H.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1970).
Ortiz, Fernando. El hanpa afrocubano: Los Negros Brujos (apuntes 
para un estudio de etnologia criminal) (Madrid: F. Fe, 1906").
El hampa afrocubano: Los Negros Esclavos (estudio soclologico y 
de derecho pdblico (Madrid: F, Fo, 1916).
"Los cabildos afrocubanos", Revista Bimestre Cubana., Vol. XVI,
1921, No. 1, pp. 5-39.
Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar, translated from the Spanish 
by Harriet de Onis; Introduction by Bronislaw Malinowski (New York 
Alfred A. Knopf, 19*47).
Africania de la musica folklorica de Cuba (Havana, 1950; second 
edition, Havana: Editorial Universitaria, 1965).
Ortiz:, Fernando. Los bailee y el teatro do los Negros en el Folklore 
do Cuba (Havana: Ministerio de EducacitiSn, 195i).
Los Instruraentos de la Hilsica Afro-Cubana, 5 vols. (Havana: 
Ministerio de Educacion, 1952-55),
Oxaal, Ivar. Race and Revolutionary Consciousness: A Documentary
Interpretation of the 1970 Black Power Revolt in Trinidad 
.^ (Cambridge,' Mass,: Schenkman. 1971).
Parede.s, Ain^ r ico. “Estados Unidos, Mdkico y el Machismo”, Journal of 
Interamerlcan Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, January 1987* pp. 65-8*1.
Paulstony Holland G. “Education”, in Carmelo Kesa-Lago (ed,).
Revolutionary Change in Cuba (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1971f, pp. 375-397. . :
P^rez de la Riva, Juan. Cuadro sindptico de la esclavitud en Cuba 
y de la cultura occidental (Havana , Suplemento de la Revista 
Actas del Folklore, May 1961).
“La population de Cuba et ses probl&nes”, Population (Paris),
Vol. 22, 1967, No. 1, pp. 99-110. ' T'
Petras, James. ’’Socialism in One Island? A Decade of Cuban
Revolutionary Government”, Politics and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2, 
February 1971, pp. 203-224* - ,•
“Has the Cuban Revolution Failed?”, Science and Society, Vol.
36, No. 1, Spring 1872, pp. 86-90.
Plank, John (ed.), Cuba and the United States: Long-Range Perspectives 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967).
Podg^recki, Adam. “Attitudes to the Worker*s Courts” (Poland), in 
Vilhelm Aubcrt (ed.), Sociology of Law (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1969), pp. 142-149.
“Political Bureau resolves that the people discuss proposed laws
drawn up by Commissions for Juridical Studies”, GNR, 10 December 
■ 1972, p. 3.
“Preliminary Data, Census on Housing and Population”, GWR, 10 January 
, 1 9 7 1 ,  pp. 8-9.
“Program Manifesto of the 26th July Movement”, in Rolando E.Bonachea
and Nelson P. Valdes (eds,), Cuba in Revolution (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1972), pp. 113-140.
Pueblo Organizado (Havana: Ediciones Con la Guardia en Alto, 1965).
Pupo Pdres, Pedro et al. “Report on Internal Order”, GUR, 11 May 
1969, pp. 7-10.
Ratliff, William E. (ed.). Yearbook on Latin American Communist Affairs 
1971 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971).
Reckord, Barry. Does Fidel Eat More than Your Father? (New York:
Signet Books, 1971).
Regalado, Aritpro. "Cinco anos do vida do la ANAP" 5 Cuba Socialista,
'■year 6 , Ho. 57, Hay 1966.
Ring, Harry. How Cuba Uprooted Race Discrimination (New York: Merit 
Publishers, 1961; second expanded edition, 1969),
Risquet, Jorge. “Speech at the closing session of the national 
Plenary on Labor Justice”. GWR, 17 August 1969, p. 2.
"Speech at the provincial meeting of. the CTC for Havana, 2-3 :
September 197049 GWR, 20 September 1970, pp. 10-12.
"Speech at the closing session of the 6th National Council of the 
CTC", GWR, 24 October 1971, pp. 4-5.
Roca, Bias. Los Fundamentos del Socialismo en Cuba (Havana; first 
edition, 1943; Ediciones Populares, 1959 and 1961).
Roche Honteagudo, Rafael. La Pollciaysus misterios en Cuba 
(Havana: La Prueba, 1908TT ^ :
Rodman, Hyman. Lower-Class Families: The Culture o f Poverty in 
Negro Trinidad (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).
Rodriguez, Basilio. "La politica laboral del gohierno revolucionario", 
Cuba Socialista, year 6 , No. 62, October 1966. ;
Rodriguez, Carlos Rafael. "The Cuban Revolution and the Feasantry",
World Marxist Review, Vol. VI11 , October 1965, pp♦ 62-71.
Rodriguez, Eaimundo. "The Poor and the Revolution", GWR,:29 April
1973, p. 8 . ■
Rogler, Charles. "Some Situational. Aspects of Race Relations in 
Puerto Rico", Social Forces, Vol. 27, 1949, pp. 72-77.
Rogler, Lloyd H. "Slum Neighbourhoods in Latin America",,Journal of_
. Interamerican Studies, Vol. S, No. 4, October 1967, pp. 507-528.
Rogler, Lloyd H* and Hollingshead, A.B. "The Puerto Rican Spiritualist 
as a Psychiatrist", American Journal of Sociology, Vol.67» 1961, 
y pp. 17-21. '
Trapped: Families and Schizophrenia (New York: Wiley, 1965).
Ruiz, Ramo'h E. Cuba: The Making of a Revolution (Amherst, Mass.:
University of.Massachusetts Press, 1968).
Saavedra y Gdrnez, Leonor. La Delincuencia Infantil en Cuba: sus causas 
(Havana: Editorial Lex, 1945).
Saenz, Jose Manuel. "Las comparsas: su trayectoria histories",
Muevos Rumbos (Havana), Vol. II, No. 3, March/April 1947, reprinted 
Actas del Folklore, year 1, No. 4, April 1961, pp. 21-25.
Saladrigas, Rene. "Criterion para una reestructuraci<£n politico-
administrativa de Cuba", Cuba Socialista, year 3S No. 17, January 1963.
Salkey, Andrew. Havana Journal (Harmondsvrorth: Penguin Books , 1971) .
"Santeria", El Militante Comunista, October 1968, pp. 82-90.
Santis, Sergio de. "Debate sobre la gestion socialista en Cuba", 
in Francisco Fernandez-Santoe and Jose Martinez (eds.),
Cuba: una rcvolucidh en marcha (Paris: Ruedo Jberico, 1967), pp. 
209-236. ~ —  (
Scheer, Robert and Reitlin, Maurice. Cuba: An American Tragedy 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964),
Semidei, Hanuela* Les ftats Unis et la reVolution cubaine (Paris: 
Cahiers de la Fondation Rationale des Sciences Politiques, 116, 
1968).
Sergio, Gil Bias. "La Escuela de cuadros de los CDR", in Pueblo 
Organizado (Havana: Ediciones Con la Guardia en Alto, 1965),
-■ . pp. 2*9-3sT
"Un Comite Constructor"^ in ibid., pp. 65-74.
"Siete ailos con la guardia en alto", Con la Guardia en Alto, year 6 ,
No. 9, September 1967, pp. 5-15.
Simpson, George E. "Afro-American Religions and Religious Behaviour", 
Caribbean Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, July 1972, pp. 5-30.
Simpson, George E. and Hammond, Peter B. "Discussion":(on "The
African Heritage in the Caribbean" by M.G. Smith), in Vera Rubin 
(ed.), Caribbean Studies: A Symposium (Second edition, Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1960), pp. 46-53.
Smith, M.G, "The African Heritage in the Caribbean", in Vera Rubin 
(ed.), Caribbean Studies: A Symposium (Second edition, Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1960), pp. 34-46.
"Introduction", in Edith Clarke, Uy Mother Who Fathered He: A
Study of the Family in Three Selected Communities in Jamaica 
(Second edition, London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp. i~xliv.
Smith, Raymond T. "Culture and Social Structure in the Caribbean:
Some recent work on Family and Kinship Studies", Comparative Studies 
in Society and History, Vol. 6 , 1963, No. 1, pp. 24-46*
Smith, Robert F. (ed.), Background to Revolution: The Development of 
Modern Cuba (New York: Alfred 7i. Knopf, 1966).
Smith, Robert S, The Kingdoms of the Yoruba (London: Methuen, 1969).
"Social Workers: Working for the Future against the Past", GWR,
29 August 1971, p. 8 .
Suarez, Andre's. Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966 (Cambridge, 
Hass.: MIT Press, 1967).
"Leadership, Ideology, and Political Party", in Carmelo Kesa-Lago 
(ed.), REvolutionary Change in Cuba (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1971), pp. 3-21.
Sutherland, Elizabeth. The Youngest Revolution: _A Personal Report 
on Cuba (Mew York: Dial Press,.1969; London: Pitrnan. 1970).
Tannenbaum, Frank. Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas 
(Hew York: Alfred 7i. Knopf, 1946).
The Second Declaration of Havana, with the First declaration of Havana 
/ (Hew York: Pathfinder Press,.1962). •
•Thomas, Hugh., "Middle Class Politics and the Cuban Revolution", in 
Claudio Veliz (ed.), The Politics of Conformity in Latin A.merica 
.;(London:•Oxford: University Press and Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1967), pp. 24S-277.
■ Cuba; Or the Pursuit of Freedom (London: Eyre and Snottxswoode, .
' .1971)..; “ -.T-- 7  .
Torres, Simon and Aronde, Julio. "Debray and the Cuban Experience", 
in Leo Iluberman and Paul H. Sweezy (eds.), Regis' Debray .and the 
Latin American Revolution (Hew York: Monthly Review Press, 1968),
• pp. 44-69.:
Tut inO;,. Saver d o. L’octobre cubain (Paris: Maspero, 1869). :
Valdes, Nelson P. "Labor and Revolution: Introduction", in Rolando E. 
Bonachea end Nelson P. Valdes (eds»), Cuba in Revolut ion (Garden 
City, H.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1972)7" ppT. 357-383.
"The Radical Transformation of Cuban Education", in Rolando E. 
Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdes (eds.), Cuba in -Revolution (Garden 
City, !I.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1972)5 pp. 422-455. . .
Valentine, Charles A. Culture and Poverty: Critique and Counter­
proposals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press7l968).
Valier, J a c q u e s . L ’^ conomie Cubaine: quelques problemes-essentials 
de son fonctionnement", Les Temps Modernes, Vol. 23, Ho. 262,
March 1968, pp. 1590-1649..™,
"Cuba 1968-1971: le developpement des deformations bureaucratiques 
et des difficultes dconomiques", Critiques de 1 *dconomie politique, 
Ho. 6 , January-March 1972, pp. 112-141,
Valle, Sergio del. "Speech at the closing session of the First 
national Forum of the Deputy Ministry of Internal Order", GWR,
6 April 1969, pp. 4-5.
"Vigilemcia Revolucionaria: Tarea No, 1 de los CDR", Con la Guardia
en Alto, year 7, No. 12, December 1968, pp. 8-9. -
Waglcy, Charles. "On the Concept of Social Race in the Americas",
Actas del 33 Congrcso Internacional de Anericanistas, Vol. 1,
7San Josd, Costa Rica: Lehmann, 1959), pp. 403-417; reprinted 
in Dwight B. Heath and Richard N. Adams (eds.), Contemporary 
Cultures and Societies, of Latin America (New York: Random Houso, 
1965), pp. 531-545. ~
"Plantation America: A Culture Sphere", in Vera Rubin (ed.),
Caribbean Studies: A symposium (Second edition, Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, I960), pp. 3-13.
Whittenj Norman E., Jr., and Sswed, John F. "Introduction", in 
North.E./Whitten Jr. and John F. Szwed (eds. ) 9 Afro-American 
Anthropology: Contemporary Perspectives (New York: The Free 
Press, 1970), pp. 23-60.
Woody Dennis B. "Las relaciones revolucionarias de clase y los
conflictos politicos en Cuba: 1868-1968", Revista Latinoamericana 
de Sociologia, Vol. V, No. 1, March 1969, pp. 40-79.
"The Long Devolution: Class Relations and Political Conflict in 
Cuba, 1868-1968", Science and Society, Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring 
1970, pp. 1-41. --
Worsley, Peter. "Frants Fanon and the ’Lumpenproletariat1", in
Ralph Miliband and John Seville (eds.), The Socialist Register 
1972 (London: Merlin Press, 1972), pp. 193-230.
Yglesias, Josd. In the Fist of the Revolution: Life in a Cuban 
Country Town (Hew York: Pantheon Books, 1968).
Zeitlin, Maurice. Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class 
(Princteon, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967; second 
expanded edition, Hew York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970).
"Cuba's Workers, Workers1 Cuba, 1969", in Maurice Zeitlin, 
Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class (Second edition, 
New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970), pp. vii-lii.
"Cuba - Revolution without a Blueprint", in Irving Louis Horowitz 
(ed.), Cuban Communism (New York: Transaction, 1970), pp. 117- 
. 129.
